





























WEAK NERVES IN CHINA: 



















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in East Asian Languages and Cultures 
in the Graduate College of the  










 Professor Robert Tierney, Chair 
 Associate Professor Alexander Mayer 
 Associate Professor Michael Kral 
Assistant Professor Roderick Wilson 
Assistant Professor Jeffery Martin 







 Although shenjing shuairuo (SJSR) has remained a salient clinical and cultural concept in 
China since the first decade of the twentieth century, in 1980 neurasthenia was removed from the 
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. This 
roughly coincided with the opening of China after Nixon’s famous visit, and for the first time in 
many years, Western academics were welcomed back into China to research and collaborate. 
Several publications arising from one such collaboration sparked what has become known as the 
neurasthenia-depression controversy and initiated a paradigm in cultural psychiatry termed the 
new cross-cultural psychiatry (NCCP). Almost without exception, research on SJSR has cited and 
relied upon the perspective and interpretation of writers situated within the paradigm of NCCP. 
Unfortunately, there has been no effort in the literature to make a comprehensive criticism of the 
predominant views of SJSR as they have been propagated over the past 40 years through NCCP 
writings. In this dissertation, I undertake this effort by first addressing the origins of neurasthenia 
in the West and then making a study of how SJSR came to be a salient category in China. After 
establishing this background, I attempt a comprehensive exegesis of the hegemonic efforts of 
Western psychiatry to frame SJSR within the NCCP and the responses of Chinese scholars to those 
efforts. In addition, I develop an explanation for how psychiatric distress can vary across cultures. 
I argue that culturally salient categories are conformed to consciously or unconsciously through a 
process of belief and expectation, and that codified experiences can be translated from the mind to 
the body and back again. I maintain that neurasthenia arose as a diagnostic category in the context 
of a long historical discourse of “nerves” and “nervousness,” but that SJSR became a salient 
conceptual category in the absence of any such historical discourse. As such, it became a 
temporally, geographically, and culturally specific mode of manifesting human distress and inner 
perturbation. SJSR will continue to defy attempts at reductionistic redefinition under the influence 
of American psychiatry, as it (and categories like it) serves an important function in capturing 
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    Chapter 1: Introduction 
“Our golden arches do not represent our most troubling impact on other cultures; rather, it is how we 
are flattening the landscape of the human psyche itself. We are the engaged in the grand project of 
Americanizing the world’s understanding of the human mind”.1 
 
In 1980 the American Psychiatric Association (APA) published the third edition of its 
clinical manual, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III).2 One of 
the many changes that made up the new version of the manual was the removal of the clinical 
category neurasthenia (nerve debility/nervous exhaustion), which had been a globally recognized 
disease category for over one hundred years. Both China and Japan had traditionally employed the 
category in their respective neuropsychiatric nosologies, but after 1980, Japan followed the United 
States and also abandoned shinkei suijyaku ( り ) for having no validity as a disease 
concept.3 While in both the USA and Japan, the category has been subsumed under other clinical 
“entities”, the Chinese language equivalent, shenjing shuairuo is still a debated category that can 
be found on China’s public health websites, in its professional neurology and psychiatric literature, 
and in its diagnostic manual, CCMD-3 (Chinese Classification of Mental Disorders Version 3).4 
Physicians in China (and the Indian subcontinent) have continued to make use of the category, 
though drastically less so, and it has wide popularity as a health concern among laypeople within 
China. Neurasthenia has also been retained in the World Health Organization’s publications of the 
International Classification of Diseases, in its current tenth edition (ICD-10) and with an eleventh 
in development. 
Neurasthenia is increasingly rarely employed as a diagnostic category outside of China and 
India. This can probably be attributed to the global influence of the DSM, which moved beyond 
its previous abandonment of neurasthenia, reintroducing it as a cultural syndrome in 1994. A 
cultural index only appeared in the DSM in the 1990s, after nearly three decades of collaboration 
between anthropologists, psychiatrists, and other mental health researchers. In 1994 the APA 
                                                             
1 Ethan Watters, Crazy like Us: The Globalization of the American Psyche, (SImon and Schuster, 2010), 1. 
2 Hereafter, DSM, with the edition listed either as a Roman numeral for I-IV or 5 for the most recent edition. 
3 To state that neurasthenia was abandoned for having no validity as a disease construct is somewhat of an 
overstatement. This subject is briefly touched upon in the concluding chapter. 





published DSM-IV, which included a section titled, “Outline for Cultural Formulation and 
Glossary of Culture-Bound Syndromes” (p. 843). Listed among these “culture-bound syndromes” 
is the following: 
Shenjing shuairuo (neurasthenia): In China, a condition characterized by physical and 
mental fatigue, dizziness, headaches, other pains, concentration difficulties, sleep 
disturbance, and memory loss. Other symptoms include gastrointestinal problems, sexual 
dysfunction, irritability, excitability, and various signs suggesting disturbances of the 
autonomic nervous system. In many cases, the symptoms would meet the criteria for a 
DSM-IV mood or anxiety disorder. This diagnosis is included in the Chinese classification 
of mental disorders, second edition. (CCMD-2).5 
By situating it as a “locality-specific pattern of aberrant behavior and troubling experience” 
(DSM-IV, p. 848), the APA defines neurasthenia as a culture-bound syndrome that belongs to the 
Chinese experience, which continues with both the DSM-IV Text Revision and the 2013 
publication of DSM-5. This has raised questions about whether the “real” underlying problem that 
patients experience is better described as a form of mood disorder, anxiety disorder, somatization 
( ), or if there are instances of SJSR that simply cannot be explained by any other category 
of experience. Whatever the case, the last two versions of the DSM have relegated the category to 
the periphery as a “local” issue. Nevertheless, shenjing shuairuo (hereafter abbreviated SJSR) has 
historically been very “real” to Chinese people and has entered into the lexicon of all native 
Chinese speakers. References to the illness in literature and magazines, webpages, and online 
shopping websites are numerous, and a simple web-search of the Chinese term yields a seemingly 
infinite array of information from countless perspectives. 
Professionally, in the decades approaching the turn of the twenty-first century, SJSR is 
claimed to account for up to half of all psychiatric diagnoses in China, and some Chinese 
neurologists and psychiatrists continue to insist that it is not merely a disorder of somatization, but 
a valid clinical category that may or may not have a clear correlate in mainstream Euro-American 
experience. It can be given as an account for undesirable behaviors, failure at work or school, 
difficulties in the home, and other functional impairments of daily life. Self-help instruction 
continues to be published on the topic as it has since the final decade of the nineteenth century; in 
                                                             
5 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV (American 




fact, such material is more plenteous today. Medicines of all kinds are still on offer for those who 
might have developed the disorder. Furthermore, Chinese researchers continue to publish scientific 
papers based on neuroimaging, nerve conduction, and other methodologies in order to argue for 
the validity of this clinical category or for the purpose of finding effective treatment. A search for 
the term り in the Chinese academic database, CNKI, from 1990 to the present yields over 
6,000 articles across a variety of journals, ranging from Western biomedicine to traditional Chinese 
medicine approaches.6 In 2017 alone, there were over 1,500 such articles. For example, in March 
of 2017 The Journal of Clinical Medical Literature published an article titled, “Study on the 
changes of serum cortisol and high sensitivity C-reactive protein in elderly patients with 
neurasthenia”. 7  In July of 2017, Cardiovascular Disease Journal of Integrated Traditional 
Chinese and Western Medicine published a rather different approach in the article, “Anshen-bunao 
ye combined with oryzanol for the treatment of neurasthenia patients”.8 These two recent articles 
serve to show the disparate approaches to SJSR today. Serum cortisol and CRP are two very 
common clinical variables that a contemporary psychiatrist might find valuable when assessing a 
patient in an American hospital. Anshen-bunao ye 9, on the other hand, is a tonic remedy in China 
that contains deer antler, licorice root, ginger, and other ingredients. It can be readily bought in 
China or online, and it is packaged professionally as shown below in Figure 1 below. It is taken 
orally, as is “oryzanol”, which is a mixture of rice oil and other plant sterols.10 
Modern approaches of clinical chemistry are being employed alongside other eclectic 
methodologies in attempts further to delineate the meaning and management of SJSR as a clinical 
category. The subject of SJSR continues to be vast and carries implications for psychiatry in a 
global arena as well as for China’s continued engagement with the world in fields like medicine. 
 
                                                             
6 CNKI (China National Knowledge Information; ). This national information platform led by Tsinghua 
University and supported by the PRC Ministry of Education and Ministry of Science includes the database China 
Academic Journals Full-Text Database. 
7 , “さ り C- ,” , no. 3 
(2017): 410–11. 
8  and , “ よ ず か り ,” わ え , no. 
7 (2017): 36–37. 
9 “ よ _ ,” accessed December 8, 2017, 
http://www.baike.com/wiki/%E5%AE%89%E7%A5%9E%E8%A1%A5%E8%84%91%E6%B6%B2. 






Figure 1: Anshen-bunao ye 
 
I have been thinking and reading about SJSR and neurasthenia for only fifteen years, which 
began when I was first living in Taiwan in the early 2000s.11 Since that time, I have realized that 
one can spend an entire lifetime examining the topic as it pertains even to just one location, at just 
one year in history. It may be for that reason that I have begun to abstract how I think about the 
category by alternately expanding and contracting the focus of my inquiry. As this is a dissertation 
in the field of East Asian studies, I do not address the Indian literature. However, since I am a 
physician and have a particular interest in cultural psychiatry, I approach SJSR from a multi-
disciplinary perspective that includes anthropology, psychiatry, history, sociology, and philosophy, 
as indicated in the next sections. I am reminded of a 2011 book edited by Arthur Kleinman et al. 
titled, Deep China: The Moral Life of the Person: What Anthropology and Psychiatry Tell Us 
about China Today.12 My own project might well be titled, What China and SJSR Can Tell Us 
about Anthropology and Psychiatry Today. An examination of SJSR raises serious questions about 
the impact of Western psychiatry on the rest of the world, which has been a matter of concern for 
critical literature since Foucault. Additionally, SJSR can push us to reconsider the ontology of 
mental illnesses as well as the mind-body problem in both philosophy and neuroscience.13 I will 
return to these issues throughout this project. Presently, by way of further introduction, let me 
attempt to frame the questions I hope to address over the course of this dissertation. 
                                                             
11 I mention this timeframe only to acknowledge that this is less than half of the time that some of the thinkers 
who are cited in this work have spent studying this subject.  
12 Arthur Kleinman, ed., Deep China: The Moral Life of the Person: What Anthropology and Psychiatry Tell Us about 
China Today (University of California Press, 2011). 
13 By “us” I am referring to Western intellectuals, researchers, physicians, and others who engage questions that 





1.1 Questions and Their Contexts 
Not only is the Chinese-language literature since the 1990s plenteous, English-language 
writing about SJSR could now amass copious volumes. These range from poorly written and 
unrigorous regurgitations of other authors’ claims, to well-thought-out and diligent efforts. One 
example of the more rigorous attempts to understand the category is a paper of Hugh Shapiro’s for 
“Symposium on the History of Disease” at the Academia Sinica. In “Neurasthenia and the 
assimilation of nerves into China”, Shapiro rightly claims that “psychiatry and medical 
anthropology have produced the most serious analyses of Shenjing Shuairuo”. 14 From among 
those literatures, Shapiro organizes seven categories of explanation raised to account for the very 
“ordinariness”15 and taken-for-granted nature of SJSR as a once-imported category in China. His 
“dominant explanations” are listed here with the addition of my own brief explanations of each 
category:16 
1) Somatization: “the expression of personal and social distress in an idiom of bodily complaints 
and medical help seeking”.17 This view has dominated cultural psychiatry and will be the subject 
of much of the latter half of this project. 
2) Euphemistic function: diagnoses such as schizophrenia can be burdensome and stigmatizing, 
whereas SJSR is less stigmatizing and less socially threatening. This view is intimately related to 
somatization, and will reappear frequently. 
3) Desirable sick role: SJSR is conceptually related to overwork, which frames the diagnosis in a 
possibly favorable light and entitles the sufferer to certain privileges.  
4) Physician/patient rapport: SJSR is a familiar and non-threatening concept. Other diagnostic 
labels might lead to patient non-cooperation or loss to follow-up.  
                                                             
14 Hugh Shapiro, “Neurasthenia and the Assimilation of Nerves into China” presented at the Symposium on the 
History of Disease, Academia Sinica, Institute of History and Philology, Nankang, Taiwan (2000), 5. 
15 Shapiro refers to the everyday, commonplace knowledge of SJSR among Chinese people as “striking 
ordinariness”. Ibid., 5. 
16 For each category, Shapiro offers a corroborating citation which I will not also cite as there are numerous 
sources of such corroboration. I accept his categories as given. For his citations, see his paper “Neurasthenia and 
the assimilation of nerves into China”. If I include a quotation from another source, it will be cited below.  
17 Arthur Kleinman, Joan Kleinman, and Byron Good, “Somatization: The Interconnections in Chinese Society 
among Culture, Depressive Experiences, and the Meanings of Pain,” in Culture and Depression: Studies in the 




5) Self-help: patients are more likely to seek treatment when the illness considered is neurasthenia, 
as opposed to some other more stigmatizing category. 
6) Status: The SJSR label has been fashionable in certain times and places.  
7) Nosological soundness: SJSR describes a form of experience not captured with other categories. 
This is the most controversial of views regarding SJSR, and it has at times constituted a position 
of resistance against the influence of Western psychiatry in its apparent effort to re-define the 
meaning of SJSR in its Chinese context. 
Shapiro quickly gets bogged down in a historical question, “examining the 
conceptualization of first systematic translation(s) of nerves into China”.18 He then finds himself 
grappling with classical Chinese medical theories in an attempt to understand what indigenous 
categories were in place to make the foreign import suitable for domestication. Before taking that 
direction, however, he does spend five and a half pages discussing “neurasthenia and politics” 
from what might be viewed as the perspectives of euphemistic function and self-help. (A 
repackaging of his discussion can be found in Kleinman and Lee and is addressed in later 
chapters.)19 He also spends just over three pages suggesting that neurasthenia is related to “being 
modern”, which does not fit well into any dominant explanation above, but which I reinterpret 
under an altered form of dominant explanation number six, status, in my third chapter. Before long, 
Shapiro’s original question of “how should we understand the popularity of neurasthenia in 
twentieth-century China” becomes somewhat obscured by these otherwise very important and 
fascinating lines of inquiry.20 His original question is just one way to approach the more basic 
question motivating my own inquiry, which I will now try to clarify. 
My aim in this dissertation is to answer the broad but basic questions:  
What are we talking about when we make reference to shenjing shuairuo, and how is its 
meaning contested by interested parties?  
On the face of it, these seem very simple questions. It should be recognized that, though perhaps 
overly broad, they necessarily entail incursions into multiple branches of inquiry, making them far 
                                                             
18 Shapiro, “Neurasthenia and the Assimilation of Nerves into China,” 16. This definition serves here, but there are 
numerous variations of it that appear in Kleinman and will arise again in the next chapter.  
19 S. Lee, “Depression: Coming of Age in China,” in Deep China: The Moral Life of the Person, What Anthropology 
and Psychiatry Tell Us about China Today (University of California Press, 2011), 177–212. 




from simple. First, SJSR is a term in the Chinese language, which makes explicit the need to 
engage a variety of Chinese language materials that also refer to the term and often take it for 
granted. Second, SJSR is an official psychiatric category, which necessitates engagement with 
psychiatric literature as well as medical anthropology. In combination, these lines of thinking are 
what make up cultural-psychiatry as an academic discipline. Third, for better or worse, thinking 
about forms of human experience variously labeled disordered, ill, psychiatric, or diseased raises 
questions about the relationship between the mind and the body. For instance, SJSR is a formal 
category labeled “mental disorder” in both the CCMD and the ICD. In the twenty-first century, 
this label raises philosophical questions about mind-body dualism, and whether a given psychiatric 
disorder is ultimately a brain disorder. Or to put it another way: are mental states reducible to brain 
states, thereby necessitating the conclusion that mental disorder is ultimately brain disorder?   
While this last question may seem very far afield from the main question I aim to address, 
and far afield from East Asian studies particularly, careful consideration will show that one very 
important aspect of my intended question cannot be answered without some recognition of the 
mind-body question.21 To illustrate this, let me recount part of my recent conversation with a 
professor of psychiatry at a well-known university on the east coast of the USA. The professor 
asked: 
Aren’t we treating a diseased organ? Aren’t psychiatric illnesses disorders of the brain? If 
my patient is human and the Chinese patient is human, should not the disorders of the brain 
be the same here as they are there? How could there be a brain disorder that only occurred 
in the brains of people from that location?  
His question is a fascinating one. The obvious implication is that, since we are all human, 
a particular label referring to mental disorder in one locale must correspond to the same disorder 
in another locale, even if they are being labeled differently. I do not agree. All cultural experiences 
are mediated by nervous systems. That is to say, every experience supervenes on brain states, and 
there is no reason to think that people with different cultural and linguistic backgrounds share 
                                                             
21 Let me make this clear with further questioning. What are we referring to when we make reference to the 
formal diagnostic term of a mental illness, which is also a term appropriated by countless people who feel they 
have a debilitating illness? Does it make reference to an illness with respect to a mental state or a brain state? Is 
there a difference? I intend to address this as a theoretical problem later in this dissertation. It is a question that 
cannot go unanswered by those working in cross-cultural psychiatry, as I recently found out. Furthermore, I believe 
how we answer the question can go a long way towards explaining how Chinese people have historically claimed a 




precisely the same brain-states. There may very well be particular brain-states at the micro-
physical level that are unavailable to me as a result of my not being fluent with or residing in a 
particular cultural/linguistic milieu. 22  The possibility of such differences has far-reaching 
consequences for how mental disorders are viewed cross-culturally and requires greater rigor and 
sensitivity. 
Returning to my general questions, reference to SJSR is something that has a historical first 
occurrence. Answering my question does not require, à la Shapiro’s efforts, that I pinpoint the 
exact first occurrence of the term in Chinese, although I look at the matter briefly in a later chapter. 
In order to answer my question, however, it is necessary to make efforts at understanding when 
and how SJSR becomes popular in the twentieth century. Part of this process requires establishing 
a conceptual framework for understanding nerves, neurasthenia, and nervous discourse in Western 
societies prior to and leading toward their introduction into Japan and China. This is the subject of 
Chapter 2. Most writing on SJSR addresses this in only a cursory manner, and I attempt to provide 
the reader with a fuller account of this background. Once there is some understanding of the 
Western history, however, some cultural theorizing is necessary for any attempt to explain how 
SJSR became a meaningful category of experience in China. This I attempt in Chapter 3. As with 
all theorizing, conclusions and implications can be debated, and my conclusions in this project are 
not reliant on my conclusions in that single chapter. Over the subsequent two chapters, I will 
provide the reader with the most influential interpretations of the Chinese experience of SJSR that 
have arisen from the literatures of anthropology and cultural psychiatry (hereafter referred to as 
ACP). These professional interpretations have shaped the definition of SJSR in the cultural 
appendices of DSM-IV and DSM-5, and have framed the view of how Chinese experience SJSR 
for the countless psychiatrists around the globe who use the DSM. It has also caused pushback 
from Chinese researchers who believe SJSR is something other than what it has been framed to be 
by their Western colleagues. These considerations facilitate a theoretical model for cultural 
psychiatry that I find helpful when thinking about how psychiatric phenomenology changes 
                                                             
22 Charles M. Olbert and Gary J. Gala, “Supervenience and Psychiatry: Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?,” 
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 35, no. 4 (November 2015): 203–19, 
https://doi.org/10.1037/teo0000023. I think it should be uncontroversial that the microphysical brain states that 
correspond with language production in Chinese are not equivalent microphysical states that occur with language 
production in English. They may be analogous, but it does not seem reasonable to argue that they are equivalent 




temporally and geographically. For the sake of clarity, I conclude this section with a summary of 
some of the questions that will be the focus of the individual chapters that follow. 
Chapter 2: Before being translated into Chinese language and geography, what was the 
understanding of neurasthenia in the parts of the world where the term originated, namely Europe 
and the USA? Was there a discourse of nerves there? What did it mean to speak about nerves and 
weak nerves in American and European contexts? 
Chapter 3: What do we know about the introduction of neurasthenia into Japan and then 
China? How might its popular reception be interpreted? What was the popular understanding of 
SJSR as evinced by the readily available sources of public information?  
Chapter 4: During its inception in the 1970s and 80s, how did the alliance between 
anthropology and psychiatry conceptualize SJSR? Given that ACP have produced the most serious 
analyses of SJSR, what influential interpretations, consensuses, or conclusions did the fields 
produce in their first decade of inquiry? How did Chinese psychiatrists respond to the ACP model 
of SJSR? 
Chapter 5: Once established, how did ACP sustain a research paradigm over the ensuing 
two decades?23 How was it employed by various researchers? How did Chinese psychiatrists 
respond? 
Chapter 6: In the final chapter, a few questions will remain that will point to a conclusion 
for the project. After the first decade of the twenty-first century, how has somatization continued 
to be a subject of inquiry? What types of claims are being made in the twenty-first century by those 
who can be considered heirs of the interpretations presented in Chapters 4 and 5? Can we find 
phenomena analogous to SJSR in East Asia today? How might current Japanese uses of 
dysautonomia24 discourse influence our view of SJSR and somatization? What about the mind-
body problem? Can neuroscience offer any help to the future of cultural psychiatry?  
 
                                                             
23 There are a few reasons for choosing to separate Chapters 4 and 5 in this chronological manner. One is that from 
the original publications in ACP there were about ten years of settling-in time. Also, the decades closely follow the 
publication of DSM editions. DSM-III was published in 1980; DSM-III-Revised came out in 1987. DSM-IV was 
published in 1994, with its revisions in 2000. DSM-5 was published in 2013.  





1.2 Theoretical Considerations 
This work begins with a quotation from Ethan Watters for a number of reasons. First, I 
have to admit that I am partial to the line of argumentation that Watters presents in his book, Crazy 
Like Us, and my overall thesis in this dissertation is very close to the idea that he is describing in 
the two sentences quoted above. Watters, whose wife is a psychiatrist, takes the reader through 
several examples of psychiatric disorders as defined in the DSM, and he attempts to show that 
their rising prevalence and incidence (of diagnosis or treatment) in specific countries outside the 
United States is directly related to their professional introduction into those countries. However, 
he denies that this occurrence is merely one of increasing recognition.25 Rather, he believes that 
the situation is better explained by another type of phenomenon that I prefer to describe as follows: 
human distress, of the type we call “psychiatric”, continually converges toward a homogeneity as 
American forms of any given category are exported globally. What this means and how it occurs 
will be discussed in more detail throughout these chapters as I specifically focus on neurasthenia 
and its Chinese language equivalent. To foreshadow, I consider SJSR to be an example of this on 
more than one occasion. 
Second, Watters’ quotation reminds us that there is always the opposing influence of local 
culture acting as a force that resists, or at least modifies, conceptual categories to fit local needs. 
Returning to the quotation for the sake of demonstration, we might consider momentarily the 
hegemonic influence that the golden arches have played on the world scene, despite Watters’ 
downplaying of them. Visiting the golden arches in Taipei, Kaohsiung, Tokyo, Yokohama, Beijing, 
Shanghai, Xi’an, Hong Kong, and other places, one finds that the customer can order a sandwich 
with a rice patty instead of a bun, and since 2014 one can even order a “black squid ink burger”. 
                                                             
25 Take as an example the incidence of treated ADHD in Taiwan from 1999–2005. Huang et al. found that “there 
was a significant increase in the treated prevalence rate of ADHD during the study period, from 64.65 per 100,000 
in 2000 to 145.40 per 100,000 in 2005 (p = .001). An increase in the treated incidence rate of ADHD, from 44.67 per 
100,000 in 2000 to 81.20 per 100,000 in 2005, was also observed (p = .013)”. The argument from recognition claims 
that ADHD is just being recognized more, therefore driving up these numbers. Some suspect, however, that the 
introduction and popularization of ADHD as a category leads to an effect whereby people populate the category. It 
is difficult to determine when recognition is the source of epidemiologic changes as opposed to other effects of 
constructed categories. More is said on this later. For Huang’s study see: Huang, Charles Lung-Cheng, Chin-Chen 
Chu, Tain-Junn Cheng, and Shih-Feng Weng, ‘Epidemiology of Treated Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 





26 I take this as an example of the molding of the “golden arches” to fit the local, which is something 
that likely occurs through a give-and-take of local demand and clever marketing. The Japanese 
name of the sandwich is ika-sumi baagaa ( ト . .) and is usually written in katakana
( . .)	 This is one of the better efforts to create “a culturally specific entity that 
integrates conceptual categories of traditional Japanese culinary art (ika-sumi) with the Western 
category of burger”.27 One need not enter into a discussion of John Montagu, Fourth Earl of 
Sandwich, and the etymology or history of sandwiches in order to understand that the sandwich as 
it appears in that chain restaurant is a Western import that has taken on local flair. Sandwiches, 
mass-produced and listed on a menu, were institutionalized by the chain restaurant, and the 
customers got that first. The squid ink burger is a later consequence. An imported concept is the 
supraordinate category that is antecedent to its local embrace. The difficulty here lies in trying to 
understand what is the supraordinate and universal category behind reference to any phenomenon 
we might refer to as psychiatric. With respect to SJSR, it has always been premature to conclude 
that Chinese people “somatize” their “depression” and therefore have historically found SJSR to 
be a useful category or label, because both SJSR and depression, as conceptualized by the field of 
psychiatry, are imports. Given Watters’ analogy, the golden arches phenomenon may equally 
apply to the human psyche and what we might call the global “McDonaldization” of psychiatry. It 
should be predicted that at a given period of time, SJSR rates, and at another time depression rates, 
like burger consumption, should soar in China as each in turn becomes an increasingly available 
category of experience.  
What is the point of all this? The Americanization, or Westernization, process is not undone 
by the process of indigenization that gives rise to the squid ink burger. Nor does recognition of the 
locally specific nature of the squid ink burger help us get at what the Japanese are “really” buying 
when they go to the golden arches. Rather, the squid ink burger brings into focus the imported 
character of the golden arches in the first place. This is, of course, only an analogy that I am using 
to link Watters’ point and my own topic. Writing in 2010, Watters attempts to tackle a concrete 
category. He tells us that “in the past two decades, for instance, eating disorders have risen in Hong 
                                                             
26 “McDonald’s Japan Unleashes Black Squid Ink Burger,” NY Daily News, accessed December 1, 2017, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/eats/mcdonald-japan-unleashes-black-squid-ink-burger-article-1.1957094. 
27 I am using the first sentence of the of glossary of cultural concepts of disease in DSM-5 for Shenjing shuairuo: 
“Shenjing shuairuo is a cultural syndrome that integrates conceptual categories of traditional Chinese medicine 




Kong and are now spreading to inland China”.28 What is the cause of the rise? Is disordered eating 
the consequence of imported norms of body image and beauty from the USA? He elaborates in a 
later chapter with the claim that the rise of anorexia in East Asia is a result of the popularizing of 
the category itself both among the professional community and the lay public. This amounts to a 
psychiatric version of, “if you build it, they will come”. This is a very serious claim, and I suggest 
that the reader look at his book carefully, as his other examples help make his case.  
For my own part, I began studying anorexia in East Asia in 2007, three years before Watters’ 
book was published.29 At the time, I also came to the conclusion that anorexia was occurring as a 
consequence of its professional and lay introduction into Asian societies. However, I thought that 
it was unreasonable to demand, as a criterion for diagnosis, that the patient have an “intense fear 
of gaining weight or becoming fat, even though underweight”, especially in the context of rural 
Taiwan.30 By the time DSM-5 was published, cultural and gender research had demonstrated that 
alternative rationales for food refusal exist around the globe, and fear of gaining weight was 
removed as a necessary condition for the diagnosis. However, if Watters’ view is right, in the next 
ten years, East Asian patients with anorexia will look very similar to the average American patient, 
whereas this appears not to have been the case in years past.31 In other words, over time, most 
patients will likely demonstrate a “fear of gaining weight”. If this does occur, there will be 
researchers from various orientations arguing that the homogeneity across cultures is evidence of 
the underlying universality of the phenomenon in question. Others will see the social construction 
of a category that has slowly became populated. By analogy, there may be as many cultural 
manifestations of food refusal as there are varieties of burger; yet, those varieties are dependent on 
the introduction of the initial category. In like manner, we may see a time in China when 
“depression” as described in the DSM is more common than SJSR as defined in the CCMD. I do 
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not believe, however, that this would demonstrate that past SJSR patients were actually depressed. 
Let us consider another example from the United States to clarify what I am suggesting. 
While recently perusing a web forum for discussions among young psychiatrists, I ran 
across this complaint: 
I spent a year after residency working locums jobs in 3 different areas of the country, before 
taking a permanent job this past summer in yet another area. One thing I noticed is that 
there seem to be problems/complaints that are more common in some areas than others. 
Each locale had sort of its own ‘classic’ issue. And where I am now, it seems to be adults 
wanting to get diagnosed with ADHD for the first time in adulthood . . . I have a hard-
enough time believing in childhood ADHD, but in residency I got through the mandatory 
rotations in child/adolescent (psychiatry) by keeping my head down, smiling and nodding, 
and doing what the attendings said. I did not expect this to follow me into the adult 
population.32   
The thread continued with some discussion until one of the contributors opined in this fashion:  
You might not be aware, but there was a flood of news reporting on adult ADHD in the 
last year or so. A lot of information disseminated about how it has different symptoms than 
classic ADHD . . . It seems like it's the medical community leading patients who then 
surprise another part of the medical community.33 
The last comment above implies that patients are presenting in the clinic with a list of 
symptoms/complaints that only arose after the patient learned of the possibility of such a diagnosis 
from the interaction between the medical community and popular media. In other words, there is 
something going on in the culture that makes possible or draws a connecting framework around a 
certain type of experience. This may be true whether it is a newly recognized phenomenon like 
adult ADHD, increase in ADHD treatment in Taiwan, a rise in diagnosis of anorexia nervosa in 
Taiwan, or the rise in depression at a particular period in Chinese history. How could it be the case 
that aspects of society and culture give rise to phenomena referred to as psychiatric? It is necessary 
to make a serious effort at addressing this question before proceeding any further.  
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1.3 How Does Culture Shape or Give Rise to Phenomena Referred to as Psychiatric? 
To begin to answer this question, several theoretical problems need to be addressed. For 
example, it is necessary first to clarify what is meant by the term “culture”, a problem about which 
no small amount of ink has been spilt. More importantly, the concept of “psychiatric disorder” has 
to be approached in a way that makes clear the presuppositions that must be admitted in order for 
such a question to be asked in the first place. This latter problem is at the heart of nearly all inquiry 
in the fields of anthropological psychology, psychological anthropology, and cultural psychiatry. 
It has also been the cause of great debate from the anti-psychiatry movement (Szasz) and social 
science critiques of psychiatry (Horowitz, Hacking, etc.).  
Therefore, I divide this theoretical discussion into six sub-sections. I begin by briefly 
defining what I mean by the term culture. Without spending time to work through the details of a 
theory on culture, I merely posit a generally acceptable position from which to proceed. In the 
second section, I outline some of the philosophical problems requiring consideration for a 
meaningful use of the term “psychiatric disorder”. This includes a short discussion of the 
ontological and epistemological issues that underlie the main question posed here. Only then do I 
attempt, in the third section, to address the role of culture in shaping those phenomena normally 
classified and handled by the discipline of psychiatry. This requires a discussion of the notion of 
“idioms of distress” and the idea of a “cultural symptom pool”, Sections 4 and 5 respectively. In 
the sixth section, a brief summary concludes the theoretical section of this chapter. 
1.3.1 Culture 
Although there have been numerous workings and re-workings of what is meant by the 
term “culture”, it is safe to say that most can be summarized or otherwise embodied in the 
explanation offered by Clifford Geertz in his 1973 text, The Interpretation of Cultures. There he 
writes that culture can be described as “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied 
in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which 
men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their attitudes toward 
life”.34   
Since Geertz offered this anthropological definition, understandings of culture have 
broadened. Ironically, even the highly criticized publications of the American Psychiatric 
                                                             




Association have attempted to develop a sophisticated conception of culture. The latest volume of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) has explained it as follows:  
Culture refers to systems of knowledge, concepts, rules, and practices that are learned and 
transmitted across generations. Culture includes language, religion and spirituality, family 
structures, life-cycle stages, ceremonial rituals, and customs, as well as moral and legal 
systems. Cultures are open, dynamic systems that undergo continuous change over time; 
in the contemporary world, most individuals and groups are exposed to multiple cultures, 
which they use to fashion their own identities and make sense of experience.35  
By approaching the concept in this manner we can conclude that human beings living 
within any given society or community employ culture in various ways in order conceptually to 
understand and organize their lives. On this definition, we can eschew assuming the existence of 
such monolithic cultures as “Chinese Culture”, “Indian Culture”, or “American Culture”. Rather, 
it is understood that there may be numerous “Chinese cultures”, or others, that constitute and are 
constituted by the life-worlds of the people in question. Such an understanding helps avoid the 
errors of either essentialization or attribution of special status to some overarching order. 
Nevertheless, there may be some conceptualizations about life experience that appear to group 
geographically, historically, and/or linguistically. These are the kinds of cultural 
conceptualizations that are of interest when discussing the role of culture in shaping psychiatric 
phenomena.  
1.3.2 Ontic vs. Epistemic Understandings of Psychiatric Disorder 
Using the term “psychiatric disorder” normally implies some presuppositions about the 
world. This is the case because speaking about “disorder” already situates the term within the realm 
of a specific medical discipline that is largely traceable to eighteenth and nineteenth century 
Europe and the United States. Psychiatric disorders are the “object” of medical inquiry, diagnosis, 
and treatment, and as such, they are given ontological status consonant with the notion of “disease 
entities” studied by psychopathology. In the context of cultural influences on the psychiatric, 
however, it may be necessary to de-medicalize the subject of inquiry to some extent in order not 
to assume the ontology of scientific realism from the outset of inquiry.  
Horacio Fabrega suggested that the term “psychiatric condition” suits this purpose. In his 
                                                             




work on the history of mental illness in India, he submitted that emotional and behavioral 
disaffections or disruptions in habit-patterns or social conduct fit the meaning of psychiatric 
condition when they fulfill four criteria. These are: 1) persistence over time rather than situational 
or fleeting, 2) interruption of the course of one’s life, 3) production of psychological and bodily 
distress, including visceral/somatic complaints, and 4) disruption associated with significant 
changes in functioning noticeable from within the social and cultural space of the persons involved. 
These four criteria constitute the manner in which one can be said to “suffer” from a “condition”.36 
Fabrega’s use of the term condition rather than disorder in this case seems to stem from the 
desire to address what he sees as universal, human phenomena without imposing a specific 
epistemological system or nosology onto them. In other words, he wants an etic ontology regarding 
phenomena of psychiatric interest while maintaining the possibility for an emic epistemology of 
their meaning. He accomplishes this far better when he uses the model of “Human Behavioral 
Breakdown” (HBB), which does not depend on either disorder or condition as a descriptive term.37 
There is now a large body of evidence suggesting that in all societies and communities throughout 
human history there have been types of behavior that persist over time and are understood by others 
in the community as constitutive of breakdown (as something having gone awry).38 This need not 
always carry a moral, judgmental, or normative evaluation. Rather, it may merely indicate that the 
behavioral disruption leads to the inability to perform some task as usual, or it may indicate some 
other significant loss of functioning recognizable by others. The range of descriptions referred to 
in contemporary clinical psychiatry as schizophrenia happens to be one candidate of HBB that 
appears to occur across time and space, though course and outcome of the experience seem to vary 
by culture.39 
If the phenomena of psychiatric interest are re-conceptualized as HBB, then it is possible 
to reconsider what is meant by disorder and pathology in a broad sense. In this way, disorder 
becomes an instance of dis-order, and pathology takes on the etymological sense of pathos as 
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suffering. A comparative researcher (e.g., a cultural psychiatrist) can look for instances of HBB 
that appear to share an analogical relationship, if not an equative one, with the phenomena that are 
subsumed under certain psychiatric nosologies without requiring absolute equivalence in all 
aspects of experience. Rather than assign a privileged status to the context that gave rise to the 
conception of psychiatric disorder (namely, nineteenth-century Euro-American medicine), this 
orientation allows for the understanding that contemporary psychiatry is itself a culturally and 
historically specific approach to HBB that may not be appropriate or valid in all settings. 
It is very important to parse out the difficulty inherent in the discussion thus far. By taking 
the line of thought outlined above, clinical psychiatry is placed in a position of being always-
already an emic endeavor, insofar as it is itself a particular hermeneutic of certain kinds of human 
experience. When Fabrega, Kleinman, Kirmayer, and others investigate HBB across cultures, 
however, they assume an etic position, at least in that they believe there is something to investigate. 
For this reason, Fabrega has suggested that studying HBB always involves a form of ethnocentrism, 
and the tension inherent in this kind of inquiry may be irresolvable. In order to proceed, it will 
have to suffice merely to point out that, for cultural psychiatry, a strong cultural-relativist position 
is as untenable as a strong realist one. Between these two is one that maintains the ontological 
reality of psychiatric conditions, however construed, while upholding a weak cultural-relativist 
stance with regard to how they are to be known (epistemology). It is from this position that 
researchers are able to inquire into how it can be said that culture shapes psychiatric disorders. 
1.3.3 The Role of Culture 
Before moving further into the discussion of culture giving rise to psychiatric disorders, it 
is necessary to make an important distinction between the kinds of roles that culture is said to have 
in experience. “Giving rise to” implies an influence other than efficient causation, so it should be 
pointed out that such causation is not addressed here. Those discussions are normally had in terms 
of the “pathogenic”. For instance, one could argue that the brutality of Spartan culture was 
pathogenic if it was, in fact, a causal force in producing HBB among members of that society we 
might characterize as psychiatric. In a similar way, one could argue that certain cultural rigidities 
in parts of contemporary Japan are pathogenic in that they may be causes of conditions like 
hikikomori. For the purposes of this discussion, I set aside the pathogenic notion in order to discuss 
the “pathoplastic”, shaping role of culture. 




that facilitated the rise of cultural psychiatry as a discipline. The International Pilot Study of 
Schizophrenia (IPSS), which began in 1966, was the first large scale, longitudinal attempt at a 
cross-cultural study of schizophrenia, and it serves as a good example for clarifying the concept of 
“pathoplasticity”. At that time, psychiatrists understood schizophrenia to be an organic disorder of 
the brain/nervous system; however, the symptoms and outcome of the disorder were understood 
to be under the shaping influence of the respective cultural background of the patients. In other 
words, whatever the supraordinate pathology was, it was plastic (moldable or able to be shaped) 
as per the cultural context of the disorder. 
In 1986 Kleinman pointed out that this pathoplastic paradigm had already become a 
psychiatric orthodoxy, the classical example being the delusional symptoms of a paranoid patient. 
In the USA, one might fear CIA mind-control, whereas in the USSR the fear might be of the 
KGB.40 While this example alone serves as one explanation of how culture shapes psychiatric 
disorder, it is not the most remarkable because it relies too heavily on a realist disease ontology 
that appears to pay mere lip service to a relativist symptomatology. The deficiency of such an 
approach becomes clear when considering the categories listed in the DSM-5 “Glossary of Cultural 
Concepts of Disease”. With only this notion of pathoplasticity, Ataque de Nervios would be seen 
as the cultural manifestation of the disease entity known under the DSM as “Panic Disorder”, Susto 
would actually be “PTSD”, Nervios actually “Anxiety Disorder”, Shenjing Shuairuo actually 
“Depression”, Taijin Kyofusho actually “Social Phobia”, and Dhat actually “Hypochondria”.41 
This approach to pathoplasticity is precisely what psychiatrists like Fabrega try to avoid, although 
often unsuccessfully. When attempting to understand the role of culture in psychiatric conditions, 
a more sophisticated conceptualization is necessary.  
1.3.4 Pathoplastic or Plastopathic42 Idioms of Distress 
The term “idiom of distress” has been in use among cross-cultural researchers for nearly 
forty years, and it has been the subject of special issue publications within cultural psychiatry 
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journals. 43  As a research paradigm it has grown substantially over the years, and has been 
incorporated into the language of DSM-5. Anthropologist Mark Nichter popularized the term with 
his research in south Indian communities in the late 1970s, using the term to describe the 
socioculturally resonant means by which local persons manifested distress. He documented how, 
in one particular Indian cultural group, when women experienced severe family pressure or other 
difficult life circumstances, they engaged in behaviors that meaningfully indicated a distressed 
state to members of their community.44 In that particular case, the behaviors included food refusal 
or excessive fasting, expressions of fear of being poisoned, and disruption of normal commensality.  
Though the details of those studies are not important here, Nichter’s research suggests that 
there are very particular forms of behavior that serve as socially and culturally specific ways of 
conveying affliction. This original conceptualization of idiom has undergone some change that 
should be addressed at this point, but it is important later to return to the notion of action and 
behavior as idiom. 
Within the idiom of distress research agenda that developed in the years following 
Nichter’s work, there arose a very specific use of the term that came into wide employ. Numerous 
debates in the literature took place regarding what was called a “bias in illness cognition” on behalf 
of those undergoing some kind of distress or situation of suffering.45 Specifically, researchers 
developed the practice of eliciting the patients’ “explanatory models” of illness, and these models 
offered information as to the ways in which patients conceptualized their experience. 46,47 The term 
“bias” is not intended to be pejorative in any sense; rather, it is meant to indicate that patients’ 
explanations of their experiences tend toward particular directions. For example, the most widely 
discussed issue in the literature pertains to the tendency to discuss illness experiences either using 
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psychological descriptors or bodily descriptors. Of course, this is especially important when no 
physical/physiological ailment can be identified. In such cases, the point is that a somatic bias in 
illness cognition would be evident when a person expresses distress by talking about physical 
symptoms such as body aches, feeling tired, headaches, and others bodily feelings. A 
psychological bias in illness cognition leads the person to express their distress by talking about 
psychological symptoms like feeling down, sad, blue, or similar psychological feelings. Cultural 
psychiatrists suggest that both ways of talking, in addition to evincing a bias in illness cognition, 
are idiomatic ways of expressing states of distress. This recognition of varieties of illness cognition 
seems to be an effort at self-reflection by those in the field of cultural psychiatry, recognizing the 
ethnocentric tension in claiming that one form of illness cognition is more correct or natural. The 
obvious caveat to the notion of biased illness cognition (and description), however, is that patients 
are actually undergoing the experiences that they explain themselves to have (i.e., body pains or 
emotional pain). This orientation to idioms gave rise to a debate in the cultural psychiatric literature 
as to whether patients from non-Western countries tended to express their distress in somatic 
idioms.48 Subsequently, decades of work by researchers in the field led to the canonization of 
“idioms of distress” in DSM-5 as having to do predominantly with language. It defines the concept 
as follows:  
Cultural idiom of distress is a linguistic term, phrase, or way of talking about suffering 
among individuals of a cultural group (e.g., similar ethnicity and religion) referring to 
shared concepts of pathology and ways of expressing, communicating, or naming essential 
features of distress (e.g., kufungisisa). An idiom of distress need not be associated with 
specific symptoms, syndromes, or perceived causes. It may be used to convey a wide range 
of discomfort, including everyday experiences, subclinical conditions, or suffering due to 
social circumstances rather than mental disorders. For example, most cultures have 
common bodily idioms of distress used to express a wide range of suffering and concerns.49 
It should be obvious just from this description that the current DSM definition has changed 
significantly from the one offered by Nichter in his early research. For the DSM, idiom has been 
confined to its origins in linguistics in that its use is meant to reference particular ways of speaking 
about illness experience. While this is an important aspect of cultural influence on experiences 
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deemed psychiatric, it misses the metaphorical sense in which idiom functions by analogy. For 
example, although a south Indian participant in Nichter’s research could describe her food refusal 
as a loss of appetite, others might engage in fasting without describing the undertaking as loss. 
Certainly, disrupting commensality need not be linguistic at all, and this non-linguistic sense of 
idiom deserves more discussion. 
In order to turn to the non-linguistic sense of the term idiom, it is helpful to recall what 
idioms accomplish linguistically. Idioms, through cultural imputation, convey a meaning different 
from the literal meaning of a group of words used separately or together. In any given language, 
there are a myriad of idioms in use; English alone has thousands. For the purpose of example, we 
can consider just two: “doesn’t cut the mustard” and “let the cat out of the bag”. It is obvious that 
the respective meanings, understood by their correct use, have nothing to do with the literal 
meanings of the phrases. The appropriation of the term “idiom” by ACP is based on the fact that 
idioms express their signification by means other than the literal.  
When not used in a linguistic sense, the concept of idiom must be understood to function 
analogically. One need think only of the reference to idiomatic expression in various genres of 
music for this to be clear. For instance, it is not uncommon to hear musicians talk about “jazz 
idiom” when discussing the compositions of George Gershwin.50 This analogical use of idiom has 
provided researchers a useful means of conceptualizing certain types of experience. But what does 
it mean for an action, behavior, or experience to be idiomatic in the sense Nichter means it?  
Having seen that idioms are meant as symbolic indicators of what should be inferred by 
others, we can reconsider non-verbal examples. As mentioned above, it may be that patients 
describe their experiences (e.g., tightness in the chest or shoulders) in ways that may be idiomatic 
indicators of other problems (e.g., severe strain from job loss). However, the actual experience of 
tightness itself is non-verbal. In a similar way, it is evident that the experience of fainting is non-
verbal. In a context where there is no physical/physiological explanation for fainting spells, the 
fainting can be termed idiomatic insofar as it is not seen as the literal problem needing ultimate 
attention, but rather is a symbol or indicator of something of greater significance.  
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Researchers have documented numerous examples of behaviors and actions that are 
believed to serve as idioms of distress in their respective cultural contexts. Nichter’s 
documentation of fasting in India has already been mentioned, and food refusal has been 
interpreted in numerous contexts around the world as being a culturally appropriate form of 
expressing distress (Sing Lee, Hong Kong and China; McLawhorn, Taiwan; Stark-Wroblewski, 
Japan; and others).51 DSM-IV included fainting spells as a cultural idiom in the southern USA, and 
the act or attempt of suicide has itself been described as having become a culturally understood 
idiom in certain locations (Kral, Arctic North; Zayas, Latinas in the USA).52 In addition to these 
behaviors, which continue to be studied, there are also examples of illness expression that have 
been studied historically.  
For example, Ian Hacking has written about the very bizarre phenomenon of dissociative 
walking-fugue, which became a nosological category in nineteenth century France (Hacking 1998). 
Doctors encountered epidemic incidence rates of dissociative walking-fugue followed by a nearly 
complete cessation of the phenomenon within a matter of years. A great deal has also been written 
on the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century histories of neurasthenia and hysteria as 
categories of experience with very specific symptoms.53 These categories of experience illustrate 
that types of behavior that appear to be idiomatic for severe distress can take on or lose their 
cultural meaningfulness historically.  
1.3.5 Cultural Symptom Pool 
In his work On the “Disappearance” of Hysteria: A study of the clinical deconstruction of 
a diagnosis, historian Mark Micale argued that the formal diagnosis of hysteria underwent 
“atomization” followed by a “reconstitution in many new places under a multitude of different 
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names that has created the historical illusion of a disappearance of the disorder itself”.54 His 
archival work demonstrates that clinical categories become parsed and disseminated within newer 
nosographies, and his historical findings probably are easily applicable to other categories such as 
neurasthenia. However, something seems to be missing in such explanations. It is one thing to 
agree that a patriarchal system constructed the category of hysteria only to alter and have it 
subsumed under other categories later; but it is very different to suggest that such is the extent of 
the meaning and mechanism of hysteria’s “disappearance”. After all, the classical Charcot-style 
hysterical fit did seem literally to disappear shortly after Charcot’s death. And there are many other 
examples of visible, tangible symptoms that prevailed only temporarily in history. How could this 
happen?   
The historian Edward Shorter has attempted to address this problem in several works on 
the historical phenomenon of psychosomatic illness.55 From the main title of his earlier work From 
Paralysis to Fatigue, the reader can see that Shorter intends to explain how the experience of 
paralysis as a defining feature of neurosis can shift toward fatigue as a defining feature, all within 
the span of a generation. He employs the metaphor of a “symptom pool”. For instance, the 
epidemic rise of neurasthenia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries can be seen as 
the creation of a clinical category that contributed to a symptom pool out of which 
sufferers/patients could draw. The bodily experiences were taken on as distraught individuals 
somehow conformed to the culturally available symptoms found in the symptom pool.  
Hysteria very likely worked in just this same way. The symptom pool model can explain 
how hysteria was both the creation of patriarchal doctors, and at the same time, an accurate 
description of the symptoms that predominantly affected disturbed women.56 Did women really 
manifest hysteria in such large numbers? Yes, they did. And they did so because they believed it 
to be an actual disease that afflicted them.57 In Charcot and Freud’s day, there was a clearly defined 
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symptom pool that was socially recognized and attached to a sick role, and it created a culturally 
appropriate form through which distress and life disruption could be manifested. As the symptom 
pool changed and its legitimacy came into question, so did the experiences of those who had 
previously conformed to it. In this way, the idiom lost its meaningfulness as circumstances 
changed in the external world, which was the very source of its original legitimacy and meaning. 
So the analogy holds with language: some idioms are understood despite being anachronistic 
(“burn the midnight oil”), while others may lose their meaning (“drop a dime”) in a generation. 
Obviously, there are idioms that are unavailable for other reasons (“well-bottom frog”, 
	The point is that idiom depends on a geographical and historical community for 
whom the idiom is meaningful. 
1.3.6 Conclusion 
At this point I want to summarize by returning to the main question regarding culture 
shaping psychiatric disorders. Given the general definition of culture mentioned above, and the 
range of experiences that are of psychiatric interest, I have tried to explain that there exists a 
necessary relationship between how people experience suffering and how they conceptualize and 
understand themselves and the world.  
Criticisms of psychiatry often reference Michel Foucault in order to argue that the power 
belonging to psychiatry constructs clinical entities and thereby medicalizes human experiences. A 
perhaps subtler side of Foucault, not often employed in the social sciences or humanities, raises 
questions about a different aspect of power: how do implicit powers of knowledge and 
representation serve as internalizing forces in the life-world of a subject so as to make possible the 
varieties of illness experience and local/cultural idioms of distress that the subject then manifests? 
This same form of power, often attributed to the psychiatric profession, is equally attributable to 
all aspects of culture, which provide meaning and norms of behavior. Culture serves as the force 
that makes fainting a meaningful symptom in the context of nineteenth century European 
understandings of human responses to stress, embarrassment, or shock. Culture and socialization 
are forces behind at least some of the experiences of Chinese complaints of weak nerves and Latino 
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descriptions of “attack of nerves”. However, if the culture provides an alternative symptom pool 
to draw from, people will learn to draw from that as well.  
Finally, the existence of idioms of distress that derive their meaning from cultural systems 
is indicative of the embodying power of culture in the experience of the psychiatric. The local 
idioms that arise through the medicalizing and categorizing influence of the discipline of 
psychiatry, that arise as a result of traditional medical beliefs and narratives, and that come from a 
host of other religious or philosophical views, all serve to shape human experience and 
understanding. The universal human experience of severe distress, demoralization, and behavioral 
breakdown must always occur within a cultural context; and it is culture that shapes and sanctions 
a meaningful outlet for such experiences. It should be kept in mind that the model of idioms of 
distress that I have framed here does not rely on patients “talk” about bodily symptoms. Rather, 
the available experience itself is the idiom, whether that be a subjective experience of dysthymia 
or a collection of aches and pains. Such are the indicators and consequences of human distress and 
difficulties in living.59 
 
1.4 Method 
 Attempts to apply the theoretical considerations of the previous section to the subject of 
SJSR and to my basic questions may be approached from a few possible directions. 
Methodologically, the vast majority of published research on SJSR has been from the orientations 
of ACP. Almost invariably, the preferred methods used are qualitative and ethnographic in nature. 
These include modifications of the psychiatric clinical interview, observation in hospitals, and 
more traditional ethnographic interviewing approaches that employ in-depth interviews with a 
grounded theoretical approach, among others. These are most often employed in order to elicit 
from patients the meaning of their symptoms and experiences. Occasionally, quantitative methods 
are used in order to determine numerical data regarding epidemiological or clinical questions. 
Some of these matters are addressed in the later chapters, but they are worth mentioning here to 
point out that I do not use the methods predominant in the research on this topic. Rather, I use a 
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multidisciplinary approach that might be termed “textual studies”, “literary studies”, “historical 
ethnography”, or some other amorphous description pointing to the source of information for my 
study. I take as my source of data a variety of print texts that span the turn of the twentieth century 
to just a few months ago, all of which are written in English, Chinese, or Japanese. Additionally, 
there will be instances where I make reference to a photographic or other visual text that was 
produced with these same three language populations as its target audience. I address these sources 
below, but it is worth first taking some step toward describing my motivation for a textual approach, 
rather than the predominant methodology, when studying this subject matter. 
 Returning momentarily to Ethan Watters, we might consider an example of textual studies 
that informed his chapter on depression in Japan. In that chapter, he relied heavily on the work of 
Junko Kitanaka, whose doctoral dissertation was published under the title, Depression in Japan: 
Psychiatric Cures for a Society in Distress. Given a variety of academic concerns regarding the 
global medicalization that appears to happen through the influence of American biomedicine and 
psychiatry, Kitanaka set out to examine how, “at the turn of the twenty-first century, depression 
has suddenly become a ‘national disease’ in Japan”.60 The second half of her book is largely 
ethnographic in nature, and through careful analysis, she was able both to address what depression 
means to contemporary patients as well as to contribute to theorizing about what kind of cultural 
work the category of depression was doing in Japanese society. It is noteworthy that she seems to 
have rightly recognized that the ethnographic work ought not be carried out in isolation from some 
more fundamental inquiry regarding the various meanings of the category itself in society. That is 
to say, she wanted to know when Utsubyou came into popular use in Japanese society, what the 
sources of popular understanding were, the manner in which it was described, and other such issues. 
61 For instance, if she intended to ask the ethnographic question, “What are patients referring to 
when they make reference to their personal experience of Utsubyou?” then the second half of her 
work may have sufficed. However, the question, “What are we referring to when we make 
reference to Utsubyou?” requires a form of inquiry akin to an “archaeology”.62 In other words, she 
hoped to understand what made the meaning of and patient reference to the category possible in 
the first place. Analogously, a number of researchers have been studying SJSR from the position 
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of patients’ explanatory models as assessed by the former ethnographic question, without ever 
having any firm footing in the latter archaeological question. 
 A similar approach from the USA might be helpful here. I am deeply indebted to the 
archaeological efforts of Ian Hacking, who has attempted to come to grips with the same 
fundamental body of knowledge necessary to give rise to the explosion of multiple-personality 
disorder (MPD) diagnoses in North America.63 While MPD was exceedingly rare (and those few 
patients normally had one or two “alter” personalities) in the middle of the twentieth century, in 
the 1980s there appeared to be an explosion of people diagnosed with the disorder, often having 
more than a dozen personalities. Furthermore, there were numerous books and movies released 
about the topic in that decade. Hacking wanted to know what the pre-conditions were for what 
appeared to be the rise of a new phenomenon. Ethnography of patients and physicians would 
probably not have served well, and so he turned to historical texts, professional texts, and popular 
works of fiction and autobiography, which he argued served in some ways to lay the social 
groundwork for an epidemic rise of MPD experiences. I believe that relying on ethnographic 
methods to elicit patients’ explanatory models has tended toward an overestimation of what that 
approach can tell us about patient experiences; furthermore, I contend, throughout this project as 
a whole, that ACP research has ended up giving us a synchronic analysis that fails to consider 
certain possibilities regarding how human categories diachronically affect those who populate 
them. 
 I view the present project as residing in the same family of inquiry as both Kitanaka and 
Hacking. In the social sciences, humanities, and philosophy, textual analysis is a research method 
with a long and rigorous history. After all, “most of the recoverable data about human thought and 
human behavior are texts of one kind or another”.64 Following the sociological tradition in textual 
studies, I view texts as a “window into human experience”,65 but I do not engage in the study of 
my sources using formalized coding or other means of objectification of data. Instead, I examine 
literary, professional, and lay texts of varying types with the aim of understanding the social, 
cultural, historic, lay, and professional constructions of SJSR, and with a consideration of how 
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those constructions have been contested and challenged. 
 
1.5 Approaches to Sources 
 In the pages that follow, needs vary depending on the aim of the chapter. The analysis of 
professional, academic literature in Chapters 4 through 5 requires very different material from 
either Chapters 2 or 3. For this reason, in the next few sections I provide an account of how I chose 
source materials for the respective chapters. In a work of this kind, it is not usually necessary to 
explain the means of editing relevant source materials, and this is especially so in Chapter 2, as it 
offers an analysis of the Western discourse of nerves using materials dating back to the seventeenth 
century. However, if perchance the reader desires to know how I came across source materials, 
this information is available in the next few pages. Additionally, bibliographic information is all 
contained in the footnotes of each chapter. 
1.5.1 Sources for Chapter 2 
 Chapter 2 includes a literary and historical approach to nervous discourse in the West that 
relies on a large number of original writings, both fiction and non-fiction, dating from the 
seventeenth century to the twentieth. Also included is reference to relevant secondary literature on 
neurasthenia in the West. In selecting primary source materials, I initially relied on my own recall 
of reference to “nerves” in English-language fiction. This led to document and digital searches for 
references to “nerves”, “nervous disease”, and “neurasthenia” across a variety of writings. The 
non-fiction materials making up Chapter 2 are the result of archival and database searches used in 
traditional historical research. These are primarily professional, medical texts written in some 
instances for a lay audience. In most cases, they are monographs that appear to have been intended 
by their authors to serve as medical textbooks. It is not always clear when a large work is intended 
as a reference work for a general audience or is meant to serve as a specialized volume for the use 
of fellow physicians. In any case, the number of works cited in the chapter makes such distinctions 
unnecessary.   
1.5.2 Sources for Chapter 3 
 In an effort to step away from the synchronic approaches that dominate the research on 
SJSR, I turn in Chapter 3 to a broad variety of materials dating from the end of the nineteenth 




Diet Library and secondary literature help situate the early uses of the kanji for SJSR and the 
understandings of the disorder in Japan. With respect to China, however, I take two approaches.  
First, part of my argument about a modernizing China comes from my own thinking about 
Lu Xun and other figures drawn from a “canon” of modern Chinese literature. Choice of these 
sources is entirely dependent on the argument that I wish to make, and they include figures like 
Yu Dafu, Pan Guangdan, Mu Shiying, Arthur Smith, and others. My overall aim is to get at 
everyday understandings of SJSR as it became popular, to get at what became common knowledge 
and taken for granted, and I draw on the sources that help make my argument.  
Second, I describe the increasingly available common knowledge of SJSR that served as 
the context for those writers I employ to make my argument. At that time in China, there were 
myriad publications that resulted from the new presses of the Republican Era. A large and growing 
network of periodicals, newspapers, gazettes, journals, primers, and other sources of information 
were in regular and available circulation throughout the period. To capture the kind of 
domestication that SJSR underwent, I have read numerous such materials that are now available 
in a variety of archives, both digital and physical. I mostly draw on the newspaper Shen Bao as it 
provides an interesting glimpse into what information on SJSR was available to the reading public 
for decades prior to the founding of the PRC. There were daily advertisements and descriptions 
printed in its pages and some are selected here for consideration.  
1.5.3 Sources for Chapters 4 and 5 
Chapters 4 and 5 are likely to be the only chapters about which some readers would prefer 
to know the method for source selection. In Chapter 4, my sources are entirely limited to academic 
writings on SJSR as it has been studied and framed by anthropologists and psychiatrists from the 
mid-1970s to 1989. These materials are primarily written by scholars in North America, but there 
are also a number from East Asian countries who are writing for their colleagues in international 
and Chinese-language journals. That chapter is not merely a literature review, although it is also 
that; it is a critical engagement with the predominant interpretation of the meaning of SJSR that 
has shaped how the category is understood by Western psychiatry on the global scene.  
An extensive professional literature on SJSR has developed in North America since the 
time of Arthur Kleinman’s original research in the late 1970s. In assessing the theoretical model 




edited works (three volumes) that Kleinman has produced. Additionally, I have selected a sample 
of academic papers that deal specifically with SJSR in China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Taiwan.  
There are a variety of ways to go about establishing a group of adequate source materials 
on SJSR from the published literature, but the papers are voluminous. For this reason, I have made 
a careful selection based on a systematic search of the PubMed databases within the timeframe 
covering 1970–2017. I chose this start date primarily because it was not until the 1970s that 
researchers had access to China after Richard Nixon’s visit in 1972, and it was not until the end of 
that decade that Kleinman began his research.  
 With respect to engagement of ACP by Chinese psychiatry, I have sought out responses 
and reactions to American scholarship, much of which has been produced in Chinese without any 
representation in English-language psychiatric literature. For instance, there are numerous Chinese 
language responses to important ACP texts that American psychiatrists have never seen in 
translation; consequently, many have not had the privilege of hearing Chinese responses to 
Western interpretations of psychiatric nosology in China. Additionally, I have engaged original 
research by Chinese psychiatrists who have been involved in the debate on SJSR that arose in the 
1980s. I attempt to bring these two monologues into dialogue.  
1.5.4 Sources for Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 serves as the conclusion of the study. It does, however, briefly address the state 
of the theorizing about SJSR from 2010 to the present. Some of the material in this chapter is 
accumulated as discussed above. Additionally, I incorporate some English and Japanese language 
sources regarding the diagnosis of autonomic nervous system disorder in Japan, which I find 
interesting when viewed comparatively with SJSR. I also draw on some recent research in the field 
of cultural neuroscience in order to offer an introductory explanation for how people can draw 
from available categories in a way that is transformed into embodied experience. 
 
1.6 The Need for This Project 
In Section 1 of this chapter, Questions and Their Contexts, I mention in passing that the 
English language research on SJSR is plenteous but not always helpful. Many of the references to 
SJSR in ACP seem to repeat the same group of sources and citations without any critical reflection 




methodological orientation is addressed in Chapters 4 and 5. In this final section of the chapter, I 
refer the reader to some historical research on SJSR that is helpful in gaining an understanding of 
its meanings, with an aim toward demonstrating how the present project takes a different approach 
and makes its own contribution to the existing literature. 
Wen-ji Wang has produced a few very informative pieces regarding the contested models 
of SJSR among Republican-Era professionals from disparate theoretical orientations in psychiatry 
and psychology. In Tropical Neurasthenia or Oriental Nerves, he addresses the topic of nervous 
illness and neurasthenia as an affliction of Westerners living in China. He describes how it is 
variously attributed to climate, cultural differences, repressed sexual desire, incessant status of 
being a gazed-upon foreigner, and constant exposure to the degraded sociological condition of 
China, as competing claims about its meaning were navigated by medical authorities.66  
Continuing his analysis of competing models among practitioners, Wang has recently 
outlined a role for neurasthenia in the development of the “psy disciplines” of Republican China. 
He begins with initial German and Japanese notions of the disorder as they exist in professional 
monographs and journal articles, which primarily view the epidemic as: “an adverse effect of 
modern lifestyle, which would destroy an individual’s physical and mental health and sap the 
nation’s vigor”.67 From those origins, he suggests that, by the 1940s, there was a trajectory of 
changing conceptualizations among professionals as SJSR was gradually understood to be the 
result of psychical conflict rather than an organic disease of the nervous system. Part of this he 
sees as an attempt to stake out territory and professional boundaries for the disease; rather than 
being a disease treatable by any physician, SJSR needed a clinician from the “psy disciplines”. 
The psy-clinicians at that time were competing with popular discourses of SJSR and the huge 
market of patent medicines, such as Ailuo brain tonic.68 Psychoanalytic/psychodynamic schools 
of thought, which were growing in influence, increasingly viewed the disorder as a series of 
neurotic symptoms that served as an escape from distressing social difficulties, a view growing in 
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prominence in the USA as well.69 However, Wang recognizes that there was also a vast “popular 
psychological discourse on neurasthenia in the late Republican Era” that was available to the 
everyday consumer, further complicating the rich history of the disorder.70 The same types of 
eclectic and varied approaches are also present in his analysis of Gu Jiegang’s experience with 
SJSR.71 
Though already mentioned, Hugh Shapiro should be applauded for producing insightful 
discussions of SJSR across a number of publications. His efforts at describing the assimilation of 
nerves in China are rigorous and thoughtful analyses of historical materials. The subject of his 
previously mentioned paper is taken up further in “How Different are Western and Chinese 
Medicine? The Case of Nerves”, which he prepares for a volume on the history of science across 
cultures.72 In short, his argument is that the term shenjing took root in the Chinese lexicon as a 
result, not of sophisticated efforts of anatomists and translators, but rather as a result of Japanese 
discourses of nervous weakness; in other words, the usefulness of the concept of “nerve” for 
physiological understanding was secondary to the ability to refer to nervous pathology in a way 
that related to “age old ideas about depletion”.73 
 One specific example of those old ideas of depletion can be seen in his work on 
spermatorrhea, or the loss of seminal fluid.74 Using literary, medical, and commercial materials 
from the Qing to the Republican Era, he offers a fascinating discussion regarding the concept of 
vital essence and the variety of ways that it can be depleted through the wanton or unintentional 
loss of seminal fluid. Thereafter he devotes one page to the “discourse of nerves”, and suggests 
that the spermatorrhea in Chinese medicine since late antiquity was reformulated as “a deep-seated 
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constitutional disorder arising from weakened nerves [and so] the nervous system became the new 
substrate for an age-old depletion disorder”.75 He concludes with the question as to whether SJSR 
in China represents a new disease or a different way of referring to the older disorder of depletion, 
yijing. He finds this question central to “understanding the modern transformation of the Chinese 
body”.76  
For the sake of being thorough, I point the reader to one more discussion of SJSR that 
Shapiro offers in an edited, illustrated history of Chinese medicine.77 As he seems to have the most 
thorough and rigorous grasp of the issues involved in SJSR’s rise and persistence in China, it is 
worth pointing out his struggle in conceptualizing the disorder. In this short piece, he calls it “a 
modern disease but also a disease of modern people”, and concludes that “neurasthenia in 
China ]might have less to do with the modernity that gave birth to this particular category of 
distress and more to do with underlying intuitions regarding how the body works”.78 He also states 
that, today, in “China’s major cities and leading medical centers, the term shenjing shuairuo has 
entirely dropped out of medical discourse, and educated youth in such places as Shanghai and 
Beijing find the term ‘neurasthenia’ alien and puzzling . . . [Y]et the idea lingers on, appearing in 
self-help manuals and often tied to insomnia. Some clinicians still publish articles on the 
condition”. 79  
In the first few pages of this chapter above, I have already demonstrated that SJSR has not 
dropped out of medical discourse, and it obviously cannot both be dropped from discourse and 
have clinicians publishing on it. This kind of tension as well as the tension in trying to understand 
the category in relation to “modernity” both point to the difficulties in knowing what we are 
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referring to by the term. It also demonstrates the manner in which Western discourse on SJSR has 
increasingly dismissed the diagnosis as obsolete or irrelevant.  
In a somewhat similar fashion to Shapiro’s look at spermatorrhea, Dikotter examines a 
large number of Republican-Era periodicals in his study of Sex, Culture and Modernity in China.80 
Within this work, neurasthenia occurs only a handful of times, in each instance relating 
neurasthenia to some aspect of the sexual function. For instance, spinsters who never absorbed 
invigorating male secretions might suffer neurasthenia and anemia in older age.81  Excessive 
intercourse could lead to sexual neurasthenia. 82  Excessive physical labor/activity during 
pregnancy could drain the finite resources of the nervous system.83 Excessive sexual promiscuity 
and masturbation could lead to nervous exhaustion. 84 In each of these instances, the view of SJSR 
that he documents, as described by his sources, is nearly identical to some of those views attributed 
to George Miller Beard, who first popularized the term neurasthenia in the late 1800s. In any case, 
Dikotter does not have a great deal to say regarding SJSR in that book, but he does make the case 
for a modernizing discourse that became available in the form of printed texts and shaped how 
readers viewed the world and their lives. Ultimately, he argues that modernizing discourses “were 
not generated by an integrated scientific community under state control, as in Germany during the 
same period, but by a loose association of more or less independent intellectuals from a variety of 
disciplines”85 that were ubiquitous in the everyday life of literate people, owing to the explosion 
of printing houses and commercial presses vying for public attention. He describes their effect as 
one wherein “new structures of knowledge were created, maintained and perpetuated through texts, 
which can be interpreted as semiotic encounters through which meanings that constitute social 
reality are exchanged . . . [T]exts both reflect and act upon the environment”.86  
Compared to those prior approaches to SJSR, this current project is rather different. 
Consider what has been presented thus far. The work of Wang helps us see how professionals have 
conceptualized the disorder over time, Shapiro helps us understand the intellectual history that 
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may have made the concept palatable, Dikotter has touched the surface of what Republican-Era 
citizens may have begun to believe about SJSR, and ACP writings take a synchronic look at the 
explanatory models and meanings of contemporary patients as they experience their illness.87 If 
an example of any one of these approaches is looked at carefully, it will be found that, in addition 
to the main aim of the research, some reference must be made to the other approaches for the 
purposes of background and clarification. For example, authors almost invariably offer a very brief 
description (sometimes one paragraph but at most a couple of pages) of the Western origins of 
SJSR, after which they often make briefer and uncritical reference to the interpretations of SJSR 
offered by ACP.88 Afterwards, the bulk of the writing is dedicated to the sources and aim of the 
respective writer.  
My goal in the present project is to answer my primary questions by addressing what can 
be known from all of these approaches; that is to say, within one project, address three areas of 
related concern. This is an effort to survey the whole epistemology of SJSR. Therefore, I dedicate 
space to the following 1) a detailed explication of neurasthenia’s geographical and historical 
origins; 2) a detailed consideration of what SJSR likely means to the average person in the 
twentieth-century;89 and 3) a detailed examination of the ACP approach since its inception, with 
the aim of demonstrating how it has served to re-frame and re-define SJSR in terms of the DSM. 
 In order to make clear to the reader that the chapters to follow are not engaged in some 
outdated straw man argument, let me briefly give some examples of how the materials addressed 
in chapters 4 and 5 have influenced the field of cultural psychiatry and its engagement with patients. 
Some readers of this manuscript might be tempted to suggest that the present work does not 
demonstrate an understanding of anthropology. In fact, I am not interested in the current fads in 
anthropological theory, driven by the winds of academic fashion. The fact that I spend large 
sections of this manuscript addressing anthropologists’ writings from the 1970s, 80s, and 90s ought 
not to misguide the reader into the false notion that I am dealing with outdated material, though 
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fads they once were (and continue to be for many, as indicated by the material listed in the next 
pages and in subsequent chapters). When picking up a book subtitled What Anthropology and 
Psychiatry Tell Us about China Today, there can be no doubt that the text is involved in making a 
claim about the role of anthropology.90 The inadequacy of the claims in that text, specifically with 
respect to SJSR, are dealt with clearly in the concluding chapter below. That book was published 
in 2011 and can hardly be considered an “early work” of its individual authors and editor. The 
point more clearly to be made is that the authors of that text have had a large and lasting impact 
on cultural psychiatry, and the “seminal” claims and interpretations of Chinese experience with 
SJSR that arose from the “New Cross-Cultural Psychiatry” are continuing to cloud the hermeneutic 
frame through which contemporary writers view the East Asian experience.91  
 For example, in 2018 Cambridge University Press published the Textbook of Cultural 
Psychiatry, purported to be “the best response currently available in the psychiatric literature” to 
the complex array of unmet needs in regard to a “culturally informed approach to psychiatric 
training, clinical practice and research”.92 As an authoritative text on matters pertaining to the 
intersection of culture, social science, and psychiatric knowledge, the volume pulls together 
numerous chapters authored by various scholars in the field. With regard to SJSR, a common 
theme can easily be found.  
 In the fourth chapter, titled “Psychology and Cultural Psychiatry,” we read that, 
“Kleinman’s suggestion that depression can also vary across cultures and across different historical 
epochs is quite consistent with a biological view of depression . . . Kleinman has suggested that 
while depression and neurasthenia are different illness experiences, they are both products of the 
same underlying disease process—depression. In other words, neurasthenia is the Chinese version 
of ‘Western’ depression . . . Kleinman believes that the ultimate cause of depression and 
neurasthenia is the same . . . In summary then, Kleinman (1980, 1982) suggested that depression 
and neurasthenia have similar socio-political origins, which produce a similar biological disease 
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process, which expresses itself differently in North America and China because the different 
cultural conditions favor different forms of expression”.93 
 In the eleventh chapter, titled “Psychopathology and the Role of Culture,” we read that, 
“Kleinman (1982) conducted a clinical study of patients diagnosed by Chinese clinicians as having 
neurasthenia, and observed that 87 percent of the patients he examined could be ‘re-diagnosed’ as 
having a depressive disorder according to Western criteria. However, many prominent Chinese 
psychiatrists insisted that neurasthenia was a recognized psychiatric disorder distinct from 
depressive disorders . . . Thus parallel diagnoses need to be looked at closely in research and 
clinical criteria”.94  
 In the eighteenth chapter, titled “Neurotic Disorders: Anxiety and Fear Related, 
Dissociative and Bodily Distress Disorders,” we read that, “Shenjing Shuairuo, known as 
neurasthenia in the West, is a condition highly prevalent among the Chinese . . . There is an 
ongoing debate regarding whether or not this is a Chinese label for depressive disorders”.95 The 
authors continue in a later section by claiming that, “Neurasthenia, also known as chronic fatigue 
syndrome (CFS), is a condition of uncertain cause commonly ascribed to the effect of stresses of 
modern life on the human nervous system”.96 After a brief discussion of Japan they go on to 
mention that, “In China, neurasthenia or shenjing shuairou meaning weakness of nerves is reported 
by intellectual individuals with probable socio-political factors underlying the cause”.97 
 In chapter twenty, titled “Affective Disorders Coloured by Culture: Why the Pigment of 
Depression is More Than Skin Deep,” we read that, “Major depressive episodes (MDEs) as defined 
by DSM are fundamentally a Western Construct . . . Kleinman in the 1980s suggested that the 
diagnosis of neurasthenia was highly prevalent in China (shenjing shuairuo) and manifested there 
by way of bodily symptoms, including weakness, fatigue, tiredness, headaches, dizziness and 
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gastrointestinal afflictions (Kleinman 1982). His seminal work emphasizes that depression can 
manifest differently depending on the cultural context in which it occurs”.98 
 A familiarity with the cultural psychiatric literature should make clear that I have not 
misunderstood the impact of the intersection of anthropology and psychiatry when it comes to 
SJSR, especially as I critique it in chapters 4 and 5 below. The citations listed in the preceding 
paragraphs draw directly from and rely on the work of Kleinman. The impact of that literature on 
psychiatric theorizing and practice is clearly being referenced in the World Psychiatric 
Association’s 2002 consensus statement on neurasthenia where we read, “Contrary to some current 
beliefs and recent reports, Neurasthenia syndrome is a common problem occurring in all parts of 
the world. The syndrome has significant negative consequences for individuals and to society and 
is therefore a public health problem of major importance requiring improved recognition, 
understanding, research and education”.99 Nevertheless, the neurasthenia-depression controversy 
is alive and well, and current attempts at understanding that controversy continue to generate 
interesting philosophical discussion.100 
SJSR has become deeply ingrained in the lives and thinking of Chinese-speaking people 
over the past 130 years. It is my desire that the pages that follow help to broaden our view of SJSR 
as a category of human experience  I suggest that since its first encounter with SJSR, Western 
psychiatry has engaged in a rather hegemonic effort at reducing the concept to a size and shape 
that fits the DSM, beginning with DSM-3 and continuing to the present edition. I hope this project 
makes possible the consideration that SJSR may still be relevant for some forms of human 
suffering, perhaps even outside of Chinese experience. I also offer a warning for psychiatry 
regarding what is at stake in the creation of nosologies and their conceptual categories, as there 
are (as yet) poorly understood ways in which beliefs about experience can have real and 
physical/embodied consequences for the persons holding those beliefs. It is too early to determine 
to what extent Western psychiatry has or will succeed in convincing the Chinese that SJSR is an 
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obsolete or invalid category; we also do not know what future resistance to Western impositions 
of “knowledge” will arise with China’s growing influence in the world. Perhaps one day the DSM 
will re-incorporate an SJSR-like category. With these ideas and goals in mind, I now turn to the 




Chapter 2: Western Origins of Neurasthenia 
 “Mr. Bennet . . . you take delight in vexing me. You have no compassion on my poor nerves”. 
“You mistake me, my dear. I have a high respect for your nerves. They are my old friends. I have 
heard you mention them with consideration these twenty years at least”. 
“Ah! You do not know what I suffer”. 
Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice (1813), Chapter 1, p. 3. (Mr. and Mrs. Bennet) 
 
In the 2005 film adaptation of Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, Brenda Blethyn gives a 
wonderful performance of the extremely nervous Mrs. Bennet, who is the mother of the main 
protagonist in the novel. Upon hearing that her young Lydia has eloped with Mr. Wickham, Mrs. 
Bennett laments the suffering that the situation causes her: “Lydia must know what this is doing 
to my nerves, such convulsions, such spasms over my body!” The brief monologue that continues 
in this scene is not depicted exactly the same way in the novel, but we read in Chapter 46 that, as 
a result of the news, Mrs. Bennet has becomes so ill that she keeps to her room without any ability 
to exert herself whatsoever (p. 280). Her character in the story is representative of a type of person 
not unknown to readers of the day, and her complaint that others are not sensitive enough to her 
“poor nerves” (p. 3, 4, 118) is one that is repeated both within the novel and across other works as 
well.   
For example, in Austen’s 1811 novel, Sense and Sensibility, Marianne’s “nerves could not 
then bear any sudden noise” (p. 162), “she has had a nervous complaint on her for several weeks” 
(p. 183), has “nervous irritability” (p. 143), “she is very nervous” (p. 191), and has “nervous 
headaches” (p. 176). Almost one hundred years earlier, Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe 
(originally published in 1719) makes reference to illness and fatigue that lead the protagonist to 
declare, “I had frequent convulsions in my nerves and limbs for some time” (p. 87). Sir Walter 
Scott made reference to nerves in Ivanhoe (1820), The Betrothed (1825), and in The Talisman 
(1825), where we read that indulgence and debauchery in use of Hakim’s elixir will “rend the 
nerves”, a result of the misuse of all those things “Allah hath sent on earth for a blessing”(p. 150). 
Dickens used the adjectival form several times in Oliver Twist (1838–1839), and referred to 
“nervous” persons sixteen times in Nicholas Nickleby (1838–1839), both works being published 
serially over the course of approximately a year. The notion was also popular outside of England, 




(p. 17, 23) among other such descriptors that occur at least seven times throughout his Tales of a 
Traveler (1824). Similarly, nervous derangement, nervous affection, and the like occur thirteen 
times in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin.101   
The list could, and does, go on; but for the present purposes, suffice it to say that by the 
very early nineteenth century there was an established discourse of nerves and nervousness that 
was commonly in use and figured regularly in fiction and popular discourse from the period. We 
have inherited the remnants of that discourse; and even though characters like Mrs. Bennet may 
seem not to exist any longer, we still speak their language. The use may have passed into the realm 
of metaphor, but English speakers are still at home describing ourselves as “nervous” about an 
upcoming event, for example. Similarly, it is not at all odd to claim that some obnoxious music 
“gets on my nerves” or that “I am on my last nerve”. Rather, we are still quite comfortable using 
phrases like “nervous breakdown”, “nervous wreck”, and the like, in an era where our actual nerve 
cells are not really what we consider to be at issue. Regarding this inherited language, there are 
two things should be kept in mind while reviewing the history elaborated in the following pages. 
First, it is important to consider that literary representations of characters like Mrs. Bennet, 
although comical or annoying, are very much representations of human suffering, and the language 
that we have inherited from that time is still very much an indicator of pathos, at least weakly so. 
Despite the fact that nervous individuals may have been hard to tolerate or get along with, their 
suffering was very real regardless of the extent to which their sensations and experiences were 
“real” or imagined, self-induced or caused by something outside their control. Today we use their 
language to describe our own bodily sensations when we no longer feel tranquil, calm, or within 
our normal range of comfort. Unfortunately, it is easy to forget that at one time such terms could 
be used to refer to experiences that were often far more severe or complicated than the 
metaphorical indicator of discomfort it has become in English and some other European languages.  
Second, it should be pointed out that the inheriting of nerve metaphors described above is 
simply not the same when it comes to the quintessential nervous disorder, neurasthenia. In fact, it 
is probably safe to say that many native English speakers have never heard of the concept, much 
less are they likely to employ it as part of their vocabulary, even metaphorically. Of course, some 
languages may refer to the universal experience of “feeling nervous” without even making 
                                                             




reference to nerves at all. Such is the case with Chinese, Japanese, and Hindi, for example. 
Interestingly in the Chinese context, although there is no meaningful sense that feeling nervous 
about something could elicit the idea of feeling shenjing, it is conceivable that feeling very nervous 
or anxious about something could, at the very least, elicit a reference to neurasthenia.102 In such a 
case, we would find usage to be the exact opposite of English idiom. Some reasons for this 
difference with respect to the English language cultural/linguistic context will be addressed briefly 
towards the end of this chapter and in other chapters. More importantly, however, it is worthwhile 
to look at some of the circumstances that gave rise to the popular discourse of nerves and 
nervousness generally, and to neurasthenia in particular. These modes of discourse are an 
important development in the psychosomatic/somato-psychic understanding of the human person 
as it has developed in the field of medicine around the world. It is therefore my aim in this chapter 
to introduce a rudimentary background that can serve to contextualize both nerves and 
neurasthenia, the ultimate aim of which, in the following chapters, is to consider neurasthenic 
discourse in China and Japan as a specific development in, and contribution to, psychosomatic 
medicine.103 This chapter is divided into five main sections: 
1) The first section is an attempt to provide some background to the earliest writings on nerves or 
nervous ailments. In the seventeenth century, there was as an increasingly forceful challenge to 
classical humoral theories of specific diseases, which infiltrated both the medical and popular 
lexicons, making nerves and nervousness fashionable. 
2) In the second section, I briefly describe the increasingly negative light in which nervous ailments 
began to be viewed, from the mid-eighteenth century until the late nineteenth century. I will also 
explain some of the changes in how the pathology of nervous diseases was conceptualized. This 
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includes a summary of the growing notion at that time that there are certain diseases without any 
describable physical lesion; these came to be termed “functional lesions”. 
3) The third section begins with George Beard’s popularization of the term neurasthenia and its 
spread in both the United States and Europe.  
4) In the fourth section, I will discuss some of the controversy pertaining to neurasthenia’s 
legitimacy as a clinical concept in the decades after 1869 and offer possible reasons for its decline 
in the early twentieth century. 
5) I will conclude the chapter with a brief discussion of how the western origins of “nervous” 
discourse are important for understanding Arthur Kleinman’s model of SJSR and somatization in 
China. 
 The material in this chapter has been the subject of numerous book-length studies in the 
history of medicine, including detailed accounts of the various transitions in historical schools of 
medical theorizing. I will briefly refer to some of the changes in thought and the social contexts 
that coincide with those changes when they serve to highlight a new way of thinking about nervous 
disease. This is the case, for example, with the various ways of defining nervous system lesions 
and the increase of nervous disorder, but I do not cover those issues in detail as I have chosen 
instead to point the reader to other sources. In addition to a broad secondary literature, I also make 
wide use of numerous primary sources whenever I think it helpful, which is often.  
 
2.1 The Rise of Nervous Discourse through the Mid-Eighteenth Century 
It is not within the scope of this project to provide a detailed history of the epistemological 
transitions that took place with respect to the field of medical science now called psychiatry. 
However, it should be noted that nervousness and nerve discourse represent a paradigm shift away 
from more classical theorizing on emotional complaints. As other scholars have pointed out, prior 
to this shift, disease conditions were theorized on the basis of classical models inherited from 
Hippocrates and Galen. 104  The etymologies behind some of the major illness categories of 
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antiquity also serve to illustrate this point. For instance, some etiological assumptions can be 
inferred from the disease names melancholy (Greek melanos-khloe “dark bile”), hypochondria 
(hypo-khondriakos “below the cartilage/lower abdomen”), and hysteria (hystera “womb/uterus”), 
all three of which fell within the rubric of nervous disease, once the concept was developed. One 
point that should be uncontroversial is that, even though these categories relied on humoral theory 
and the notion of diseased abdominal organs105  to account for the maladies now considered 
psychiatric, they ought to be considered psychosomatic theories insofar as they readily recognized 
the effect that such “bodily” diseases had on emotion, thought, and mood. Furthermore, there had 
long been at least some recognition, dating back to Galen and Hippocrates, that emotion, thought, 
mood, and the passions could also affect very detrimental changes on various parts of the body.106 
However, as should slowly become clear, body/thought theorizing historically took place within a 
continuum wherein medical and public opinions swung between extremes of somatic and psychic 
causation.  
The fear, sorrow, worry, indigestion, flatulence, belching, headaches, irregular pulse, 
difficulty breathing, insomnia, and other disturbances that were indicative of diseases of the 
hypochondrium had been attributed, since Hippocrates and Galen, to the various disregulations of 
biles and harmful vapors, which resulted from ailing organs that sat below the rib-cage (hence the 
Greek name). Robert Burton’s famous 1621 work, The Anatomy of Melancholy, is the most famous 
and representative example of the type of theorizing that went into explaining such ailments during 
the Renaissance and prior to the introduction of nerve discourse.107 “It may properly be called the 
first psychiatric cyclopaedia for nearly one thousand authors are cited, about half of them medical 
men”.108 The diverse array of causal forces that Burton took into consideration in his work, all of 
which fell within humoral discourse, was not uncommon to works pertaining to similar illness 
descriptions in the more than 1500 years before him, as well as for at least 100 years after his 
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death.109 Even though the mind-body relationship worked causally in more than one direction, 
Burton pre-dated any discussion of the nervous system as was later to come to light from dissection 
and anatomical study.  
In the second century, Galen systematized the views of Hippocrates. In this systemization, 
classical medical theory maintained that, among the four humors (blood, yellow bile, black bile, 
and phlegm), black bile accounted for disease conditions in a number of ways. “One of these was 
a primary disease of the brain, with only a local excess of black bile. In the other two types the 
brain was affected only secondarily. In one of the secondary forms . . . melancholia 
hypochondriaca, the primary disease was in the upper abdominal area with the resultant flatulence 
and digestive disturbances”.110 Black bile was thought to be filtered out of the blood via the liver, 
gaining its thickness and pathogenic abilities. It was then believed to undergo transformations in 
the spleen before being changed either into nutrients or elements of blood, after which, relocation 
to the stomach could either aid digestion or cause stomach disturbances. Ultimately, evaporations 
of the humor in the stomach could result in vapors that might later rise to the brain. If the spleen 
or liver failed to do its job for whatever reason, harmful vapors could be the end result; a disordered 
stomach could also initiate the disease process, and the numerous titles of medical texts published 
on the topic bewray these theoretical commitments.111 The classical, humoral views that were 
summarized by Burton were soon to enter decline as physicians attempted to incorporate growing 
anatomical understandings that had been on the rise at least since the mid-1500s.112 
From the middle of the eighteenth century, there appears to be an increased interest among 
physicians to find the source of certain medical complaints in the anatomical system of the nerves 
and brain. This shift can be traced, along with the growing number of challengers to the classical 
etiologies, through Thomas Willis113 (1621–1675), who introduced the term “neurology”, Thomas 
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Sydenham (1624–1689), Sir Richard Blackmore (1653–1729), Nicholas Robinson (1697–1775), 
George Cheyne (1671–1743), Robert Whytt (1714–1766), and to William Cullen (1712–1790), 
who coined the term “neurosis”.114 Other scholars have rigorously documented the changing 
understandings of melancholy, hypochondria, and related distempers across the writings of these 
and contemporaneous authors, and it is not necessary to repeat that effort here.115 Instead, a brief 
summary will suffice before considering neurasthenia. 
Scholars differ as to who most influenced the popularization of “nervous disease” as a 
concept. For example, Heather Beatty has suggested that, “Nervous disease first achieved 
widespread attention as a nationally significant disorder early in the eighteenth century, with the 
work of the Bath physician, George Cheyne”, whose 1733 text is titled The English Malady; or, A 
Treatise of Nervous Diseases of All Kinds, as Spleen, Vapours, Lowness of Spirits, 
Hypochondriacal and Hysterical Distempers.116 Lopez-Pinero, on the other hand, argues that “the 
series of monographs” published during the early eighteenth century on the topic of nervous 
disorders “culminated with the publication of a book by Robert Whytt”, in 1765, titled 
Observations on the Nature, Causes and Cures of those Disorders which are commonly called 
Nervous, Hypochondriac, or Hysteric.117 According to Lopez, it was Whytt’s text, published more 
than thirty years after that of Cheyne, that had the stronger influence. He claims, “Nervous disease 
became a fashionable diagnosis because of Whytt’s reputation”.118 The apparent difference is 
probably a minor one that can be resolved by considering the different audiences for the texts in 
question; Whytt had a stronger influence on other physicians while Cheyne was likely to have 
influenced a lay readership, as can be inferred from discussions to follow below. 
Hypochondria, hysteria, melancholy, and their varied symptoms had been referred to as 
“nervous” conditions at least since the first decade of the eighteenth century, and discussions about 
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the role of the nervous system in explaining classical disease entities began even sooner.119 As 
early as 1667, London physician, Thomas Willis, wrote his Essay of the Pathology of the Brain 
and Nervous Stock: In which Convulsive Diseases are Treated of, which indicated by its title the 
aim of focusing on the role of the brain.120 Although still deeply entrenched in seventeenth century 
and classical thought, Willis rejected the “wondering womb” conception of hysteria, as well as the 
idea that hysteria was specific to women, arguing that hysteria was the result of the brain and of 
the nerves that ran from the brain to the rest of the body.121Willis employed both Galenic notions 
alongside knowledge gained from dissection and anatomy, in a revolutionary attempt to account 
for classical disease conditions like melancholy: 
Sometimes the Melancholy, being disturb’d in the spleen, conveys thence the passion to 
the brain, whence disorderly and hypochondriacal fancies happen: And on the contrary, 
when violent Passion of the mind, occasionally rais’d within the brain troubles the Spirits 
residing in it, the impression given the fancy, is convey’d to the spleen by the course and 
successive affect of the spirits, lying within the nerves.122 
Richard Blackmore’s 1725 monograph, A Treatise of the Spleen and Vapours, Or 
Hypocondriacal and Hysterical Affections, mentions the term “nervous” at least thirty-five times, 
usually in the context of irritated nervous-fibers or the otherwise “tender and delicate constitution 
of the nervous system”.123 Blackmore maintained that patients in his day were embarrassed by the 
diagnoses of hysteria and hypochondria due to the odd ideas such patients were expected to hold, 
as well as the derision and contempt that they met socially.124 It was the notion of a tender nervous 
system that Cheyne capitalized upon, when in 1733, he postulated that a third of all conditions of 
complaint in England were “nervous” in nature (preface, p. ii).125 Cheyne’s text serves as a famous 
example of attributing various medical phenomena, later to fall within the purview of psychiatry, 
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to the particular romanticized aspects of a certain class. For Cheyne, it was the refined sensibilities 
of the upper-class English who most suffered from the confluence of delicate nervous systems, an 
unfavorable climate, and the luxurious living available to advanced, civilized society. 
 
 
Figure 2: Front page of Cheyne’s The English Malady 
 
Roy Porter suggests that, “by characterizing nervous debility as the archetypal malady of 
the elite, Cheyne seemed to imply that to be truly fashionable, it was necessary to display at least 
a little mental abnormality or emotional anxiety”.126 Following the example set by Blackmore’s 
reference to the “English Spleen” and Burton’s reference to the melancholic suffering of scholars, 
Cheyne was able to combine and popularize the notion that the refined life of those exceptional 
higher classes facilitated the distempers that were common to susceptible people with delicate 
                                                             




nervous systems.127 In his chapter on exercise for nervous distempers, he wrote that “the common 
division of mankind, into Quick thinkers, Slow thinkers, and No thinkers, is not without foundation 
in nature and true philosophy. Persons of slender and weak Nerves are generally of the first Class: 
the Activity, Mobility and Delicacy of their intellectual Organs make them so”.128 These ideas, 
repeated in the advertisement for the work, along with Cheyne’s overall project, are considered to 
be one of the major contributions to the popularity of nerves as they figured in the language of the 
period. The same can be said for literature of sensibility, or the sentimental novel, which had its 
beginnings with Cheyne’s close friend Samuel Richardson, author of the epistolary novels Pamela 
(1740) and Clarissa (1748).129 The language and literature of the era were inseparable from the 
romantic discourse of nerves, which claimed exceptional sensibilities for those suffering from 
nervous disease.130  
 
2.2 Nerve Discourse from the Late Eighteenth Century to 1869 
 Such popularization of nervous diseases may have been one motivation behind Robert 
Whytt’s 1764 publication of Observations. The Edinburgh professor was weary of the haphazard 
use of “nervous” as a diagnosis and set about to offer an objective categorization of such illnesses, 
but in the end he concluded on the “impossibility of fixing a certain criterion, by which nervous 
disorders may be distinguished from all others”.131 Nevertheless, he was able to provide a list of 
symptoms by which physicians could attempt to distinguish between the complaints of the “simply 
nervous”, “hysterics”, and “hypochondriacs”. More importantly, even though he did not make the 
                                                             
127 In the preface to his Treatise on page vi, Blackmore states that the “English spleen, as I have now named it, and 
as I have described it in the following pages, is comparatively but seldom found among the inhabitants of other 
countries”. Richard Burton dedicates a chapter to the melancholy of scholars, and defines it as a cause on page 201 
of volume one of his Anatomy. 
128 George Cheyne, The English Malady (1733) (Scholars’ Facsimiles & Reprints, 1976), 26. 
129 Raymond Stephanson, “Richardson’s ‘Nerves’: The Physiology of Sensibility in Clarissa,” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 49, no. 2 (April 1, 1988): 267–85, doi:10.2307/2709500; G. J. Barker-Benfield, The Culture of Sensibility: Sex 
and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain (University of Chicago Press, 1996).  Stephanson presents very clearly 
that Clarissa’s cause of death was her nerves, something she argues other literary theorists ignore completely. 
130 In fact, Stephanson offers a scathing critique of numerous literary theorists, some very respected (e.g., 
Eagleton), who she sees as having used “the text to score points for a particular literary-critical methodology or 
political-sexual ideology [and] sometimes tended to obscure or deflect attention from the novel's historical 
contexts and circumstances, or at least to make history secondary to the needs of current critical theories” (268). 
Unfortunately, she does not go far enough. She fails to point out that it really does appear that such abuse of texts, 
without any concern for this type of infidelity to the intellectual/historical backgrounds of their creation and 
reception, is seemingly ubiquitous in the humanities. 




evaluative judgments regarding a link between increased levels of civilization and nervous 
disorder that were common to Cheyne and the popular understanding, he did confirm the idea that 
nervous diseases were more likely to occur in those persons with more delicate nervous systems. 
Such patients experienced exaggerated or extreme sensations arising from relations of “sympathy” 
between differing parts of the body. Sympathy that became pathological could lead to the nervous 
diseases. 
Since Hippocratic times, “sympathy” was a recognized phenomenon whereby disparate 
parts of the body were found to share relationships such as consensual pupillary dilation in the 
eyes, pain at a distance (e.g., pain in the face from a rotten tooth), or vomiting associated with 
inflammation in the kidneys.132 In the first chapter of his Observations, titled “Of the Structure, 
Use, and Sympathy of the Nerves”, Whytt set out to establish nervous disease as a legitimate object 
of medical concern by arguing that both “general” and “specific” sympathies in the body were 
inseparable from sensibilities that were made possible only by the nerves (as opposed to something 
like humoral interaction). In 1681 Thomas Willis had already proposed a possible explanation for 
how there might be functional (sympathetic) interactions across disparate parts of the body. 
Specifically, Willis had identified the “intercostal” nerve structure, which was later named the 
Grand Sympathique (and is known as the sympathetic trunk today). In opposition to Willis’s model, 
Whytt argued very strongly that the sympathy attributed to the “intercostal” could not arise merely 
from nerve anastomoses between organs. Rather, he believed that the role of the intercostal in 
creating sympathy had to be mediated via nerves’ interaction with the spinal “marrow” and the 
brain.133 This overlooked detail of Whytt’s is arguably the first brain-body explanatory model 
accounting for somatic complaints, a topic which will be addressed in the next chapters. 
 The last major figure in the eighteenth century who worked to establish the seriousness of 
nerves in the research of “physic” was William Cullen. His writings are cited by historians for 
having coined the term “neurosis” in his Synopsis Nosologiae Methodicae (1769), but he also 
popularized a school of thought, now known as “neural pathology”, that claimed the central place 
for the nervous system in all disease processes and described a nerve “power” or force that 
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originated in the brain and circulated throughout the nervous system.134 His nosology was less well 
accepted, but it is worth mentioning briefly since later advances in cellular pathology slowly 
dismantled nosological attempts like Cullen’s.  
Cullen’s classification provided discreet categories for “neuroses” that were considered to 
be general diseases of the nervous system. These included reduced involuntary movements (e.g., 
reflexes), reduced voluntary movements (e.g., comas), spasms (abnormal muscle or fiber 
movements), and “vesaniea” (Latin ves “not” + saniea “sane”) or altered judgments/mental 
derangement.135 Hypochondria fell under the category of diminished involuntary movements, 
hysteria fell under spasms, and both melancholia and mania fell under vesaniea. A simple glance 
at these categories makes clear that numerous phenomena could be classified under Cullen’s 
“neuroses” that are not presently considered to be psychiatric in any sense. In fact, Cullen included 
diarrhea, diabetes, whooping cough, and other conditions under his classification of “spasmi” 
neuroses in his First Lines of the Practice of Physic.136 This seemingly odd classification was the 
result of Cullen’s desire to interpret clinical phenomena through the etiological model of general, 
nervous system causation. When seen this way, it makes sense that diarrhea, for example, would 
be considered a spasmodic disorder of nerves that causes the excessive contraction of the bowels. 
This intended meaning of “neurosis” was quite literally a disease of the nervous system. A century 
later, the changing views in physiology brought about by cellular pathology established the belief 
that most of Cullen’s neuroses were not really nervous system pathologies at all. Before cellular 
pathology, however, nervous diseases were to move even further away from being fashionable 
maladies, while becoming increasingly associated with growing social problems.  
The end of the eighteenth and the beginning of nineteenth century saw some changes in 
the way nervous diseases were viewed. While they had been somewhat romanticized in early 
eighteenth century medical publications and in the period’s literature, the close of the century 
brought a more pessimistic view. Whytt and Cullen had attempted dispassionate scholarship on 
the topic in the mid-eighteenth century, but nineteenth century physicians had very strong opinions 
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about the moral decline that accounted for nervous ailments believed to be on the rise. Thomas 
Trotter, a Scottish naval physician, published a text on the topic in 1807, the position of which, 
although resonant with earlier ethnocentric theories of the diseases, cannot be mistaken as anything 
other than demeaning. Because Trotter attempted to describe the nervous disorders as best as he 
could, given the developments within medical practice, he offered a lengthy definition of what the 
categories had come to mean; I quote him at length.  
Nervous feelings, nervous affections, or weak nerves, tho’ scarcely to be resolved into 
technical language, or reduced to a generick definition, are in the present day terms much 
employed by medical people, as well as patients; because the expression is known to 
comprehend what cannot be so well explained. An inaptitude to muscular action, or some 
pain in exerting it; an irksomeness, or dislike to attend to business and the common affairs 
of life; a selfish desire of engrossing the sympathy and attention of others to the narration 
of their own sufferings; with fickleness and unsteadiness of temper, even to irascibility; 
and accompanied more or less with dyspeptic symptoms, are the leading characteristics of 
nervous disorders; to be referred in general, to debility, increased sensibility, or torpor of 
the alimentary canal.137 
This definition does not refer to the classical categories of hysteria, hypochondria, or 
melancholy, and the terms only appear in the larger text four, four, and two times respectively, 
without any explanation of their intended meaning. It seems unlikely that the historic categories 
had lost their understood meaning, but the vagueness of nervous debility made their delineation 
less necessary by the time of Trotter’s writing in England. Among the interesting claims in the text, 
however, three stand out as being worthy of note. 
 First, Trotter continued to perpetuate the nationalist discourse that was so prominent in 
Cheyne. Regarding international comparisons Trotter wrote that, “It is probable the other countries 
of Europe do not exhibit such general examples of these diseases; as many of their causes are to 
be traced to the peculiar situation of Britain; its insular varieties of climate and atmosphere; its 
political institutions and free government; and above everything, its vast wealth, so diffused among 
all ranks of people”.138 The organization of his book also evinces this perspective, as it first 
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discusses the health of the “savage”, which is compared to the nervous diseases that occur among 
“civilized mankind”.139 In this way, Trotter claimed for civilization the status of an indirect cause 
of nervous ailments. Second, although he maintained the nationalist outlook, he denied that the 
diseases were indicative of any special status intranationally, since he claimed that the “nervous 
aliments are no longer confined to the better ranks in life, but [are] rapidly extending to the poorer 
classes”.140 In other words, even though the least estimable in British society were still seen as far 
superior to uncivilized savages (international comparison), the nervous ailments were nothing to 
be proud of insofar as they also befell the lowest social classes (intranational). This raises the issue 
of Trotter’s third claim regarding the more direct causes of nervous ailments. Specifically, he 
claimed that nervous weakness, more than any other disease, “is induced by indolence, by sloth, 
and want of active motion” and it “puts on the form of every other complaint, and becomes one of 
the greatest stings to human happiness”.141 He thought that a “life of indolence . . . led under 
luxuriant diet, joined to the liberal use of fermented liquors” was one of the representative 
examples of what was causing the nervous ailments among his countrymen.142 In other words, 
nervous ailments had begun to lose their former glamor.  
Historian Heather Beatty has convincingly argued that by 1800, British nervousness had 
become “a disease of the masses”, “a disease of the weak willed”, and “a disease of the softer sex”; 
and views similar to those of Thomas Trotter were increasingly shared in magazines, medical 
books, and newspapers.143 She points out that “increasingly negative attitudes toward nervous 
women were also reflected in novels of the eighteenth century. Whereas the fainting heroines in 
the sentimental literature of the early part of the century were celebrated for the strength of their 
debilitating sensibility, the heroines of nineteenth-century novels exhibited stronger command of 
their deep feelings”.144 This shift towards growing impatience with the nervous sufferer meant that 
some physicians felt it necessary to counterbalance the growing harshness of popular attitudes, 
and one such example can be found in John Reid’s (1776–1822, English physician) 1821 
monograph, Essays on Hypochondriasis and other Nervous Affections. Reid wrote: “Nervous 
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diseases, from their daily increasing prevalence, deserve, at the present time, a more than ordinary 
degree of attention and interest on the part of the medical practitioner. Yet . . . we often act upon 
the ill-founded idea that such complaints are altogether dependent upon the power of the will”.145 
While he did not deny the common notion that nervous diseases continued to proliferate, Reid did 
take issue with the idea that the individual sufferer could ameliorate their ailment by an act of will. 
He went on to criticize those who suggested that the plight of nervous patients resulted from their 
own “imaginary sorrow”, which would merely require a change of perspective about their own 
lives. Reid chose not to attribute blame to the sufferer. On the surface, this view seems at odds 
with the likes of Thomas Trotter and others who attributed the ailments to the lifestyle, choices, 
and mentality of the patient. As mid-century approached, however, new ideas were further 
complicating how nervousness was understood.  
The situation outside England at the turn of the nineteenth century was not much different. 
For example, Benjamin Rush, father of American psychiatry and student of William Cullen, stated 
in 1774 that “the hysteric and hypochondriac disorders, once peculiar to the chambers of the great 
are now to be found in our kitchens and workshops. All these diseases have been produced by our 
having deserted the simple diet and manners of out ancestors”.146 The belief that the nervous 
ailments were becoming increasingly common among the lower classes seems to have become the 
norm by 1800, and theories on social decline and degeneracy were not uncommon in political 
theory, criminology, and medicine.147 However, there were some changing or disparate views 
regarding the anatomic mechanisms underlying nervous disorders, and these differences gave rise 
to vocabulary that was to facilitate how physicians conceptualized the variety of disorders. 
Historians of psychiatry seem generally to agree that, by the end of the eighteenth century, three 
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distinct schools of thought had developed regarding the concept of neurosis.148 These were the 
naturphilosophie, the anatomo-clinical, and the pathophysiological schools. 
A detailed account of the changes in these historical schools can be found in Lopez-
Pinero.149 Though an oversimplification, it is sufficient to categorize naturphilosophie as an out-
growth of German romantic philosophy that was not involved in detailed anatomic examinations 
of clinical phenomena. The anatomo-clinical school was popularized by Pinel and Georget, and 
can be characterized by its focus on the search for anatomical lesions. According to Lopez-Pinero, 
it was this shift away from symptom as central focus, toward anatomical lesion, which became the 
basis of medicine.150 One can summarize the period by stating that the priorities of the anatomo-
clinical school led to the identification of increasing numbers of structural lesions via physical 
examination of patients both in life and post-mortem. However, it became clear to many physicians 
that some diseases, especially those traditionally considered to be “nervous” diseases, persisted in 
the apparent absence of any structural, anatomical lesion. This fact raised serious problems for 
how such diseases should be conceptualized. Highlighting this tension, Hodgkiss has argued that 
the anatomo-clinical school gave rise to the concept of lesion-less symptoms at the turn of the 
century with the coining of new terms. In his Nosographie Philosophique of 1798, Philippe Pinel, 
one of the fathers of modern psychiatry, appropriated and altered the meaning of Cullen’s term, 
making the absence of any tissue lesion central to his own concept of “neurosis”.151 Three years 
later in 1801, physician and anatomist Francois Chaussier introduced the term “neuralgia” to 
describe cases of pain in the absence of any lesion. The pathophysiological school is considered 
to be a modification of the anatomo-clinical method in response to its failure to “redefine the 
neuroses in morphological and localizationist terms”.152 A number of theories and explanatory 
paradigms building on the anatomo-clinical school arose in the first half of the nineteenth century 
and need not be discussed here. Instead, it is more informative merely to focus on one particular 
contribution to the conceptualization of nervous diseases that came directly from the 
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physiopathological view of neurosis, before moving on to discuss the arrival of neurasthenia as a 
concept.  
The tenth chapter of Michel Foucault’s Birth of the Clinic appears to credit the French 
physician Francois Broussais (1772–1838) with initiating the resolution of the problem of lesion-
less diseases, which plagued the anatomo-clinicians’ attempts to correlate physical lesion with 
pathology.153 The context of Foucault’s chapter is more closely associated with the ontological 
status of fevers and inflammation, but as Hodgkiss points out, Broussais was also interested in the 
problem of aches and pains absent structural lesion.154 While it is not necessary to attend to 
Broussais’s theories in detail, it is important to note that his predominant focus was on the concept 
of “irritation” in specific organs, and the transmission of that irritation by the nerves. It should also 
be mentioned that his move towards irritation as an explanatory concept was not without precedent, 
as historian of psychiatry Edward Shorter has pointed out previously.155  
Unfortunately, it appears that Broussais overemphasized gastroenteric irritation as a cause 
of many, if not most diseases, a fact for which he has been criticized. Nevertheless, his 
conceptualization “that disease was not an ontological ‘other’ but the result of altered functions—
too much or too little of regular processes” — revitalized the concept of “irritation” as a central 
characteristic of pathology. 156  Before turning to further developments in such functional 
conceptualizations of nervous diseases, it is worth quoting a section of his A Treatise on Physiology 
Applied to Pathology, which speaks of “the manner in which the Exercise of the Intellectual 
Faculties disorders health”, since his description is very much in concert with the descriptions of 
neurasthenia that were to come only a few decades later. He wrote: 
In the lowest grade of the intellectual operations . . . sudden perturbations never arise . . . 
It is thus, that purely intellectual labours, without any mixtures of passions, such as the 
abstract sciences, — mechanics, the forced exercise of memory, — the labours of the 
copyist, the analyst, or the historian, philology, bibliography, — in a word, every thing 
which only exercises thought by requiring a lively and constant attention, keeps up in the 
encephalon a state of vital erection by which it is sensibly transformed into a permanent 
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focus of irritation. Under these circumstances, the head becomes heavy and painful; there 
is an inclination to sleep, or else an obstinate state of wakefulness is established: and 
inflammation of the brain, either acute or chronic, as well as haemorrhages of this organ, 
are on the point of being developed . . . In time, the same irritability is established in the 
ganglionic nerves; and the movements of the viscera as well as those of the vascular 
apparatus in general, become disordered under the influence of the slightest causes . . . 
Another modification of the system, is sometimes associated with the cerebral irritation 
produced by the excessive exercise of thought. It is a state of debility in the muscular 
apparatus, a sluggishness of digestion, accompanied with costiveness and with a 
remarkable languor in the cutaneous transpiration. Hence result a multitude of evils: for 
food, by remaining in the upper regions of the digestive canal, finally develops there an 
irritation.157 
The physiopathology approach to finding the source of disease in a physiological process 
rather than an anatomical entity continued into the mid-nineteenth century. This can be seen in 
physicians’ continued theorizing about function rather than merely focusing on discrete structures. 
One of the interesting details of this period is that British medical writing seems to have done away 
with much discussion of neurosis for the next fifty years. Instead, the concept of irritation was 
applied to nervous ailments in an attempt to localize the source of disease without reference to a 
lesioned tissue. Lopez-Pinero has suggested that from the 1820s, “the clinical and pathological 
phenomena to which the word neurosis referred, continued being debated under different names, 
such as ‘Spinal irritation’ or ‘Reflex functional nervous diseases’, which were but explanatory 
images created by British physiopathology”.158  
The subjects of “spinal irritation” and “reflex functional nervous diseases” have been 
commented on in detail by Shorter, Hodgkiss, and Lopez-Pinero.159 The development of the 
former model seems to have facilitated the introduction of the latter, and they can both be 
summarized by the claim that local irritations in organs or in the spinal nerves (or the spine itself) 
can give rise to the experience of discomfort, pain, or pathological symptoms without the evidence 
of any specific discrete lesion or inflammation. Development of this idea led to the notion that 
spinal irritation could reflexively be transmitted to distant parts of the body in a route mediated by 
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the spine and its nerve pathways, and Hodgkiss suggests that it was the “explanatory utility of 
irritation as invisible lesions” that led to its use among British authors.160 Among the exegetes of 
this theory was Benjamin Travers (1783–1858), surgeon at St. Thomas Hospital, London. In 1826 
Travers published a large monograph on the topic of spinal irritation titled, Inquiry Concerning 
that Disturbed State of the Vital Functions Usually Denominated Constitutional Irritation, and 
nine years later (1835), he published a second volume on the topic.161 Travers defined local 
irritation as an “alteration in the habitual and proper sensation or action of a part: as a depravation 
or suspension of function in an organ of sense” or as “pain, unattended by any other sign of 
inflammation. The irritable joint, breast, testicle, (etc.)”, and it is surprising to consider how 
contemporary conceptions of categories like “irritable bowel syndrome” have hardly moved past 
Trover’s attempts at explanation for similar phenomena.162 
 One of Travers’ contemporaries and the founder of Leeds School of Medicine, Thomas 
Pidgin Teale (1800–1867), helped in promoting the notion of spinal irritation with his 1829 
publication of A Treatise on Neuralgic Diseases, Dependent Upon Irritation of the Spinal Marrow 
and Ganglia of the Sympathetic Nerve. In regard to the variety of visceral pains, bodily weaknesses 
and discomforting sensations claimed by so many patients, Teale wrote:  
I have for a few years been in the habit of treating many of these nervous affections as 
diseases of some portion of the spinal marrow or ganglia: and have been still further 
confirmed in my opinion, by the frequent and almost uniform co-existence of tenderness 
on pressing some portion of the vertebral column, and the circumstance of the tender 
portion of the spine being in the particular situation where the nerves of the affected part 
originate.163 
It is not clear the extent to which this line of thinking was later to contribute to the 
development of the practice of chiropractic, but it seems to have had some influence on a very 
hotly contested issue in the United States and Britain. From the mid-nineteenth century, there was 
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a growing debate in medical literature over the legitimacy of litigants’ claims to have been injured 
in railway accidents. Eric Caplan has written about the instrumental role of “railway spine” in the 
conceptual development of psychotherapy in the USA, and he sees it as one of the pivotal debates 
that facilitated a move toward “psychogenic notions of causality” that would dominate the early 
twentieth century.164 
 In 1866 the English surgeon John Eric Erichsen delivered a series of lectures on the 
phenomenon he called “concussion of the spine”. His motivation in investigating the issue in part 
arose from his observance that “there is no class of cases in which medical men are now so 
frequently called into the witness-box to give evidence in courts of law, as in the determination of 
the many intricate questions that often arise in actions for damages against railway companies for 
injuries alleged to have been sustained by passengers in collisions on their lines; and there is no 
class of cases in which more discrepancy of surgical opinion is elicited than in those now under 
consideration”. 165 The discrepancy of opinion arose not in the instances where there were clearly 
physical lesions such as bone fractures or other obvious injuries; rather, Erichsen set out to explain 
a host of physical and emotional disturbances that had no obvious causal relationship to the railway 
accident. The lectures are organized beginning with obvious and serious trauma to the spine (i.e., 
actual spinal fractures or death) and moving progressively toward explaining concussion of the 
spine from slight injury or from shocks, twists, and wrenches of the spine. He accomplished his 
argument by presenting a series of fourteen cases of spinal concussion, a typical example of which 
is Case Eleven. Because of its similarities both to the ailments described already and to those that 
follow below, it is worth mentioning here in brief before concluding this section. 
 A fifty-year old, healthy man was in a railway collision in 1865 without any evidence of 
physical injury despite being violently shaken during the accident. He proceeded on his journey 
another seventy miles only to find himself feeling shaken and confused upon arrival. Being unable 
to attend to business matters, he sought medical help progressively over the next year as his 
symptoms continued to worsen. When Dr. Erichsen saw him in 1866 the man had lost twenty-five 
pounds, was weak and unable to walk one-quarter of a mile without fatigue, and was still unable 
to attend to any business. His friends and family described him as an “altered man”. He suffered 
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impaired digestion and always had a pulse above ninety-six. Because of memory problems he 
would stop talking mid-sentence, and would often forget what he was talking about. His thoughts 
were confused and his attention on any subject was limited to a few minutes duration. He could 
only read for a few minutes without the letters blurring, he often misspelled words when writing, 
had horrible dreams, and often awoke frightened and confused. Another common complaint was 
feeling habitually hot and flushed with an accompanying dull, confused sensation. Loud and 
sudden noises distressed him a great deal, and he could not bear the noises of his own children at 
play. He often saw stars, lines, or other such images in his field of vision, and ordinary levels of 
daylight were distressing to him. He would sit habitually in a dark room without any artificial light 
sources, knitting and depressing his brows. He complained of smelling bad odors that others could 
not, and he felt pins and needles in his arm or leg. He had weakness in his legs and could not easily 
move about or flex his back.166 Erichsen’s diagnosis was that the patient suffered concussion of 
the spine with secondary inflammation being present in the meninges (membranes) of the spinal 
cord as well as “irritability of the brain and its membranes”.167 In 1866 the patient sued the railway 
company and was awarded £3,500, which was no small amount in that day.  
Although we do not know whether this particular patient improved, many of the other 
patients did seem to gain some relief from their symptoms after receiving financial compensation 
through legal action. With a great deal of money and lawsuits at stake, Erichsen became a 
controversial figure. Caplan demonstrates the great disdain with which many railway surgeons and 
other physicians viewed Erichsen’s ideas, which continued across a number of subsequent 
publications.168 Considering how the concepts of “spinal irritation” and “concussion of the spine” 
had been put to use legally near the end of the century, it is easy to see that there were three obvious 
interpretations of patients like the one described in Case Eleven above. First, defenders of Erichsen 
continued to champion a somatic model of such symptoms on the basis of either an unseen or 
functional lesion. Second, there were detractors who believed that Erichsen had done a great 
disservice by legitimating those malingerers who were out for financial gain. Third, there were 
those who began to consider the possibility that the traumatic experience of being in a railway 
accident somehow affected the psychical/mental state of the patient, leading to physical symptoms 
                                                             
166 Erichsen, 59–61. 
167 Erichsen, 61. 




that had no physical lesion at all. These three positions were fought out in the following years, and 
the developments that arose from those fights have been dealt with elsewhere.169 For our purposes, 
it is worth looking at Erichsen’s retrospective thoughts on the topic before concluding this section. 
John Eric Erichsen, though a minor figure in the historical situation summarized thus far, 
influenced many people during the course of a long career, passing away at the age of seventy-
eight in 1896.170 Two years before his death, Erichsen wrote an editorial to the Texas Sanitarian 
reflecting on the categories of illness that he had popularized in the 1860s. He wrote: 
Nearly thirty years have passed since I first brought the subject of railway and other injuries 
of the nervous system to the notice of the profession. At that time, the pathology of the 
nervous system and injuries was very imperfectly understood, and even the nomenclature 
had not been invented. “Neurosis” and “neurasthenia” even, were unknown terms, and 
what I then, for want of a better name, called “concussion of the spine”, is now universally 
recognized and described under the more modern appellation of “traumatic neurasthenia”. 
The morbid states are the same, and the symptoms identical: but the name has been changed, 
and the modern designation is probably more in accordance with modern views than was 
the older one. In all my writings on this subject, I have pointed out that symptoms arising 
from railway shocks are identical with those that occur from other and more ordinary 
accidents of civil life, and that these symptoms so occurring had been described by 
surgeons many years before railways were dreamt of, and fully a century before I had 
written a line on the subject.171 
Of course, we have already seen that the term “neurosis” had been in use for some time 
when Erichsen wrote his first major work in 1866, but its decreased usage in Britain probably 
accounts for why Erichsen claimed not to have known the term. Neurasthenia, on the other hand, 
really did not appear on the medical scene in full force until after Erichsen had formulated his 
notion of railway spine. Although the term surfaced occasionally without much fanfare, the 
substantive debut of neurasthenia as a clinical concept occurred in 1869. 
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2.3 Nerve Discourse from 1869 into the Twentieth Century: George Beard and Neurasthenia 
The choice to place 1869 as a dividing line in the historical discussion thus far is not 
entirely arbitrary, but it is biased. We know that neurasthenia as a clinical concept can be found in 
the written record dating back much earlier in the century. Gosling credits an Italian physician for 
its use in 1808172 and Pinero tells us that the term appeared in a few authors influenced by German 
Romantic medicine from the early 1830s.173 In choosing 1869, I am following the convention of 
crediting George Beard with the first systematic presentation and public advocacy for the wide-
scale adoption of neurasthenia as a diagnostic entity. It is true, however, that even in the year 1869 
(or perhaps at the end of the previous year) another physician had already attempted to bring the 
term to professional attention. “Observations on a Form of Nervous Prostration (Neurasthenia) 
Culminating in Insanity” was published in the 1868–1869 edition of the American Journal of 
Insanity but it seems to have failed to bring much attention to its author, Edwin Holmes Van 
Deusen, despite the fact that his description of neurasthenia’s various situational causes, its 
symptoms, and physicalist models of explanation (e.g., nerve force, nerve power, etc.) are almost 
indistinguishable from those given by Beard. Schuster is one of the few authors who attempts to 
explain why Van Deusen failed to attract much interest, while Beard’s name became synonymous 
with the disorder.174 Schuster suggests that “alienists”, like Van Deusen, who worked in rural 
asylums for the overtly insane were more marginalized professionally compared to more urban, 
chic neurologists like Beard. Whatever the reasons, Beard succeeded in the promotion of his less-
than-novel category. 
2.3.1 Beard’s Debut Article 
The April 29, 1869 edition of The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal appears to be 
Beard’s first effort at introducing his ideas about nervous exhaustion to his peers. The journal 
article is based on a lecture given at the University of New York. In that lecture, Beard made clear 
that when he “refer[s] to neurasthenia, or exhaustion of the nervous system” he meant it as a 
“morbid condition or state” that he believed had been long understood, but that “the special name 
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neurasthenia” was only then being presented to the profession for the first time.175 After describing 
the Greek language etymology for his clinical term of choice, Beard continued his short lecture for 
the length of five or six pages. It is worth taking a moment to highlight three interrelated features 
of this debut article.176 
First, as the term “neurasthenia” etymologically signifies, “want of strength in the nerve” 
(p. 217) can be viewed analogously with anemia. “Anemia is to the vascular system what 
neurasthenia is to the nervous. The one means want of blood; the other, want of nervous force” (p. 
217). Beard believed that both diseases could be caused by chronic or acute disease states. “Thus, 
neurasthenia may be the effect of wasting fevers, exhausting wounds, parturition, protracted 
confinement, dyspepsia, phthisis (consumption), morbus brightii (renal disease), and so forth” (p. 
217). Continuing his analogy with anemia, Beard suggested that “constitutional tonics” (p. 218) 
were the best form of treatment for both diseases. With respect to anemia, tonics were given in 
order to affect the blood; in neurasthenia, tonics were given in order to affect the nervous system. 
Second, one of the most interesting aspects of Beard’s analogy is the claim that “both 
anemia and neurasthenia are most frequently met with in civilized, intellectual communities . . . 
[T]hey are part of the compensation for our progress and refinement” (p.217). Recalling Cheyne 
and other figures above, we see that Beard also made use of the “disease of civilization” theme, 
and this turned out to be a major feature of his delineation of neurasthenia in other works. In 
subsequent pages, I suggest that this theme plays no small part in the rise of neurasthenia in East 
Asia.  
Third, Beard argued that neurasthenia resulted from slight, undetectable, physio-chemical 
changes in the central nervous system (CNS). He even went so far as to testify to his conviction 
that, in the future, microscopic and chemical examination of deceased neurasthenic patients at 
autopsy would confirm such CNS changes. Consistent with this physicalist notion of 
neurasthenia’s pathophysiology, Beard suggested that the condition could give rise to “dyspepsia, 
headaches, paralysis, insomnia, anaesthesia, neuralgia, rheumatic gout, spermatorrhoea177 in the 
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male, and menstrual irregularities in the female” (p. 217). Interestingly, it is not a contradiction for 
Beard to state that neurasthenia could both result from and give rise to “dyspepsia” (p. 217, 218), 
for example. The reason for this is that the nervous system affects all others, and “neurasthenia 
may result from any causes that exhaust the nervous system” (p. 218). Although there is no 
indication that etiology is limited only to those hereditarily disposed, he did indicate that 
“hereditary descent terribly predisposes to neurasthenia” (p. 218). For those who may or may not 
be predisposed, there were still “exciting causes”, among which were “pressure of bereavement, 
business and family cares, parturition and abortion, sexual excesses, the abuse of stimulants and 
narcotics, and civilized starvation, such as is sometimes observed even among the wealthy order 
of society, and sudden retirement from business” (p. 218). Consistent with his overall view of the 
nervous system, it is reasonable that this list of exciting causes, and those in future works, should 
include both physical agents (e.g., narcotics) and those that might be considered psychological in 
nature (e.g., bereavement, family cares, etc.). 
 Beard’s second claim regarding the role of civilization in neurasthenia’s etiology would 
not have come as a surprise to contemporaneous readers. In the same year as Beard’s debut article, 
the American poet and doctor Silas Weir Mitchell published in Lippincott’s Magazine describing 
his views on the effect of modern work and its requirements on the intellectual capacities. In 1871 
he enlarged his tract and published again in Lippincott’s under the title “Wear and Tear, or Hints 
for the Overworked”.178 In that volume, Mitchell expanded on the now-familiar notion that the 
intellectual classes were susceptible to a particular type of ailment, which was the direct result of 
their excessive use of mental faculties. Mitchell did not refer to neurasthenia by name, however, 
which lends some credence to the idea that the category came to prominence only after Beard. 
With Mitchell, the target audience was the non-specialist, and terms like “brain-fatigue” were 
common. Beard’s second major publication likely benefitted from Mitchell’s little tract, and Beard 
expanded his earlier views in 1880 with the publication of A Practical Treatise on Nervous 
Exhaustion (Neurasthenia), Its Symptoms, Nature, Sequences, Treatment, in which he delineated, 
in much greater detail, what he believed to be the scientific relevance of neurasthenia as well as 
the various reasons why the disease went undiagnosed and unclassified for so long.179 A detailed 
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analysis of Beard’s maturing conceptualization of neurasthenia is unnecessary for present purposes, 
but there are a number of important features that should be mentioned as they are important 
indicators of how the category was likely understood at the turn of the twentieth century. 
 
 
Figure 3: Cover of Beard’s Practical Treatise 
 
2.3.2 Neurasthenia Overlooked Historically 
 In posing the question, “why is it that this important field of science has been so little 
studied?” Beard offers four explanations.180 First, the symptoms of the disorder were subjective, 
and unlike surgical, acute, or inflammatory diseases, the physician could not see or feel any 
evidence of pathology with their senses or instrumentation; the physician must rely on a patient’s 
report of symptoms. Second, the nature of the disease could only be uncovered by the process of 
reasoning applied to the encounters across a large population of patients. Third, investigations of 
disease and various disorders had historically relied on research material drawn from hospitals, 
dispensaries and other institutions of charity; physicians studying in such a setting would fail to 
encounter a significant number of neurasthenic cases as the disorder was not as commonly found 
among the abjectly poor. Last, physicians had been overly dependent on European textbooks from 
countries like England and France, where neurasthenia occurred to a much lesser extent than in 
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the United States; neurasthenia was an American disease and had not been understood among the 
medical authorities of Europe. This latter point was not a denial of the existence of nervous 
diseases generally among European populations; rather, Beard believed that the specific disorder 
of neurasthenia was the result of American progress in all its facets, including her unique climate.  
2.3.3 Ontology of Neurasthenia 
 An ontology of neurasthenia was already nascent in Beard’s understanding of its neglect 
by science, which facilitates a corresponding threefold description.  
First, the disorder was not to be confused with organic or structural disease. On numerous 
occasions Beard explicitly stated that the disease was functional, not organic, and he made himself 
clear as follows:  
Practically, we apply the term structural, or organic, to those diseases where the pathology, 
whatever it may be, can be brought under the direct observation of the aided or unaided 
senses. Functional diseases, on the other hand, are those where the pathology, whatever it 
may be, cannot be brought under the observation of even the best aided senses. What the 
microscope can see, we call structural—what the microscope cannot see, we call functional. 
In functional nervous disease, the pathology is negative—a deficiency in quantity or quality 
of the normal constituents of the nerve substance. In organic or structural nervous disease 
the pathology is positive—an addition of abnormal substances to the nerves. We can more 
easily supply what is wanting in the nutrition of the nerves than remove what is organized 
on the nerve as a foreign substance (p. 114–115). 
The obvious implication, which he later stated outright, was that functional nervous diseases were 
more amenable to treatment. One should not forget, however, that Beard had made it very clear in 
his 1869 article that he believed science would one day be able to visualize a physiological, organic 
change in neurasthenics at autopsy, a possibility that would cause a shift in its categorization from 
functional to structural.  
Despite its functional status at the time, Beard believed that neurasthenia’s pathological 
basis could be characterized, and this he did by describing it as an impoverishment of nervous 
force, a waste of nerve-tissue in excess of repair, which led to physical and mental feebleness and 
instability of nerve action (p. 115). In a sense, the nervousness of neurasthenia was a manifestation 
of “nervousness” or the failed function of nerves as a result of their excessive use without proper 




throughout the body secondary to deficiency of nerve force. Beard offered fifty-two major 
symptoms of the disease, and they make up the second chapter of his Practical Treatise. Because 
authoritative reference works in psychiatry merely state the number, rather than content, of Beard’s 
tally of symptoms, I have itemized the symptoms here despite the tedium.181 They are worth noting 
in order to demonstrate their vague and ubiquitous nature, which was later to contribute to the 
growing skepticism regarding neurasthenia as a meaningful category. They are as follows: 
1) Tenderness of scalp: accompanied with heat and burning of the skin. Tenderness also 
occurs over the eyebrow, temple, or nape of the neck and can be brought on by emotional 
disturbance (p. 15). 
2) Dilated pupils: temporary inequality of the pupils or sluggishness in dilation or 
contraction is a sign of neurasthenia or, at least, nervous irritability (p. 16). 
3) Sick headache and various forms of head pain: this is a way for nervousness to manifest 
itself, and is commonest between ages of fifty and fifteen (p. 17). 
4) Pain, pressure, and heaviness: particularly in the back of the head. Lightness of the head 
is also a common complaint (p. 17). 
5) Changes in the expression of the eye: this includes protrusion of the eye, attributed to 
the sympathetic nervous system. Changes in the whites of the eyes (sclera) are also 
common (p. 18). 
6) Congestion of the conjunctiva: during severe bouts of neurasthenic irritation, the eyes 
show heavy bags and appear as though the patient had been drinking heavily (p. 18). 
7) Disturbances of the nerves of special sense: for example, neurasthenic asthenopia is a 
disturbance of the eye leading to difficulty with vision accompanied by headache, 
especially upon reading. No observable impairments can be found with ophthalmoscope or 
other instrumentation (p. 19). 
8) Muscae Volitantes: floating specks within the eye’s field of vision (p. 20). 
9) Noises in the ears: sudden explosive sounds or pulsations; tinnitus (ringing). These are 
more common upon exercise or exertion, but without physical cause detectable (p. 21). 
10) Atonic voice: softness or faintness of voice (p. 22). 
11) Deficient mental control: inability to concentrate on any task. The mind wanders, and 
is seen in cases of reading a paper several times without knowing what was read (p. 23). 
12) Mental irritability: of diagnostic validity when the irritability is inconsonant with the 
normal temperament of the patient (p. 24). 
13) Hopelessness: patients feel despair about life without any seeming objective cause, and 
are often challenged or ridiculed by family or friends for it (p. 25). 
14) Morbid fears: these make up any number of bizarre phobias from fears of particular 
places, crowds, illness, disease, contamination, lightening, etc. (p. 26–42). 
15) Frequent blushing: this can be brought on without any known cause to the patient or in 
the context of a thought, etc. It occurs in both sexes (p. 42–43). 
                                                             





16) Insomnia: this takes numerous forms from inability to initiate sleep to the inability to 
maintain sleep. The mind is painfully active, and patients awake feeling very tired (p. 45–
46).  
17) Drowsiness (p. 45–46). 
18) Tenderness of the teeth and gums (p. 46). 
19) Nervous dyspepsia: this is often the first noticeable symptom; it is also commonly 
accompanied with flatulence. Unlike cases caused by gastric pathology, nervous dyspepsia 
can be treated with sedatives (p. 48). 
20) Deficient thirst and capacity to assimilate fluid: patients are able to do with less fluid 
intake than normal. In this respect, Beard wrote that Europeans use more liquid 
nourishment as they are far less nervous than Americans (p. 49). 
21) Desire for stimulants and narcotics: abuse of certain stimulants or the sudden inability 
to continue their normal use (p. 49–50). 
22) Abnormalities of secretion: excessive moisture in the eyes. The opposite is also noted, 
with hair becoming excessively dry (p. 50).  
23) Abnormal dryness of skin, joints, and mucous membranes (p. 50). 
24) Sweating of hands and feet, with redness (p. 51). 
25) Tenderness of the spine and of the whole body (p. 53).  
26) Coccygodynia: tenderness of coccyx (tailbone), made worse when sitting (p. 54). 
27) Peculiarities of pain in the back: tenderness or pain in the back, hips or loins which is 
transient and may suddenly disappear (p. 54–55). 
28) Heaviness of the loins and limbs: one of the most frequent complaints is heaviness and 
aching in the limbs or whole body (p. 55–56).  
29) Shooting pains simulating ataxia: shooting pains in the limbs (p. 56). 
30) Podalgia: pain in the feet including numbness (p. 56–57). 
31) Tremulous and variable pulse and palpitation of the heart (irritable heart): patients often 
show concern regarding heart disease, but no pathology can be found (p. 57–58). 
32) Local spasms of muscles (tremors): spasm or twitching of the muscles are periodic and 
often annoying to the patient (p. 58). 
33) Dysphagia (difficulty in swallowing): symptoms are sporadic without any objective 
cause being ascertained (p. 59). 
34) Convulsive movements, especially on going to sleep: at the moment of falling into a 
sleep, a convulsive or spasmodic movement occurs suddenly bringing the patient back to 
wakefulness with a feeling of panic (p. 59). 
35) Special idiosyncrasies in regard to food, medicine, or external irritants: sensitivities 
that were not present prior to neurasthenic state (p. 60). 
36) Sensitivity to changes in weather: these include pain in the joints as well as emotional 
disturbance upon change in weather conditions (p. 62–63). 
37) Localized peripheral numbness and hyperesthesia (p. 63–65). 
38) A feeling of profound exhaustion unaccompanied by positive pain (p. 66). 
39) Ticklishness: increases more than normal and becomes a severe annoyance (p. 67). 
40) Vague pains and neuralgia (p. 67). 
41) General or local itching (pruritus): itching of the scalp after intellectual exertion is one 
example. Other locations range from the face to the axilla (armpits) (p. 67–68). 




43) Cold feet and hands (p. 68). 
44) Nervous chills (p. 69). 
45) Sudden giving way of general or special functions: for example, sudden loss of strength 
leading to collapse while walking, etc. (p. 69). 
46) Temporary paralysis: paralysis of a limb without any evidence of structural disease (p.  
69). 
47) Diseases of men: involuntary emissions, partial or complete impotence, irritability of 
the prostatic urethra (p. 70). 
48) Diseases of women: irritability of ovaries or uterus (p. 71). 
49) Oxalates, urates, phosphates and spermatozoa in the urine (p. 71–72).182 
50) Excessive gaping and yawning (p. 73). 
51) Appearance of youth: the age of patients, despite their numerous complaints and 
symptoms, is always underestimated (p. 73). 
52) Rapid decay and irregularities of the teeth (p. 74.).  
 
The second aspect of Beard’s ontology of neurasthenia is that the particular symptoms 
themselves are not informative in the context of a single patient. It should be obvious that the 
physician needs to understand symptoms in the context of a patient population rather than an 
individual, but Beard’s meaning in this instance was to point out that neurasthenia was 
characterized by two unique subtleties; it mimicked organic diseases, and symptoms might 
manifest in an opposing way from patient to patient. For example, items 22 and 23 are seemingly 
exclusive, but patients might present with either excessive or deficient skin secretions; nevertheless, 
the physician was expected to deduce the malfunctioning nervous system as the causative agent in 
both cases even though the dysfunction was in opposite directions. 
Third, Beard took great pains to show that neurasthenia was an ailment of those persons in 
modern, civilized society who were more likely to be of the intellectual classes. In other words, 
the patients filling the wards of poverty or charity hospitals were less likely to develop the disease 
as they were unlikely to tax their nervous system through the excesses of brain work. This line of 
thinking contributed to the accounting analogy of neurasthenia that became common after Beard’s 
death in 1883. For instance, in an 1887 monograph on Nerve Waste, H.C. Sawyer drew on the 
banking analogy to describe the depletion of nerve force. He wrote that “the stock-board and the 
street are notorious fields of shattered nerves and softened brains, and every year the excitement 
of political campaigns makes overdrafts upon the vitality of thousands . . . [The neurotic diathesis] 
                                                             





becomes established . . . as a result of the nervous strain and overdraft of civilized life; city 
Americans of the second and third generation are apt to be more or less neurotic”.183 
Last, as has been hinted at or stated explicitly already, Beard believed that the civilizational 
cause of neurasthenia was more readily present in America than in other nations. In addition to 
being a problem of the upper classes, it was particularly an American malady, in much the same 
fashion that Cheyne once argued that certain nervous ailments were best categorized as the English 
malady. 
2.3.4 Treatment of Neurasthenia 
The last chapter of Beard’s Practical Treatise is labeled “Treatment and Hygiene of 
Nervous Exhaustion”, and in those remaining sixty pages he discussed numerous aspects of health 
management aimed at both overcoming neurasthenia and avoiding its onset. Rather than list all the 
therapies that Beard discussed, I briefly summarize their use following a three-fold division: 
internal medications, mental therapeutics, and external therapeutics.  
The supposed nature of neurasthenia required that its treatment follow specific principles. 
Beard believed that the physician should treat the local manifestations of the illness in whatever 
form they appeared, especially since the disease was not experienced in the same way among 
patients. Each case was to be handled as specific situations arose. Such being the case, the available 
internal medications were numerous and were considered with respect to substances positively to 
be prescribed as well as negatively to be withheld. For example, he made wide use of Bromide 
salts as well as phosphate compounds (p. 153–156), but suggested that certain chemicals, like 
caffeine, might have idiosyncratic effects and should be monitored accordingly. Laxatives were 
employed in order to provide a counter-irritation to the systemic irritation caused by the 
dysfunctional nerves (p. 168), and given the understanding and accepted practice of his day, Beard 
did not shy away from things like arsenic and strychnine. These, along with numerous other 
internal treatments, were often used concurrently and in combination with other therapeutic 
methods. In fact, there were myriads of tonics and patent medicines that grew out of the 
popularization of the diagnosis, the study of which deserves its own monograph. Suffice it to say 
that vast quantities of money were spent advertising pharmaceuticals that claimed to cure nervous 
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ailments generally and neurasthenia in particular. Among the most popular and controversial were 
those of Miles publishing company, which by 1891 had already put out a thirty-four page booklet 
on nervous disorders and their patent medicine treatments. 184  “Antineurasthin” was another 
popular medicine, and its print ads could be found in magazines around the world, and for the 
discovery of which the pope’s physician offered his congratulations. 
 
 
Figure 4: Full print discussion of Antineurasthin from 1909185 
                                                             
184 Dr. Miles Medical Company and Charles Franklin Miles, New and Startling Facts for Those Afflicted with Nervous 
Diseases: An Illustrated Treatise on Sick and Nervous Headache, Nervousness, Convulsions, Neuralagia, Apoplexy, 
Paralysis, Sleeplessness, Nervous Prostration, Sexual Weakness, Epilepsy, Dyspepsia, Etc (Dr. Miles Medical 
Company, 1891). 





Figure 5: Dr. Miles Nervine tonic was one of the most prolifically advertised patent medicines. It 
appeared twenty different times in the religious weekly magazine The Interior in the year 1899.186 
 
Figure 6: Article from American gazette, Country Life. The pope’s physician congratulates the discoverer 
of “antineurasthin”, the supposed cure for neurasthenia.187 
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Figure 7: A sedative advertised as a remedy for neurasthenia in Pharmaceutical Journal, published in 
London.188 This compound looks structurally like a sedative, but it is not in pharmacological use today. 
 
 
Figure 8: Originally patented as a “Nerve Tonic”, even Coca Cola was advertised as a treatment for 
neurasthenia.189 
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Figure 9: Wine of Coca, advertised as a treatment for neurasthenia in the New England Journal of Medicine 
(1890).190 
 
Beard was firm in his belief that mental therapeutics, though helpful, should never be the 
exclusive mode of treatment, and he made an effort to explain that, even though disease conditions 
might arise as a result of disturbed emotions or other aspects of the patient’s thought life, the 
physical pathologies that ensued were real nevertheless. Though they arose from the imagination, 
they were not imaginary, and they could not be spoken or thought away any more than could 
typhoid fever (p. 145). Beard’s physicalist position may have influenced his opinion of Charcot, 
which seems very ambiguous. On the one hand, he claimed that Charcot’s public exhibitions 
proved nothing about the nature of functional diseases, but his own personal communications with 
Charcot led him to believe that Charcot was at least making some headway into the physiology of 
hysteria and neurasthenia.191 Despite Beard’s view, mental therapies became the major treatment 
                                                             
190 The New England Journal of Medicine (Massachusetts Medical Society, 1890), 6. 
191 I have intentionally left Charcot out of the discussion on nervous disease. The literature on his work and 
thought is plenteous, but seems of little help with respect to my aims in this chapter. I believe that the charisma 
and fame of Charcot are an impediment to our understanding; great controversy flowed around his practice as it 
does around his work even today. For a discussion of Charcot, see Micale, Approaching Hysteria: Disease and Its 
Interpretations; Micale, “On the ‘Disappearance’ of Hysteria. A Study in the Clinical Deconstruction of a Diagnosis.” 




of neurasthenia in the twentieth century. Subsequently, the rise in psychotherapy in the USA, 
which predates Freudian theories, has been directly attributed to the medical community’s attempts 
to address the condition Beard popularized.192 
The preferred methods of treatment fall under the category of external therapeutics. Among 
these were hydro-therapies (water pressure on the outside of the body), Turkish and Russian baths, 
variation of hot and cold wraps, inducing small blisters on the skin of the back, magnets, metal 
therapies, and many others. Beard’s favored method, however, was the use of therapeutic 
electricity, which had already been written about widely by the time of his debut article. For 
example, Channing’s Notes on the Medical Applications of Electricity was already in its third 
edition by 1852, and Beard had himself co-authored a text on the subject in 1881.193 Probably 
because electric therapies had been considered for some time, there were already a variety of home-
therapy products available in the market. Regarding these, he had nothing good to say; rather he 
declared that “the galvanic belts, so much advertised, are of no value in nervous exhaustion”. 
Nevertheless, such products continued to sell after his death, as can be seen in the 1902 Sears and 
Roebuck catalogue advertisements. 
Beard advocated a number of treatment methods using the application of electric current 
over parts of the body surface. Most of the machines that he described in his text were similar in 
structure and function, consisting of a battery with electrodes held by the physician and placed 
over the point of interest. The desire to manipulate nervous force with electricity and a variety of 
other therapies continued well into the twentieth century, until physicians grew suspicious of the 
conceptual model of neurasthenia and nervousness advocated by Beard and others. The question 
began to arise as to whether the experiences given the label “neurasthenia” really constituted a 
discreet entity. 
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Figure 10: 1902 Sears and Roebuck advertisement for electric belt. Beard described the uses for the belt 







Figure 11: A typical “faradic” machine as illustrated in Beard’s text on electric therapy 
 
2.4 Views on Neurasthenia in the Twentieth Century 
 It is probably futile to search for the scientific discovery or major social actor that brought 
about the death of neurasthenia as a clinical concept in Euro-American medicine. In a manner 
similar to Micale’s description of hysteria’s “atomization” into multiple other categories, the 
twentieth century saw the dismantling of neurasthenia.194 The decline of neurasthenia has been 
dealt with by a number of scholars, but I will summarize the process by lumping the transformative 
forces into three categories: doubt about the usefulness of the category, changing paradigms in 
psychiatry and neurology, and new legal and institutional stances toward medicine and public 
health. 
2.4.1 Doubts 
                                                             




Doubts about the usefulness of the category were present very early on in neurasthenia’s 
conceptual development. Papers read at professional meetings and articles carried in respected 
journals led to debate between famous physicians of the day. For example, as early as 1886, The 
Lancet published the observations of one of the physicians at a London hospital, Sir Andrew Clark. 
His essay forcefully argued that “the term neurasthenia is unscientific, inaccurate, and misleading; 
that the descriptions given of it do not include a clear, concise, or distinctive account of genuine 
nerve exhaustion, and do include a mob of incoherent symptoms borrowed from the most diverse 
disorders . . . [N]o rational principles of treatment are possible”.195 Clark went on to argue that the 
category added nothing positive to the notion of “nervous temperament” understood since the time 
of Cheyne, but instead created a catchall that served no purpose for medical knowledge. His essay 
led to a lengthy response in The British Medical Journal that same year by the professor of 
obstetric medicine at King’s college, William Playfair. Arguing from his own case accounts, 
Playfair defended the usefulness of the category and lamented its prior neglect.196 
 In the United States, similar debates played out in American Journals despite the fact that 
the category was already in wide use. Drawing from the nosological research of Kraepelin in 
Germany, the New York Neurologist Charles Dana read a paper at the January meeting of the 
Boston Society of Neurology and Psychiatry in 1904. Later published in the Boston Medical and 
Surgical Journal, Dana’s paper levied some serious criticisms of the ease with which the diagnosis 
was being applied to a host of problems that might be better categorized in other ways.197 
Specifically, he claimed that most of the patients diagnosed as neurasthenic were not actually 
suffering from nerve exhaustion, a somatic category that he believed still had value when applied 
only to those who experienced extreme fatigue secondary to physical exhaustion, toxicity of some 
kind, or disease in some part of the body locally.198 He pointed out that nearly all cases of 
diagnosed neurasthenia could more readily be attributed to the patient’s having taken a “hit” to 
their psyche; their underlying problem was nearly always one of a morbid mental state that resulted 
from the “mismanagement of their minds rather than their bodies”. 199  Taking this into 
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consideration, Dana believed that at least fifty percent of neurasthenia cases could be removed 
from clinical diagnosis, a fact that he recognized as having such a huge cultural impact that he 
might be charged with disrespecting the “one great national malady”, especially if “America has 
been deleted of one of its most distinctive and precious pathological possessions”.200 In its place 
he proposed the term “phrenasthenia” (Greek: phrenos, mind; asthenia, weakness), but the term 
never caught on in clinical use. Nevertheless, the call to reconsider both the category and its 
terminology had not fallen entirely on deaf ears. Almost two years later (December 1905), at a 
meeting of the same society in Boston, the Rhode Island physician G. Alder Blumer delivered a 
talk on “The Coming of Psychasthenia”.201 While praising Dana for his call to improve the 
relationship between psychiatry and neurology, and their handling of patients labeled as 
neurasthenic, Blumer advocated for the adoption of “psychasthenia”. Without going into detail, 
suffice it to say that Blumer proposed the adoption of French psychiatrist Pierre Janet’s term 
psychasthenia over Dana’s phrenasthenia both because he thought the term, already in use, would 
be more readily embraced, and because he believed that Janet’s theories of psychoneuroses could 
better describe and distinguish the phenomena addressed by Blumer and Dana in their writings. 
Additionally, Blumer and others had a few years earlier already begun employing the diagnosis in 
state hospitals in the place of neurasthenia. In any case, psychasthenia entered clinical practice and 
would continue for a number of decades to coexist with and be used alongside neurasthenia, most 
likely in a synonymous manner.  
2.4.2 Shifting Paradigms 
 The preceding, brief discussion regarding the debates surrounding neurasthenia’s usage 
blends the roles of doubt and shifting paradigms in the gradual decline of neurasthenia. A full 
discussion of the details of how theory changed in twentieth century psychiatry is beyond the scope 
of this work, but a few words should be mentioned about the ramifications of viewing neurasthenia 
as psychological in nature. 
The shifting paradigms of twentieth century medicine made dealing with the problem of 
neurasthenia more difficult than could have been foreseen when it was originally proposed to be 
predominantly a physiological disease of nerve force. For instance, as early as 1895, Sigmund 
Freud wrote an essay titled “On the Grounds for Detaching a Particular Syndrome from 
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Neurasthenia under the Description ‘Anxiety Neurosis,’” in which he introduced ‘anxiety neurosis’ 
(Angstneurose) as a specific category. He began as follows: “It is difficult to make any statement 
of general validity about neurasthenia, so long as we use that name to cover all the things which 
Beard has included under it”.202 He went on to suggest that numerous neurotic disturbances could 
be separated out form “neurasthenia proper”, which was primarily a physiological problem. As 
Dana had done after him, Freud maintained that real neurasthenia existed, but that most cases so 
diagnosed were actually “pseudo-neurasthenias”.203  
While it is not necessary to enter into the details, it should be enough to point out that for 
Freud neurasthenia was an “actual neurosis” (neurosis here should be read as a “neuropathology”) 
that ought to be distinguished from the various psycho-neuroses that were the result of psychical 
conflict. As one might imagine, Freud claimed in his writing that “the specific aetiology of the 
neuroses has escaped Beard’s notice”, since Freud rejected the argument that the various nervous 
conditions arose etiologically from any of the factors discussed thus far in this chapter.204 For 
Freud, the various neuroses were etiologically related to sexuality and libido; interestingly, Freud 
also viewed neurasthenia as caused by the sex life, albeit for different reasons. Interrupting the sex 
act was one such culprit, but the main offense to the nervous constitution was masturbation, and 
Freud believed that “medical treatment . . . can have no other aim than to lead the neurasthenic, 
who has recovered his strength (by ceasing to masturbate) back to normal sexual intercourse”.205  
Most importantly for the current discussion, Freud contributed to the ongoing conversation 
regarding the overreach of the neurasthenic diagnosis, and incidentally, his influence would 
eventually dominate American psychiatry until the 1980s. Before Freud, as the title to Gosling’s 
study suggests, neurasthenia was on safe ground; but it should not be inferred from anything stated 
here that Freud was the major influence in neurasthenia’s decline. Such a conclusion would be 
oversimplified, even though Gosling suggests that the triumph of Freud’s views on the neuroses 
and psychoses was one of “three essential factors contributing to the downfall of the neurasthenic 
model”.206 It should be kept in mind that the hegemony of Freudian theory in American psychiatry 
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did not eliminate neurasthenia from the DSM; the disorder appeared in both the first and second 
editions. Instead, it merely decreased its significance by first altering the clinical term to 
“psychophysiologic nervous system reaction” in 1952, and then returning to “neurasthenic 
neurosis” in 1968.207 The term was finally removed from the DSM in the third edition of 1980.  
In any case, shifting views on neurasthenia arose very early in the twentieth century and 
can be attributed both to the introduction of Freudian concepts as well as the failure to find the 
underlying organic lesion that Beard had hoped autopsies might eventually reveal. Caplan’s 
suggestion that American psychotherapy both predated Freud and arose as a response to the 
neurasthenic diagnosis, is a compelling argument in favor of the idea that neurasthenia gradually 
lost its status as a neuropathology and was increasingly seen as a psychopathology.208 This is all 
the more interesting considering that even Freud maintained the neuropathology view of 
neurasthenia; in other words, the Americans had already grown suspicious of the category long 
before theories of the unconscious and anxiety neuroses entered the scene.  
2.4.3 New Legal and Institutional Stances 
Among the influences that led to the decline of neurasthenia, we can point to changing 
policies within the American Medical Association as early as 1900. Schuster has called this the 
“crackdown on drug advertising”, and he argues that the AMA had some success in turning public 
opinion against the cure-all claims that were widespread in the print publications of the day.209 
With changing policies regarding advertisements, companies were required to submit ingredients 
if they wanted to win print space for their products in medical journals. In addition, bodies like the 
Journal of the American Medical Association were eager to print chemical analytical studies done 
by independent researchers for the purposes of bringing to light questionable claims made by 
patent drug companies. For example, in 1952 JAMA published a critical piece titled 
“Antineurasthin: a new use for eggs and milk”, wherein the analytic makeup of that drug was 
shown to contain nothing more than egg yolks, milk, and potato starch. The method of analysis 
and the results were printed alongside a mocking criticism of the quack medicine.210 Eventually, 
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there were enough such articles that they were compiled into monograph format to be printed and 
then reprinted. By 1912, the second edition was extensive and was printed under the title, 
“Nostrums and Quackery: Articles on the Nostrum Evil and Quackery Reprinted, with Additions 
and Modifications, from The Journal of the American Medical Association”.211 
The professional efforts by the AMA to crack down on bogus medicines probably did have 
an impact on how the common person viewed the claims of pharmaceutical companies. Its efforts 
cannot be divorced from the fact that the United States passed the Pure Food and Drug Act of 
1906.212 Nevertheless, Schuster probably overstates the impact to some extent, as the category 
stayed in the diagnostic manuals for several decades. Schuster downplays the role that neurasthenia 
played with respect to psychiatric and neurologic casualties of the first World War, arguing that 
British influence favored the term “shell-shock”. However, British authorities recognized the 
importance of neurasthenia in diagnosing mental trauma, as is evinced by professional publications 
such as H.C. Marr’s Psychoses of the War: Including Neurasthenia and Shell Shock.213 A full study 
of neurasthenia’s importance for military psychiatry has never been done however, and the closest 
such study seems to be one published by Smithsonian.214 Despite its use during World War I, by 
the close of World War II, neurasthenia seems to have fallen almost completely into disrepute. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have undertaken the task of providing some background to neurasthenia 
and the discourses of nerves and nervousness, which were antecedent to the experiences of SJSR 
in East Asia. My overall aim has been to demonstrate the long life that such discourses have had, 
including some of the transitions that occurred in medical thought. Nervousness has been with us 
over such a terribly long span of time that it would not be feasible to contextualize its life through 
the Thirty-Years War in Europe (1618–1648), the American War of Independence (1775–1783), 
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the American Civil War (1861–1865), World War I (1914–1918), and all the other wars and events 
that took place in between. The same difficulty can be found when thinking about neurasthenia 
specifically, even though its lifetime in “Western” countries only lasted a very short period, 
relatively speaking, approximately from 1869 to the 1940s.  
The fact that neurasthenia was with us for a considerably short period does not in itself 
explain fully, however, why it has completely fallen out of the lexicon while nervousness has not. 
The social construction of neurasthenia in the West fit into a perfect niche of time and place, 
growing out of the already well-established discourse of nervous disease, but its cultural work soon 
came to an end. The discourses of nerves and nervous disease were the foundation that made 
neurasthenia possible as a discrete entity or category of diagnosis; their conceptualization created 
a space where neurasthenia could exist, and it has always been reasonable to view neurasthenia as 
an outgrowth or extension of what it means to suffer from nervousness or nerves. The question to 
consider at this point is how such a relation differs from the experience and conceptual 
development of neurasthenia as a category in East Asia, where there was no long history of nerve 
discourse to ground the newly introduced idea. In order more fully to address this issue, as well as 
to assess critically the models of neurasthenia attributed to Kleinman and colleagues in the fourth 
chapter, I begin in the next chapter to look at the Chinese experience of neurasthenia, starting with 
its introduction into East Asia at the turn of the twentieth century.  




Chapter 3: Weak Nerves in China 
“The ‘origin’ of the word is less meaningful than the process of its transformation and its taking root in 
another culture and renewing it”. 
Peng Hsiao-yen, A Traveling Disease, 96. 
 
Having summarily addressed the long-standing discourses of “nerves” and “nervousness” 
in the European and North American context out of which neurasthenia arose as a conceptual and 
diagnostic category, I will now turn to the issue of such discourses as they take root in East Asia. 
Specifically, this chapter is about neurasthenia in the context of its arrival in China, having been 
first introduced to and making entry via Japan.  
For many years it has been assumed that the concept and orthographic depiction of 
neurasthenia as shenjing shuairuo ( )215 was a Japanese neologism, though the precise 
dating of its inception was long left a question for historical research. For example, when writing 
in 1986, Kleinman limited his discussion of this issue to the remark that “[n]eurasthenia had been 
introduced into Japan from German medicine”, citing as evidence work by T. Suzuki that was in 
press at the time and was published in 1989.216 Unfortunately, the only information that Suzuki’s 
paper later provided was the claim that “[t]he term Neurasthenia was introduced to Japan in the 
late nineteenth century”, after which he immediately turned to the transformation of the clinical 
category that occurred at the hands of famed Japanese psychiatrist, Morita Masatake217 (
), in the 1920s.218 After several decades of research, we now know only a little more than we did 
in the 1980s, and some of that clarification will be addressed in the pages that follow. It should be 
kept in mind that among the models of SJSR offered by Kleinman and Lee is the suggestion that 
SJSR really came to life under Mao as a consequence of the public suppression of affect. While 
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this is incorrect, it seems accurate to claim that SJSR took on new meanings in the post 1949 period, 
which is modestly to be touched upon in later chapters. 
 Presently, the material in this chapter is organized so as to make a particular argument 
about the status of neurasthenia in China prior to 1949. I will summarize some of what is now 
known about the origins of SJSR as it first appeared in Japan, relying on recent research that has 
uncovered some of, if not the, first references to the term in Japanese writing as well as some of 
the ways it was then understood. I believe that SJSR played very different roles in the 
modernization projects of China and Japan, the details of which should become clearer below. My 
argument is a variation of the sixth of Shapiro’s dominant explanations (status) cited in Chapter 1. 
Recall that Shapiro suggested that psychiatry and anthropology have produced the most serious 
analyses of SJSR, among which is the notion that the category conferred status or that the 
diagnostic label was fashionable, notions also at play in the American and European experiences 
of nervousness and neurasthenia as presented in Chapter 2. However, in this chapter, rather than 
refer to the analysis of SJSR with respect to the status or fashionableness for the individual person, 
I apply it to a nation and consider what the category has meant from that vantage point. To 
oversimplify: in the Japanese context, SJSR was a problem of Westernization; in China, it was a 
national accomplishment. I present this position in the following manner. First, I present some 
background to SJSR in Japan, including findings regarding the origins of the translation of SJSR 
into Chinese (Section 1). I then summarize recent research that argues that, in early twentieth-
century Japan, SJSR was seen as a malady resulting from the deterioration of Japanese ways of 
life (Section 2). Third, I suggest that the atmosphere in China was ripe for a very different 
appreciation of SJSR; in particular, that SJSR could be seen as evidence of Chinese progress 
(Section 3). This section deals primarily with Lu Xun and one of his most renowned creations, Ah-
Q, to point out how he could view neurasthenia as an indication of the progress of a people toward 
modernization. In Section 4, I offer further proof of the entrenchment of neurasthenia into the 
Chinese lexicon with examples from print publications of the day, both non-fiction and fiction. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the importance of SJSR as a conceptual category 
in early twentieth-century China prior to 1949, the significance of which highlights what has been 
neglected in the mainstream models of neurasthenia so far prominent in cross-cultural and 
anthropological psychiatry. Models that I begin to describe in detail in the next chapter. A special 





3.1 Brief Background of Neurasthenia’s Introduction to Japan  
Bowers has documented the Meiji effort to modernize medicine by adopting German 
infrastructure as a national paradigm.219 The changes that took place in the Meiji and Taisho have 
been characterized as a major cultural transformation. In her work on the historical development 
of depression as a conceptual category in Japan, Kitanaka Junko has convincingly argued that this 
period witnessed an epistemic shift away from previous models of illness etiology toward a 
European discourse of the brain and nervous system as the site of pathology. She terms the era 
“The First Expansion” in her periodization220 of the expansion of psychiatry into everyday life in 
Japan.221 Not only were sorcery, magic, and shamanism outlawed, but in an effort to establish 
German Neuropsychiatry, even traditional medicine was repressed. 222  Neuropsychiatry was 
officially made a department within Tokyo Imperial University in 1886; and according to Fujikawa 
Yu, by 1911 native Japanese held the position of “Chair of Psychiatry” in the medical faculty of 
the University of Tokyo, Kyoto University, and another medical university in Fukuoka. All had 
been trained in Japan before studying in Germany, Vienna, or Paris. Additionally, the “Japan 
Psychiatric Society” was founded in 1904 around the same time as the “Japan Society for 
Neurology and Psychiatry”.223 Throughout the Taisho period and leading up to World War II, 
psychiatrists became regular contributors to newspapers, magazines, and self-help manuals in an 
effort to educate the populace about the importance of the hygiene of nerves 224  (on the 
establishment of Eisei generally, see Rogaski, Jannetta)225. 
It is not surprising that the major focus of nerve hygiene in Japan was the epidemic rise in 
neurasthenia. This disorder had become a topic of prolific publication in America and Europe, and 
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its introduction into the medical sphere in Japan, and subsequently China, is universally attributed 
to the clinical description given of it by George Beard in 1869. Even Morita Masatake, the most 
famous Japanese psychiatrist associated with debates surrounding neurasthenia and its treatment 
in the 1910s and 1920s, attributed the clinical concept to Beard.226 Nevertheless, the earliest uses 
of the Japanese kanji that were to designate the category of neurasthenia actually pre-date any use 
of the English term by Beard.227 How the term entered into the Japanese and Chinese linguistic and 
conceptual spheres, therefore, has proven less obvious than expected.  
The translation of the term “nerve” (  Chinese shenjing, Japanese shinkei) is generally 
considered to be the work of Sugita Genpaku in his Kaitai shinsho ( , but prior to the 
official adoption of German medicine, the term seems to have remained obscure.228 One known 
exception is the efforts of Komori Genryo  (1781–1843) who attempted to relate the 
German term with the traditional concept of keiryaku ( ), which, in the indigenous medical 
systems of China, are the meridians or channels through which Qi is believed to flow.229 It is less 
clear where “neurasthenia” finds its first kanji translation. Using a tertiary source, Kitanaka cited 
an early explanation of the causes of utsusho ( ; she cited Kaneko Junji (1965) who is 
supposed to be citing Komori Genryo.230 If this is an accurate citation, it probably predates all uses 
of the term in English.  
The presumed standard citation for the earliest instance of SJSR appearing in Japanese-
kanji usage is given by the Nihon kokugo daijiten.231 In its most recent publication, the earliest 
citation offered by the dictionary is that of Ogata Koan’s ( 1810–1863) 1842 
translation232 from Christoph Wilhelm Friedrich Hufeland’s (1762–1836 ) Enchiridion medicum 
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oder Anleitung zur medizinischen Praxis: Vermächtniß einer Fünfzigjährigen Erfahrung (1837).233 
The original German term schwachung der nerven (p. 262) is literally translated as  
(Japanese shinkei suijyaku, Chinese: shenjing shuairuo). Writing in a section on hypochondriasis 
and hysteria, Hufeland stated that these two illnesses were essentially the same disease except that 
hysteria was basically limited to women. Regarding the gender-neutral malady of nervous debility, 
however, he explained (p. 204):  
The debility of nerves (scwachung der nerven), especially from excesses in venery and 
onanism in both sexes; immoderate exertion of the faculty of thinking, and also feeling, 
perpetual physical or moral sufferings as pains, sorrows, excessive corporeal exertion, 
continuous debilitating evacuations, especially of loss of blood by too frequent 
venesections, menstrua, hemorrhoids, chronic diarrhea (also hypercatharsis), gonorrhea, in 
the female sex (often as a secret cause) flour albus.234  
Interestingly, in this passage there is a familial relation to Beard’s clinical description of 
neurasthenia given thirty-two years later, further suggesting a historical continuity as outlined in 
the previous chapter. However, Koan’s use of the kanji predates Beard’s or Van Deusen’s coinage 
of the term by twenty-seven years. 
 Recently, research by a Japanese scholar has demonstrated that the Nihon kokugo daijiten 
is incorrect, with a new attribution being placed several years earlier. In 2003 Watarai Yoshi-ichi 
(  ) published his study of the history of nervous disease in Japan’s Meiji period titled, 
Meiji Seishin no Isetsu.235 The first chapters point out that references to  in the texts of 
the Rangaku scholars should not carry all the conceptual information that Beard later formulated 
for neurasthenia in his own phenomenology of the disease.236 In one subsection, Watarai chooses 
to make a distinction between “shenkei suijyaku and the shinkei suijyaku-disorder of American 
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birth”.237 There he cites the earliest known reference to the term so far, which he claims can be 
found in the 1822 work of Udagawa Shinsai ( , 1769–1834) in his text titled Ensei iho 
meibutsoko ( ).238 With this reference, Watarai has further demonstrated that, as 
was the case with Ogata Koan, Udagawa’s use of kanji to translate Dutch texts was an early use 
of the neologism that would eventually come to describe the phenomenology of that specific 
disorder attributed to Beard. 
 
3.2 A Deterioration of Japanese Ways of Life 
The role that neurasthenia played in Japan’s modernization has been treated by scholars in 
different ways, depending, it appears, on the window of time and theoretical orientation though 
which the issue is analyzed. One typical example can be found in Sabine Frühstück’s handling of 
the topic with respect to the “building of a modern Japan”, found in an edited volume with the 
same title.239 In that article, she attempts to show that the discourse of neurasthenia was intimately 
tied to nationalistic efforts at providing an ideal for the type of masculinity necessary for Japan’s 
war efforts. Both among those being evaluated as military recruits and those who were selected to 
be military brass, it was necessary to recognize and remove the “lazy [or] effeminate” while 
ensuring that both classes of men were of strong nerves since “to suffer from neurasthenia would 
be very dangerous in the case of military leaders who work under a lot of pressure”.240 Within 
Frühstück’s theoretical and hermeneutic orientation, sexuality becomes the major locus of concern, 
a notion that is not without legitimacy. She points out that masturbation and homosexuality were 
among the causal explanations given for neurasthenia’s negative impact on the national supply of 
soldiers, but this is only one aspect of the narrative, which has some precedents even in the writings 
of Ogata Koan, Hufeland, Beard, and later theorists like Freud. To overemphasize the importance 
of sexuality is an obvious error, however, as can be seen by Frühstück’s recognition that, by the 
1950s, writings on neurasthenia had once again focused on the stressors placed on over-burdened 
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white-collar workers, completely independent of their sexual lives.241 A broader understanding of 
the condition, therefore, must consider neurasthenia as an exemplar of the negative consequences 
arising from Japan’s efforts to modernize and thereby avoid being counted among the colonized. 
It can be argued that those very efforts resulted in Japan’s colonization of itself with things foreign 
through a shift in cultural practices and norms of societal life.  
 In his extensive study of alternative treatments for neurasthenia in Japan from 1890–1945, 
psychiatrist and historian Wu Yu-Chuan has very convincingly argued that the disorder was a 
burden for Japanese people in a way substantially different from the experience of European and 
North American sufferers.242 Analyzing primary source material from the turn of the century, Wu 
successfully demonstrates that, by 1920, there were already a number of very popular and allegedly 
successful forms of treatment for neurasthenia in Japan, the treatment modalities of which were 
inseparable from specific theories of etiology. In other words, the therapeutic methods becoming 
broadly known owed their existence to etiological theories and models that explained how 
neurasthenia arose within the patient. Those treatments and causal theories highlight for us the 
cultural meanings that were attributed to neurasthenia from the vantage point of both professional 
and popular conceptualizations of the disease, at least until the height of the war effort. 
 Wu begins his study with the 1909 publication of Neurasthenia and Recovery by the former 
Tokyo Daily news managing editor, Ishikawa Hanzan. By comparing Ishikawa’s experience and 
treatment methods to those of numerous other authors of the day, Wu argues that not only were 
the three characteristic symptoms—(1) reverse upward flushing of blood (gyakuzou), (2) tension 
of the shoulders (katakori), and (3) coldness of the feet—quite common among those writing about 
neurasthenia at the turn of the century, but they also formed a constellation that was best described 
as a sense of “top-heaviness”.243 The congestion and tension in the upper body coincided with a 
feeling of weakness in the rest of the body, all of which demanded a physiological explanation. 
Ishikawa went so far as to claim that even the return to traditional garments like the tafusagi ( ) 
could be instrumental in reversing the effects of neurasthenia. Wu cites Ishikawa quoting a Navy 
captain, whose logic was as follows:  
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Since sarumata and fundoshi became popular in Japan, the will power of Japanese men has 
considerably declined . . . The tafusagi can constantly locate the mind in the tanden. The 
knot tied over the principal part of the spine can repress the upward flushing of blood . . . 
that I could remain so calm in the terrible battlefield of the Russo-Japanese war was all 
because of wearing the tafusagi.244 
 Of course, to the modern reader this attribution made to the Japanese loincloth sounds like 
nonsense. However, the point is that there was such a belief, and as we will see later in this chapter 
(in a Chinese context), such beliefs have their impacts whether they are correct or not. In any case, 
Ishikawa believed that the predominant causal features of neurasthenia could be undone by a return 
to traditional methods of living forfeited in the rush to modernization. This theme is continued 
across the primary literature, and is evinced by the major therapeutic systems that were 
promulgated to combat the disease. Even though it is true that Japanese neurasthenics could 
attribute their strange physical sensations to the overworking of the brain, which was a necessary 
part of modern life, as Beard similarly claimed, it was not the newness or excessiveness of modern 
demands per se that caused the symptoms. One can easily image that people in any period of 
history could equally exhaust their brain-power or nerve-force (as the explanatory models put it) 
given enough strain and stimulation. What made neurasthenia a problem was that the traditional 
forms of life that naturally buffered against excessive demands had been undermined by adopting 
Western ways of living. 
 For example, Wu points out that Japanese scholars of industrial psychology like Ueno 
Youichi (1883–1957) undertook studies comparing Western and traditional Japanese sitting styles. 
Ueno described Western habits of sitting as bending/hanging at the waste, koshiwokakeru (
) and Japanese as suwaru ( ), thereby playing on the notions of stability carried in 
phrases like suwarigayoi / suwarigawarui (  / ). The excessive demands 
of modern work, when done in the posture of koshiwokakeru, led to the depletion of the central 
nervous system. The comparisons do not stop there, however. The adoption of numerous other 
standards such as Western-style calisthenics in public schools were seen as exercising the skeletal 
muscles while neglecting the belly and tanden, and the two “major neurasthenic symptoms 
[rushing of blood in the head and stiff shoulders] were consequences of the transformation of body 
                                                             




position in modern life”.245 Famed bacteriologist, physician, and winner of the Japan Order of 
Merit, Futaki Kenzo (1873–1966) also attributed neurasthenia to changes in lifestyle, but his focus 
was on changes that led to compromised circulation. His books on abdominal breathing and his 
invention of the “abdominal pressure meter” were tools meant to reverse the weak diaphragm and 
strengthen the belly’s ability to control the movement of blood, all of which aided in meeting the 
demands placed on people by modern society.  
Numerous other forms of abdominal breathing, ki ( ) exercises, and quiet sitting can be 
found across a plethora of publications, but the common thread was reclamation of Japanese 
tradition. This raises the obvious question regarding the extent to which Japanese understandings 
of neurasthenia were the result of nationalistic efforts at ideology. Wu does not address this issue 
in any detail other than a brief section on tropical neurasthenia among Japanese in Taiwan. In that 
case, he shows the ideological use of claiming degeneration in those Japanese raised in the colony, 
insofar as they were separated from the mainland of Japan. However, that issue is not of particular 
importance presently. Whatever the role of imperialist ideology, it does not seem to detract from 
the major conclusion Wu draws: 
Neurasthenia, without doubt, was a disease of modern civilization in Japan as it was in the 
West. But neurasthenic Japanese viewed modern civilization differently from patients in 
the West. For the Japanese, modern civilization was not wearing and upsetting because the 
lifestyle was fast paced and mentally stressful or because it was lavish, excessive and 
corrupt [as Beard had claimed]. Instead, it was mainly because it changed their lives 
extensively and substantially, particularly in terms of how they perceived, posited and took 
care of their bodies . . . Their neurasthenic bodies were not exhausted bodies that were 
created by the economic laws of energy saving and consumption. Neither were they 
degenerate bodies determined by the laws of heredity. They were ‘top-heavy’ bodies, both 
literally and figuratively.246 
In other words, therapies worked “not by undoing but by accommodating” the body to the strains 
imposed on it.247 The obvious implication is that, according to the major conceptualization of 
neurasthenia prevalent across the literature, Japan would have modernized without the problems 
of neurasthenia, had they simply modernized technologically while foregoing the variety of 
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changes in cultural practice that came with the embrace of Western methods. That is, the burdens 
of modernization that Beard pointed out as causes of neurasthenia would have been manageable if 
the Japanese had only maintained traditional customs and cultural ways of life. How that might be 
perceived is not of particular importance here, but it suffices to show that neurasthenia was 
conceptualized as a burden remediable by being more fully Japanese.  
 Before moving to the next section, some mention should be made of the ontological status 
of neurasthenia as it was viewed in Japan. Briefly, let us assume that the experience of neurasthenia 
in Japan was actually the result of a taxing modernity that only arose in the absence of certain 
modes of bodily comportment, the ideal forms of which were historically maintained by traditional 
lifestyles. It could then be concluded that neurasthenia was a functional disorder of the nervous 
system that naturally arose under the conditions of modern civilization, or something like it, but 
could have been avoided by the Japanese had they merely kept to certain practices throughout that 
very process of modernization. I take this position to be the predominant model of neurasthenia in 
Japan during the first several decades of the twentieth century. The ontological status would then 
be something like the fatigue of anemia (as Beard made analogy), which could have been avoided 
had the Japanese only maintained their traditional diet, as the analogy would have had it. As we 
will see throughout the pages to follow, the ontological status of neurasthenia is not so simple; but 
neither should it be dismissed as a fiction or as really being “x”, whatever “x” might be claimed to 
be. Additionally, I hope to continue problematizing “somatization” as an explanatory concept for 
neurasthenia. 
 
3.3 China’s Modernization Project 
The present section returns to a question raised in the first chapter via Hugh Shapiro, “How 
should we understand the popularity of neurasthenia in twentieth-century china?”248 While this 
question is also a variant of the main question of this dissertation as a whole, it is particularly 
relevant here as I hope to convince the reader that SJSR became popular in China in a manner 
specific to its own circumstances. In one sense, this seems obvious and trivial, but my point is to 
contrast the situation in China with the scenario framed in the discussion of Japan above. In order 
to do this, I will subdivide the present section into three parts. In Section 3.1, I begin with some 
                                                             




preliminary comments on the introduction of the term SJSR into the Chinese lexicon, a task that 
is probably impossible to undertake in any exhaustive sense, given the plethora of influences 
involved. In Section 3.2, I show how neurasthenia served for some Chinese as evidence of their 
modernization, focusing especially on Lu Xun (hereafter, LX) in Section 3.3. Finally, Section 3.4 
delves more deeply into the character of Ah-Q in relation to the views on Chinese nerves of George 
Beard and Arthur Smith of Ah-Q’s creator himself, LX. 
3.3.1 Neurasthenia Enters the Chinese lexicon. 
In considering the earliest introduction of SJSR as a term and concept into Chinese society, 
there seems no clear path to follow as the process involved numerous inroads, ranging from 
materials in Japanese translation, the influence of foreign medical missionaries, Chinese students 
studying in Japan, and an international marketing network that advertised patent medicines 
claiming to heal a variety of ailments, including neurasthenia. Nevertheless, some diligent work 
has been done in this area. Of all attempts to trace the “assimilation of nerves into China”, by far 
the best efforts seem to be those undertaken by Hugh Shapiro, as already mentioned.249 His analysis 
follows the varied attempts at translating “nerve” into Chinese characters from the early sixteenth 
century Jesuit uses of jin (  ) to twentieth-century protestant missionary uses of naoqi jin (ち
). Delineating what forces led shenjing to winning out over other options is still a work in 
progress. With respect to SJSR in particular, research has produced even less. 
 Despite the difficulty of sniffing out the introduction of SJSR into the worlds of Chinese 
linguistics and culture, no shortage of claims has been made regarding the matter. One of the more 
cautious claims was first made by Kleinman in 1986 when he stated that “it is not certain how the 
concept of neurasthenia entered China”.250 While he was right about this, he goes on to say that, 
given limited access, he could not find any mention of the term prior to the First World War. With 
the earliest reference to “neurasthenia” (English term) that he could find in the China Medical 
Journal appearing in 1923, he pointed out that in 1926 the missionary physician J.L. McCartney 
referred to “the Chinese as ‘nervous people’ given to ‘oriental nerves’ because of the great social 
                                                             
249 Hugh Shapiro, “The View from a Chinese Asylum: Defining Madness in 1930s Peking” (University Microfilms 
International, 1995); Shapiro, “Neurasthenia and the Assimilation of Nerves into China”; Shapiro, “The Puzzle of 
Spermatorrhea in Republican China,” Positions 6, no. 3 (1998): 551. 




changes of the time”.251 Kleinman concluded that the “stage was set for the transfer of neurasthenia 
to a Chinese context”, which he presumably thinks took place around that time, partial evidence 
for which claim is reference to the earliest Chinese language article on SJSR he could find, 
published in 1930, a few years after McCartney.252 It seems that Kleinman understood that the 
actual introduction of SJSR into Chinese took place much earlier, but that the palatability of SJSR 
as a conceptual category had arrived with the 1920s. As we will see, this dating is also somewhat 
too late. 
 The idea that SJSR really came to the fore in the 1930s has been repeated by others in less 
cautious terms. A 1989 special edition of Culture Medicine and Psychiatry, for example, contained 
the article “The Diagnosis and Phenomenology of Neurasthenia: A Shanghai Study”, which 
repeats the notion of SJSR popularized in cross-cultural psychiatry.253 Author and psychiatrist 
Zhang Mingyuan conducted research while he was working at the Shanghai Institute for Mental 
Health, where he had firsthand experience of SJSR’s predominance as a diagnostic category 
among Chinese psychiatrists in the final decades of the twentieth century. He concluded that 
neurasthenia was diagnosed in China in such a manner that it fell along a “disease spectrum ranging 
from mild personality disorder to simple sleep disorders”.254 Commenting on the fact that SJSR 
was the most frequently reported diagnosis among his colleagues in China, Zhang mused, “one 
may wonder whether it is due to a difference in the geographic distribution of mental disorders, or 
to variations in diagnostic concepts in different countries”.255 His own view seems to be that it is 
an admixture of both. Believing in 1989 that SJSR was growing in popularity, Zhang suggested 
some reasons for its wide acceptance similar to those addressed above in Chapter 2. Most 
importantly for my present purposes, he wrote that “it is believed that the term neurasthenia came 
to China in the early twentieth century and first appeared in a Chinese medical publication in the 
1930s”.256 Specifically, he attributes the rise of SJSR to the turbulence of the 30s and 40s, fitting a 
needed role in diagnosis for physicians at that time. This historical claim has been oft repeated but 
is not factual. 
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 As Shapiro has pointed out, cultural psychiatry has produced the largest literature on SJSR, 
and as a result, its influence has extended into other academic disciplines. This influence can be 
seen, for example, in Raoul Birnbaum’s chapter on the conversion of the famous Buddhist master 
Hongyi in Buddhism and the Modern World.257 Hongyi’s (Li Shutong) self-diagnosis of SJSR 
played a pivotal role in his move to become a monk and leave his life in society. Most interestingly, 
Birnbaum has a great deal to say about SJSR in Hongyi’s life and all the efforts at self-cure that 
he undertook beginning in 1916. Despite this conversion in the 1910s and the explicit discussion 
of SJSR, Birnbaum goes on to claim “the term came to China in the early twentieth century and 
first appeared in a Chinese medical publication in the 1930s”. 258 He then references Zhang 
Mingyuan’s commentary regarding the popularity of SJSR in China. It is simply worth noting that 
it makes little sense that Hongyi would struggle with SJSR at the end of the first decade of the 
twentieth century if SJSR only appeared in the third or fourth.  
 Peng Hsiao-yen, at Academia Sinica, has given us a better picture of the difficulty in 
understanding the historical contingencies behind SJSR and its popularization in China. As I will 
return to her as well, it is worth noting that she takes SJSR back to the 1910s, including reference 
to several Japanese works in classical Chinese translation. She makes an effort to point out that, 
from 1894, Japanese texts already included the modifier kan-nou ( ) with neurasthenia (kan-
nou shinkei suijyaku), in order to indicate it as a “functional” nervous disorder, as we saw in 
Chapter 2. She states:  
In China the term ‘ り ’ appeared in the 1910s. The earliest title I can discover in the 
National Bibliographic Information Network of National Central Library in Taipei is Three 
Great Studies on Neurasthenia . . . published by Medical Bookstore in Shanghai in 1910. . . . 
This book is unavailable, but from the terms such as ‘ た ’ and ‘ り ’ used to 
describe it in the library catalog, one can assume that it is based on Japanese sources.259 
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 Peng’s efforts are helpful in placing dates on some of the early influences that may have 
facilitated the cultural appropriation of SJSR. Still, the introduction of the idea into China took 
place even earlier, and it may be impossible to pin down any first instance of cultural transfer, 
including publication of a first textual reference. Publications of various materials and popular 
references to and discussions of the malady were taking place before the close of the first decade 
of the twentieth century, as we will see in Section 4 below, and we can be hopeful that future 
research will shed light on numerous sources unknown to us even today. Presently, however, we 
should turn to a consideration of how the cultural milieu in China made possible a unique 
appreciation of neurasthenia, even to the point of viewing it as evidence for national progress.  
3.3.2 Evidence of China’s Modernization 
In order to contrast the manner of neurasthenia’s reception into China260 with the situation 
in Japan, as outlined above, there are a number of non-trivial assumptions that must be admitted. 
For example, use of the term “reception” indicates a particular orientation to the movement of 
ideas, an orientation that views neurasthenia as having been received into Japan and China 
subsequent to its construction and development as an idea in the Euro-American context. As a 
concept and a lexical term, neurasthenia was translated from one space to another, any description 
of which carries with it theory-laden notions of “source” versus “target” language, host/guest 
relationships, or other similarly complicated manners of speaking.261 Nevertheless, while I do not 
believe that reception is a passive process, it is not my intention to argue for the fairness of the 
term “reception” or to defend any other theoretical framework. Therefore, I will move directly 
toward an attempt at describing the situation that gave rise to neurasthenia’s popularity in China, 
and I will borrow from whatever conceptual categories that may aid my description.  
 At the risk of appearing unoriginal, I find it necessary to frame this subject matter by 
starting at the same place Lydia Liu begins her work on Translingual Practice; that is, I begin with 
LX. His early representation of the typical Chinese person as backwards and in need of the healing 
potential of literature is not something that grew out of a vacuum, as Liu carefully demonstrates. 
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Rather, the discourse of “national character” already had a complicated and long track record by 
the time LX encountered its application to the “Chinese” by way of Japanese translations of Arthur 
Smith’s 1894 monograph Chinese Characteristics.262 Long before being applied to Asia, theories 
of national character were developed both to explain differences between and to establish the 
unique identities of various peoples in Europe.263 Even after World War II the idea of national 
character served as a theoretical orientation within the field of psychological anthropology, as is 
evinced by the studies of famous academics like Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict.264 At the turn 
of the twentieth century, however, theories of national character were intimately tied to colonialism 
and imperialism. While on the one hand imperialist nations used the theories to justify or 
rationalize their efforts, reformers and revolutionaries in China used the theories in attempts to 
avoid some of those same imperialist influences and to effect national change; Liang Qichao was 
one such figure and Sun Yat-sen another. What is so important about the idea of national character, 
however, is not whether it was predictive, accurate, or believable when we consider its various 
forms upon retrospective investigation. Instead, its significance lies in the fact that it was believed 
and perpetuated broadly in the popular imagination of the time. This is precisely the key issue that 
Liu does not address when she writes that Arthur Smith was a key player “in the invention of the 
myth of Chinese Character” that later turned into the “ambivalent reinvention of that myth by the 
Chinese themselves, especially in the May Fourth literary discourse”.265  One is reminded of 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s discussion of such roles of literature in After Virtue where he writes:  
Heroic societies, as they are represented by the Homeric Poems or the Icelandic or Irish 
sagas may or may not have existed: but the belief that they had existed was crucial to those 
classical and Christian societies which understood themselves as having emerged from the 
conflicts of heroic society and which defined their own standpoint partially in terms of that 
emergence.266  
That is to say, it is important not to neglect the distinction between questions of fact and questions 
of what is believed broadly. For our own purposes, my claim is that LX and many Chinese believed 
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the information available in the writings of Smith and others. Such belief had consequences and 
made space for discussing the transformation of the Chinese person. 
In the same manner that laughable views regarding the tafusagi and other such matters had 
an impact on how neurasthenia was conceptualized in Japan, ideas regarding national character in 
China also had their impact. Retrospective hostility to the “myth” should not hide from view the 
large-scale ramifications on the local world that such an idea would have effected when treated as 
though it were not a myth at all but a matter of fact. Despite whatever we think of it today, “the 
myth of national character” was no myth for LX or other influential figures of China’s New Culture 
and May Fourth movements. This claim should be relatively uncontroversial, and for that reason 
I lean on it in the process of defending the notion that neurasthenia began as a cultural asset in 
China.267 While it may seem like a stretch to relate LX and the myth of national character to the 
entrenchment of neurasthenia in China, I believe there are very good reasons for doing so, 
especially given the prevailing theories of neurasthenia offered in psychiatric/medical literature in 
the United States. Let me begin with the caricature of Chinese characteristics in the early twentieth 
century, which LX and others seemed to accept as factual.  
It has been claimed that Arthur Smith’s book contains a “contemptuous” metaphor for the 
Chinese people that “no doubt reflects the author’s racist attitude toward the Chinese”.268 While 
the book also contains expressions of admiration for the Chinese people,269 it is unfortunately true 
that the book is, in the main, overwhelmingly negative in tone. As can be seen from its chapter 
headings alone, the book contains a great deal of negative topics for discussion. For instance, we 
find that he wrote about the concepts of “face”, “disregard of time”, “disregard of accuracy”, “the 
talent for misunderstanding”, “the absence of sympathy”, “the absence of nerves”, “the absence of 
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sincerity”, “the absence of public spirit”, “contempt for foreigners”, “indifference to comfort and 
convenience”, and a host of other notions that are aimed at pointing out the uncivilized status of 
Chinese society. Furthermore, it would not be surprising if we were to find out that the Japanese-
language edition available to LX had removed even those few entries where Smith praises the 
Chinese people. Nevertheless, we do not need to know exactly which copy LX was reading in 
order to get a sense that his early writings served to personify and re-present to his countrymen 
those aspects of Chinese character that he believed were a barrier to national advancement; in fact, 
such a reading of his works is commonly assumed. There can be little doubt today that LX did 
read and reflect over Smith’s book. In Mashang Zhi Riji (1926), he recounted a visit to a Japanese 
bookstore and the purchase of a Japanese work on Chinese national character purported to study 
the topic from the perspective of fictional literature. His description of the table of contents is 
similar enough to Smith’s chapter headings that the narrator opines that “he seems really to believe 
Smith’s Chinese Characteristics”.270 He goes on to state that the Japanese have had translations of 
Smith’s work for over twenty years under the title ド, but that “we Chinese have not 
paid much attention to the book”.271 Interestingly, although LX refers to twenty years of access to 
the text, Shibue Tamotsu’s translation dates to 1896, some thirty years earlier, as can be seen in 
Figure 12.272 Confident in the historical access LX had to Smith’s work in Japanese translation, we 
can consider what LX was after. Present purposes do not require a detailed look at all the change 
he hoped might occur in his countrymen; but for some clarification, it is worth a very brief 
discussion of those aspects of national character that he thought needed remedying. 
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Figure 12: Cover page and first page of Chapter 11 from Shibue Tamotsu’s 1896 translation of Smith’s 
work Chinese Characteristics 
 
3.3.3 Lu Xun and Ah-Q 
If ever it could be said that a single character maximally personified those traits described 
in Smith’s chapter headings, it would be true of the protagonist in The True Story of Ah-Q. In fact, 
LX suggests as much when, around 1933, he wrote that the purpose for having penned the story 
was “probably to expose the weaknesses of the Chinese citizenry”.273 An examination of Ah-Q 
readily presents us with a figure who neatly fits into Smith’s caricature. He is driven by 
preoccupation with “face” in regards even to the most insignificant of matters, such as competing 
with another vagabond over who can make the loudest popping sound when biting a louse. He has 
                                                             




contempt for things foreign, has no regard for time, has a talent for misunderstanding and re-
interpreting affairs to fit his own needs, lacks any public spirit, is insincere, and is generally 
indifferent to comfort and convenience. What’s more, Ah-Q’s celebratory retelling to his 
townsmen the story of a beheading that he has allegedly witnessed, takes the reader directly back 
into the classroom scene of LX’s early experience in Sendai as described later in the preface to 
NaHan ( ). Contemporaries could certainly be exposed to Smith’s critique of the Chinese 
character, though not necessarily from reading his book, by seeing in LX’s protagonists those 
depictions of a national character that Smith believed he had recognized.  
This is most readily demonstrated by considering one of the more vitriolic attacks on LX’s 
work. With the publication of “Siqule de A Q Shidai” in 1928, Qian Xingun engaged in a rabid 
assault of LX’s fiction, claiming that it was ideologically deficient, unfit for any readership, and 
lacked any relevance to contemporary China.274 Despite the pages of insults hurled at LX, Qian 
does in a few instances offer recognition that Ah-Q served well as a representative of the “aberrant 
national character” and ”mass ideology” in the period before the beginning of the May Fourth 
Movement. 275 Interestingly, Qian criticized LX not for his apparent acceptance of the myth of 
national character, but because he believed the portrayal of Chinese character accurately applied 
only within a particular timeframe. In other words, he thought it was accurate, but that it no longer 
fit after the May 30th uprising of 1925. Analysis of such an opinion is beyond the purposes of the 
present discussion; but it is worth pointing out that Smith’s “myth” was believed and that there 
was a desire to have the citizenry eventually outgrow the traits of which it was accused. Most 
importantly, Qian’s grossly naïve hermeneutic failed to recognize that LX’s narrator might himself 
already serve as a counter-example to Ah-Q and as a foreshadowing of a future citizenry to come. 
A similar issue has clued scholars into LX’s self-positionality with respect to the criticisms of 
Chinese national character. 
 One of the ways in which Liu and other contemporary scholars have addressed 
considerations of national character and class division in LX is by examining how he situates the 
relationship between narrator and protagonist. Liu came to this question via LX’s ambiguous third-
person commentary: “ Twelve years ago, Lu Xun produced a story called The True Story of Ah-Q, 
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intending probably to expose the weaknesses of the Chinese citizenry, although he did not make 
clear whether he was himself included among those with such weaknesses”.276 In consideration of 
this ambiguity, Liu concludes that LX’s “story creates not only an Ah-Q but also a Chinese narrator 
capable of analyzing and criticizing the protagonist”, which then “supersedes Smith’s totalizing 
theory of Chinese character”. 277 Regarding this very interesting insight, it is worth making two 
addenda. First, it should be very clear that LX did not “create” an Ah-Q ex nihilo; the substrate for 
the character was readily available. This is the point I have been trying to emphasize—whatever 
one thinks of the character, it appears to have been readily accepted as a reasonable re-presentation 
of something experientially available to contemporaneous persons and in need of remedy. More 
important yet is the second part of Liu’s conclusion. From this perspective, not only is Qian’s 
criticism of LX completely undermined, but insight is also gained into LX’s not clarifying whether 
he was himself possessed of Ah-Q’s deficiencies. Liu seems correct in suggesting that, at the very 
least, the narrator is exempted from some, if not all, of those weaknesses. LX’s fictional narrator(s) 
is no Ah-Q, which though a simple detail overlooked by Qian and others, interjects a 
counterexample into the discourse of national character. Such an interjection was a necessary first 
step to making way for a narrative of racial progress. This type of literary and epistemological 
disparity between writer/narrator and the characters within the narrative is nothing new. Alasdair 
MacIntyre referred to this as well. Writing about Homer’s construction of the Iliad he pointed out:  
Achilles in his moment of reconciliation with Priam had no way of representing to himself 
what Homer is able in his account of Achilles and Priam to represent to others. Thus the 
Iliad puts in question what neither Achilles nor Hector can put in question: the poem lay 
claim to a form of understanding which it denies to those whose actions it describes.278  
In like manner, the narrator of Ah-Q’s story lay claim to an awareness, sensibility, and 
understanding that is denied to Ah-Q himself. Given such a hermeneutic frame, LX’s intention of 
positioning his narrator as a counterexample to Ah-Q situates the remainder of our discussion. 
3.3.4. Ah-Q and Three Views of Chinese Nerves 
The question now arises as to what LX’s depiction of Ah-Q has to do with neurasthenia. 
While I do not believe that LX was thinking specifically about SJSR while crafting his protagonist, 
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it seems likely that he was aware that Ah-Q was the very antithesis of the kind of person who came 
down with the ailment of SJSR. Ah-Q was the anti-neurasthenic who, though susceptible to so 
many weaknesses, was incapable of the type of weakness that was believed eventually to give rise 
to neurasthenia. Are there really any grounds for making such a suggestion, or is this just an 
imaginative stretch? To make sense of this claim, it is necessary to consider all that has been 
discussed thus far in light of (1) Beard’s view of China, (2) Smith’s view of Chinese nerves, and 
(3) LX’s own diagnosis. I will take these up in order in the hope of convincing the reader that 
neurasthenia does have something to do with the sick man of Asia that LX wanted to see healed, 
as I find this fertile ground for SJSR’s sprouting forth in China and necessary background for 
discussing its growth and subsequent uses in that country. 
Let me now turn to Beard’s view of China. Recall that in both Nervous Exhaustion and 
American Nervousness, Beard presented his case that the rise of neurasthenia as a clinical ailment 
was especially an “American disease”279 that was the result of living in a modern, civilized society 
with all the concomitant over-stimulation such a life entails. It was the plight of brain workers 
rather than muscle workers,280 and was not a common phenomenon found in charity or poor houses. 
When considering “life in ancient Athens and New York contrasted”, modernity was seen as the 
culprit that brought the overbearing stressors of job specialization, clocks and watches, telegraphs, 
noise, railway travel, new development, increase in business, buying on margin, domestic and 
financial troubles, and other such forces. 281  Beard even commented on the unique case of 
America’s extreme differences in hot and cold climates, which could affect the nervous system. 
Considering Beard’s overall project, it is extremely interesting to find that he chose to compare 
Japan with America. The desire for modernization that was present in Japan at the time of Beard’s 
writing makes it all the more so. He began his comparison by recognizing between Japan and the 
USA similar extremes in climate, which he thought could affect those whose physical constitutions 
had become or were naturally susceptible. While writing in 1881, just twelve years after his debut 
article on neurasthenia, which happened to coincide with the start of the Meiji restoration, Beard 
wrote, “In the Japanese, however, we see suggestions of a fineness of type which is peculiarly 
American; and had the Japanese obtained civilization which, in institutions and intensity had even 
                                                             
279 George Miller Beard, American Nervousness, Its Causes and Consequences: A Supplement to Nervous Exhaustion 
(Neurasthenia) (Putnam, 1881), 9 
280 Bear, American Nervousness, Its Causes and Consequences, 3–4. 




approximated that of America and Europe, it is not improbable that they might have developed a 
nervous susceptibility which, in their present condition, does not exist”.282 As I discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, we now know that, by the last decade of the nineteenth century, 
neurasthenia had become entrenched in Japan in a manner that would not occur in China for 
another quarter of a century. Recall from Beard’s writings that there was some ambiguity regarding 
who could develop neurasthenia. As we have seen here, he believed that the Japanese had an innate 
susceptibility to the situation of being vulnerable to nervous weakness; but he also thought that the 
refinement that made one susceptible could be cultivated, at least over generations.283 However, 
specific social institutions and forms of life must be in place, which would then precipitate the 
diseased state. As noted previously, electricity, telegraphs, railways, and other forms of modern 
life were seen as major contributors acting on susceptible nervous constitutions. Given such views, 
Beard would not have been surprised to learn that, from the time of his debut paper to the 
publication of American Nervousness, Japan underwent a major transformation that would shortly 
precede its concerns with neurasthenia. For instance, during the same period it went from being 
completely without any railway to its first running locomotive in 1871, the establishment of around 
250 miles of tracks, and the founding of Nippon Railway in 1881.284 By the end of the century, the 
nervous susceptibility, for which Beard could say it “does not exist”, had come into existence in 
full force. Unfortunately, Beard died in 1883, just two years after the founding of Nippon Railway, 
and he and was not able to witness his idea spread to Japan and explode in the popular 
understanding, as it did by 1900. Neither did he get to see it enter China, which, from comments 
he had made regarding the Chinese people, is something he would have expected even less.  
  For whatever reason, Beard thought it necessary to offer his opinion on the state of upper-
class Americans in relation to the Japanese, explicitly setting both apart from Chinese people: 
“This is certain; that the Japanese, even of the lower orders, are of a far finer type than the Chinese, 
or any of the nations of the Orient, and that the Japanese woman of the higher classes . . . is of a 
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sensitiveness of organization and a grace and delicacy of manner that suggest the highest types, as 
we meet them in the very highest civilization”.285  In other words, the father of neurasthenia 
proclaimed that the disease of his discovery was one that occurred among those people with the 
greatest sensibilities and sensitivities when the strains that could come only from advanced and 
modern society began to take a toll on the susceptible constitution. Such an ailment could befall 
the American and European first, and then the Japanese; but it was unlikely to occur among the 
Chinese who he believed lacked the refinement of constitution and innate sensibility and sensitivity, 
as well as lacked any of the social institutions that made such a condition possible. Beard’s 
positions were very much the product of an era permeated with discourses of national character 
that emphasized and delineated those traits believed to distinguish one particular group from 
another. It is quite ironic then, that within one century of his writing, China would be the world’s 
primary setting for neurasthenia as a medical diagnosis. 
Having discussed Beard’s view of China, let me turn momentarily to Smith’s view of 
Chinese nerves. Writing only a decade after Beard’s death, Smith would have been very familiar 
with the discourse of nerves and nervousness as discussed in Chapter 2. In fact, he included his 
own chapter (Chapter XI) specifically on the “absence of nerves” among the Chinese.286 The 
chapter begins with some commentary about the concept of nerves as it was popularly known in 
Western countries. He wrote that “it is a very significant aspect of modern civilisation which is 
expressed in the different uses of the word ‘nervous’ . . . The varied and complex phraseology by 
which the peculiar phases of nervous diseases are expressed has become by this time familiar in 
our ears as household words. There is no doubt that civilisation, as exhibited in its modern form, 
tends to undue nervous excitement, and that nervous diseases are relatively more common than 
they were a century ago”.287 This “familiar” concept of nerves, as I have attempted continually to 
demonstrate, was hardly separable from the notion of refinement both in character and sensibility. 
Such refinement was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for nervous disease and only made 
“nervous susceptibility” possible. With this as context, Smith continued: “But though the nerves 
of a Chinese as compared with those of the Occidental may be, as the geometricians say, ‘similar 
and similarly situated,’ nothing is plainer than that they are nerves of a very different sort from 
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those with which we are familiar”.288 He suggested that the Chinese, when compared with the 
European, were more tolerant of pain, less susceptible to fatigue, able to sleep without being 
affected by disturbances, and less susceptible to anxiety, among other aspects of not being of a 
“nervous” constitution.289 He concluded by wondering who might be better adapted for survival in 
the twentieth century, the “nervous” European or the phlegmatic Chinese.  
The sociohistorical context in which LX encountered Smith’s book is very different from 
our own. For instance, it is interesting to find that the more contemporary Chinese translation of 
Smith’s book readily available to the reading public over the past thirty years translates his 
eleventh chapter as “bujin buman”, rather than making any reference to nerves.290 Whether the 
translation has something to do with Chinese reinterpretation or is just a failure in comprehending 
the original author, I am not certain. The most recent translations have done a better job at 
approximating Smith’s meaning, but they have also made substantial changes. One must always 
be weary when a translation of a text alters the arrangement of chapters, in this case turning the 
original eleventh chapter into Chapter 18. That is what has happened in Li’s new translations, 
where “absence of nerves” becomes “duo-xing”.291 In these instances, the translations are separated 
from the discourse of nerves elaborated in the previous chapter, which gives a grounded meaning 
to a reference like shenjing. These alternative renderings may demonstrate to us that translators 
today find the phrase “without nerves” (meiyou shenjing) to be less than clear, as it lacks the 
theory-laden sense that it once had, and “nerves” are now an entrenched part of the lexicon in both 
Chinese and English, with meanings quite different than used to be the case.292 Additionally, China 
did not undergo the extensive history of nervous discourse as outlined in the previous chapter, but 
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instead jumped directly to a discourse of neurasthenia. Still, if these contemporary translations had 
been used in LX’s day, readers would likely have missed the implication of a Chinese deficiency 
in sensibility, refinement, and susceptibility that, in Smith’s mind, set apart the Westerner from his 
Asian counterpart and in some ways disadvantaged the modern European with the burden of 
nervousness. 
Having considered Beard’s view of China and Smith’s view of Chinese nerves, let me now 
return to LX with consideration of his own diagnosis in the context of his day. What is one to make 
of Smith’s claims above, and what would LX have thought upon reading the “nerves” chapter of 
Smith’s book? We can be somewhat confident of his endorsement of certain other sections of the 
text, and so I therefore suggest that he also recognized something about this particular chapter that 
also resonated with his experience of his countrymen. However, as I have made explicit, I think 
that LX believed that there existed ready exceptions to Smith’s criticism, the representative 
example of which was LX himself.  
In the mid-1800s, flagrant insanity was prevalent enough that John Kerr founded a 
welcome hospital for the insane in Canton in 1898.293 The concept of nervous disorders was a 
different matter, however. The claim that Chinese people could be characterized by an absence of 
nerves was oft repeated at the beginning of the twentieth century, and it found its way into the 
most prominent medical journal of those working in China at the close of the nineteenth century, 
the China Medical Journal. An editorial in 1889 made the claim that nervous and mental disease 
was relatively infrequent in China. Nervous disease was, on the other hand, considered to be rather 
common among foreign missionary workers. The 1915 edition of the China Medical Journal 
reported that American physicians often employed the diagnosis of neurasthenia in China with 
regard to other foreigners. In fact, under the stress of life in the new republic and its warlord 
contenders, 44.8% of missionaries were reportedly suffering from the condition.294 In the same 
year, there appeared Chinese language advertisements running daily for patent medicines claiming 
to cure neurasthenia, a presumably new ailment for Chinese people, as well as other previously 
known ailments like semen loss and impotence. The obvious question is who those advertisers 
were targeting, as the ads often ran daily for weeks at a time (Figure 13 is one such example). 
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Figure 13:295 Shen Bao (½T) 1915j 01 12 Î 14¹ Î 15061 
Though difficult to make out, the top, right-hand advertisement reads as follows:  
わ ゆく ゆく
わ た ち り
. 
 
There is an obvious tension in the argument I am trying to make here. On the one hand, there 
appears to have been a prevailing notion among Westerners that nervous ailments were 
“remarkably infrequent in China” among the Chinese, as it has been variously put in writing. 296 
On the other hand, advertisers considered it worthwhile to begin marketing medicines for 
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neurasthenia to those Chinese urbanites reading Shen Bao. The balance between these two facts 
appears to lie in the term “infrequent”, with a special consideration of those elites like LX who 
straddled the transition from the period of Ah-Q to a “modern” China, and this may shed some 
light on the indignation of Qian mentioned above. In other words, while Qian appears to concede 
that Ah-Q was a reasonable representation of a large number of Chinese prior to 1925, the 
typification no longer held by the time of its publication in 1921. 297  This brings me to the 
consideration of LX’s diagnosis, which he received in a Japanese-named clinic after his final return 
to China. He recounted in his diary from August of 1912 that he “suffered a few days from cough 
with concern that it was bronchitis and visited Ikeda clinic this morning. The physician said it was 
not serious, only a neurasthenic condition. Liquid and powder medicines for two days each came 
to a price of one yuan, two jiao. The initial visit was two yuan”.  
LX seemed to understand the discourse of national characteristics, and certainly had read 
Arthur Smith. He was aware of the “sick man of Asia” label, and constructed Ah-Q as the 
personification in a single individual of all that was described by Smith. With his experience of 
studying medicine in Sendai, Japan, and having navigated daily life in the Japanese language, he 
almost certainly was aware of himself as non-representative of the larger Chinese population. His 
neurasthenic condition, which he chose to document in his diary, was another trait that separated 
him from all those Ah-Qs with their “absence of nerves”. As is well known, he eventually turned 
to writing literature in order to provide healing to his countrymen. It was the existence of such 
exceptions, and their susceptibility to nervous exhaustion, that made it possible eventually to claim 
equality with other peoples of the advancing world and bring modernity to China.  
If I am sincere that the reader should take everything I have stated thus far seriously, then 
how can I explain that LX did not mention SJSR in The True Story of Ah-Q? The answer to this 
question has two parts: first, the phenomenon of SJSR is not an explicitly necessary criteria for 
being modern; and second, at the time that LX penned the story in 1921, his ideal of a modern 
Chinese man was less formed than his conception of what was backward about the actual Chinese 
man. As the suitability of the Ah-Q criticism waned, LX did explicitly make reference to SJSR on 
a number of occasions. Besides his personal diary, the earliest such reference is the satirical poem, 
“My Lost Love” ÁZyWo de Shilian in 1924, which appeared in Wild Grass ( Ye Cao) 
                                                             




in 1927.298 There are multiple other references to SJSR that occur later across LX’s corpus, in nine 
other texts overall, but those individual cases are not the subject of our inquiry. More important 
for our purposes is the development of a general sense of what SJSR was beginning to mean for 
Chinese people. In Japan, neurasthenia was something that first affected those elites who lived as 
modern intellectuals. Afterwards, it was a plague on a nation that had modernized too quickly 
without keeping traditional ways of life. In China, SJSwas a new possibility of experience for 
people like LX who had made some progress toward becoming disentangled from the 
backwardness of China’s past. This was true for other writers and intellectuals, as SJSR was 
entering the lexicon of everyday use. It was a category of experience that, from the Chinese vantage 
point, had been entrenched in its Euro-American-Japanese origins and could newly be employed 
both to explain various phenomena in a changing China as well as to make money. I will return to 
its employ in the Chinese literary scene after a brief diversion into non-fiction and some 
commercial matters. 
 
3.4 Neurasthenia in Popular Discourse 
In 1937 sociologist and eugenicist Pan Guangdan (³1') translated Smith’s book into 
Chinese with the section on the “absence of nerves” titled “meiyou shenjing de zhongguo ren”.299 
By that time, SJSR had already been in semi-regular use for two decades or more, and Smith’s 
claims could be applied to fewer and fewer people. Intellectuals had long been bringing the concept 
to public attention, as noted earlier in this chapter. Recall that Kleinman listed 1923 as the earliest 
date he could find reference to SJSR, and Peng Hsiao-yen mentioned the earliest book she could 
find on the subject was one published in 1917. Aside from monographs, however, there are 
materials of historical interest that demonstrate an attempt to spread awareness of the phenomenon 
even earlier, before the establishment of the Republic of China. The following section deals with 
such materials, which demonstrate the increasing availability of information about SJSR to readers 
of what might be considered special interest non-fiction. The common thread among them is a 
relationship to knowledge coming from Japan. 
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3.4.1. Special Interest Publications 
One early example is seen in “Method for preventing Shenjing Shuairuo”, which was 
printed in Dalu (XĐ) magazine in 1905.300 Published by a press called the Xinshe Book Bureau 
( ) in Shanghai starting in 1902, Dalu was an edited periodical at the end of the 
Qing dynasty that was to shut down publication in 1906. Originally printing as a monthly, but later 
increasing to bimonthly production, the magazine was founded by Chinese students who had 
returned from study abroad in Japan. It covered a variety of topics including news, political 
editorials, and health information. While readership was probably very small and limited to an 
intellectual and student class in Shanghai, it is one example of early efforts to spread knowledge 
gained abroad. he information provided about SJSR seems consistent with Beard’s general 
framing of neurasthenia. The basic claims are straightforward: SJSR is not acute but gradual; it 
affects one’s ability to attend to details; causes one to feel ill at ease and irritated without much 
provocation; and leads to poor sleep. Its etiology includes overwork of body or spirit (ÐÉ, 
inadequacy of nutritious eating habits, inadequate time set aside for rest, excessive toil, and lack 
of peaceful sleep.Primary prevention was to include proper diet, avoidance of excessive toil, and 
establishing good sleep habits, which included eight hours of sleep per night (tĖ3ĝĊ). 
The theoretical basis for such advice was simple, “everyone’s mental power has its limits, people 
differ in strengths and weaknesses; if you over expend your spirit (ÐÉ) and don’t fully recuperate, 
your nerves will of necessity gradually weaken”.301 
More specialized journals also brought knowledge to China from overseas. One such 
Journal of Medicine (ćê^T) founded in Chiba prefecture, Japan, in 1907 made professional 
information available in classical Chinese. Founded by several Chinese studying in Japan, the main 
columns consisted of medical theories, miscellaneous records, popular speeches, essays, historical 
biographies, and lectures. The magazine’s aims were to advance new theory, study practical 
science, and seek medical reform and pharmaceutical progress in China. In 1909 an article titled 
“Neurasthenia of Brain” offered explanation regarding the meaning of SJSR. 302  As was the 
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common thinking, it was claimed that originally the ailment was rampant in the USA as a result 
of her early development (ÔªċB) and earning SJSR the title of “the American disease” 
(!Ô:?¿), all of which is consonant with the picture of neurasthenia originally offered by 
Beard. Unlike Beard, the article reported that with more research it was becoming understood that 
the disease existed in the “old world” and in all places, although nothing more of any detail is 
offered. The remainder gives much of the same symptomology previously covered, pointing out 
that exhaustive listing is impossible due to the numerous manifestations, which are divided into 
bodily and mental symptoms. For the body there are varieties of headache, tinnitus of one or both 
ears, insomnia, and fatigue following any activity such as eating, talking, exercising or changes in 
weather. The mental symptoms are not dealt with in any detail in the paper.  
 From the perspective of religious, special interest groups, there were also missionary 
papers such as the Jesus’ Teaching Family News (ÚÌalč), which was produced by a 
Presbyterian mission board that spread updates in information regarding missionary activity, 
advances in medicine, and political happenings relevant to the churches.303 In 1909 we find a 
retelling of something recently published in the magazine Riben Jiating (al). It reported 
that the Japanese magazine had offered three means of avoiding SJSR. The advice was to (1) avoid 
hereditary taint, by not marrying a girl with any family history of the disease; (2) stop drinking 
and smoking (tobacco and opium); and (3) do not overburden oneself with excessive responsibility 
or the obligations of either physical or mental labor.304  
While special interest publications not unlike those mentioned here had long existed in the 
late Qing, and Chinese print history further predates the interest in foreign learning found in the 
first decade of the twentieth century, it is fair to say that something changed in the years leading 
up to the founding of the Republic in 1912. In addition to the revolutionary interests in publishing 
during the waning of the Qing, there were practical matters of entrepreneurship that also 
contributed to the types of materials available in print. For instance, we might consider some of 
the changing demands of readers. Christopher Reed has pointed out that the “abolition of the 
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traditional education curriculum and of the civil service examination system in 1904-5 meant that, 
just as the necessary adjustments had finally been settled into, Chinese modernity was redefined 
with an emphasis on ‘new-style’ learning and books that addressed political and social problems 
with reference to Japan and the West, rather than to China’s ancient greatness”.305 This is in part 
to say that, among other factors, publishers were not going to profit from continuing to print the 
types of materials previously demanded by those preparing for examinations. This is not meant to 
diminish the fact that there had long been readers interested in popular fiction printed under the 
genre of what was to be called “Mandarin Ducks and Butterflies”. Much of that literature, however, 
was printed not as monographs, but as serials in weekly or monthly papers. 
 The complete picture of the types of changes that were occurring in China from 1911–
1920 are so complex that they take up countless volumes. From the founding of New Youth by 
Chen Duxiu in 1915, what was to be known as the New Culture Movement served as a platform 
for changing views of self and society.306 The meaning and role of the novel, and fiction generally, 
became a deeply and acridly contested matter after the inception of the May Fourth Movement of 
1919 as it furthered what had begun in the New Culture Movement.307 This is evinced by the 
development of competing theories of literature that were represented by a variety of literary 
societies from 1920 onward.308 Those debates on literature required access to large-scale printing 
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capabilities, which had been undergoing development since the late nineteenth century. A 
transformed printing culture, it has been argued, made for a transformed population.309  
3.4.2 Shen Bao and Medical Advertising 
Momentarily continuing with the present aim of setting aside fiction, one example of such 
a transformation might be seen in the role printed newspapers may have had on the formation of a 
Chinese concept of self. By studying the content published in the newspaper Shen Bao, Weiping 
Tsai has taken up this matter of how reading consumers participated in the negotiation of their own 
individuality vis-à-vis loyalty to the nation, consumer culture, hygienic practices, and other matters 
of everyday life.310  Whether Tsai accomplishes his task of demonstrating a growing tension 
between self/nation and public/private among the readership of Shen Bao is not worth arguing 
presently. More important is his argument that print material, and Shen Bao in particular, served 
as a force for changing views in early twentieth-century China. When considering that paper, it is 
surprising to see how a publication started by an Englishman (Ernest Majors) in 1872 could 
eventually end up in domestic hands (taken over by Shi Liangcai in 1912, who would come to own 
majority share in the company) and expand to the point of truly mass production. For example, in 
1916 the company purchased a Japanese-made rotary press that could produce 8,000 pages per 
hour.311 By 1918, they purchased an American cylinder printing machine capable of more than 
30,000 copies per hour. In subsequent years, more machines were purchased, and printing 
schedules were made to match train timetables in order to deliver the papers outside of Shanghai.312 
It was the mass production and commercial focus that has contributed to much of the historical 
interest in Shen Bao’s readership. Unlike many earlier papers that had a clear revolutionary or 
reform purpose,313 Shen Bao appeared to be primarily about making a profit. This is not to say that 
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influenced the types of printing presses that were initially used, rejected, modified, and improved upon in China’s 
march toward an autonomous and modern print culture. He draws an analogy with Europe where access to 
printing presses disrupted the hegemonic influence of the Roman Catholic Church, opening up possibilities for 
competing theological and political narratives. In like manner, access to printed information made possible the rise 
of the Chinese Communist Party and the eventual founding of the People’s Republic in 1949.  
310 Shen Bao (½T ) was an abbreviation for the name Shenjiang xinbao (½§T ), where Shenjiang is itself a 
shortened form of the name Qunshenjiang (É§), yet another name for the Huangpu river (Ĝ¬§) that flows 
through Shanghai.  
311 Reed, Gutenberg in Shanghai, 77. 
312 W. Tsai, Reading Shenbao: Nationalism, Consumerism and Individuality in China 1919–37 (Springer, 2009), 12. 
313For a scholarly look at one such paper, see: Joan Judge, Print and Politics: ‘Shibao’ and the Culture of Reform in 




no political ideology was expressed in its pages, as Tsai clearly points out; but even the political 
material was often aimed at increasing sales of a particular product.314 Rather than viewing the 
reception of commercial material as a passive process, scholars like Tsai and others have seen a 
mutual exchange going on within the market that gave rise to the various advertisements and 
information exchanges in Shen Bao.  
Huang Kewu has put this succinctly in his study of medical and medicinal advertisements 
in Shen Bao from the founding of the Republic of China through 1926.315 He suggests that the 
readers are most appropriately viewed as “searching through the papers actively seeking out 
information that might resolve problems they were having in their lives, and the advertisements 
produced by the market needed to match up with consumer needs in order to be effective as 
advertisements”.316 Among the empirical findings from Huang’s study, one of the most salient is 
that all advertisements for general hospitals appearing in Shen Bao during that period were for 
Western medical hospitals rather than hospitals of Chinese medicine, of which there were more 
actual buildings. On the other hand, advertisements incorporated a variety of medical theories, 
which ranged from Western to Chinese traditional and folk medical theory. In the period even 
before Huang’s study, we can find advertisements appearing in Shen Bao that appear to draw from 
a global market influence. Recall the Sears and Roebuck advertisement for an electric belt in Figure 
10 of the previous chapter. Only three years after appearing in Sears and Roebuck, ads for very 
similar products appeared in Shen Bao, as can be seen in Figure 14 below. 
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guilt readers into buying Chinese rather than foreign cigarettes.  
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Running daily for weeks and months at a time, such images and concepts were either 
ignored, were seen but eventually forgotten, or were imprinted on the minds of readers. As the 
second decade of the twentieth century progressed, and the scale of printing continued to expand, 
Chinese readers were increasingly exposed to imported concepts through commercial 
advertisement imaging. I have included some of these images because of their ability to capture 
readers’ attention and their similarity to commercial efforts in the USA around the same time, but 
it should not be ignored that the images are often accompanied by the written word, which further 
provided conceptual information for the reader. Additionally, image-free print space containing 
SJSR content was also ubiquitous in the newspapers of the day. 
 One such advertisement column on a front page of Shen Bao serves as a representative 
example of the type of material that contained only text (Figure 16 below). The text of this 1925 
commercial piece is presented under the title, “Effective Medicine for Shenjing Shuairuo”. While 
SJSR appears as the targeted ailment for the patent medicine being offered, the actual text that 
follows does not explicitly use the term SJSR. Instead it refers to a general category of “nerve-
weakness”. The full text can be found in the caption and reads as follows:  
Arriving at middle age, work is excessive, and worries become harmful. There are many 
diseases of weakened nerves. Initially, memory becomes less clear, things are forgotten as 
soon as they happen. Sadness upon events (illegible), there is no telling right from left, 
thinking is sluggish, and one is easily aggravated. If not treated, suffering from mental 
illness will ensue, tinnitus, vertigo, and decline of memory will all follow. Melancholic 
malaise, mental and physical debility will be the end result. In past decades, Ailuo Brain 
tonic has received universal praise as a medicine that mind-workers shouldn’t be without. 
Each large bottle is 2 yuan. Small bottles are 1 yuan, 2 jiao.317
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Given what has been said thus far about SJSR and its gradual introduction into the Chinese lexicon, 
this 1925 advertisement can readily be seen as fitting into the general pattern of framing the ailment 
as befalling a cognitive, rather than manual, class and having a common set of symptoms as have 
already been described. The number of such pieces is extremely large, running often on a daily 
basis, month after month, until the paper ceased publication in 1949. 
Stepping away from Shen Bao momentarily, the ubiquity of print information about SJSR 
in other publications can easily be demonstrated by a cursory view of the source materials collected 
by the Shanghai Institute of Scientific and Technological Information in their databases of the 
National Newspaper Index
For instance, in the years from 1900 until the proclamation of the 
founding of the Republic of China in 1912, there are only five articles documented that have SJSR 
in their title. Three of these have already been discussed above.320 In the first decade after the 
founding of the ROC, the count of such articles jumped to fifty-nine. The following decade (1930–
1939) saw an increase to 329 such publications, and these numbers reflect only those articles with 
shenjing shuairuo directly in their title. In the two decades after 1912, those articles that make 
direct reference to shenjing, shenjing guanneng, or other such variations are almost too numerous 
to count, much less address in any systematic fashion.321 Suffice it to say that there appears to be 
a distinct change in the availability of discussion about SJSR that corresponds to changes in 
Republican-Era printing practices. Such print culture was able to naturalize and embed SJSR in 
the cultural lexicon by the mid-1920s.  
3.4.3 Return to Literary Examples 
In my effort to continue pointing the reader toward a shift in how Chinese people of the 
early twentieth century viewed their own capacity to experience conditions like SJSR (that 
ultimately end up being distressing for the person), we have reached the appropriate place to return 
to discussion of literary references to the subject. I have already explicitly argued that, as a result 
of his immersion in Japan, LX saw himself and a potential future Chinese populace as having 
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320 The first of these begins with the material cited in Section 4.1. 
321 Guanneng-zheng ( た ) is the term applied to “functional disorders” as described in Chapter 2, which at least 




sensibilities that could serve as a counterexample to those historic Chinese people that could be 
characterized by an “absence of nerves”. I have also made an effort to demonstrate the manner in 
which the concept of “weakness of nerves” went from being completely unknown, to something 
known to a few Chinese like LX, to something that, by the end of the 1920s, any literate Chinese 
person could readily be expected to understand. The publishing capabilities, the commercial sector, 
and the print culture were in place to make hermeneutically possible a broad utilization of modern 
scientific concepts and Japanese neologisms in a manner previously unseen in China.322 With that 
said, I do not intend to continue my argument by reproducing the research efforts of others who 
have adequately analyzed the socio-cultural-linguistic milieu of China during this time period. 
Instead, I will refer to literary uses of SJSR as they have been described by others, in an effort 
merely to add to the preponderance of evidence suggesting that SJSR could be seen as a new 
possibility for a modernizing and advancing Chinese populace.  
A particularly convincing argument has been made by Peng Hsiao-yen regarding how 
returned loanwords from modern Japanese scientific terminology profoundly modified the lexicon 
of modern Chinese literature as well as everyday language in speech, newspapers, textbooks, and 
other formats. She argues that such changes conditioned the ways that Chinese people understood 
their own bodies and minds, as well as those of the people around them. Peng accomplishes this 
in “A Traveling Disease: The ‘Malady of the Heart,’ Scientific Jargon, and Neo-Sensation”, where 
she uses neurasthenia as a case study showing how this “modern” disease made its way into China 
through Japan, having originated in the West. She begins her article by situating SJSR as a form 
of description for what the Chinese people were experiencing by the third decade of the twentieth 
century. Specifically, she says that “after the discourse of the ‘Sick man of Asia’ (dong ya bing fu) 
prevalent in China since the late Qing (CF. Heinrich 2008), writers in the 1920’s and 1930’s were 
telling us that Chinese were now suffering from the ‘malady of the heart’”. Part of her argument 
appears to be that, at the particular historical moment in China, people in general, and writers in 
                                                             
322 Liu, Translingual Practice; Lydia He Liu, Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations, 
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Additionally, I am not unaware of the theory-laden character of terms like “modern scientific concepts”. It is not 





particular, were at a loss for describing and naming the “sensations, feelings, psyche, and illnesses 
of the heart of the modern person”.323 As a result, she claims “they needed to use translated 
vocabulary”.324 Making such a claim requires that she discuss in detail some of the history of 
psychology as a discipline in Japan and then China, with a focus on how psychological terminology 
made its way into China. We saw at the beginning of this chapter that she attempted to date some 
of the earlier introductions of SJSR into print in China. Her claim further requires that she 
demonstrate incorporation of such terminology into Chinese literature and other media.  
 I will return briefly to the examples that Peng gives of SJSR’s use in Chinese literature. 
First, however, I want to draw attention generally to the possible meanings of Peng’s claim that 
writers and others in China “needed to use translated vocabulary”. One can see that this claim 
entails at least one of many possible scenarios. For example, either the existing lexicon lacked 
terminology that resonated with the new experiences people were having, or something more 
complex was occurring. An example of the former might be what happens when a person from an 
equatorial climate is transplanted to the north or when a person learns how to sail, both of which 
entail the novice having to become acquainted with a host of unfamiliar or technical jargon. The 
latter, more complicated scenario takes place when new experiences co-occur along with changes 
internal to the person. An example might be when my five-year-old daughter uses “scared” to 
describe feeling “embarrassed”, when someone undergoes a religious conversion, or when one 
navigates a socialization process in a new cultural milieu.325 I think that Peng has something more 
like the former in mind. That is, the world had changed for the Chinese people, and as such, they 
needed new language to explain and describe how they were experiencing that new world. My 
own position is that for many, such as LX, the Chinese people were undergoing changes in their 
own persons that were co-occurring alongside the societal transition that typified that turbulent 
time. This is to recall my main argument in this chapter, part of which might be summarized by 
saying that Ah-Q would not have turned to a translated vocabulary had he survived into the 1930s. 
The change would have seemed wholly external to him. However, in time there were others for 
whom an alternative lexicon was necessary. Furthermore, I want merely to point out that I am not 
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example. However, I think the clearer example is being immersed in another society and language. Religious 




convinced that the Chinese needed to use translated vocabulary; I am content to recognize that 
they did, in fact, use translated vocabulary.326 
Transitioning back to Peng’s references to the early modern Chinese literary scene, she 
makes the claim that neurasthenia had entered broad conceptual employ and was referenced by 
Chinese authors as they attempted to understand themselves and their time. As I have already 
mentioned, SJSR appears famously in LX’s diary but only in passing a few times in his other 
works. As one example of SJSR being put to use as a translated vocabulary, Peng points readers 
in the direction of some of the writers that made up the New Sensationalist movement. 327 One of 
the founders of the movement, Liu Na’ou, ( , 1905–1940) described his own struggles with 
the ailment in his diary in 1927, some fifteen years after LX. However, according to Peng, as an 
explicit category of experience, “the term neurasthenia appeared in modern Chinese literature 
around the mid-1920s”.328 By that time, it could be referenced in a manner that took for granted 
that readers understood what the term meant. Peng relies on this fact as a central feature of her 
thesis, with Mu Shiying’s short story, “A Man Taken as a Plaything” serving as the starting point 
for her discussion of neurasthenia.329 Her position, in short, is that Mu Shiying took a lighthearted 
or, perhaps, satirical view of other writers’ use of contemporary scientific and psychological 
vocabulary in their literary works. The main targets of this satire, she argues, were the various 
novelists that made up the Creation Society.330 Translated terms like neurasthenia, hypochondria, 
                                                             
326 After all, the Chinese could have done something like what the Japanese did; namely, they could have drawn on 
their own textual tradition and created neologisms from there. Of course, this was already done. 
327 The New Sensationalist Movement (xin ganjue pai, ) was a group of writers that focused more on the 
psychological and aesthetic experiences of modern Chinese, in stark contrast with the deeply political and 
revolutionary writings of some of their contemporaries that arose after the May Fourth Movement. Mu Shiying, Liu 
Na’ou, and Shi Zhecun were the main authors. For further discussion see Leo Ou-Fan Lee, Shanghai Modern,  190–
231. 
328 Peng, “A Traveling Disease,” 113. 
329 Mu Shiying ( , 1912–1940) is well known for his short stories as well as for being a major figure/founder 
of what is known as the “new sensationalist movement”( ). His short story mentioned here has the 
Chinese title, “る ”. 
330 It is not my aim to discuss the history or other intricate details of these literary societies and their productions. 
That has been done in Denton and Hockx, 2008 and others. However, I will mention briefly that the Creation 
Society or Chuangzao she ( ) was a literary society that owed its existence to several Chinese intellectuals 
who had studied in Japan and used the vernacular language of baihua ( ) while incorporating contemporary 
terminology provided by the translated vocabulary of psychological sciences to describe the social and 
psychological milieu of the China of the day. Guo Muoro (ー の, 1892–1978), Zhang Ziping ( , 1893–1959), 
Cheng Fangwu ( , 1897–1984), and Yu Dafu ( , 1896–1945 ) were the figureheads of the Creation 




and hysteria (xie si di li, ) made frequent appearance in Creation Society writings and 
were taken as matters of fact in the contemporary Chinese situation of the day. Specifically, she 
references Zhang Ziping’s 1926 novel Taili ( ) wherein the protagonist says of his cousin’s 
wife, with whom he had an affair, “She fell ill with hysteria, while I, with neurasthenia”. 331 In like 
manner, Yu Danu’s most famous novella, Sinking ( ), deals with the plight of a young Chinese 
student living in Japan who suffers from “hypochondria” and “megalomania”. Both terms were 
printed in English in the original, with the Chinese youyuzheng ( ) offered as a footnote.332 
An inveterate masturbator and frequenter of Japanese geisha houses, the protagonist of Sinking 
hates the Japanese women he desires because he believes they look down on him for his Chinese-
ness. His apparent suicide in the Sea of Japan is accompanied by his famous call for China to grow 
stronger, blaming his death on the nation’s weakness: “O China, my China, you are the cause of 
my death! . . . I wish you could become rich and strong soon! . . . Many, many of your children 
are still suffering”.333  
Peng makes reference to Sinking and then immediately cites the famous author, professor, 
and Catholic convert Su Xuelin (1897–1999) who is well known for her criticisms of the decadence 
and self-absorption of her contemporaries, like LX and Yu Dafu. In 1934 she wrote that “Egotism”, 
“Sentimentalism”, and erotic indulgence constituted the basic elements of Yu’s works. 334 
                                                             
331 Peng, 113. Hysteria is xie si di li,( ), while neurasthenia is the term SJSR. 
332 For the reader of Japanese, this term is yuu-utsu shou ( ), or severe depression. However, it should be 
clear that this category of illness is not necessarily conceptually related to “hypochondria” at all. This is a matter of 
rather complicated inquiry, which I have taken up personally but is beyond the scope of the present discussion. In 
short, I believe that Yu Dafu was suggesting something with his use of “hypochondria” that is not addressed in any 
commentaries on his story; namely, that the perceived deficiencies of the protagonist were believed but not based 
in reality. As such, the Chinese sense of inferiority that is expressed by the protagonist is one that is imagined, 
without basis in fact. That is to say, the illness that caused his suspected suicide was hypochondriacal self-loathing. 
His outlook regarding himself and how others saw him was not an accurate representation of reality. He was 
melancholic and delusional as a result. Delusional self-degradation was the norm in his day for Chinese people 
comparing themselves to the world (consider Smith’s view of them). Unfortunately, we cannot pursue this further.  
333 Joseph S. M. Lau and Howard Goldblatt, The Columbia Anthology of Modern Chinese Literature (Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 55. The original Chinese text is as follows:  
れ は   
334  and つ , レ  ( , 1986), 68. In the original, egotism and 
sentimentalism are used in English, with the Chinese stated as つ  and . I have translated “erotic 
indulgence” from Su’s use of the term , for which she offers no English translation. This is perhaps 
because  she pulls from an existing Chinese tradition, for which she need not draw from any translated 




Interestingly, when writing specifically on Sinking, Su interprets the protagonist’s plight as going 
beyond hypochondria, megalomania, or depression ( ). In fact, she says of the protagonist 
that, “because he is unable to curb his erotic appetites, he becomes self-destructive, all vitality 
sinking into a neurasthenia, the result is suicide by throwing himself into the sea”.335 Despite the 
fact that Yu Dafu never made reference to SJSR in that particular work, Su interprets his specific 
malady as a contemporary phenomenon subsumed within the modern, translated conceptual 
category of SJSR. For Peng, this is an instance of the need for a translated vocabulary to get at the 
contemporary lived experience. While I agree with this, I want simply to go a step further by 
suggesting that Su’s application of SJSR to the protagonist further illustrates that, by the time of 
her writing (1934), SJSR was comfortably embedded in the Chinese lexicon.  
Mu Shiying, however, does make explicit reference to SJSR in “A Man Taken as a 
Plaything”. The protagonist claims that he has developed SJSR as a consequence of his pursuit of 
the modern Shanghai girl. The nature of this relationship entails all the complications of Shanghai 
nightlife such as dance halls, jazz, imported American pastimes and references, and multiple 
suitors who are competitors for the narrator and additional playthings for the girl. On four separate 
occasions in the story, the narrator endorses his having fallen victim to neurasthenia. He blames 
her specifically by stating, “she cured me of misogyny, but gave me neurasthenia”, and later goes 
on to bemoan the fact by claiming, “I feel that I’m suffering from profound neurasthenia”.336 
Peng’s interpretation of this use of language is that whenever “psychological jargon becomes the 
target of ridicule in a literary work, we are looking at the vernacularization, or popularization, of 
the knowledge imbedded in psychology as a discipline”. 337 To be more precise, she believes that 
Mu Shiying’s use of SJSR to describe such ephemeral and banal goings-on satirizes the more 
serious and polemical postures of his contemporaries. My own view is that, at the very least, it 
further demonstrates the entrenchment of SJSR as an available conceptual category by this time in 
China’s history.  
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It has been my overall aim in this chapter to provide some background so that the reader might be 
able to consider how the content from Chapter 2 became relevant for the Chinese people. However, 
the Chinese did not pass through a gradual, historical acclimation to the complex discourse of 
nerves, which lasted nearly two centuries in the Euro-American context. I have tried to describe 
some of the ways in which there was a shift in how Chinese people of the early twentieth century 
viewed their own capacity to experience and describe distress, which found a form of manifestation 
in what became known as SJSR. Part of this process has included a discussion of neurasthenia in 
Japan and some of the ways it was interpreted there. I argued that, early in the twentieth century, 
intellectuals like LX, who were introduced to SJSR through Japan, considered the ailment to be 
something that would not befall simply anyone, as those Chinese people who were represented by 
figures like Ah-Q did not yet have the susceptibility and sensitivity of constitution that made the 
disease possible. LX, in the person of his narrator, was a representative exception. With the 
founding of the Republic and efforts to import new knowledge and sophistication into the culture, 
new means of information distribution arose in the forms of magazines, gazettes, and newspapers. 
In time, the development of large commercial publishing companies with modern mechanical 
printing presses, daily exposed any willing reader or commercial consumer to articles and 
advertisements, slowly embedding SJSR in the popular lexicon. Through print media, including 
fiction of the day, the neurasthenic condition became a viable category of experience that anyone 
could understand. By the 1930s the Chinese populace went from being members of the “sick man 
of Asia” exemplified by Ah-Q, to being something else entirely. Ironically, to move beyond that 
“sickness”, the Chinese began to see themselves as capable of a different kind of sickness. The 
weakness of nerves became something that demonstrated China’s advancement toward equality 
with the Japanese, the Americans, and the Europeans. It was part of becoming modern.  
 China went from a state of affairs where nobody knew about SJSR to a situation where 
almost anyone could describe a given experience as being precisely an instance of SJSR. As I 
mentioned in the previous chapter, for the Chinese there was no previously existing discourse of 
nerves or nervousness on which SJSR could build. When a change of this nature takes place within 
any social milieu, it raises interesting questions about the type of cultural work to which the newly 




a part of the lexicon, how might it be put to use? As a concluding line of thought I want to return 
to Howard Shapiro’s work on hospitals in early Republican China in order to look at one issue he 
raises in passing. I think his question highlights the possibility of an analogous process that is at 
the heart of the present project. 
Shapiro’s research uncovered evidence in from Beijing Union Hospital medical records of 
the influence of literature and the arts on some early Republican-Era patients.338 For instance, he 
describes how one patient escaped criminal charges by eating his own excrement, a method of 
feigning madness that he claimed to have learned from Song Jiang in Outlaws of the Marsh (Shui 
hu zhuan).339 Similar phenomena were documented by others; in his sociological study of 1920s 
Beijing, David Strand recounts how rickshaw pullers expressed their ideas using language and 
examples taken from the “operatic stage”  340 Shapiro argues that opera provided motifs of bodily 
expression used by women to feign madness and seek refuge from familial situations. He recounts 
another case where physician records describe a patient singing in a high-pitched voice while 
performing operatic hand gestures, only later explaining that she was trying to find a way out of 
her situation at home by being admitted to the hospital. Shapiro suggests that the prescribed hand 
and sleeve movements of the theatre served as a vocabulary for articulating illness. Such gestures 
are briefly discussed in A.C. Scott’s The Classical Theatre of China, wherein he explains the 
idiomatic movements used to “signify someone not responsible for their actions or madness”.341 
The point here is that, if watching performances like Mei Langfang’s depiction of Miss Zhao’s 
“mad scene” in Yu Zhou Feng could serve patients’ goals of feigning madness, then serious 
questions arise about how other conceptual categories get put to use.342 Shapiro asks, “did women 
consciously, or unconsciously, emulate motifs preformed on the stage?”343  He concludes by 
raising the issue that I find at the heart of all nosological constructions of illness categories. He 
states:  
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This raises a critical problem of interpretation: was the ‘craziness’ of the stage mindfully 
emulated? Or instead, did the examples from vernacular literature condition the experience 
of madness? In other words, was the madness of women a conscious emulation of social 
templates or a culturally-conditioned expression of mental illness? These issues refer us 
back to the elusive question of how cultural knowledge is embodied as disease.344  
What is of interest here is not the universal phenomenon of malingering or feigning illness 
for some other purpose. Rather, we can consider the possibility that patients who were truly ill 
manifested their illness through forms that were socially and culturally available, forms which are 
contingencies of history, cultural belief, practice, and geography. Illness in a Chinese literary and 
cultural context seems to be intimately related to an aesthetics of illness, a historical sociology of 
national situation, and a medical anthropology of illness. The role of illness representations in 
Chinese print history has served not only as a canonical means for expressing idealized aesthetic 
fetishes in texts like Dream of the Red Chamber, for example, but it has carried over into 
metonymic signification for a pathologized nation and ethnic zeitgeist in writers like LX and Yu 
Dafu.345 I believe that the most interesting case of all, however, is the under-studied situation 
whereby the introduction of conceptual categories of diagnosis like SJSR contributed to the 
cultural knowledge of how experiences of certain types of distress are likely to manifest and how 
the sick role can or is supposed to be carried out. In the past, spitting blood seems to have been 
one idiom of extreme distress that was universally understood, if not attempted.346 One of the 
purposes of this project is to press the notion that local categories serve as paradigms that can 
become embodied and manifested as signifiers of extreme distress.  
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Chapter 4: Western Psychiatry Engages Shenjing Shuairuo 
“The ideas we export to other cultures often have at their heart a particularly American brand of 
hyper-introspection and hyper-individualism. These beliefs remain deeply influenced by the Cartesian 
split between the mind and the body, the Freudian duality between the conscious and unconscious”.347 
 
Thus far we have examined the historical origins behind the label neurasthenia, and we 
have had some discussion of its introduction to and acceptance as a category of experience in Japan 
and China. The current chapter picks up with the first serious engagement between Western 
academic psychiatry and the formal diagnostic category of SJSR as it was used in Taiwan and 
China after the close of the Cultural Revolution. While in Taiwan the DSM and the ICD were 
officially used, China developed its own system of classification. The first drafts of the Chinese 
Classification of Mental Disorders (CCMD) appear to have begun in the 1950s, coinciding with 
the first nationwide conference on psychiatric disorders in 1958.348 A second national conference 
in 1978 led to the convening of a committee that revised the 1958 draft and produced the 1979 
“Draft of Classification of Mental Disorders”, which was to constitute the first edition of the 
CCMD (CCMD-I). This edition coincided roughly with the World Health Organization’s adoption 
of the ninth edition of the ICD. As a result of the publication of material presented in this chapter 
and the publication of DSM-III (1980), work on the CCMD continued in 1981, 1984, and 1986. 
SJSR was ultimately retained as a diagnostic category, but debates have been ongoing ever since 
American psychiatrists first challenged its validity in the publications addressed in the following 
pages. 
Studies of phenomena properly belonging to the field of cultural-psychiatry were 
undertaken long before Chinese SJSR became a subject of intense scrutiny. For instance, Yap 
tackled the matter of what would later be called “culture-bound syndromes” as early as 1951.349 
There are many other such studies but these are not my focus. My concern is solely with SJSR, 
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which entered the debate some twenty years later as a result primarily of Arthur Kleinman’s work 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It is to his credit that anthropology and psychiatry have focused 
their lenses on this fascinating form of human experience. Most writing on neurasthenia and SJSR, 
especially writing from the perspective of the humanities, cites new cross-cultural psychiatry 
(NCCP) literature from the 1980s as an affirmative model for understanding SJSR; I take a 
different approach. I view the NCCP model of SJSR from that period as an imposition of the 
diagnostic framework of Western psychiatry of the day. I will not address the various theoretical 
debates in cultural psychiatry. I am interested specifically in the stance taken regarding Chinese 
SJSR, which involves precise claims about Chinese culture and language that have not been 
retracted thirty-five years later.  
Kleinman’s earliest publications did not address SJSR as a specific and theoretical topic of 
inquiry as he was, at that time, heavily focused on comparative health systems and comparative 
systems of medical meaning.350  Even so, as early as 1975, he already had some established 
opinions regarding the diagnosis of certain Chinese patients whose presentations carried specific 
cultural features. For instance, in the American Journal of Chinese Medicine he offered a brief 
case discussion of a thirty-year-old man with insomnia, weight and appetite loss, fatigability, 
chronic pain in the neck, and loss of interest in work and life activities who denied being depressed 
or feeling dysphoric. Mr. Wang attributed his experience to a loss of qi. After failing some herbal 
and acupuncture treatments, he tried three weeks of antidepressant medications. It was said that 
thereafter he had complete symptom relief. Kleinman reported being “convinced that this was an 
empirical demonstration both of the efficacy of the antidepressant and of the diagnosis of 
depression”. 351  Relating this to Chinese culture and its “tremendous impact on symptom 
formation”, he stated that a “number of dysphoric affects, usually presented as psychological 
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complaints in Western cultures, are presented as somatic complaints by Chinese patients; this 
process of somatization . . . seems to have specific characteristics in Chinese populations”.352 I 
return to this case shortly, but it should be pointed out that these conclusions are of interest for a 
few reasons. First, even in 2017 there is still a great deal of research aimed at elucidating precisely 
to what the clinical label “depression” refers.353 Second, antidepressants are helpful across a variety 
of complaints for which patients see a physician; improvement does not indicate the etiology of 
the initiating complaint. 354  Third, the claims regarding somatization remain to be carefully 
examined. While I do not address each of these problems specifically, they should all be kept in 
mind when considering the various views of SJSR as they arise throughout this chapter. I aim to 
demonstrate that, from the very first encounters with Chinese SJSR patients, the engagement gave 
a privileged place to Western diagnostic systems and was framed by a process of re-diagnosis and 
re-definition.  
In this chapter, it is also my aim thoroughly to address the interpretations of SJSR that took 
hold in the literature of NCCP during the 1980s, which interpretations are nascent in Kleinman’s 
case discussion cited above. The models of Chinese experience of SJSR developed over a number 
of years and had consequences for the research programs and literatures that followed. There were 
also Chinese academic responses to the predominant NCCP models that resisted Western 
psychiatry’s theoretical formulations, although they seem not to have achieved much traction in 
the English language literature. Tracing these developments in thought requires an approach that 
focuses on the major, groundbreaking publications and claims that have proven so influential, even 
to the extent that alternative interpretations have been difficult to achieve as the study of SJSR has 
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continued into the twenty-first century. Alternative stances in the American and Chinese literatures 
are also considered, and I undertake the task in the following manner. 
The material as a whole is organized in a chronological fashion. I begin with what I think 
is an uncontested starting point for NCCP interpretations of SJSR: Kleinman’s 1977 paper 
“Depression, Somatization and the ‘New Cross-Cultural Psychiatry’”. The first section of the 
current chapter establishes a hermeneutic framework for reading the subsequent work of Kleinman 
and others. In section two, I examine what is probably the most influential monograph regarding 
SJSR, a monograph that established Kleinman’s original model of somatization. There I 
demonstrate that his model relied on some very dubious claims regarding Chinese culture. In 
Section 3, there are several papers that employ Kleinman’s work as a theoretical ground for 
viewing somatization in a number of patient populations and contexts. Section 4 is a discussion of 
Kleinman’s study of neurasthenia patients in Hunan, China, which took place in 1980 and was 
originally published as a report in 1982. The report was later re-fashioned into a monograph in 
1986, but not before it received reactions in both American and Chinese literatures. Section 5 
pertains to the edited volume of 1985, Culture and Depression, which followed Kleinman’s 
Chinese publication “Somatization” in Guowai Yixue. I suggest that, by the time of the publication 
of these works, his model of SJSR as somatized depression was beginning to lose the coherence it 
had in 1980 while at the same time becoming a less derogatory position. Section 6 is a short 
overview of the 1989 special edition of Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry on the subject of 
neurasthenia. Some of the Chinese authors in that edition took issue with Kleinman’s model, and 
these authors are briefly discussed, along with relevant commentary by Xu Youxin, professor and 
director of the Peking University Institute of Mental Health. Section 7 briefly refers to the 1988 
monograph, Rethinking Psychiatry, which addresses SJSR indirectly. I conclude with a summary 
of what the chapter has intended to show. 
 
4.1 The Late 1970s and the “New Cross-Cultural Psychiatry” 
 A reasonable candidate for the beginnings of NCCP is one particular critical response to 
the transcultural psychiatry in place during the mid-twentieth century. As a starting place, I draw 
attention to a researcher in the psychiatry department at the University of Hong Kong, Kieran 
Singer, who in his 1975 paper titled “Depressive Disorders From A Transcultural Perspective”, 




looking carefully at a large number of epidemiological studies, Singer concluded that 
“investigations to date on the role of culture in depressive disorders have been unsophisticated. 
There is insufficient evidence to support the prevalent view that depressive illness in primitive and 
certain other non-Western cultures has outstanding deviant features”.355 Singer’s goal appears to 
be that of finding transcultural similarities in symptom manifestation, and his conclusion leaned 
toward the view that depressive illness was more similar across cultures than it was different. He 
did recognize, however, that there appeared to be differences among people in “the Orient”, as he 
clearly stated that “it is possible . . . that cultural beliefs which inculcate an unhealthy 
preoccupation with the functions of the body, as traditionally found in the Orient, play a 
pathoplastic role in the genesis of these symptoms”.356 His final comment is a word of caution: “it 
would be unwise to embark on further comparative work without closer attention to the problems 
of methodology. Alternatively, researchers may perhaps be more fruitfully occupied testing 
hypotheses about the nature, distribution, and consequences of depressive disorders in their own 
cultures”.357  
 Singer’s paper served as a springboard for Kleinman’s announcement of the shift away 
from the “old transcultural psychiatry” to the new cross-cultural psychiatry. In 1977 Kleinman 
wrote a critical response to Singer’s analysis, rejecting the idea that “the features of depressive 
disorders do not exhibit significant cross-cultural differences”.358 On the contrary, he argued that 
such differences did exist and were a result of the cultural shaping of normative and deviant 
behavior. To demonstrate his contention, he relied on qualitative data from his work with Chinese 
patients, stating that “somatization amongst Chinese depressives is used as an illustration”.359 
Before commenting on these cross-cultural differences and their supporting data, it is helpful to 
recognize Kleinman’s main criticism, which is that Singer committed a “category fallacy”. As 
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mentioned above, both this criticism and the supporting data serve as a framework for reading 
subsequent sections of this chapter.  
 My purpose is not to rehash an old debate between two scholars, so I do not address whether 
Singer really is guilty of the error for which he was accused.360  However, it is important to 
understand what such an error would look like. Kleinman formulated a very important hermeneutic 
and methodological problem that potentially lurks in all cultural research, and serves as the major 
issue to be recalled throughout the remainder of the current project. He termed it a “category 
fallacy”. That is to say that the researcher might “dispense with indigenous illness categories 
because they are culture-specific, [and] go on to superimpose their own cultural categories on some 
sample of deviant behavior in other cultures, as if their own illness categories were culture-free”. 
361  This is a very important and reflective consideration that has extreme relevance today as 
psychiatry, led by academic and pharmaceutical efforts centered in Europe and the USA, continues 
to engage populations across the globe. Perhaps Kleinman’s greatest contribution has been in 
pointing out that transcultural psychiatry tended toward “reliance on external, Western psychiatric 
categories which are applied by clinicians and epidemiologists as if they were independent of 
cultural bias”.362 If this criticism rightly applies to Singer’s work, it is probably the result of 
methodologically limiting comparative studies to those phenomena that are obviously related to 
the categoric phenomena of his interest, overlooking phenomena that problematized his ideas 
because these are culturally specific in either form or content. With this contention of Kleinman’s 
in mind, I want to consider what he sees as counter-examples to Singer’s claim that depression 
does not essentially vary across cultures.363  
 As is clear from the title of this pivotal paper, Kleinman centered his discussion on 
“depression and somatization in Chinese culture”. It is beyond the aim of the current section to 
address all the individual claims about Chinese understandings of mental illness that are made in 
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this paper. However, it is vital to address two claims that run through all or most of Kleinman’s 
publications on depression and SJSR in China and Taiwan. The first claim is that “popular labels 
[in Chinese] for mental illness cover only indisputably psychotic behavior and mental retardation. 
Minor psychiatric problems like depression, anxiety reaction, hysteria, psychophysiological 
reactions, etc.—most commonly are labeled as medical illnesses . . . [P]sychological issues are 
systematically left unlabeled”.364 This mistaken assumption about the availability of labels and 
linguistic tools for describing psychological issues appears to be one of the presuppositions that 
informs Kleinman’s model of somatization. While recognizing the use of some terms like men 
(|among others, discussion is limited to terms encountered in interactions with patients.365 One 
wonders if there is an implicit claim being made about the need to express symptoms bodily 
because patients lack the linguistic tools to describe their experiences in psychological language. 
Other reasons offered as explanations for Chinese patients’ somatic complaints are more explicit. 
The second claim, and the fundamental presupposition of the 1975 paper, is that Chinese 
patients with mental disorders tend to present somatic complaints in place of psychological ones.366 
While Kleinman admits that somatization exists in the USA, it is believed to occur more frequently 
among Chinese patients. Some reasons are given for why this might be so. First, mental illnesses 
are more stigmatizing for Chinese and can label an individual or a family, causing many difficulties 
in social life, including calling into question fitness for marriage. Second, medical sick roles are 
socially sanctioned, whereas psychiatric sick roles historically have not been; therefore, sick roles 
release the sufferer from certain obligations. He cites SJSR as the most common medical sick role 
available for Chinese patients with mental health concerns, although SJSR has not become the 
systematic subject of his research yet. Third, it is claimed that Chinese informants and patients “do 
not commonly reveal strong normal or dysphoric affects . . .  [S]uppression of affect is common”.367 
These cultural considerations are offered as an account for differing phenomenologies of 
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depressive illness among American and Chinese patients; having outlined these explanations, 
Kleinman turns to three brief case descriptions to exemplify such phenomenologies.  
 Three cases are offered: Miss Liu is a thirty-two-year-old Taiwanese accountant, Mr. Hung 
is a sixty-year-old retired Navy Captain from China and living on Taiwan, and Mr. W is a thirty-
three-year-old Chinese male (Cantonese speaking) who presents at the medical clinic in Boston. I 
do not address Miss Liu or Mr. Hung, but briefly discuss Mr. W, who alone is not given a name 
but is rather indicated only by a letter. I focus on Mr. W only because he serves to illustrate that 
the conclusions in this 1977 paper are not new, and we already know something about his case. As 
can be seen from Table 1, Mr. W is the same person as Mr. Wang in the 1975 paper mentioned at 
the beginning of this chapter.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of patients from 1975 and 1977 papers on somatization.368 Similarities in bold. 
Person Age Symptoms Patient’s view 
of illness 
Recent history Self-treatment Medical Treatment 
Mr. Wang 
1975 




-20 lb. wt loss,  
-chronic pain in 
cervical spine,  
-heaviness in 




-loss of interest 




















In USA for 10 
years 
One trip to Hong 



























-insomnia for 6 
months  
-20 lb. wt loss, 
-pains in upper 
back described 


















causing him to 
suffer “cold” 
(leung) ⁎ 
Lost most of his 
savings in the 
stock market, 
 





In USA for 10 
years 
Friends suggested 
trip to Hong Kong 























Note: being from Honk Kong, both patients should be Cantonese speakers. Yet Mr. Wang’s explanation of illness is given in mandarin Pinyin, 
while Mr. W is quoted in Jyutping. 
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A few features of these cases should be of interest. First, they are clearly the same patient. The age 
and time in the USA correspond with the year published, among the other overwhelming indicators. 
However, they are presented as though they are different persons. When responding to Singer’s 
work from the University of Hong Kong, Mr. W is clearly offered as a Cantonese speaker with a 
more elaborate model of his own illness involving blood deficiency; the earlier case appears to be 
a patient whose illness model is given from the perspective of a Mandarin speaker (from the pinyin 
quotations) who fails to mention anything about blood deficiency. Second, and related to the first, 
a long-existing tension surfaces regarding the reliability of qualitative data in research of this kind. 
It is not my aim to stress this tension any further. I leave it up to the reader to decide what 
implications should be drawn from the discrepancies here. For the sake of argument, we might 
assume that this is a mistake easily made when dealing with qualitative data, rather than assume 
that it is an intentional alteration of data. It does raise the question, however, why it is necessary 
to re-use qualitative/case description data of this kind when there is presumably no shortage of 
cases available to demonstrate the point.  
These cases suggest that this view of SJSR, outlined in detail throughout the following 
pages, was almost completely formulated very early, before the research attributed as the source 
for bringing NCCP interpretations to a wider audience and before the publication that introduces 
my second section, which relied on fieldwork from the mid-to-late 1970s. As early as 1975, 
Kleinman had come to three conclusions: 1) Chinese tend to present with somatic complaints more 
than their Western counterparts; 2) “indigenous Chinese cultural categories pattern the perception 
and experience of depression”369; and 3) the ailments that Chinese patients present with constitute 
somatizations that they fail to recognize as, and deny being examples of, depression. 
Throughout his research, Kleinman does not simply dispense with indigenous Chinese 
cultural categories methodologically. Where other authors may have been dismissive of 
indigenous models of illness, Kleinman takes them very seriously and attempts to study them. One 
manner of approaching these categories is by differentiating a disease concept from a cultural 
category that constructs illness experience, as we will see in the next section. However, I contend 
that he violates his own standard of the category fallacy in another manner. He indirectly dispenses 
with indigenous categories when he reduces them to Western categories; in other words, he 
                                                             




undertakes a philosophically reductionistic stance by categorizing the patient experience as 
“somatization” and labeling them “depressives”. The epidemiologists and transcultural 
psychiatrists may have methodologically ignored “wind” disease, “blood deficiency”, and 
“neurasthenia” in their investigation of depressive illness, insisting on the diagnostic criteria for 
depression from their own cultural perspective. But, while Kleinman does include those Chinese 
categories, he reduces them ontologically to the category of depression, which category he inherits 
from his own culture and training. This category fallacy via reductionism plays out in the 
subsequent research that focuses particularly on Chinese experiences of SJSR.  
 
4.2 Patients and Healers: Cross-Cultural Psychiatry of SJSR in Taiwan 
 Kleinman’s work began in earnest as a psychiatry resident from 1972–1975, the time 
during which he developed the conclusions seen in the previous section. Of his works that take up 
SJSR specifically, the most influential was published in 1980, the year neurasthenia was removed 
from the DSM. I refer to this first major work as Patients and Healers. At the time, Kleinman was 
continuing his research on health care systems across cultures with the aim of developing a 
theoretical approach to understanding “how culture affects core clinical activities and in what ways 
they constrain the cultural patterning of health care”. 370  To accomplish this he employed 
ethnographic research carried out at general medical clinics in Taiwan in 1975, and similar 
qualitative data from 1974 in Boston. He focused primarily on three issues: illness experience, 
practitioner-patient transactions, and the healing process.371 The theoretical questions he poses in 
his “Orientations 1” are numerous, but for the purposes of the present work it is worth mentioning 
just three: “What are the range of clinical phenomena in a society? How do they relate to systems 
of cultural meanings and norms on the one hand and to institutionalized social patterns of power 
relations on the other? How and to what extent do cultural conceptions about sickness influence 
the prevalence, morphology, and course of particular disorders?”372  
This third question is the fundamental question at hand, especially as it relates to 
morphology. In particular, I am interested in the conclusions regarding SJSR as they pertain to this 
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third question. To understand how he conceptualizes the phenomenon and accounts for its cultural 
particularity, it is necessary first to make clear his theoretical distinction between disease and 
illness.  
The key framework for understanding Kleinman’s initial model of SJSR is the 
illness/disease category distinction, which he delineates in “Orientations 3: core clinical functions 
of a health care system, cultural construction of illness as psychosocial experience”. 373 The first of 
five core clinical functions is where we find what he calls an “analytical dichotomy” between 
disease and illness. Disease is the term reserved for a particular type of explanatory model that 
describes biological or psychological malfunctioning. Most often employed by the professional 
practitioner, this model refers to a particular type of process or relationship that takes as its focus 
“biochemical processes, anatomical structures, physiological reactions, or patterns of behavior and 
communication”.374 Illness, on the other hand, describes the experience of the patient (and perhaps 
those close to the patient), including its meaning for the patient, responses to the experience, beliefs 
about the ailment, cognitions, and values regarding the experience. In other words, illness 
describes the varieties of experience that arise out of being sick, along with its personal, social, 
and cultural meanings. In some places, he refers to this distinction as “two aspects of sickness”, at 
other times elaborating that “disease/illness can be thought of as expressing different aspects of a 
single clinical reality, or representing different aspects of a plural clinical reality, or creating 
different clinical realities”.375 There are a number of theoretical problems with the disease/illness 
dichotomy that simply cannot be addressed here due to space limitation.376 Instead, it is more 
helpful to move directly to how this approach becomes applicable for characterizing SJSR. 
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 As with papers already cited, it is a presupposition that the research in Patients and Healers 
deals with depressive syndromes.377 So, employing the disease/illness distinction it can be readily 
claimed that “Chinese popular sickness categories label depression as a somatic problem, while 
American popular categories label it as a psychological problem. Those labels shape the quality of 
the experience of depression in Chinese culture into a bodily or vegetative experience and in 
American culture into an intrapsychic and existential experience”.378 In other words, it is not 
merely the case that members of various groups construe symptoms in a different manner. Rather, 
the result of the cultural construction of illness as psychosocial experience leads to distinctive 
illness experiences such that “through labeling and the other cognitive processes, symptoms are 
socially constructed”.379  
This is Kleinman’s original theoretical model, and it is a very significant contribution to 
how we think about phenomena that appear to be instances of culturally specific patterns of illness, 
or what used to be called “culture-bound syndromes”. Sickness is imbued with cultural meaning 
and undertakes a particular form, illness. Sometimes cultural shaping is minimal and the illness 
appears very similar across cultures, but often the process results in illness that is significantly 
different in meaning and type of experience. “Sometimes the patterning of symptoms produces 
culture bound disorders, which [he] interprets to be illnesses associated with culturally unique 
patterns of meaning superimposed on diseases that are universal”.380 With this view in mind, we 
can understand why he takes issue with Singer above. At this stage in his thinking, he does not 
deny the universality of the disease, rather, he presupposes it. Furthermore, he sees culture as 
shaping it in a way that gives rise to a locally specific syndrome. That is to say, there are cultural 
variations in how the disease manifests as clinical illness, something that Singer appears not to 
appreciate. This takes a large step toward answering the third theoretical question above regarding 
how culture affects the morphology and course of an illness.  
There are two possible mechanisms for cultural patterning of illness. The second of the two 
Kleinman does not emphasize and describes vaguely. It involves a “direct effect upon the 
physiological substrate”, bypassing cognitive appraisal and being outside conscious awareness; 
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how this might occur is not discussed in any detail, so I will ignore it for now.381  The first 
mechanism functions by means of subjective interpretation and cognitive appraisal of not only 
external stimuli, but also bodily emotional states. This is the mechanism he emphasizes, though 
the description is also vague. Some discussion of the effects of cognitive appraisal is worthwhile, 
as his specific examples have spawned significant controversy.  
Cognitive appraisal is intimately related to the patient’s explanatory model (EM) of illness 
and includes what the patient believes with respect to etiology, natural course of illness, probable 
outcomes for the individual, and potential therapeutic options. Recognition of the importance of 
EM in health care systems has proven to be of unimaginable importance, as so often, the health 
care system breaks down when practitioner and patient have incommensurate EMs. The realization 
that attending to divergent EMs can lead to improvements in health outcomes is another of 
Kleinman’s great contributions. However, there is another aspect of EMs that is equally important. 
It may be the case that the patient attends to the EM of the practitioner, and unwittingly conforms 
to that EM, even to the point of experiencing symptoms that are expected from the perspective of 
the practitioner’s EM. In other words, “EMs may come to create the behavior they seek to 
explain”. 382  If this scenario is possible, then the patient certainly can experience symptoms 
consonant with their own EM, so then the question becomes why the patient’s EM has the form 
that it does.  
In Chapter 4 of Patients and Healers, there are finally some concrete explanations as to 
why Chinese EMs contain the symptom complexes they do, and neurasthenia is the central topic. 
The case description is of a twenty-two-year-old Taiwanese male with stiffness/tenseness in his 
neck, insomnia, inability to concentrate at work, weakness, chronic ulcer, and anxious feelings, 
for whom various medications and herbs have had no effect. Western doctors, the patient, and his 
mother believe he has SJSR, but Kleinman concludes that it is a case of “somatization of dysphoric 
affect”. By expounding considerably on the cultural factors that he has raised in prior publications, 
we get a explicit position regarding the meaning and role of neurasthenia. First, he relies on a 
fundamental notion, namely, that “during their primary socialization, individuals in Chinese 
society learn that their own personal affects, especially strong and negative ones, should not be 
                                                             
381 Ibid., 80. I believe a direct effect on the cognitive substrate as a result of conscious or unconscious appraisal is 
probably a more likely scenario, which I return to at the conclusion of this project.  




openly expressed”. 383  Revealing affect, especially dysphoric affect, can place a variety of 
relationships in jeopardy, can disrupt social harmony, and can cause loss of “face”. I call this the 
“inscrutable Asian” claim. Second, “physical sickness, not emotional distress, is an excuse for 
failure in school, sports, work, personal transactions, and sexual relations”. 384 That is to say, there 
are socially sanctioned sick roles with respect to physical ailments and symptoms that are far more 
forgiving than if one were to exhibit shortcomings secondary to emotional instability. I call this 
the stigma/sick role claim. Third, the Chinese (and Hokkien) language is “rich in terms for bodily 
states and their dysfunctions, and for interpersonal transaction and their problems, but relatively 
impoverished in psychological terminology”.385 I call this claim the “poverty of language” claim.  
The last of these claims is a very serious idea that turns out to be an empirical question as 
to what is lexically available in the Chinese language. Presently, let it be clear that his position is 
that Chinese people learn not to talk about or attend to feelings and are subsequently deficient in 
identifying emotional states. For Chinese, “non-specific names lump together emotions that 
contemporary Westerners readily differentiate”, and emotion descriptors are comprised of Chinese 
characters that refer to bodily organs.386 He considers this linguistic, descriptive deficiency to be 
recognizable in other cultures, including “traditional Western society”,387 and his thinking on this 
matter appears to be heavily influenced by Julian Leff.388 Leff’s paper in the first volume of the 
journal founded and edited by Kleinman would later be expanded into book-length form and would 
raise significant controversy over the problem of imposing Western ethnopsychologies during the 
research process.389 Some of that arises briefly later in this chapter. Presently, a few words about 
Leff’s view in 1977 before I return to the three claims described above.  
Briefly, Leff’s view of linguistic descriptions of emotion appears to be a variation of the 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. His primary claim is that “somatization of emotion . . . is actually built 
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386 Ibid., 135. Examples are |, ·ú, s}[, Ü´. I fail to see how these terms are impoverished, not to 
mention that there are many more such expressions. Furthermore, etymological inquiry into English language 
terms indicative of emotional states will easily uncover physical/bodily origins for the words. For example, 
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387 Ibid., 135. 
388 Julian Leff, “The Cross-Cultural Study of Emotions,” Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 1, no. 4 (December 1, 
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in to the respective languages” as a result of historical, evolutionary changes that occur in the 
semantic networks of any given cultural group.390 Starting with English and other Indo-European 
languages as an example, he suggests that the development of emotional vocabulary likely began 
with an undifferentiated term that “denoted the somatic experiences of unpleasant emotion”. The 
specific example offered is the root angh, from which anger, angst, and angina likely arise.391 His 
idea is that such a term originally “stood for the whole range of bodily experiences because they 
were undifferentiated, [but later] the word came to stand for the cognitive experience rather than 
the somatic experiences”392. The word is thought to have split up over time and differentiated into 
various cognates that describe discrete feelings. This process is proposed as occurring in an uneven 
manner, faster in some cultures and slower in others, “so that some languages still lack an extensive 
range of words denoting the cognitive experiences of emotions, [and] languages with restricted 
vocabularies for the cognitive experience of emotion should be less capable of differentiating 
between the various unpleasant affects”.393 This theory appears identical to Kleinman’s discussion 
of Taiwanese affect. 
Taken together, Kleinman’s three claims depict a situation wherein dysphoric affect is 
inhibited, inner psychological sates are neglected, and physical complaints are substituted for 
psychological ones. His conclusion is that there is a drastic discrepancy in the phenomenology of 
depression between American and Chinese populations explainable by the cultural patterning of 
illness; “the illness is markedly different, but the disease would be the same in both populations”.394 
There is one final aspect of this model that deserves careful consideration. Kleinman is no 
ethnocentrist with disparaging views of the Chinese language’s ability to describe affect and of 
Chinese cultural sanctions against affective expression. The manner in which he elaborates his 
model is subtle, and one particular aspect must not be missed. For example, it is certain that 
Chinese people, like any other people, experience an array of affective states resulting from a 
variety of stimuli, which stimuli take on their meaning and significance owing to how they are 
evaluated in that culture. Prior to a process of cognition, primary “affective states are an essential 
psychobiological phenomenon, with physiological correlates, and as such are universal” human 
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experiences.395 In other words, there is no difference between the Chinese affective states and any 
other person’s affective states, prior to the process of cognizing about the state. Once categorized 
as sadness, anger, hot liver, fire qi, or some other such cultural label, the secondary affective state 
takes on its particular quality of experience; “differences in quality of secondary (cognized) affects 
result from their cognitive processing, not from their psychobiological substrate”.396 
This view, that universal, human experiences of affect are subsequently morphed via 
cognitive processing, is an interesting model of emotion that continues to deserve investigation. It 
appears to preclude the possibility that there are culturally specific affective states at the level of 
the psychobiological substrate, a question that still needs to be addressed by experimental 
psychology and cultural neuroscience. Nevertheless, he goes the extra step and simultaneously 
proposes the idea that troubling affect is managed within Chinese society through dissociation, 
minimization/denial and somatization.397 For the reader familiar with psychoanalytic models of 
mind, such influences are clearly seen in Kleinman’s view of affect management as forms of 
defense mechanisms, which view even goes as far as labeling bodily symptoms “forms of somatic 
masquerade”.398 This line of thinking is continued across other publications, showing up just one 
year later with the claim that dysphoric affects are “articulated” in culturally approved idioms in 
the form of somatic rather than psychological distress.399  
In summary, we have the following position: particular aspects of Chinese culture acquired 
through socialization define and constrain what kinds of psycho-social stimuli give rise to 
particular types of affective states. Affective states themselves are universal forms of human 
experience that are psychobiological in nature prior to cognitive processing. Cultural norms 
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encounter yet another Mr. Wang, who is clearly a new case.  
398 Ibid., 149. 
399 Arthur Kleinman and Tsung-Yi Lin, Normal and Abnormal Behavior in Chinese Culture, vol. 2, Culture, Illness, and 
Healing (D. Reidel, 1981). See page xiii and xv. Headache, backache, weakness, and impotence are offered as 




acquired through socialization dictate that affect is largely to be suppressed (inscrutable Asian), 
which norms interact to produce a linguistic system that neglects the development of 
psychologically sophisticated language (poverty of language). As dysphoric affects arise, 
linguistic descriptions “minimize” or “deny” emotional content and significance, which gives 
prominent place to bodily/physical experiences that are then the source of primary symptom 
presentation (somatization). Psychiatric labels are stigmatizing. Hence, SJSR is a culturally 
specific form of somatic presentation of depressive syndromes in bodily language. The 
interpretation of SJSR as presented in Patients and Healers constitutes a model in NCCP that 
appears to have exerted considerable influence since its systematic presentation in 1980, and that 
influence can be seen in a number of other publications from that decade. 
 
4.3 Writings on Somatization Following Patients and Healers: 1982–1984 
 Kleinman continued with several other publications into the 1980s. Normal and Abnormal 
Behavior in Chinese Culture has already been mentioned; it only has a small number of pages 
dedicated to SJSR and repeats the main claims already covered.400 However, the co-editor of that 
volume, Tsung-yi Lin wrote a piece in 1982 that is worth mentioning because of an irony that the 
reader may appreciate if it is pointed out directly. Lin describes his motivations for writing 
“Culture and Psychiatry: a Chinese Perspective” as arising largely from the need to respond to the, 
then current, situation wherein no clear relationship could be defined between the state of 
“orthodox psychiatry” and the growing field of cultural psychiatry. He addressed the question of 
whether cultural/comparative psychiatry has a pragmatic usefulness for clinical practice. 
Specifically, he outlined two tendencies in psychiatry that he thought were problematical and could 
be prepared for remedy by the growing and new cultural approach; these he referred to as 
“ethnocentrism” and “a belief in clinical universalism”.401  
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 Regarding ethnocentrism, Lin made reference to any hypothetical “psychiatrist who tends 
to judge patients, or human beings in general, as normal, or abnormal or even pathological, based 
on the criteria of his own culture”.402 The reader will recall that this is precisely the position 
Kleinman referred to when defining his “category fallacy”. Clinical universalism, on the other 
hand, “originates in the belief that all human beings basically live, feel, think and behave alike, so 
that the symptomatology, course, and outcome of a disease, as well as its methods of treatment or 
theories of its causation should apply in all cases in spite of any individual, racial, ethnic or cultural 
differences”.403  As concrete areas of focus with respect to these issues, Lin discusses major 
psychoses, minor mental disorders, and patterns of help-seeking among Chinese.  
 Lin summarized his article with the claim that “the phenomenology of depression differs 
vastly from that in the West and is characterized by somatization”.404 He gave four socio-cultural 
factors that he believed accounted for the feature of somatization, citing Kleinman among others 
as supporting sources. These are: 1) as traditional Chinese medical theories and folk beliefs 
influence the perception of mental disorders, it is to be expected that patients describe their 
symptoms in the language of “dysfunction or imbalance of bodily organ systems”, which is 
consonant with classical notions of a “unitary psychosomatic system”; 2) somatic complaints are 
recognized as belonging to a socially sanctioned sick role; 3) there is a cultural taboo regarding 
discussion of emotions directly in public, leading to psychical and emotional states being 
prevented from surfacing both to the self and others’ attention; and 4) somatization may be a 
Chinese cultural trait, “consisting of the predominance of the oral-hypochondriacal quality”. 405 
The reader will notice that Lin, being a Chinese who grew-up in Taiwan, was unwilling to offer as 
an explanatory factor that the Chinese language is deficient in its ability adequately to describe 
emotional experience. However, clinical universalism and ethnocentrism are present, in part, 
insofar as depression is viewed as a universal phenomenon with a presumed etiology and presumed 
influence on the human person. Furthermore, a patient’s experience is interpreted in the context of 
this Western, psychiatric category, despite whatever resistance to the category may be offered by 
the patient. Lin’s conclusions about somatization are the same as Kleinman’s, and the experience 
of the Chinese patient is interpreted through the framework of the clinical category of depression, 
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albeit with somewhat less derogatory implications. For our present purposes, I will briefly turn to 
Kleinman’s conclusion regarding minor mental disorders, of which SJSR is considered to be the 
majority example, before moving on to other researchers. I believe the reader should be able to 
recognize that both ethnocentrism and clinical universalism, as he defined them, are precisely what 
we have encountered when it comes to their model of SJSR thus far.    
 In January and February of 1982, Kleinman co-authored a two-part review of “depression 
and Somatization” with the Wayne Katon and Gary Rosen.406 Having presented a view in Patients 
and Healers that attempted to justify the diagnosis of depression among Chinese patients when 
dysphoric affect was denied and/or physical symptoms predominated, there remained the issue of 
such patient presentations here in the USA. As I point out in a moment, the prevalence of 
“somatization” in the USA poses a serious problem for the cultural model Kleinman proposed, 
which necessitated further commentary in 1984. However, a general model of somatization that 
was not necessarily specific to Chinese patients needed to come first. Part one of their review 
admits that “as many as 50 percent of patients utilizing primary care clinics actually have 
psychosocial precipitants as opposed to biomedical ones as the main cause of their clinic visits”.407 
This slippery language, however, avoids stating that fifty percent of patients presenting to primary 
care clinics “somatize”. That would undermine the unique Chinese somatization argument. 
However, the claim is made that more than half the patients going to primary care clinics have 
somatic presentations as part of the “depression”.408 They attribute such numbers to the inability 
of primary care physicians to conceptualize their patients as having depression without the patient 
perceiving and/or reporting the requisite mood and/or affective state.409 “Thus a patient who has 
not developed the language to label and report his emotional states, or who utilizes defenses or 
coping styles that minimize affects or who believes his problem is a physical one will not be 
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recognized as depressed by many physicians”. 410  This position is familiar, and relies 
predominantly on the poverty of language argument once again; this time however, a 
developmental model is provided such that the language system itself (English, for example) need 
not be deficient in its ability to describe psychological states, but instead the individual persons 
are deficient as a result of their upbringing in families that fail to talk about and label disturbing 
affects. In other words, they “postulate that it is in families that have not developed psychological 
language for articulating unpleasant emotions that would be most apt to see the selective focus on 
the somatic manifestations of depression”.411 That is to say that children learn through familial 
reinforcement how to elicit care from family by, for example, “complaining about a headache 
rather than about being sad or depressed”.412 These ideas are supported by findings that such 
patients often have mothers with the same “somatizations” and respond to Tricyclic 
antidepressants, which is questionable support at best.413 At the center of this whole position, 
however is their theoretical view of affect.  
 What ought we to make of the claim that the “affective component of depression can only 
be known to the patient through cognition”? Is it true that “without the cognitive perception of the 
feeling component, the depressive disorder exists as a somatic syndrome expressed by vegetative 
symptoms”?414 This is a question for affective and cognitive neuroscience and psychology; suffice 
it to say that, at best, this seems a very doubtful claim. It seems unlikely that affect is unrecognized 
or inaccessible, except as somatic sensation, to those who are unable or fail to cognize it (e.g., 
other primates, persons with intellectual disability, etc.). However, antecedent even to this 
theoretical issue, is their presupposition that the underlying phenomenon in question is 
“depression”. Regardless, there is no shortage of serious theoretical and philosophical questions 
that are left un-attended in this attempt to frame the variety of physical complaints that present to 
primary care providers as “somatized depression”. Two years later, Katon and Kleinman’s 
discussion of somatization was somewhat more even-handed, as it was discussed in the context of 
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the recognition that somatic complaints are a common feature of patients with depression, panic 
disorder, somatization disorder, histrionic personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, 
grief syndrome, posttraumatic stress disorder, factitious disorder, hypochondriasis, and 
malingering.415 Nevertheless, recognizing that a large number of patients are eventually diagnosed 
with depression after many months of somatic presentation does not itself validate the claim that 
the somatization is a “masked depression”;416 rather it raises the question as to whether the eventual 
diagnosis is an example of post hoc ergo propter hoc. 
 
4.4 Social Origins of Distress and Disease: SJSR in Hunan, China  
Returning specifically to questions regarding Chinese culture, Kleinman followed up with 
a large report in 1982 that served as the primary source material for his second most influential 
monograph, published in 1986 and which I refer to as Social Origins.417,418 As such, I address only 
the monograph here. This later work, which he described as a work on affect and affective disorder, 
includes additional material that is not found in the earlier paper. These consist of a historical 
background chapter on neurasthenia in the West and China, a chapter on depression,419 and one on 
somatization itself. Findings from the clinical research undertaken in 1980 begin in Chapter 4, and 
Chapter 5 includes follow-up that occurred in 1983. Chapter 6 presents clinical cases, and Chapter 
7 is a theoretical discussion of SJSR. An epilogue concludes the book. In the next few paragraphs, 
I try to summarize some of the key aspects of Social Origins for the reader in a manner that 
problematizes Kleinman’s views.  
 The clinical research presented in Chapter 4 of the text took place in 1980 at an outpatient 
psychiatric clinic in Hunan, China, and the study sample included 100 patients with a diagnosis of 
SJSR between the ages of eighteen and fifty-six. Each patient received a psychiatric assessment (a 
questionnaire) to assess for DSM-III diagnoses as part of a psychiatric interview, in addition to 
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418 Kleinman, Social Origins of Distress and Disease: Depression, Neurasthenia, and Pain in Modern China.  
419 The discussion of both depression and somatization in these two chapters is nearly identical to, and cites the 
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ethnographic interviews that could last up to two hours.420 Patient symptoms, living situation and 
life events, meaning of and duration of symptoms, patient views of etiology, and previous 
experiences and medical help seeking were all assessed. After interviews, patients were counseled 
regarding current medications and/or offered medication if it was thought to be indicated. Patients 
were asked to return several weeks later, 76 of whom were able to do so. Overall, 87 of the 100 
patients were found to meet criteria for major depressive disorder, with more than half meeting 
definition for chronicity lasting more than two years. On average, most patients complained of 
around five physical symptoms such as headache, insomnia, dizziness, pains (back pain, chest pain, 
and other pains), weakness, loss of energy, and poor concentration.421 Of the 100 patients, 39 
initially expressed no affective or mood complaints, but among those who were re-labeled as 
depressed, dysphoria or anhedonia was elicited over the course of the interview in one hundred 
percent of the patients (hence labeled as depressed). That is to say, 87 of the 100 patients admitted 
they had experienced either a) non-specific displeasure, unhappiness, or b) loss of interest in all or 
most of their usually pleasurable activities; which are criteria for depression according to DSM-
III, as can be seen in Figure 17 below. 
A great deal of space in Social Origins is used to describe the meaning of patients’ illness 
experiences. For instance, it is stated that in ninety-three percent of cases, the illness significance 
“was to express personal or interpersonal distress or unhappiness”.422 Other examples are gaining 
time off work or receiving care from family or friends. I will not take time to discuss these issues 
as they are completely irrelevant to the fundamental question that I am pursuing. The reason they 
are irrelevant is because these significances, whatever they are, would still be the same whether 
Kleinman chose to exchange one diagnostic label for another or not. Why insist that the patient is 
“somatizing”? In other words, his reduction of neurasthenia into somatized depression is 
independent of the significances attributed to the experience. The experiences and their cultural 
functions would remain whatever they are, despite the label.423 This is so even in the event that 
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Kleinman is wrong and SJSR is a valid ontological category that describes a specific pathological 





Figure 17: DSM-III (1980) Diagnostic Criteria for Major Depressive Episode424 
  
 Returning to China in 1983, Kleinman conducted a study “to determine to what degree 
somatic complaints among these patients were amplified or dampened in response to work, family, 
and other social problems over a period of years, and to what extent both chronic pain and 
depression had responded to medical treatments”.425 He hypothesized that the “social context of 
illness would be the major determinant of persistent somatization”.426 Following up on 21 cases, 
he found that 8 of them continued to meet the DSM criteria for major depression. Another 5 met 
criteria for dysthymic disorder (basically a chronic depressive disorder). He further found that 
those who improved had undergone some significant life change that contributed to their 
improvement, such as changing jobs or being reunited with a loved one. Nevertheless, it appeared 
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that 20 of the 21 follow-up cases still had significant physical complaints which included the 
following: Headaches (20), weakness/tiredness (20), insomnia (18), dizziness (15), bad memory 
(13), other pains (8), and poor appetite (7).427 Most interesting, however, was that just over half of 
these patients had embraced the idea that their complaints were psychological in etiology, which 
was a change from his 1980 findings. Kleinman attributed this switch in explanatory model to the 
fact that he and his colleagues attempted to convey a psychosomatic stress model during their 
initial interactions with patients three years prior. One seeming consequence of this switch was a 
decrease (70%) in medical help seeking, whereas only one-third of those who continued to 
maintain a non-psychological model of their experience were found to have reduced medical 
visits.428 
 One of the very fascinating conclusions Kleinman draws from his follow-up study pertains 
to what he sees as a shifting view regarding psychotherapy. When eight patients requested 
treatment with psychotherapy, he “wondered whether psychiatry is contributing to the advance of 
modernism in the clinic, a form of Westernization of Chinese culture by ‘rationalizing’ (explaining 
and legitimating) psychological idioms and self-images and thereby transforming neurasthenia 
into a disorder of ‘affect’”.429 “This sea change in the cultural mode of communicating distress”, 
as he put it, is something that he thinks was well on its way, and had already taken hold among the 
more educated class of teachers and professionals.430 At least in this regard, he may very well have 
been correct in stating that such a change had been occurring or would occur, especially as Chinese 
continued to adopt imported ways of thinking and talking about their experience. The obvious and 
more important question is whether or not the epistemic framework that he had positioned onto 
those patients’ experiences mapped on to what was “really” going on for them.  
Kleinman’s arguments are tantamount to the following claims: these patients report 
symptoms consistent with the cultural category for SJSR. Those symptoms and the patients’ 
explanatory models for illness are richly imbued with somatic language, bodily experience, and 
physical (rather than psychological) explanations as to etiology. Those symptoms and models 
perform the cultural work of x, y, and z. Therefore, their illness is a somatization of major 
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depressive disorder. The conclusion obviously does not follow without some intervening premises, 
which we have already seen in Patients and Healers. These are reformulated as follows: 1) 
psychiatric problems are so stigmatizing that the needed cultural work could not be accomplished 
with a psychiatric label, 2) patients minimalize or deny the affective component of their sickness, 
and 3) patients are not able to describe their real problems because they lack the linguistic capacity. 
As we have seen in Social Origins, the patients presented to a psychiatric clinic, nullifying (1). 
Most patients appeared able to describe affective issues, nullifying (2) and (3). What this leads me 
to conclude is that, for at least some of these patients, Kleinman probably imposed the diagnosis 
of depression as a result of looking for it.431 That some patients embraced a psychological model 
after the fact demonstrates that people are able to take on new experiences when it is suggested to 
them. It does not validate his reduction of SJSR to depression any more than response to 
antidepressants demonstrates “a depression”. 
 In the final substantive chapter to Social Origins, there is a section titled “What is 
Neurasthenia?”432 In that section, many pages are spent repeating and describing the varieties of 
ways that neurasthenia serves as a “culturally approved and socially legitimated illness 
behavior”.433 His concluded that “neurasthenia can be most fruitfully conceptualized as illness 
experience—a culturally salient form of chronic somatization that acts as a final common 
behavioral pathway for several distinctive types of pathology, of which major depressive disorder 
is the principal disease”.434 Despite this conclusion, he suggested that SJSR could reasonably be 
retained in Chinese diagnostic manuals, presumably because of its salience and the cultural work 
it performs.435 He nevertheless viewed it as depression, and expected it to become increasingly 
viewed as such over time.  
Of course, the obvious “thought experiment” is to consider a patient who believes they 
have SJSR, meets all traditional symptom criteria, but does not “employ” that model for any social 
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gain. That is, he does not attempt to get out of work, account for a failed exam, or otherwise achieve 
anything with a socially legitimated illness behavior. What if such a person suffered silently, 
fulfilling all their familial, social, and interpersonal obligations? Surely such persons exist, and 
considering such a person questions the relevance of the myriad pages spent justifying the claim 
that SJSR should be recognized as somatized depression because “somatization” performs cultural 
work.  
While the discussion of this pivotal text in the literature of 1980s NCCP could proceed 
much further, a few words here should conclude this section. The works discussed thus far created 
a renewed interest in the conceptual category of somatization, long held to be a mechanism of ego 
defense by psychoanalysts. NCCP reframed it as a “culturally constituted coping strategy (or 
defenses)” and as a mechanism for coping with dysphoric affect in Chinese culture.436 Cultural 
psychiatrists again reviewed the literature on somatization phenomena, attempting to frame what 
types of somatization could be recognized. Laurence Kirmayer’s categorization includes three 
types: 1) presentation or amplification of physical symptoms merely “in the absence of ” organic 
pathology, 2) presentation of physical symptoms “in place of ” personal or social problems, or 3) 
manifestation of physical symptoms “as defense” against unpleasant emotion.437 From this vantage 
point, the NCCP classes SJSR as type (2), with the view that SJSR labels a somatization process 
whereby cultural learning facilitates the presentation of physical symptoms in place of personal or 
social problems.  
Kirmayer further organizes models of somatization into seven explanations for occurrence : 
“(a) the somatic concomitants of emotion and affective disorder; (b) a consequence of an 
incapacity for, or suppression of, emotional expression; (c) a result of attention focused on the 
body; (d) the use of the body as a channel of communication; (e) an idiom of distress or way of 
making meaning out of suffering; (f) a path to enter the sick role; (g) a result of the organization 
of health care delivery”.438 With this manner of conceptualization, NCCP can be seen to employ 
all of the models to some extent. As I have made clear, model (b) is among the most controversial, 
prompting Kirmayer to point out that “judging the differentiation of experiential categories within 
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a culture by its lexicon is a highly questionable practice”.439 As such, claims regarding a broad, 
culture-wide form of somatization (as some have done) most certainly should not rely on notions 
like alexithymia either, which is as problematic as Leff’s evolutionary view.440  
In addition to garnering attention from culturally oriented psychiatrists in the West, Social 
Origins and its preliminary report in 1982 caught the attention of Chinese psychiatrists who 
disagreed with the idea that SJSR as a diagnostic category had been undone. Beijing University 
Institute of Mental Health professor Zhong Youbin argued that despite having conceptually arisen 
with Beard’s Neurasthenia, SJSR in the Chinese context was conceptualized rather differently than 
the “wastebasket” diagnostic category that it had been when first formulated.441 That original 
category admittedly included those patients with physical ailments arising from panic disorder, 
anxiety disorders, depression, and “hysterical conversion” ( ), but after 
defining those conditions carefully and separating them phenomenologically, physicians are still 
left with a group of patients that do not quite fit into these categories. After a considerable 
background discussion of neurosis including the subjects of “masked depression” ( ), 
“hidden depression” ( ), and “missed depression” ( ), Zhong concluded 
that the category of depression had become broad enough to capture patients with all kinds of 
complaints, which is exactly the criticism of SJSR as a category. He conceded that an argument 
could be made for a “masked depression” if all SJSR patients remitted after anti-depressant therapy, 
but experience showed that this was not what happened in practice. Instead, there were patients 
who presented with fatigue, headache, and other symptoms, admittedly psychological in origin, 
for whom anxiety and depression did not seem to factor and antidepressants did not seem to help. 
For Zhong, forcing those patients into a DSM category seemed early and without foundation. 
Rather than continue further with this line of discussion, it is more profitable to return to 
those subsequent research projects that have been influenced by, or continue, Kleinman’s views 
of SJSR.  
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4.5 Culture and Depression: Thoughts on Somatization from 1984 and 1985 
As this volume is over five hundred pages in length, there is not presently space to examine 
the contribution of every author. Instead, I want to draw the reader’s attention to the material of 
just four. First, a little can be said about Kleinman’s section, “Somatization: The interconnections 
in Chinese society among culture, depressive experiences, and the meanings of pain”, co-authored 
with Joan Kleinman. Afterwards, I mention Obeyesekere’s “Depression, Buddhism, and the work 
of culture in Sri Lanka”. Lastly, a few words from Catherine Lutz and William Beeman regarding 
translation and linguistics from the perspective of linguistic and cultural anthropology can be 
applied to what has been covered so far throughout this chapter.442  
The title of the Kleinmans’ chapter in Culture and Depression gives the impression that 
they are prepared to discuss “depressive experiences” rather than major depressive disorder (the 
diagnosis), which is what many other contributors to the book have done. However, the orientation 
to the chronic pain complaints is based on the same group of patients from 1980 that A. Kleinman 
diagnosed as having major depressive disorder. Once again, I will not address the case descriptions 
because I do not think they are helpful. Not only are they verbatim the same group of cases that 
appear in Social Origins, but there is no way for any reader to know what was done well or what 
may have been missed in the process of formulating those descriptions.443 Instead, it is better to 
look at what is done differently in this chapter and compare it to some of what is repeated.  
One interesting aspect of this chapter in Culture and Depression is that there is a 
reinterpretation of the 1980 findings (from Social Origins as described above) in two regards. First, 
they claimed that, “we suggested that neurasthenia and depression could be understood as 
                                                             
442 “Depression and the translation of emotional worlds” (Lutz) and “Dimensions of dysphoria: The view from 
linguistic anthropology” (Beeman), are chapters 2 and 5 of Culture and Depression, respectively.  
443 Additionally, I am not sure that qualitative data, filtered through one person, is the best form of data when it 
comes to a topic as controversial as SJSR. What’s more, the reader who systematically goes through the works of 
Kleinman will find the repetition of a small number of cases. As I have already demonstrated, some of the cases 
change. Another example can be found in the Illness Narratives (1988), where the case of Yen Guangzhen is 
repeated. A footnote states, “When I originally wrote up this case, I emphasized the complaint of headache and 
deemphasized the other complaints in order to stress the chronic pain syndrome. The current description is fuller 
and brought up to date”. He is referring to the original formulation in Social origins, (p. 134–137) which was 
written-up some three years prior. Given the seriousness of the claims and the controversy of SJSR found in the 
earlier work, it seems like the “fuller and . . . up to date” formulations would have been given in the original, not in 




distinctive cultural construals of the same psychobiological state in which Chinese and American 
cultural values influenced both lay and professional constructions of distress”. 444  It seems 
impossible to find that interpretation anywhere prior to its appearing in Culture and Depression, 
which has contributions from so many anthropologists critical of Western psychiatry. In fact, such 
a view did not appear in English at all in the 1980s. But A. Kleinman does frame the issue in this 
manner when writing for a Chinese audience, as I show below. Second, there is more openness to 
alternative views of patient experiences than was expressed in Social Origins, despite repeating 
the claim that “Depressive disorder . . . seems to have conduced to the development of chronic 
somatization in most of our cases”.445 While still tending toward this view (contrary to the claimed 
interpretation above), some nuance was added to the original position.  
Specifically, the 1980 study and its follow-up are reframed. Recall that the chief complaints 
(Social Origins) of all the neurasthenic patients (n=90) were somatic in nature, as we have already 
seen. Also recall that dysphoria could be elicited from all those same patients. Among those 90, 
80 were re-diagnosed with Major Depression, and 71 were treated with tricyclic antidepressants. 
Approximately five weeks later, 58 of the 71 showed improvement. Of those, 46 showed 
substantial improvement. Though 1 patient had no problems, 30 reported minor symptoms, 15 had 
substantially fewer symptoms than originally, and 12 still had significant problems. No 
improvement was shown by 6 of the patients, and 7 were worse. This is best viewed 
diagrammatically, as in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Self-assessed improvement among 71 patients treated with tricyclics 
Completely, with no current problem 1 
Only minor, current problems 30 
Still some problems, better than before 15 
Still significant, current problem 12 
No improvement 6 
Worse than before 7 
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There are a number of ways to think about this table, but the most obvious is to conclude 
that after a month of medication all but one patient continued to have physical complaints of some 
kind or got worse. Remember that follow-up took place again three years later, with only 21 
patients available for interview. Of those 21 patients, 7 claimed that their pain was the same as 
before, 10 claimed 50% improvement, and 3 claimed 75% improvement. Nevertheless, there 
continued to be significant somatic complaints, as can be seen in Table 3. 
 





Bad memory 13/21 
Poor appetite 7/21 
 
These patients present a problem. Not only did the initial group largely reject the label of 
“depression”, but their physical complaints continued after treatment. Subsequently, a three-year 
follow-up with a subset of those patients indicated significant, chronic symptoms. This situation 
deserves more explanation, which comes toward the end of the Kleinmans’ chapter.446  
Somatization is defined in this chapter as “the expression of personal and social distress in 
an idiom of bodily complaints and medical help seeking”.447 Relying on research papers published 
two years after his Hunan study was completed (citing Rosen, 1982), Kleinman re-conceptualized 
somatization as being categorized into acute, subacute, or chronic forms.448 1) Acute somatization 
is the result of an acute stress reaction to some life event that effects the autonomic nervous system 
in a manner that gives rise to psychophysiological symptoms. These symptoms last days or weeks. 
2) Subacute somatization is framed as a situation where the patient, “abetted by the family and 
health professionals, systematically focuses on and thereby amplifies the physiological symptoms, 
while at the same time he minimizes and thereby dampens their affective and cognitive 
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concomitants”.449 The initiating cause of the problem would be either from a prolonged response 
to stress or from the development of a psychiatric disorder, “most usually depression and/or 
anxiety disorders”, and symptoms would last several months. 450  3) The chronic cases of 
somatization, then, are seen as much longer periods of physical complaints that are 
accompaniments to persistent psychiatric disorder; again, bodily symptoms are emphasized and 
the affective components are deemphasized, minimized, or denied. However, an additional form 
of chronic somatization is also offered. Specifically, he suggests that acute or subacute 
somatization may be prolonged and transformed into a long-term sick role. In other words, even 
“in the absence of medical disease or psychiatric disorder”, chronic somatization can become 
adopted as a “habitual coping style or idiom of distress that is learned via childhood socialization 
in family, in school, and in other sectors of the local systems under the aegis of society-wide, 
paradigmatic cultural norms”.451 This more complete interpretation resolves/removes the need to 
diagnose a psychiatric disorder in the SJSR patients viewed as exhibiting somatization, although 
A. Kleinman had done so previously. Furthermore, it offers an account for the claim that Chinese 
tend to somatize, even if there is no disease. That is to say, Chinese learned a “somatic style of 
coping with stress and of articulating distress” from their families and culture.452 
 This more nuanced approach to SJSR seems somewhat more palatable than what I have 
described to the reader so far, even though it still has problems. They avoided any strong version 
of the “poverty of language” argument as I previously outlined it. Presently, it seems that it might 
have sufficed to say that the poverty of language was learned in families, which is something we 
saw above as well, but that would not have explained how an entire cultural milieu tended towards 
a minimization of affect and an emphasis on bodily symptoms. Regardless, the troubling claims 
that founded A. Kleinman’s model have already been stated in Social Origins and Patients and 
Healers though they have been slightly modified in this small chapter. There appear to have been 
significant pressures in Culture and Depression that led to modifying this position to the form 
found here. I briefly address some of those pressures below.  
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Only the most obtuse reader would fail to recognize that a number of the anthropologists 
writing in Culture and Depression have used the opportunity to call for a more sophisticated 
conceptualization of depression than occurred in A. Kleinman’s previous work. This probably had 
the positive effect of helping him, as editor, to reframe his stance slightly in his own contribution, 
which serves as the final chapter of the book. Obeyesekere was the most straightforward in his 
criticism. Lutz and Beeman dealt with slightly more complicated issues. 
Gananath Obeyesekere took issue with the most obvious conceptual problem facing cross-
cultural work by strongly warning that “one must not delude oneself with the false notion that the 
existence of patients labeled depressives proves in any way the existence of a disease known as 
‘major depression’”.453 The conceptual problem here is very similar to Kleinman’s category fallacy, 
insofar as the label “depressives” can easily constitute the application of a category outside of an 
appropriate context and thereby reify the category. Obviously, the use of such labeling has to do 
with a deeper epistemic claim about human experience. In other words, the act of applying the 
label constitutes a claim to understand what is “really the case”. Obeyesekere’s main 
counterexample to the act of such diagnostic454 labeling is his own experience with Buddhism in 
his home country, Sri Lanka. From this perspective, what “is called depression in the West is a 
painful series of affects pertaining to sorrow and is caused by a variety of antecedent conditions—
genetic, sociocultural, and psychological”, but they exist in the West in a “free-floating manner” 
without a philosophical cohesion to give them meaning and are therefore subject to being labeled 
as illness or disease.455 Alternatively, he viewed the philosophical comportment toward life as 
articulated in Sri Lankan Buddhism as being grounded in a system of meaning where affects of 
sorrow, suffering, and hopelessness define a human condition that should not be labeled either 
illness or disease. In his worldview, suffering, and perhaps dysphoria, constitute one of the three 
fundamental marks of existence.456 Exploring this further is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Suffice it to say that Obeyesekere’s view of culture, and its role in framing human existence and 
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affectivity for the individual person, serves as a warning for the psychiatrist who is apt to label as 
depression those expressions of dysphoria that might otherwise be intimately grounded in a 
normative mode of experience. Given these considerations, I think it was wise for A. Kleinman to 
alter his position so that patients need not be labeled depressed merely because they meet criteria 
of the DSM, and it was probably with such a consideration in mind that he re-framed chronic 
somatization as possibly occurring in the absence of psychiatric or medical disease.457  
Catherine Lutz offered a criticism of Western psychiatry that was informed by her 
anthropological work with the Ifaluk of Micronesia.458 Beginning with the idea that depression as 
a conceptual category is fundamentally emotional in nature, any discussion of depression must 
begin with the antecedent analysis of emotion. Specifically, she took issue with the idea that 
emotions are “natural, precultural facts”.459 She argued that this type of notion is a consequence of 
what she sees as Western ethnopsychology’s dichotomization between emotion as feeling and 
cognition as thought. In other words, Western intellectual history gives rise to the idea that emotion 
is primarily an “internal, psychobiological species of feeling”460, that stands in contradistinction to 
cognition. As she quoted directly from Patients and Healers, there should be little doubt that her 
criticism applies directly to the type of position taken by A. Kleinman when he claimed in 1980 
that his Taiwanese patients had a universal, primary (un-cognized) psychobiological state of affect, 
that was later cognized into its secondary, culturally shaped form. She used her own ethnographic 
work to suggest ways that emotions exist as culturally constructed judgments, which I will not 
address here.461 Adequate for our discussion, however, is the challenge to the assumption that 
affect is antecedent to and ontologically separate from thought. She also spent several pages 
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addressing Kleinman’s apparent reliance on the thinking of Julian Leff, but since that makes up a 
large part of Beeman’s criticism, I will turn to Beeman for that context. 
Writing about dysphoria from “the view of linguistic anthropology”, William Beeman was 
not shy about stating that the “assumption of universality of depression seems ill-founded”.462 
Nevertheless, he addressed the role of language in both the expression of dysphoria as well as 
some varieties of therapeutic interaction aimed at treating it. As not to belabor the point, I focus 
on his criticism of Leff. He began by saying the following: “I must confess that I feel somewhat 
foolish addressing Leff’s schema, since it is ground that has already been worn bare by the tread 
of many others who have come before me. Nevertheless, this schema is equally foolish and must 
be dealt with by someone before a generation of psychiatrists adopt it as doctrine”. Of course, it is 
Kleinman who adopted Leff’s schema in Patients and Healers, as Leff seems to be the main source 
of Kleinman’s theorizing regarding the idea that Chinese speakers lack sufficient vocabulary to 
describe dysphoric affective states.463 As Beeman pointed out, Leff’s theory separates languages 
between those with linguistic capacity for explicit, referential terms regarding depression and those 
with only “relatively undifferentiated” references that employ bodily experiences of emotion.464 
With Leff, the undifferentiated terms of reference are evidence of the stage of sophistication of a 
linguistic group, as I already demonstrated in discussion of his views above.465 Beeman argued, 
however, that such views are rather naïve accounts of how language gets used, suggesting that Leff 
failed to understand some of the primary functions of metaphor in language. In fact, Beeman 
claimed that metaphor is the primary mode of expression for emotion, and with enough local 
knowledge, the researcher should be able to understand the sophisticated and nuanced use of such 
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metaphor. The criticism and discussion of Leff on language by Lutz and Beeman likely served to 
inform the model presented in the Kleinmans’ chapter, such that the poverty of language claim 
does not feature prominently 
With respect to Culture and Depression, the discussion thus far should leave the reader 
with the sense that it became expedient to soften some of the explanatory claims originally offered 
as an account for SJSR as a category of Chinese experience. By 1984, A. Kleinman has distanced 
himself from Leff and the poverty of language argument, and makes the claim that he intended to 
suggest that “neurasthenia and depression could be understood as distinctive cultural construals of 
the same psychobiological state”.466 While the English language record is clear, he has addressed 
Chinese colleagues in less pejorative language. 
In 1984 Kleinman wrote a paper on somatization that was published in Chinese for a 
journal covering medical topics outside China and published by Hunan Medical University.467 
There are a couple features of this article that make it worth mentioning here. He begins by framing 
somatization ( ) as an evolving process that involves the biological, the psychological, 
and the social, placing it within the biopsychosocial paradigm.468 Within that frame, he elaborates 
the same tripartite conceptualization of acute, subacute, and chronic that appeared after 1982, with 
the idea that prolonged “illness behavior” ( ゆ ) can be transformed into a “sick role” (
) that is reinforced through a type of “operant conditioning” ( ゆ ), and this 
occurs with increased interactions with medical systems that seek a physiological etiology. Even 
in the absence of disease, this can also become or result from a learned “coping style” ( ) 
that we might call the “somatic style” of responding to and expressing distress (
ら ).469 The patient, however, is conceived as unconsciously ( つ ) 
playing out this coping style and should not be misconstrued as feigning illness ( ). This 
paradigm is basically compatible with Social Origins and it is interesting to see in Chinese 
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translation, but the conclusion of the paper appears to be novel. There he made two claims that he 
described as clarifications of misunderstandings about the concept of somatization. 
 First, he stated that somatization is unrelated to psychoanalysis, on the grounds that 
“Psychoanalytic theory espouses that subconscious psychological factors are more fundamental 
than somatic symptoms and that psychological symptoms are transformed into somatic symptoms 
in a symbolic form”.470 He was careful to use the theoretic language of “subconscious” here (
) since he had already claimed that somatization occurs in an “unconscious” manner ( つ ). 
In contrast to psychoanalytic theory, he proposed that somatization, as he used it, be regarded as a 
descriptive term referring to the simultaneously occurring bio-psycho-social distress, that if 
intensified and maintained, becomes an “illness behavior”. 471 I will not dispute his use of language 
here, as he modified his claim from the prior stance that SJSR is “somatized depression”.  
Second, in his final comments he made the statement that investigating somatization 
certainly does not mean that the diagnosis of SJSR lacks the reliability ( ) of depression.472 
After all, SJSR is a codified category with criteria. However, he went on to state that “the two 
phenomena are superimposed, and it can be said that they are two sides of the same coin, or two 
different ways of examining the same one object”. 473 He continued: “clinical depression is one 
type of psychiatric disease that is related to somatization. And SJSR is one form of manifesting 
one’s illness experience or illness behavior; that is, it’s a form of somatization. Perhaps depression 
is primary or secondary to SJSR, but the former is not more fundamental than the latter, nor is it 
more important. The diagnosis and treatment of illness behavior like SJSR, is equally as important 
as the diagnosis and treatment of a disease like depression”.474 
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The reader should be able to recognize that the disease/illness distinction is maintained in 
Chinese (  vs. ), and SJSR is framed as illness experience/somatization while depression 
is a psychiatric disease that is related to somatization. So what does it mean to claim that they are 
two sides of the same thing? What is that one thing, that one shiwu ( )? We do not have an 
answer for this because the claim is amorphously relativistic; after all, at other times he referred to 
SJSR as a disease as well, owing to its recognition in official manuals.475 This is one of several 
criticisms raised by the renowned psychiatrist Xu Youxin in response to Kleinman’s Chinese 
article.476 Kleinman’s original claims in Patients and Healers were very clear that depression as 
disease is the underlying ontological entity, while the somatized SJSR is the phenomenal 
experience. For all its problems, at least the original stance was logical and coherent. By 1984, 
there is no coherent position. 
 
4.6 Neurasthenia Revisited in 1989 
By the mid-1980s, the views of SJSR as somatization that I have outlined thus far had 
become a prevalent model in anthropology and cultural psychology/psychiatry, as evinced by how 
widely it was cited by subsequent researchers.477 Not all of those can be addressed here.478 Instead, 
space is better used by summarily looking at the 1989 special issue of Culture, Medicine and 
Psychiatry that served as a conclusion to that decade as well as a “culmination of a venture” begun 
by Kleinman and Lin regarding SJSR in Asia.479  
Intended to offer “a glimpse of the controversy in Chinese psychiatry about the status of 
neurasthenia, stimulated in part by publication of Dr. Kleinman’s research findings”, the papers in 
the 1989 special issue provided some cultural history of neurasthenia, and challenged the effort at 
“formulating an international classification of mental illnesses as well”. 480  The volume is 
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comprised of nine papers, two of which argued unapologetically for the retention and use of SJSR 
as a clinical category (Young and Yan)481, while two others argued that it was too early to abandon 
the category (Zhang and Liu).482 The volume begins with Lin’s offering of a historical view based 
on his own experience in Taiwan, Japan, and China.483 Suzuki addressed the thinking of Morita 
Masatake and the role Morita therapy played in shifting lay and clinical models from shinkei 
suijyaku ( ) to shinkei shitsu (  484 Munakata discussed the role of Japanese culture 
in allowing SJSR, among other categories, to be used as a “disguise” diagnosis that prevents the 
shock and social stigma of more severe illness like schizophrenia.485 Rin and Huang described their 
study of patient and physician understandings of SJSR in Taiwan, demonstrating that most 
“Western-trained” physicians found the category without validity, while both patients and Chinese 
medicine physicians believed it to be a valid disease category. Interestingly, ninety percent of 
patients endorsing SJSR in their Taiwan study did not think brain CAT scans would be helpful in 
understanding their ills, implying that in the Taiwan context SJSR may not be seen as primarily a 
disorder with imageable brain pathology.486 Lastly, Cheung attempted to paint a picture of the 
“indigenization” process whereby popular booklets, patent medicines, tonics, and folk medicine 
facilitated widespread ideas about SJSR as a physical ailment that could be talked about without 
the stigma associated with psychiatric and emotional problems.487 
With respect to historical background, the special issue does not provide much information 
beyond what can be found in the two chapters of this project above, with the exception of Liu’s 
discussion of the role of Soviet and Pavlovian theory regarding SJSR’s physiology. Lin’s 
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background of SJSR in the West and Japan is cursory; he also made some statements that are 
difficult to corroborate (e.g., that neurasthenia established itself as a major disease in the minds of 
the Taiwan public in the late 1940s and early 1950s).488 For the most part, the issue serves as an 
interesting editorial or opinion piece, with some additional, informal studies being reported. Some 
claims are clearly incorrect, such as Yan’s statement that “the first article on neurasthenia was 
published by Song Ming-tong in 1936 in the Tong Ji Medical Journal”.489 Still, there are other 
aspects of the special issue that are interesting enough to raise again for discussion in Chapter 5 
below. Presently, I will conclude this section with a brief look at a response to Kleinman that is 
represented by Derson Young ( , Hunan Medical University), as his commentary is repeated 
by others.  
One of Young’s primary criticisms of Western handling of SJSR, as described thus far, is 
the fact that the DSM has variously included, altered, and removed neurasthenia from its pages. 
He argues that terminological changes hardly resolve the epistemological difficulties in crafting a 
valid psychiatric nosology. For this reason, he is not willing to embrace the early efforts at 
diagnosing SJSR patients according to DSM-III descriptions of depressive disorder. Additionally, 
Young has offered a sophisticated etiological explanation for neurosis, which describes two 
“characteristic features” in the general population—a “low threshold of reaction to and 
hypersensitivity in response to weak stimuli” and “easy fatigability”490—that make it more or less 
likely that certain people will develop certain life problems in the face of stressors. He believes 
that these constitutional factors, in combination with environmental strain acting on the innate 
constitution of individuals, gives rise to neuroses such as neurasthenia subsequent to the nervous 
system’s management of stress. That is to say, vulnerable people share a diathesis for certain 
neurosis syndromes. His view is an empirical matter that is not without significant interest among 
researchers. In any case, the reason for raising Young’s view is to situate his understanding of 
“somatization”, which follows below.  
As we have already seen, Kleinman stated in his Chinese language article that somatization 
is unrelated to psychoanalysis, but he also claimed that SJSR was a manifestation of the somatizing 
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of psychosocial distress and/or the psychiatric disease state of depression. In response to that 
position, Young had the following to say. First, physical diseases cause mental changes that are 
never referred to as “psychologization”. Second, somatization has been categorized for a long time 
as a defense mechanism whereby patients unprepared to face psychic anxiety or dissonance 
convert emotional factors into bodily symptoms. Xu Youxin raised this criticism of Kleinman’s 
position as well when he pointed out that, “It is well known that psychological factors themselves 
can be converted into somatic/bodily symptoms, and this concept was first raised by S. Freud in 
the initial stages of his research on Hysteria, which he undertook almost a century ago”.491 It is 
therefore wrongheaded to use “somatization” as a term to stand-in for “somatic symptom” as such 
uses only cause confusion. Third, mental tension is known to cause a variety of somatic symptoms 
such as tachycardia and headaches, which are the direct result of stress and do not warrant the 
claim that they are a somatization of something else.492 Fourth, only in some cases is “mental 
tension or the desire for secondary gain transformed into somatic symptoms through semi-
conscious somatization or conversion processes”. Of course, there are also unconscious processes, 
but it is “inappropriate to consider all somatic symptoms in mental illness as psychogenic. 
Regrettably, in the investigation of somatization, some authors have tried to include the whole into 
the part”.493 In like manner, Xu Youxin concluded with a rejection of Kleinman’s notion that 
somatization is merely a descriptive term. Rather, Xu argued that “it is a mode of explanation that 
considers a patient’s physical symptoms to be a conversion of their psychological issues, and of 
course not all physicians chose to adopt such an explanatory framework for their patients’ 
experiences”.494This stance of Xu’s served as a preliminary repudiation of the attempt to re-frame 
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SJSR patient experiences as instances of clinical depression manifesting bodily. As will be seen in 
subsequent chapters, resisting this attempt at redefinition is no simple task. 
 
4.7 Rethinking Psychiatry and Conclusion 
 The 1988 publication of Rethinking Psychiatry did not offer any new approach to SJSR. 
However, it did call on psychiatric researchers to engage in a critical self-reflection of how they 
conceptualize the experience of patients. Cultural and comparative studies are rightly seen as “an 
antidote to professional ethnocentrism”, and psychiatry’s “central assumptions and paradigms” are 
said to be exposed through the process of cross-cultural comparison.495 As it is not my aim to take 
issue with the larger anthropological approach of Kleinman, with most of which I agree, I ignore 
most of the theoretical discussion of the book. Instead, I point out that he appears not to recognize 
his own instances of ethnocentrism and assumption when it comes to SJSR. In that regard, I only 
address theory in one instance at the end of this discussion. 
 Seven pages into this monograph we once more are provided with a case description of an 
SJSR patient from 1980 (Mrs. Lin), and her presentation appears typical. However, he concluded 
that, for the anthropologist, her problem seems more like the consequences of demoralization and 
life distress than it does depression. The obvious question, then, is why diagnose depression? If “a 
psychiatric diagnosis is an interpretation of a person’s experience”, then why interpret her 
experience as the DSM category of depression specifically?496 Of course it may be the case that 
the severe disease condition, recognized even before Burton, is what best describes the patient’s 
experience.497 In that case, then perhaps she should be rediagnosed as a “Chinese depressive” as 
he has done numerous times before (and says as much on p. 13). In such a case, one should 
conclude that SJSR represents “culturally shaped illness experience underwritten by the disease 
depression”.498  The problem is that Kleinman repudiated such a view only pages later when 
criticizing the often held idea that the “biology of depression and anxiety disorders underwrites 
the inner form of these disorders, but cultural beliefs and values so shape the ‘expression’ of the 
disease that the bodily complaints come to ‘mask’ the real psychiatric disease ‘underlying’ 
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them”.499 Surely, “underlying” is not different from “underwrites”, and I have made it clear from 
the previous sections that he claimed numerous times that depression is the underlying disease in 
SJSR. Furthermore, he continued to claim to “have shown that headaches, dizziness, and lack of 
energy form a symptom cluster in ancient Chinese society and in contemporary Taiwan and China, 
which is the core neurasthenic illness behavior associated with mixed depressive and anxiety 
disorders”. 500 However, re-diagnosing one hundred percent of SJSR patients with a category from 
DSM-III, to the consternation of their Chinese physicians, does not constitute a demonstration of 
anything other than the fact that there are competing nosologies at play in different parts of the 
world. It seems apparent that many SJSR patients experience symptoms of “psychophysiological 
arousal and the multiform somatic effects of stress”, but it is not clear that they are “selectively 
perceiving, labeling, and communicating them” to fit some cultural template or as a consequence 
of failure to recognize affective symptoms.501 This appears to be the fundamental question at hand.  
 Let me reformulate what I see as a shortcoming of this text. In the introduction, there is 
much discussion about the importance for psychiatry in avoiding invalid interpretations of patient 
experiences, with proper understandings of cultural context serving to buffer against committing 
such mistakes. One representative example of such an error is labeling as hallucination a normative 
cultural experience, such as when an indigenous North American hears the voice of a deceased 
spouse.502 This phenomenon may very well be part of the normative processes of bereavement. 
The implication is that “the term ‘hallucination,’ when used in its clinical sense to mean an 
abnormal percept, is an invalid interpretation for these individuals”.503 In other words, a person can 
have the perception of a deceased spouse speaking to them, in the absence of any physical stimulus, 
as a consequence of the cultural expectation that such speaking will occur. In this case, we are told 
that the psychiatrist should not label such phenomena as an abnormal percept or a hallucination.504 
This raises two related, important criticisms.  
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 First, on the very same page, is the description of a Chinese patient with a culturally well-
understood syndrome that carries certain expected symptoms, but he chooses to apply a DSM 
diagnosis to the patient, which both the patient and her Chinese physicians do not endorse. Insofar 
as the invalid labeling of the Native American’s bereavement constitutes a category fallacy, the 
rediagnosing of SJSR patients certainly seems to raise the same question of the validity of the 
“depressive” label. 
Second, it is an empirical question as to whether the Native American has spontaneous 
temporal lobe activity in the absence of external stimulus, which is then interpreted as the voice of 
the deceased, or if they misinterpret external stimuli as the voice. The difference is actually quite 
significant. If the grieving person does not merely misinterpret external stimuli, but actually has 
the experience/perception of a voice, with the spontaneous brain activity that would have occurred 
if there were external stimuli, then it means that the role of cultural expectation and belief is far 
more important than even Kleinman’s cultural approach implies. It would mean that the 
expectation/belief is a causal force of the spontaneous brain activity that is perceived as voices. In 
such a case, Kleinman would not claim that the Native American’s perception “selects out and 
lumps together” the experiences of the deceased voice. The perception is the very experience of 
the voice. The culturally informed belief gives rise to the perception causally. In like manner, why 
does Kleinman not argue that Mrs. Lin’s perception is the symptom? Instead he argues that her 
“perception of her symptoms selects out and lumps together those symptoms that are familiar and 
salient to her, namely the ones that fit the popular blueprint of neurasthenia”.505 Why is it that in 
one case the perception would be the symptom/experience, while in the other case the perception 
selects out and lumps the salient symptoms? Because, as Kleinman stated, “For myself, the North 
American psychiatrist who interviewed Mrs. Lin, neurasthenia was not a diagnostic possibility”.506 
That is despite the fact that the category existed in ICD at the time. In any case, this tension 
regarding the individual’s perception “giving rise to” versus “selecting-out” experiences serves to 
highlight that Rethinking Psychiatry does not go far enough in conceptualizing SJSR and the power 
of culture to affect the brain generally.  
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In the previous pages, I have attempted to outline for the reader a process of Western 
academic engagement with SJSR as a clinical category that began just before 1980. It seems that 
Kleinman’s original aim in calling on his colleagues to work at the interface of anthropology and 
psychiatry was motivated by the desire not to overlook the contributions of culture in the 
experience of patients. His disagreement with Singer was based on the notion that Singer failed to 
see that patient presentations differ on the basis of the cultural backgrounds that give rise to 
experience and mold the manner in which symptoms take shape. As can be seen from the literature 
produced, however, there is a great irony at play. The attempt to employ anthropology in the study 
of SJSR appears to have led to the very types of cultural impositions for which anthropology has 
historically been criticized. In this case, SJSR was viewed as being the result of Asian suppression 
and denial of affect, the linguistic incapacity for emotional descriptions, and the need to avoid 
stigma by using clinical categories that failed to delineate the real underlying reasons for patient 
distress. By the mid-1980s, it appears that some of these presuppositions and conclusions were 
less emphasized, but the claims had already reached Chinese psychiatrists who began to take issue 
with what was being claimed. In the next chapter, I continue this examination by looking at the 





Chapter 5: Shenjing Shuairuo Survives into the Twenty-First Century 
“Modes of healing and culturally specific beliefs about how to achieve mental health can be lost to 
humanity with the grim finality of an animal or plant lapsing into extinction. And like those plants and 
animals, the diversity in the human understanding of the mind can disappear before we’ve truly 
comprehended its value”.507 
 
 The materials that monopolized discussion in the previous chapter served primarily to 
demonstrate just how contentious was the intellectual orientation of the NCCP in its early 
interpretations of SJSR. Some of the explicit claims that were documented in that chapter have yet 
to be recanted by the originators, despite no longer being voiced. Nevertheless, the period marked 
a turning point in both Western and Chinese views of neurasthenia, and the debates arising from 
the literature were later called “the neurasthenia-depression controversy”. 508 The 1990s and the 
first decade of the twenty-first century saw an interesting transition from the stance-taking that 
occurred earlier. For example, by the mid-eighties, opinions seemed to be very much split between 
the two camps, with one side arguing for the validity of SJSR as a disease category that was 
epistemically (and ontologically) distinct from depression, while the other side argued that SJSR 
was a local illness experience in China that facilitated the manifestation of dysphoric affect or was 
itself underlain by depression. 509  In the subsequent decades, opinions and interpretations of 
research findings were much more nuanced, with an apparent recognition that it was difficult to 
argue for an either/or scenario when it came to SJSR. Part of the reason for this change was that 
the Chinese classification system modified its assessment criteria for the disorder, narrowing the 
population that could receive the diagnosis. Other reasons include changes to both the ICD and the 
DSM. Still, there were instances where the forced dichotomy continued to raise its head and 
researchers occasionally took sides.  
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 My aim in the following pages is to continue with a consideration of the ways in which 
SJSR was undergoing reconstruction in the decade following Kleinman’s original reduction of it 
to depression. In the 1990s, there was engagement with SJSR from a number of fronts. One of 
these was a reexamination of the increasingly entrenched Western idea of Chinese somatization, 
while another consisted of a comparison of SJSR with ICD and DSM categories in a search for 
equivalencies. One of the key proponents of the NCCP and interpreters of SJSR in the nineties 
was Hong Kong psychiatrist, Sing Lee, who recognized only in part the role of the NCCP in the 
transformation of SJSR at the turn of the century. In the first decade of 2000, there was a 
hodgepodge of commentary about SJSR, demonstrating only that not much progress had been 
made. I take up each decade in turn. First, however, I briefly offer some background to the 
changing diagnostic systems in place from the end of the 1980s, in order to situate the attempts to 
frame SJSR within those new diagnostic systems. 
 
5.1 Changing Diagnostic Systems on the World Scene 
 Let me begin by stating that it is beyond the scope of this project to undertake a detailed 
examination of all the numerous forces that gave rise to the publications and revisions of the 
various diagnostic systems through which SJSR has been examined, critiqued, and interpreted. 
Instead, I want to make clear how the classification systems are relevant, specifically with regard 
to the research into SJSR that has taken place since 1980. I start briefly with the ICD, and follow 
with the DSM and the CCMD. 
 The World Health Organization was officially founded in April of 1948, and the First 
World Health Assembly took place in July of that same year. I remind the reader that the creation 
of the WHO was the result of a vote two years earlier in New York in response to a proposal by 
the delegations from China (at the time, this was the Republic of China) and Brazil regarding the 
need to establish such an organization.510 At that time, the WHO took on the responsibility of 
publishing and updating the ICD, which would be a continuation of a long-standing international 
effort at documenting causes of death. With the founding, morbidity was added to the 
documentation of mortality, and that version, undertaken by the new WHO, would be published 
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as ICD-6.511 “Nervousness with debility” fell under “ill-defined diseases” while “[p]sychoneurosis 
with somatic symptoms” and “asthenic reaction” were among the diagnostic groups listed. This 
practice continued through ICD-7 and was later modified with the separation of psychoses and 
neurosis in ICD-8 in 1965, with neurasthenia being listed as a neurotic disorder.  
To the present day, neurasthenia has continued to be listed as a neurotic disorder, but other 
classes of disorders have been added to the system, including chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS), 
somatization disorder, somatoform autonomic dysfunction, unspecified somatoform disorder, 
among others. Some of these changes are listed for reference in Table 4. The history and changes 
of the ICD system are very complicated and cumbersome. I mention them here so that the reader 
can understand the various directions that SJSR researchers have taken since the mid-1980s in an 
attempt to explain what is “really” happening in the Chinese context. I return to this topic after 
briefly addressing the DSM and the CCMD. 
The first edition of the DSM, published in 1952, catalogued a “psychophysiologic nervous 
system reaction”, which “term includes many cases formerly called neurasthenia”.512 At that time, 
it was conceived as a psychophysiological asthenic reaction with fatigue as the predominant 
complaint. It was understood that the disorder could also have visceral symptoms and could 
represent a conversion reaction or an anxiety reaction. Neurasthenia was not formally a diagnostic 
category. In the second edition of the DSM, published in 1968, neurasthenic neurosis was 
(re)introduced as a “condition characterized by complaints of chronic weakness, easy fatigability, 
and sometimes exhaustion”. 513  It was considered different from both anxiety neurosis and 
psychophysiologic disorders in the predominant complaint.514 It was also to be distinguished from 
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Table 4: Historical versions of ICD and their diagnostic categories pertaining to neurasthenia 
Version / Date Relevant categories pertaining to neurasthenia 
ICD-6 / 1948 -Nervousness, debility, undue fatigue, and depression 
-Psychoneurosis with somatic symptoms by organ system, 
-Psychoneurosis with somatic symptoms and asthenic reaction 
ICD-7 / 1955 -Same as above 
ICD-8 / 1965 -Nervousness, debility, and undue fatigue 
-Separation of psychoses and neuroses 
-Anxiety neurosis, depressive neurosis, and neurasthenia listed as distinct 
neurotic disorder entities  
-Encephalitis, myelitis and encephalomyelitis listed 
ICD-9 / 1975 -Fatigue listed as a general symptom with a code 
-Neuroses are refined as neurotic disorders. Anxiety states, neurotic 
depression have their own coding. 
-Neurasthenia is listed as a subcategory of neurotic disorders. 
-“Other neurotic disorders” lists “somatization disorder”. 
-Benign myalgic encephalomyelitis named. 
-Chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) added in 1988 (code 780.71). 
ICD-10 / 1990 -Malaise and fatigue listed as “general symptom and sign” with codes. 
-Post-viral fatigue syndrome listed as a brain disorder with sub-heading of 
benign myalgic encephalomyelitis.  
-CFS indexed to “benign myalgic encephalomyelitis”. 
-“Neurotic, stress-related and somatoform disorders” (F40-F48) includes 
somatoform disorders and neurasthenia 
F45.0       Somatization disorder 
F45.1       Undifferentiated somatoform disorder 
F45.2       Hypochondriacal disorder 
F45.3       Somatoform autonomic dysfunction 
F45.4       Persistent somatoform pain disorder 
F45.8       Other somatoform disorders 
F45.9       Somatoform disorder, unspecified 
F48          Other neurotic disorders 
F48.0       Neurasthenia 
 
By 1980, DSM-III officially removed neurasthenia as a diagnostic category but indexed the term 
with a reference to the category of “Dysthymic Disorder (or Depressive Neurosis)”, which was 
characterized by a chronic disturbance of mood. 515  The revised DSM-III continued this 
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organization when it was published in 1987.516 In addition to the removal of neurasthenia, DSM-
III added a specific section on somatoform disorders, the essential features of which “are physical 
symptoms suggesting physical disorder (hence, somatoform) for which there are no demonstrable 
organic findings or known physiological mechanisms and for which there is positive evidence, or 
a strong presumption, that the symptoms are linked to psychological factors or conflicts”.517 The 
fourth edition of the DSM was published in 1994, at which point neurasthenia was reintroduced 
and reduced to a translation of SJSR, and appeared in the appendix glossary of “culture bound 
syndromes”, as was mentioned and cited in the introduction. The organization of somatoform 
disorders continued in DSM-IV, a list of which can be seen in Figure 18 below.  
 
 
Figure 18: DSM-IV Somatoform Disorders518 
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These categories and the listing of neurasthenia in the Culture-Bound Glossary were to 
continue with the Text Revision of DSM-IV in 2000; however, at that time, chronic fatigue 
syndrome (CFS) was not listed as a distinct category as it was in the ICD. Instead, unspecified 
somatoform disorder was described as being characterized by complaints of chronic fatigue. Other 
writers have addressed the history and intellectual challenges that under-gird the various changes 
in the DSM nosology, and so these are not repeated here.519 It is worth noticing, however, that the 
basic categories in the DSM followed the ICD changes at least nominally, with the exception of 
excluding neurasthenia from the main body of the diagnostic text after 1980. A few words about 
the CCMD should be said here. 
Recall from the last chapter that the earliest drafts of the CCMD appear to have begun with 
the first nationwide conference on psychiatric disorders held in 1958. The second national 
conference in 1978 revised the 1959 draft and produced the 1979 “Draft of Classification of Mental 
Disorders” that was to constitute the first edition of the CCMD. This process also roughly 
coincided with the World Health Organization’s adoption of the ninth edition of the ICD (1975). 
Around the same time, the American Psychiatric Association published DSM-III in 1980. For ease 
of comparison, these dates of publication can be compared in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Comparison of publication dates for ICD, DSM, and CCMD 
ICD DSM CCMD 
ICD-6 (1948) DSM-I (1952) --- 
ICD-7 (1955) --- First draft, not officially used 
(1958) 
ICD-8 (1965) DSM-II (1968) --- 










ICD-10 (1990) DSM-IV (1994) --- 
--- DSM-IV-TR (2000) CCMD-3 (2001) 
ICD-11 (in process) DSM-5 (2013) --- 
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In 1986 Professor Derson Young headed a committee to revise the CCMD. Among the 
many goals of the revision were the aims of approximating ICD-10 and DSM-III in a manner that 
was grounded in ongoing research in China and around the world, with consideration given to 
cultural issues within China that might not be reflected in American or international classifications. 
Upon its completion in 1989, CCMD-2 was used in a field trial in China, comparing the Chinese 
classifications with DSM-III-R diagnostic differences across Chinese patients. From a final sample 
of 254 patients (209 inpatient, 45 outpatient) from fifteen hospitals across China, researchers came 
to some interesting conclusions. The results of the trial demonstrated that CCMD-2 was nearly 
indistinguishable in its inter-user diagnostic reliability when compared with DSM-III-R across 
almost all psychiatric diagnoses and could be considered as an interchangeable classification 
system. Unsurprisingly, however, there were a small number of cases where diagnostic 
discrepancy did exist. By CCMD-2 criteria, five patients where labeled with SJSR; using DSM 
criteria, these five patients were formulated as undifferentiated somatoform disorder (one patient), 
generalized anxiety disorder (one patient), or no diagnosis was found to be suitable (three 
patients).520 This discrepancy gets at the very heart of the entire controversy regarding SJSR in the 
Chinese context, especially since neurasthenia would have been a diagnostic option if the ICD had 
been used.  
The researchers involved in the field trial, still sensitive to Kleinman’s 1980 re-diagnosing 
eighty-seven percent of SJSR patients with depression (Social Origins), readily admitted that SJSR 
had been overused as a diagnosis prior to the introduction of DSM-III into China.521 However, and 
perhaps most importantly of all, they rejected the notion that SJSR lacked validity as a concept 
merely due to its being expunged from the DSM. They pointed out in their publication of the study 
results that none of the patients diagnosed with SJSR using CCMD-2 met criteria for DSM 
depression. Focusing on this fact, they turned to the issue of unspecified somatoform disorder 
(USD) in the DSM and the growing American interest in chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS), which 
had also been listed in the ICD. They raised the question of whether some SJSR patient diagnoses 
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might be equivalent to either of these categories, implying that the American Psychiatric 
Association had merely made nominal changes to the DSM; that is, the APA had expunged 
neurasthenia but introduced unspecified somatoform disorder. Even so, there were still cases that 
met neither USD nor CFS criteria. Much of the literature in the 1990s was focused on just these 
issues.  
 
5.2 Reframing the SJSR Diagnosis in the 1990s 
 As academics continued to consider the meaning of SJSR in the 1990s, a central question 
persisted regarding the concept of somatization. In 2015 we can continue to find criticism of the 
concept as applied to Asian persons when we read that “a received opinion in medical literature 
holds that Asians are prone to present psychiatric problems as physical complaints—depression as 
back ache. Implying as it does that Asians lack a proper understanding of what ails them or, if they 
do understand, hesitate to call it by its right name, this dogma enshrines prejudices and misreadings 
as medical facts”. 522  Some of the writings that helped to entrench such ideas were already 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter. In the years following the publication of those writings, 
there was no shortage of efforts to bring some clarity to the concept of somatization.  
Continued reflection on the issue of somatization made clear that, with the publication of 
DSM-III (and subsequent editions), somatic symptom presentations were no longer to be viewed 
as symptom constellations that clearly pointed to some other underlying diagnosable issue. Instead, 
the DSM began to list somatization phenomena as separate diagnosable entities themselves.523 
These categories are listed above as discrete diagnostic entities, whereas in the past, patients were 
diagnosed on the basis of what was considered the etiology underlying any given form of somatic 
presentation. This change along with publications claiming somatization as a culturally particular 
phenomenon of help-seeking led researchers to examine how commonly patients presented to their 
providers with bodily complaints. By the end of the 1980s, it increasingly was understood that 
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somatic presentations were ubiquitous, including within Western countries.524 The question then 
became one of clarifying the variety of manner in which patients tended to present physical 
complaints in the absence of any recognizable lesion. Recall from Chapter 2 that absence of lesion 
was the historical way of formulating the idea of “functional” disorder. In such cases, there 
appeared to be a problem with the physical functioning of some part of the body without any 
obvious or identifiable lesion to account for the functional change.525 I pointed out earlier that 
somatization was defined by Kleinman as “the expression of personal and social distress in an 
idiom of bodily complaints with medical help seeking”.526 The bodily complaints and medical 
help-seeking could arise from a number of factors, as Katon and Kleinman addressed more 
thoroughly elsewhere and as can be seen in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Five definitions of somatization from Katon and Kleinman527 
1. The selective focus on the somatic components of a psychological syndrome (depression, panic 
disorder) that has cognitive, affective, and somatic symptoms. 
2. The amplification of somatic symptoms in a patient with organic illness for primary gain, i.e., the 
use of somatic symptoms as a defense against underlying dysphoric affect or intrapsychic conflict, or 
secondary gain, i.e., the interpersonal or environmental advantage supplied by the symptoms. 
3. The use of somatic symptoms in the absence of any demonstrable organic disease to avoid dysphoric 
affect or intrapsychic conflict or consciously or unconsciously to manipulate the social environment for 
personal gain. 
4. The selective focus on psycho-physiologic symptoms such as migraine headaches, peptic ulcers, or 
back pain secondary to stressful life events with denial or minimization of life problems that have 
precipitated or exacerbated the illness. 
5. The expression of physical complaints as a culturally sanctioned idiom of distress to indirectly 
implicate family, work, school, financial, or other social problems. 
 
                                                             
524 K.W. Bridges and D.P. Goldberg, “Somatic Presentation of DSM III Psychiatric Disorders in Primary Care,” Journal 
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Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 179, no. 11 (November 1, 1991): 647–55. 
525 Obvious examples are stomach aches, constipation, headache, etc., in the absence of any pathology. With 
modern medical technology, search for lesions is even more thorough than mere physical examination.  
526 Kleinman, Kleinman, and Good, “Somatization,” 430. 
527 W. Katon, R. K. Ries, and A. Kleinman, “A Prospective DSM-III Study of 100 Consecutive Somatization Patients,” 




If we think about this list with regard to the attempt to apply it to claims about Chinese 
somatization, we find that it is overly broad for two reasons. First, SJSR patients that present with 
difficulties in concentration or memory (cognitive symptoms) are not included in (1). Second, 
amplification of symptoms from “organic illness” rules out SJSR patients who lack bodily illness, 
eliminating (2). Items (3–5) are the real issues regarding SJSR, where we are interested in patients 
selectively presenting bodily symptoms to the exclusion of any psychosocial attribution.528 The 
question now becomes one of carefully delineating the illness behavior of a patient presenting with 
bodily symptoms in the absence of lesion; in other words, does the patient refuse to allow for any 
psychosocial interpretation when queried, or will they be open to attributing some of their 
experience to such factors? In the primary care context, Bridges and Goldberg determined in 1985 
that we might do well to think of somatization as being at least separable into those who were “true 
somatizers” as opposed to “facultative somatizers”.529 That is to say that the true somatizer was 
one whose consulting behavior (seeing the doctor) was specifically for somatic complaints without 
psychological symptoms, who attributed the symptoms only to physical causes, and had been 
determined to meet criteria for psychiatric diagnosis without any physiological explanation that 
could account for the somatic complaints. On the other hand, facultative somatizers were those 
whose consulting behavior was for somatic complaints (not psychological) and no physiological 
cause was found, but the patient did not attribute symptoms only to physical causes when 
interviewed by a psychiatrist. In other words, their somatic presentation was facultative as they 
were open to psychosocial explanations that might account for their symptoms.  
Kirmayer, who we discussed in the previous chapter, continued writing on somatization in 
the 1990s, and attempted further to differentiate somatization as illness behavior in primary care 
along the lines of clarification initiated by Bridges and Goldberg. Working with Anglophone and 
Francophone Canadians, he operationalized somatization with four criteria summarized and 
simplified here: (1) meet criteria for DSM diagnosis, (2) present only somatic symptoms, (3) make 
exclusively somatic attributions for the symptoms, and (4) “when asked directly, reject nerves or 
worries as a possible cause of their problems”.530 Patients meeting all four criteria correspond to 
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the true somatizers; those who meet (1–3), but are open to psychosocial attributions when asked, 
correspond to facultative somatizers. A third group consists of those who meet (1–2), but instead 
of conforming to (3), they also volunteer psychosocial explanations in the course of the interview. 
This third group he called “initial somatizers”, as they present initially with somatic complaints, 
but then offer psychological explanations of their own accord. The significance of this delineation 
is to point out that illness behavior unfolds in a variety of ways depending on the 
sociocultural/learned expectations for how one ought to present oneself to a health care provider.531 
The illness behavior of somatization proved to be extremely common and quite varied.  
In the Chinese context, some of the more vocal critiques about culture-group somatization 
seem to have fallen on deaf ears. In 1992 Yuko Kawanishi’s “Somatization of Asians: An Artifact 
of Western Medicalization?” took aim at Kleinman’s early work in an attempt to demonstrate from 
the literature that a tendency to present in a clinic with somatic symptoms did not equate with the 
claim that Asians somatize. Her convincing argument rests in part on the fact that past research 
was based primarily on ethnographic studies of small groups of patients, limiting their 
generalizability and perhaps relying on preconceived notions about cultural traits. Furthermore, 
she cited larger studies that directly conflicted with the idea that Asians presented with somatic 
complaints disproportionately more than Western patients.532 This is to say that, while it may be a 
cultural phenomenon that Chinese patients tend to present themselves to physicians with initial 
complaints pertaining to the body, it is not clear that such presentations indicate unawareness of 
underlying emotional or psychological distress or unwillingness to endorse such experiences. As 
even Kleinman’s work from 1980 demonstrated, many of his patients would be categorized as 
facultative somatizers. Others may have been initial somatizers. Still, others refused to endorse 
psychological symptoms; all such situations are consistent with Kirmayer’s findings with 
Anglophone and Francophone Canadians. Kawanishi concluded that the Asian-somatization thesis 
was likely the result of racial stereotyping, limitations of Western psychotherapy, and a 
dichotomous view of the mind-body in medicalized, Western society.533 
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 Writing in 1995, Psychologist Fanny Cheung reminded readers, in “Facts and Myths about 
Somatization among the Chinese”, that the explanatory concepts put forth to justify the idea that 
Chinese tend to somatize their problems basically fell into three categories of assumption about 
Chinese patients: (1) “Denial, suppression, or repression of emotions”, (2) “Lack of vocabulary or 
semantic network to express affective states”, and (3) “Lack of differentiation between mind and 
body”.534 I demonstrated previously that her criticisms here are correct in pointing out exactly these 
premises, which served as the intellectual foundation of the NCCP’s initial understandings of SJSR 
as somatized depression. Nevertheless, most writers appear to ignore this very ill-informed and 
dubious starting position. 535  Her conclusions seem to suggest that thinking about Chinese 
somatization had simply moved beyond its original formulations with increasing recognition that 
Chinese patients, along with patients in other parts of the world, are able to present and talk about 
psychological symptoms quite fluently when probed directly. Instead of being viewed as a culture-
specific tendency, it seems that researchers had come to appreciate that somatization is universal, 
and Chinese patients also participate in the facultative, initial, and true somatizer forms of 
symptom presentation.  
 In the midst of the effortful investigations into somatization, the psychological construct 
of “alexithymia” also came into play in the mid-1990s. Classically, alexithymia served as a 
personality construct used to describe the inability of certain patients to describe emotional 
experiences. Working with a study population in Toronto in 1995, Dion found that Chinese 
speakers in Toronto scored significantly higher on rating scales for alexithymia when compared to 
native English speakers or non-native English speakers of European background. She 
hypothesized that the finding could be explained by the existence of “sociocultural processes 
characteristic of Chinese culture. According to this sociocultural explanation, the personality trait 
of alexithymia is fostered among ethnic Chinese because Chinese culture strongly encourages a 
somatic idiom for construing expressing and describing one’s emotional states . . . as an alternative 
to the psychological idiom prominent in ‘Anglo’ and Western European segments of Canadian and 
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American cultures.536 Claiming that Chinese persons are alexithymic as a consequence of their 
culture resonated with some of the NCCP claims from previous years, but research in the coming 
decade would show that the construct of alexithymia needed further parsing. This is briefly 
addressed in the final chapter.537 
 Reflecting on his prior work, Kleinman wrote in 1995 that Patients and Healers was a 
“critique of biomedicine for its ethnocentrism, its reductionism, its essentialism, and its failure to 
engage the life world of patients”.538 The obvious irony is that Patients and Healers was itself a 
paradigmatic example of ethnocentrism, reductionism, and essentialism. Its contribution, however, 
was to emphasize the importance of engaging the life-worlds of patients. Further reflection on 
those life-worlds led Kleinman significantly to modify his view on somatization, with a 
recognition that his earlier formulations of the concept were “too tied to a disease/illness 
distinction, which becomes less and less tenable”.539 Another irony: such over-reliance on the 
disease/illness distinction was the very criticism leveled at Kleinman by Derson Young two years 
earlier, and which Kleinman dismissed as Young’s ignorance of anthropology and cultural 
psychiatry.540 Additionally, Kleinman also accused Young of denying that changes in “society and 
worldwide” contributed to mental illness, despite Young’s having written just the opposite 
regarding neurotic disorders.541 Nevertheless, with Kleinman’s changed view of somatization, 
there was no longer the need to view SJSR complaints as arising from a “cognitive coping process”, 
and he began to believe that “somatization seems normative and often normal: it is not so much a 
substitution for something more basic as it is a basic way of being-in-the-world”.542 As such, his 
“study of somatization suggests that the body can be a vehicle for experiencing, interpreting, and 
communicating about emotion and social issues, that the person’s experience, interpretation, and 
expression of bodily functions is negotiated in interpersonal relations. Somatic idioms of distress 
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also indicate that in some nontrivial sense the body feels and expresses social problems”.543 Such 
a view of somatization, according to Kleinman, marks the beginning of a shift away from viewing 
clinical depression as a disease and toward seeing it as lying within a broader context of social 
suffering. It should be obvious that with such a view of somatization, and the shift away from 
viewing depression as a disease, no philosophical ground remains for any claim regarding the 
hierarchy or ontological priority of depression, somatic complaint, or SJSR. The increasingly 
relativist intellectual position translated into Kleinman’s work becoming ever less clinical in nature. 
Still, the view of somatization and SJSR that were put forward in the 1980s were spread broadly 
enough, and the controversy had become significant enough, that the numerous researchers 
involved continued to investigate the subjects despite whatever changes in view Kleinman 
professed. As intellectuals grew increasingly dissatisfied with the “Asians somatize” view, as well 
as with the idea that neurasthenia was “simply a somatized form of anxiety or depressive disorder”, 
some clarity had to be sought regarding where exactly the various nosologies were getting things 
right and where they were getting it wrong.544  
 Neurasthenia’s continued place in ICD-10 was suggested to be a result of the fact that the 
category was not easily reducible to other labels. The ICD-10 book of clinical descriptions 
explained the following: 
Although omitted from some classification systems, neurasthenia has been retained as a 
category in ICD-10, since this diagnosis is still regularly and widely used in a number of 
countries. Research carried out in various settings has demonstrated that a significant 
proportion of cases diagnosed as neurasthenia can also be classified under depression or 
anxiety: there are, however, cases in which the clinical syndrome does not match the 
description of any other category but does meet all the criteria specified for a syndrome of 
neurasthenia. It is hoped that further research on neurasthenia will be stimulated by its 
inclusion as a separate category.545 
Ultimately, neurasthenia was given a lengthy description that was later to raise a number of 
questions in comparison to other categories, and it can be viewed in Table 7. 
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Table 7: ICD-10 clinical description of neurasthenia 
F48.0 Neurasthenia 
Considerable cultural variations occur in the presentation of this disorder; two main types occur, with 
substantial overlap. In one type, the main feature is a complaint of increased fatigue after mental effort, 
often associated with some decrease in occupational performance or coping efficiency in daily tasks. 
The mental fatigability is typically described as an unpleasant intrusion of distracting associations or 
recollections, difficulty in concentrating, and generally inefficient thinking. In the other type, the 
emphasis is on feelings of bodily or physical weakness and exhaustion after only minimal effort, 
accompanied by a feeling of muscular aches and pains and inability to relax. In both types, a variety of 
other unpleasant physical feelings, such as dizziness, tension headaches, and a sense of general 
instability, is common. Worry about decreasing mental and bodily well-being, irritability, anhedonia, 
and varying minor degrees of both depression and anxiety are all common. Sleep is often disturbed in 
its initial and middle phases but hypersomnia may also be prominent. 
Diagnostic guidelines 
Definite diagnosis requires the following: 
(a) either persistent and distressing complaints of increased fatigue after mental effort, or persistent 
and distressing complaints of bodily weakness and exhaustion after minimal effort; 
(b) at least two of the following: 
 - feelings of muscular aches and pains 
 - dizziness 
 - tension headaches 
 - sleep disturbance  
 - inability to relax 
 - irritability 
 - dyspepsia; 
(c) any autonomic or depressive symptoms present are not sufficiently persistent and severe to fulfill 
the criteria for any of the more specific disorders in this classification. 
Includes: fatigue syndrome 
Differential diagnosis. In many countries neurasthenia is not generally used as a diagnostic category. 
Many of the cases so diagnosed in the past would meet the current criteria for depressive disorder or 
anxiety disorder. There are, however, cases that fit the description of neurasthenia better than that of 
any other neurotic syndrome, and such cases seem to be more frequent in some cultures than in others. 
If the diagnostic category of neurasthenia is used, an attempt should be made first to rule out a 
depressive illness or an anxiety disorder. Hallmarks of the syndrome are the patient's emphasis on 
fatigability and weakness and concern about lowered mental and physical efficiency (in contrast to the 
somatoform disorders, where bodily complaints and preoccupation with physical disease dominate the 
picture). If the neurasthenic syndrome develops in the aftermath of a physical illness (particularly 
influenza, viral hepatitis, or infectious mononucleosis), the diagnosis of the latter should also be 
recorded. 
Excludes: asthenia NOS (R53) 
 burn-out (Z73.0) 
 malaise and fatigue (R53) 
 postviral fatigue syndrome (G93.3) 





At about the same time, the taskforce working on the new edition of the DSM had to decide 
whether to reintroduce neurasthenia back into the American manual, and its members took a very 
different direction than the ICD. The DSM-IV Options book was published in 1991 as a “work in 
progress”, a look at the thought processes going into the new revision. Regarding the diagnosis we 
can read the following:  
This category has a long historical tradition and is included in DSM-II, ICD-9, and ICD-
10. Neurasthenia was not included in DSM-III for two reasons: 1) it was difficult to define 
in a way that would not excessively overlap with the Somatoform, Anxiety, and Depressive 
Disorders, and with nonpsychiatric medial conditions; and 2) the DSM-II diagnosis was 
rarely used. Nonetheless, Neurasthenia is frequently diagnosed in many other cultures and 
may be a frequent presentation in primary care settings (e.g., chronic fatigue syndrome).546  
The taskforce ultimately concluded that it was “unlikely that this disorder will be included 
as a separate category in the official classification. Instead, Neurasthenia may appear as a subtype 
of Undifferentiated Somatoform Disorder”. 547  As I have already mentioned, the category 
ultimately was not included in DSM-IV (except as a translated form of “culture bound disorder”), 
but the reference to its frequent presentation in primary care as chronic fatigue syndrome echoed 
the nosological concerns of Derson Young mentioned above, with the difference between Young 
and the DSM taskforce being the nosological priority assigned to categories. Logically for Young, 
SJSR was the antecedent category, and new changes in the Western nosology were an introduction 
of chronic fatigue as a mere terminological effort that was not only dismissive of psychiatric 
practice around the globe but also prioritized the phenomenological picture of patients in the 
Western context.  
 These issues raised by the DSM-Options book as well as changes to the DSM framework 
appear to have prompted a number of researchers to ask whether neurasthenia and chronic fatigue 
were really different names for the same clinical phenomena. One British researcher put the issue 
this way, “The thesis of this essay is that the origins of ‘ME’ [myalgic encephalitis] lie not in 1955 
or 1934, but in the last century, and in the condition known as neurasthenia”548 The literature on 
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ME in Britain, or chronic fatigue syndrome in the US, is too vast to expend the space on here, but 
in the 1990s there was some consideration that these and neurasthenia were all a single entity.549 
Similar claims stated that “chronic fatigue syndrome will meet the same fate as neurasthenia—a 
decline in social value as it is demonstrated that the majority of its sufferers are experiencing 
primary psychiatric disorders or psychophysiological reactions and that the disorder is often a 
culturally sanctioned form of illness behavior”.550 In 1992 Ware and Kleinman also engaged in a 
comparison between the categories, while still using the old qualitative data from a decade 
before.551 The question, specifically for the Chinese context, was beginning to cohere around the 
four categories of SJSR, neurasthenia, undifferentiated somatoform disorder (UDS), and chronic 
fatigue syndrome (CFS). 
 In 1988 the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published 
specific criteria regarding symptoms of increased fatigability in relation to what had previously 
been labeled “chronic Epstein-Barr virus syndrome”. Due to the fact that it was not certain whether 
Epstein-Barr virus would prove to be the causal agent, what came to be known as the Holmes 
criteria proposed that a set of particular symptoms should classically define chronic fatigue 
syndrome.552 At the time, most focus was placed on the idea that the chronic fatigue making up 
the syndrome was a result of latent viral infections, and CFS criteria were oriented towards this 
view. As a result, patient symptoms and physical findings were put forward as defining features 
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Table 8: Holmes criteria for CFS (1998)553 
MAJOR CRITERIA:  
 1. New onset of persistent or relapsing, debilitating fatigue or easy fatigability in a person who has no 
previous history of similar symptoms, that does not resolve with bed rest, and that is severe enough to 
reduce or impair average daily activity below 50% of the patient's premorbid activity level for a period 
of at least 6 months. 
 2. Other clinical conditions that may produce similar symptoms must be excluded by thorough 
evaluation, based on history, physical examination, and appropriate laboratory findings. 
MINOR CRITERIA: a symptom must have begun at or after the time of onset of increased 
fatigability, and must have persisted or recurred over a period of at least 6 months (individual 
symptoms may or may not have occurred simultaneously).  
 1. Mild fever—oral temperature between 37.5° C and 38.6° C, if measured by the patient—or chills. 
(Note: oral temperatures of greater than 38.6° C are less compatible with chronic fatigue syndrome and 
should prompt studies for other causes of illness.) 
 2. Sore throat. 
 3. Painful lymph nodes in the anterior or posterior cervical or axillary distribution.  
 4. Unexplained generalized muscle weakness.  
 5. Muscle discomfort or myalgia. 
 6. Prolonged (24 hours or greater) generalized fatigue after levels of exercise that would have been 
easily tolerated in the patient's premorbid state.  
 7. Generalized headaches (of a type, severity, or pattern that is different from headaches the patient 
may have had in the premorbid state). 
 8. Migratory arthralgia without joint swelling or redness.  
 9. Neuropsychologic complaints (one or more of the following: photophobia, transient visual 
scotomata, forgetfulness, excessive irritability, confusion, difficulty thinking, inability to concentrate, 
depression).  
 10. Sleep disturbance (hypersomnia or insomnia).  
 11. Description of the main symptom complex as initially developing over a few hours to a few days 
(this is not a true symptom but may be considered as equivalent to the above symptoms in meeting the 
requirements of the case definition).  
Physical Criteria: Physical criteria must be documented by a physician on at least two occasions, 
at least 1 month apart. 
 1. Low-grade fever—oral temperature between 37.6° C and 38.6° C, or rectal temperature between 
37.8° C and 38.8° C.  
 2. Nonexudative pharyngitis.  
 3. Palpable or tender anterior or posterior cervical or axillary lymph nodes. 
 
To make matters more complicated, CDC definitions for CFS were refined in 1994; these modified 
requirements have become known as the “Fukuda” criteria and can be found in Table 9. 
                                                             




Additionally, a case of “idiopathic chronic fatigue” was defined as “clinically evaluated, 
unexplained chronic fatigue that fails to meet criteria for the chronic fatigue syndrome”.554  
 
Table 9: Fukuda refinement to CFS criteria, including idiopathic chronic fatigue (1994)555 
A case of the chronic fatigue syndrome is defined by the presence of the following: 
1) clinically evaluated, unexplained, persistent or relapsing chronic fatigue that is of new or definite 
onset (has not been lifelong); is not the result of ongoing exertion; is not substantially alleviated by 
rest; and results in substantial reduction in previous levels of occupational, educational, social, or 
personal activities. 
2) the concurrent occurrence of 4 or more of the following symptoms, all of which must have persisted 
or recurred during 6 or more consecutive months of illness and must not have predated the fatigue: 
a) self-reported impairment in short-term memory or concentration severe enough to cause substantial 
reduction in previous levels of occupational, educational, social, or personal activities 
b) sore throat 
c) tender cervical or axillary lymph nodes 
d) muscle pain 
e) multi-joint pain without joint swelling or redness 
f) headaches of a new type, pattern, or severity 
g) unrefreshing sleep 
h) post-exertional malaise lasting more than 24 hours. 
A case of idiopathic chronic fatigue is defined as clinically evaluated, unexplained chronic fatigue 
that fails to meet criteria for the chronic fatigue syndrome. 
 
 As already mentioned, there was some Chinese skepticism about the American 
codification of the category of CFS, as the American Psychiatric Association had removed 
neurasthenia from its manual at the same time that American psychiatrists like Kleinman had 
raised questions about the validity of SJSR. Introduction of a similar and nebulous category like 
CFS seemed hypocritical. Given all the classificatory changes that took place, researchers of 
psychiatric nosology were in an even more complicated conundrum than in 1980. 
 Within China there was still considerable debate regarding the history and validity of SJSR 
as a diagnostic category. For example, we can find instances of Chinese psychiatrists undertaking 
“Research on the Re-diagnosis of Shenjing Shuairuo” in attempts to determine how CCMD-
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diagnosed SJSR patients would be labeled if assessed strictly using DSM-III criteria and symptom 
assessment batteries. One of the first of several such studies occurred around the beginning of 
1990. 556  Two research psychiatrists, from Tongji Medical University and Harbin Medical 
University respectively, diagnosed fifty-two patients with SJSR, excluding any known 
physiological pathology, at the end of 1989. These patients were each reassessed using DSM-III-
R, ICD-10, the Hamilton anxiety scale, and the Hamilton depression scale.557 Chronic fatigue 
syndrome was not considered in this study, though such comparisons were to come. The diagnostic 
groupings can be seen in Table 10 below. One might immediately recognize that the differences 
between the systems are unsatisfying, and subsequent studies improved upon this problem. For 
our purposes, it is worth mentioning that the authors concluded that they were in agreement with 
many psychiatrists in their own country who believed that “Shenjing Shuairuo should be retained 
as a diagnostic label”.558 Additionally, it should be noted that, as ICD-10 allows for neurasthenia 
as a label, re-diagnosis of the fifty-two patients resulted in half the patients continuing to carry this 
diagnosis. The other half was dispersed among the various other labels. With the DSM, however, 
no patients could be diagnosed with neurasthenia, and most ended up being labeled with depression, 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), or adjustment disorder. 
Writing in 1993, Li Lingjiang and Yang Desen (Derson Young) also continued to write 
about whether “SJSR should continue to be maintained as a psychiatric category”. 559  Their 
conclusion was also that it should continue, though they voiced recognition that its 
conceptualization in Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong had diverged from the understanding held by 
Chinese psychiatrists.560 It seemed necessary to undertake empirical research in China to compare 
the diagnostic differences between SJSR, ICD-10 neurasthenia, and chronic fatigue syndrome 
(CFS), as this was where much of the Western literature had been focusing since 1988. 
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Table 10: Re-diagnosis of 52 SJSR patients from  (Zhao) et al., 1991 
Diagnostic Label CCMD-II DSM-III-R ICD-10 
Neurasthenia SJSR/ り  52 Not included in DSM 27 
Somatization disorder 
、 
 0 3 
MDD  
  
• Moderate  








Mixed anxiety and depressive disorder 
み 、 
  1 
Dysthymia  
 
 8 2 
GAD  
み 
 13 3 
Adj-D  
、 
 11 5 
Conversion disorder  
、 
 2  
Bipolar depression  
、 
 1  
Panic attacks  
 
 1  
OCD 
ャ  
 1  
Unspecified neurotic, stress-related, and 
somatoform disorders 
、 
  1 
MDD= major depressive disorder, GAD= generalized anxiety disorder,  
Adj-D=adjustment disorder, OCD= obsessive compulsive disorder 
 
In 1994 Li and others561  at Hunan Medical University Subsidiary Hospital undertook 
“Comparative Research on Shenjing Shuairuo and Chronic Fatigue Syndrome” in an effort to 
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understand the diagnostic consequences of the newest classificatory systems when applied to a 
cohort of Chinese patients whose primary complaint was the experience of easy fatigability that 
had first begun at least three months prior.562 The basic conceptual aim of the study was to 
determine how many in the cohort who could meet criteria for SJSR would also be diagnosable 
with either ICD-10 neurasthenia and/or Centers for Disease Control-chronic fatigue syndrome 
(CDC-CFS).563 The results were very interesting, but not without problems, as can be seen in Table 
11 below. One of the immediate implications of their findings was that, although all 50 patients 
included in the study met criteria for SJSR, 18/50 did not meet criteria for either ICD-10 
neurasthenia or CDC-CFS. Additionally, although 32/50 met criteria for ICD-10 neurasthenia, 
only 8 of those met criteria for CFS. The conclusions that can be drawn from this exercise are 
limited, but not meaningless.  
 
Table 11: Comparison of Chinese patients’ diagnoses by classification system in Li, Zhang, Yang, and Hao 
(1994). 
Number  Diagnostic classification System 
Total= 50 CCMD-II ICD-10 CDC-CFS 
18 SJSR   
24 SJSR Neurasthenia  
08 SJSR Neurasthenia CFS 
 
First, while it may be tempting to argue that CCMD-II SJSR is distinct from ICD-10 
neurasthenia in this population, it must be kept in mind that CCMD-II required only three months 
of symptoms while ICD-10 required six months (as does the CFS criteria). Since the inclusion 
criteria for the study only required three months, the study was likely to include patients who 
would meet CCMD-II but not ICD-10 diagnostic criteria. In fact, the authors attribute the isolated 
eighteen SJSR diagnoses to this fact.564 
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Second, most of the patients who met both CCMD-II and ICD-10 criteria did not meet CFS 
criteria, despite the fact that they met the time duration requirements. This finding implies that 
there are other aspects of the CFS operationalization that distinguish the category from 
neurasthenia. In the present case, only eight patients met the criteria for fevers, sore throat, joint 
pain, etc., that were required by CDC. In sum, forty-two of the fifty SJSR patients could not be 
labeled with CFS, prompting the authors to point out that “among those who can be diagnosed 
with SJSR, most cannot be diagnosed with CFS, but it is not the case that those who are diagnosed 
with CFS cannot be diagnosed with SJSR”.565 That is to say, using diagnostic criteria, it could 
have been stated that all CFS were also SJSR, but not all SJSR were CFS. For the Western reader, 
it should also be recognized that all CFS was also diagnosable as neurasthenia (ICD-10), but not 
all neurasthenia was diagnosable as CFS. They conclude that perhaps CFS should be recognized 
as a form or sub-category of neurasthenia in ICD-10.566 Indeed, “fatigue syndrome” is listed in 
ICD-10 as something that is included within the diagnostic rubric of neurasthenia.567 
In a similar study conducted from 1992 to 1994, Li and Yang attempted to bring clarity to 
the issue of comparative diagnosis and possible equivalencies between categories within the 
various diagnostic systems discussed above. 568  Once again at Hunan Medical University 
Subsidiary Hospital, patients were included whose chief complaint was easy fatigability with onset 
at least three months prior. After ruling out organic disease, ninety-six patients were included in 
the study and assessed for any diagnosable condition using CCMD-II-R, ICD-10, DSM-III-R, and 
CDC criteria for CFS. Unlike their previous study, the DSM is included here, which makes 
possible the diagnosis of unspecified somatoform disorder in addition to any other diagnosis 
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Table 12: Comparison of Chinese patients’ diagnoses by classification system in Li, Yang, Zhang, and 
Zheng (1994). 
Number 
Diagnostic classification system 
Group Total = 96 CCMD-II-R ICD-10 DSM-III-R CDC-CFS 
A 16 patients Depressive 
neurosis 
Dysthymia Dysthymia CFS (2 ) 
B 10 patients GAD GAD GAD CFS (1) 
C 08 patients SJSR USD No diagnosis 0 patients 
D 49 patients SSJSR Neurasthenia USD 0 patients 




GAD= generalized anxiety disorder, 
USD= undifferentiated somatoform disorder,  
CFS=chronic fatigue syndrome, 
SJSR= Shenjing Shuairuo 
 
Groups A and B represent patients with psychiatric disorders that also met criteria for CFS, 
and the authors were not particularly interested in these groups as they had a primary psychiatric 
diagnosis. As with the previous study, the symptom duration used for inclusion necessitates that 
some patients diagnosable with SJSR by CCMD (only three months needed) will not meet criteria 
for ICD neurasthenia (six months needed). This most likely accounts for patient differences 
between CCMD and ICD in group C as USD is not constrained by duration of symptoms. The 
authors’ interests are specifically in the fact that, out of ninety-six patients, seventy were 
diagnosable with CCMD-SJSR, and sixty-two met criteria for ICD neurasthenia. This, they argue, 
“suggests that Shenjing Shuairuo constitutes one type of psychiatric disorder that indeed exists 
within clinical practice, and retention of the neurasthenia label in Chinese and international 
classification systems is appropriate to clinical practice”.569 However, the more interesting aspect 
of their findings pertains to the application of the DSM to those patients diagnosable with CCMD-
SJSR or ICD neurasthenia in groups C, D, and E. In those groups where 70 of the 96 patients could 
be labeled CCMD-SJSR, 59 received a DSM diagnosis of USD and 12 received no DSM diagnosis 
at all. In other words, nearly all 70 SJSR patients were labeled as USD by the DSM standards. The 
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researchers therefore ask the question, “does this suggest that neurasthenia in Europe and America 
has disappeared, or rather that in the DSM the majority of such cases have been attached to another 
diagnostic labels, namely Undifferentiated Somatoform Disorder”.570 Though it is not stressed in 
the conclusion of their study, one might also point out that a number of SJSR patients (12/70) 
received no diagnosis at all by DSM standards. Additionally, the same conclusions regarding CFS 
hold as in the previous study. Overall, what the researchers appear sufficiently to have 
demonstrated is the fact that SJSR serves as a category in the Chinese system that describes a set 
of experiences for which patients seek-out professional help, which experiences may not 
adequately be captured or accounted for by the DSM classificatory system. 
While Chinese psychiatrists were engaged in these kinds of research projects in the early 
90s in China, researchers in the USA were also thinking about some of the same issues. Given that 
there is a paucity of English language materials describing the findings or work of academics in 
China, the subject could have remained constrained by language barriers if there were not some 
native Chinese speakers to take up the issue. Publishing predominantly in English, these issues 
were thankfully taken up in earnest by psychiatrist and University of Hong Kong professor Sing 
Lee during the mid-1990s, a period which overlapped with his appointment as a Fellow in 
Harvard’s department of Social Medicine. The question that he wanted to address directly was 
whether the ICD definition of neurasthenia was compatible with the experience and presentation 
of Chinese patients; if so, then one might further pursue the idea that neurasthenia, UDS, and CFS 
were getting at the same phenomena outside of China that SJSR was getting at inside China.  
Review of Table 7 above should demonstrate that ICD characterizes neurasthenia with 
hierarchical criteria, with the predominant feature being fatigue or weakness that is either mental 
or physical in nature. CCMD, on the other hand, has never required that fatigue be a necessary 
symptom for a diagnosis of SJSR. In ICD, fatigue is given as the main complaint; accompanying 
this primary symptom are others such as headache, dizziness, and sleep disturbance. Lee was aware 
that this operationalization of neurasthenia did not match past experience or some 
contemporaneous studies of SJSR. For instance, Kleinman had made the same assumptions in 
1984 about SJSR that ICD codified with regard to neurasthenia in the early 1990s. Weakness and 
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loss of energy may have been common descriptions of neurasthenia in Beard’s day, but Kleinman 
found that only thirty to thirty-five percent of his Chinese study subjects carried such complaints. 
In 1984 he wrote, “This surprised us since weakness and exhaustion are central problems in 
traditional Chinese medicine where they are related to lack of qi and imbalance between yin/yang. 
For this reason, we assumed they would be a ready-made traditional Chinese cultural form for 
integration into the diagnosis of neurasthenia. It remains unclear why they are present in only a 
minority of cases”.571 Fatigue, in fact, had not made it into Kleinman’s list of complaints, while 
headache, insomnia, and dizziness made up seventy-three to ninety percent of patient concerns. 
His surprise at this fact illustrates his preconceptions that prevented him from fully considering 
SJSR’s long historical background in China and the cataloguing of its symptoms within popular 
and professional culture, which long predated Kleinman’s first visit to Asia. Nevertheless, this 
discrepancy with the more recent ICD framing of neurasthenia led to a reexamination of its 
symptom profile and comparison across diagnostic systems.  
Lee’s research set out to determine the extent to which fatigue, as opposed to other bodily 
complaints, constituted SJSR in its symptom profile. One can image that prior committees working 
on ICD, who were likely aware of the Western history of neurasthenia, simply assumed that the 
clinical category in China that translates as “neurasthenia” into English would have the same 
symptoms and constitute the same syndrome as the known phenomenon of “neurasthenia” in the 
West. However, translation need not imply equivalence, and Lee published a significant number 
of papers that cast doubt on the idea of the CCMD-ICD equivalence between the categories of 
SJSR and neurasthenia as they are operationalized. While it is not necessary systematically to 
review all of Lee’s publications from the 1990s, for the sake of thoroughness I should address his 
overall project from that period as it pertains to our subject matter. 
Continuing my chronological approach to these matters, I refer readers to Lee’s 1994 
editorial “Neurasthenia and Chinese Psychiatry in the 1990s”, which he published in the Journal 
of Psychosomatic Research.572 This paper is an important contribution to our topic as Lee makes 
explicit the distinction between the CCMD and the ICD insofar as the ICD requires fatigue as first 
among a hierarchy of symptoms necessary for the diagnosis of neurasthenia, whereas the CCMD 
requires three out of five symptoms that may or may not include fatigue. Making reference to some 
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of his own studies in Hong Kong, he points out that the most common symptoms attributed to the 
illness concept of SJSR are insomnia, anxiety, depression, and fright; fatigue is not among them.573 
The illness concept common among lay persons is not the same, however, as the actual symptom 
endorsement of patients. Nevertheless, Lee suggested that there may be some aspect of the Chinese 
experience of SJSR that does not quite fit the ICD formulation of a syndrome of fatigue. While 
SJSR continues to serve Chinese populations, the various “somatoform” categories of the DSM 
and the ICD such as quti hua tengtong zhang ai ( 、, somatoform pain disorder), 
wei fenhua quti zhangai ( 、, undifferentiated somatoform disorder), and others, are 
as “as weird as they are experience-distancing”.574 He concludes that we should, “Let the sufferers 
speak more”.575 
In the same year, Lee continued with “The Vicissitudes of Neurasthenia in Chinese 
Societies: Where Will It Go from ICD-10?”, where he further argued that the ICD descriptions of 
neurasthenia may not be true to the illness experiences of Chinese patients carrying SJSR 
diagnosis.576 Recall from earlier in this chapter that the ICD-10 Classification of Mental and 
Behavioural Disorders publication of clinical descriptions made the following statement about 
neurasthenia: “Although omitted from some classification systems, neurasthenia has been retained 
as a category in ICD-10, since this diagnosis is still regularly and widely used in a number of 
countries”.577 Lee suggests that on this basis, the formulation of neurasthenia in the ICD might be 
conceived of as constituting a “category fallacy”578 since the formulation does not match that of 
the country wherein the category is most widely used. For example, Table 13 lists the diagnostic 
criteria for CCMD-2 and ICD-10 in parallel. It can be seen that the hierarchical nature of the 
criteria for the ICD is such that cases of SJSR may fail to meet ICD criteria. Once again he 
concluded, “Let the sufferers speak for themselves”.579 
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Table 13: Comparison of CCMD-2 and ICD-10 criteria for a diagnosis of neurasthenia 
CCMD-2 ICD-10 
Must have 3/5 symptoms, lasting three months 
and causing: 
 (i) lower work or study efficiency, or disruption 
of social functioning,  
(ii) mental distress, or 
(iii) cause person to seek treatment. 
Definite diagnosis requires the following lasting 
for six months: 
 
(a) either persistent and distressing complaints of 
increased fatigue after mental effort, or persistent 
and distressing complaints of bodily weakness 
and exhaustion after minimal effort; 
 
List of symptom groups: 
(a) Weakness: mental or physical. Mental includes 
poor memory or difficulty in concentration. 
(b) Affective symptoms, dysphoria 
(c) Excitement: easy excitability, sensitivity to 
sound or light 
(d) Aches pains: such as headaches or myalgias 
(e) Sleep disturbances 
(b) at least two of the following: 
 - feelings of muscular aches and pains 
 - dizziness 
 - tension headaches 
 - sleep disturbance  
 - inability to relax 
 - irritability 
 - dyspepsia 
 
Exclusion:  
Other physical and psychiatric disorders causing 
these symptoms exclude diagnosis of SJSR. 
Exclusion: 
Any autonomic or depressive symptoms present 
must not be sufficiently persistent and severe to 
fulfill the criteria for any of the more specific 
disorders in this classification. 
Fatigue not a mandatory symptom group Fatigue /weakness is a mandatory symptom 
 
 Writing two years later, Lee again took up the issue of “cultures in psychiatric nosology” 
in a lengthy review and comparison of all the major psychiatric categories in ICD-10 and CCMD-
2-R.580  He had already demonstrated that among college students in Hong Kong, the illness 
concept of SJSR differed from the ICD formulation,581 and his earlier analyses suggested the same 
about patient experiences. When he arrived at the subject of neurasthenia in his 1996 review he 
wrote that “the ICD-10 definition of neurasthenia, which requires fatigue (or weakness) as a 
mandatory core symptom, misrepresents the illness reality of Chinese neurasthenic patients. In 
Hong Kong, insomnia and headache are usually the ‘core’ symptoms. So, the CCMD-2-R 
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configuration of neurasthenia, in which any three out of five non-hierarchical groups of weakness, 
dysphoria, excitement, nervous pain, and sleep symptoms constitute the diagnosis, is more 
congruous with the Sinicized version of neurasthenia. It also eliminates the nosological need for 
somatoform disorders”.582  While he may be technically correct, it should be mentioned that 
CCMD-2-R seems to have attempted to follow the ICD by framing SJSR as a disorder whose 
“primary clinical picture is one of easy excitability associated with ease of mental fatigability”.583 
Furthermore, the listed criteria contain the necessary requirement that “a weakening of brain-
function constitutes the primary clinical picture”, with three out of five symptom types present.584 
While the “fatigue symptoms” (り ) need not be one of the three necessary symptom 
clusters present, the second criteria is clear regarding the requirement of brain-function weakness 
( たり ). Unfortunately, other authors make reference to Lee without 
realizing that the Chinese text very heavily leans toward mental fatigue or other cognitive 
symptoms. Writing in 1999, for example, Starcevic claims that SSJR diagnosis can be made using 
CCMD-2 “without the presence of fatigue, weakness, or exhaustion”.585  While the symptom 
cluster containing fatigue, weakness, or exhaustion need not be present in the patient experience, 
the disorder appears to be framed as one of cognitive fatigue, excitability, or decreasing mental 
performance.586 In any case, the matter is further cleared up in CCMD-3. In that edition, the first 
of five sets of symptom clusters from CCMD-2-R was moved up in the requirements of CCMD-3 
such that the “weakness symptoms” (り ) were placed in the necessary criteria section, 
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rather than being in a list of multiple, possible symptom types.587 In this manner, CCMD-3 mirrors 
ICD-10. 
 Still, it is true that CCMD-2-R basically did exclude the somatoform disorders that were 
codified in the DSM and ICD-10, a subject Lee wrote about in 1997.588 Those categories were 
later added to CCMD-3 as well, however. While his contention was that the translations of the 
categories were unidiomatic and experience-distancing, they further relied on the philosophical 
distinction between functional versus organic conceptions of disease. Additionally, it was unlikely 
that many of China’s non-urban peoples, or even many living in urban centers, would have the 
resources to meet the criteria, which required “repeated presentation of physical symptoms 
together with persistent requests for medical investigations, in spite of repeated negative findings 
and reassurances by doctors that the symptoms have no physical basis”.589 Still, one could question 
whether cases of SJSR were equivalent to the DSM cases of “undifferentiated somatoform 
disorder”. As the decade of the 1990s was drawing to a close, however, Lee could remark that 
“SJSR owns and will continue to elaborate a cultural history too rich to be ignored”.590 
 It is surprising, then, that Lee’s last major publication of the 90s was one that weighed-in 
and returned specifically to the “neurasthenia-depression controversy”, despite the unresolved 
nature of the somatoform, chronic fatigue, and ICD neurasthenia questions about cross-cultural 
equivalences. He begins with the supposition that “psychiatric disease categories are not isolable 
things-in-themselves, but products of vested interests, political strategies, and ambivalent social 
practices”.591 This social-constructionist approach to psychiatric classification allows for some 
serious questioning regarding the changes and controversies addressed both in the previous and 
current chapter. Lee takes his readers through several categories of influence that he believes have 
led academic psychiatrists in China to marginalize older views of SJSR and recast them as 
depressive disorder. He refers to “the opening of China and DSM hegemony” as a source of 
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scientism in a post-Mao, 1980s China, such that the authority and perceived superiority of Western 
psychiatry threw Chinese practice into question. With the influence of the American Psychiatric 
Association and the DSM, multinational pharmaceutical corporations made their way into the vast 
Chinese market. Lee describes how medical graduates receiving salaries several times higher than 
a practicing physician would be groomed to influence prescribing and diagnosing practices of 
Chinese physicians in the 1990s. New generation “antidepressants”, the selective serotonin re-
uptake inhibitors (SSRIs), were developed in the early 1990s. Prozac had already been approved 
by the FDA in 1987, and its use in China under the translation Baiyou-jie ( ), or “the un-
doer of a multitude of woes” could be sold for anywhere from fourteen to twenty-seven times the 
cost of the older tricyclic-antidepressants, depending on whether the drug was respectively 
imported or manufactured domestically.592 He wrote, “For better or worse . . . pharmaceutical 
companies are ahead of the CCMD schema in expanding the perceived burden and concept of 
depression”.593 If the “neurasthenia-depression controversy” was leaning more heavily in one 
direction, it was certainly not for lack of interested parties. Though it was not his intention, 
Kleinman’s initial approach to SJSR in China and the controversy that it sparked turned out to be 
very useful in marketplaces besides the marketplace of ideas. Unfortunately, Lee is not able 
explicitly to make the connection between the early efforts of the NCCP and its usefulness for 
commercial gain. 
 Tracing the various influences of pharmaceutical corporations on the shaping of psychiatric 
nosology is not my aim in this project.594 Nevertheless, such forces appear to be at work presently 
as, for example, the DSM continues to broaden its scope of who can be diagnosed with depression; 
the once horrific and rare condition of melancholia as described by Robert Burton in 1621 is not 
the depression of today. The medicalization of everyday difficulties and experiences opens up the 
possibility of exposing many more people to the commercial markets of psychiatric drugs, and 
other writers have addressed those issues elsewhere.595 Suffice it to say that the 1990s served as a 
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further period of inquiry and contestation regarding the meaning of SJSR as an illness category 
that was not immune to such market concerns. The “neurasthenia-depression controversy” was to 
continue in various forms at the turn of the millennium. 
 
5.3 SJSR at the Turn of the Millennium 
 Despite the fact that Chinese psychiatrists had made efforts at modifying their national 
classificatory system in such a way as to differentiate clearly between depression and neurasthenia, 
with the diagnosis of SJSR being excluded when there was evidence of a depressive disorder, even 
in 2001 there were Western writers who felt it necessary to review “evidence for the claim that 
lower rates of depression among Chinese reflect denial of the illness or tendency to express 
depression somatically”.596 The suspicion that “Chinese somatize” or otherwise do not experience 
“depression” as Westerners do has continued to be widely held, and it was among the theoretical 
explanations for the lower prevalence of depression in large epidemiological efforts in China. At 
the turn of the millennium, some of the same writers continued to lend support to such ideas. 
 Kleinman continued occasionally to make some of the same types of claims that he had 
made nearly twenty-five years prior. For instance, in 2004, he offered a perspective piece in The 
New England Journal of Medicine with the exotic-appearing Chinese characters for “depression” 
prominently enlarged in the middle of the page, as can be seen in Figure 19. The caption beneath 
the characters informs readers that “the Chinese characters for ‘depression’ are employed in 
medical settings but are not in popular usage”.597 Being a “perspective” piece, such claims can go 
without citing any evidence, and one is reminded of similar claims in the 1980s regarding Chinese 
speakers’ lack of terminology for depressive emotional states.598  
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Figure 19: NEJM perspective article on culture and depression (2004) 
 
What does he mean by the claim “not in popular usage”? For the sake of argument, let us assume 
that he no longer means that the Chinese language is “relatively impoverished in psychological 
terminology”. 599 Does he then mean that it is not popularly understood what these characters mean? 
Does he mean that Chinese people with various types of emotional distress simply will not refer 
to these Chinese terms, and they are therefore not popular in usage? I find both of these ideas to 
                                                             




be completely unfounded. In 1980 he made reference to the term | (men) as an undifferentiated 
term, presumably without awareness that the term had been used variously to describe emotional 
grief or sorrowfulness since the time of the Daodejing. When combined with ę (yu) , ę| (yumen) 
can be found describing sorrow and depression as early as the Romance of the Three Kingdoms 
sometime around the fourteenth century, and the term also appears in the Record of the Three 
Kingdoms substantially earlier. 600  It is not surprising, then, that the most famous cultural 
production among literate Chinese for centuries also includes language very similar to the classical 
texts mentioned here. In Dream of the Red Chamber, we read of spats between Baoyu and his 
granny’s servant in Chapter 3.601 When he ignores her she feels melancholy ( ). Later 
in Chapter 64, we learn of Baoyu’s concern about Lin Daiyu growing dangerously sorrowful. 
Baoyu uses the term ę (yu) when he refers to his competing concerns that his visit may either 
“vex her to the point of holding in all her emotions ( ), or help her give expression 
to her grief so that her “sorrow doesn’t lead to illness” ( ęâ¿).602 Suffice it to say, variants 
(ę/ , /ę) have been in use among literate Chinese for centuries, which is precisely 
how contemporary clinical terms come to palatable translations. The translation for “depression” 
as a diagnostic category is not made up out of thin air. As is clear even from this concise discussion 
here, the terms have been around to describe depressive-like symptoms for a long time.603  
One might then wonder whether the term  appears in popular media in China, given 
that it is claimed not to be in popular usage. A cursory look at print news databases from the year 
before Kleinman’s perspective piece (2003) reveals that “ ” appeared as a subject of articles 
in 13 issues of the People’s Daily ( ), 12 issues of Beijing Daily ( ), 12 issues of 
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の ラ 「 て ”.  
603 Contrast this with “undifferentiated somatoform disorder”, which is made-up out of thin air and truly is “not in 




Liberation Daily ( ), 12 issues of Southern Daily ( ), and 11 issues of Workers 
Daily ( ), and many other such daily newspapers and periodicals.604 This amounts to more 
than one article per month across many different publications. The idea that the Chinese term for 
depression is not in popular usage is rightly labeled a matter of perspective. It is an opinion that 
appears ill informed. To press the issue further still, an examination of print databases from years 
approaching the establishment of the People’s Republic is also telling. The term appears in 
over 190 non-medical publications from 1940 to 1949.605 The idea that the term is not present in 
the popular lexicon in 2004 is very dubious indeed. 
Returning to the perspective piece, we find that the article opens with the following claim: 
“In many parts of Chinese society, the experience of depression is physical rather than 
psychological. Many depressed Chinese people do not report feeling sad, but rather express 
boredom, discomfort, feelings of inner pressure, and symptoms of pain, dizziness, and fatigue”.606 
Such commentary not only helps perpetuate stereotypes in the literature by implying that many 
Chinese people are unique in this matter, but it also fails to inform the reader that many (perhaps 
most) people of all types who are labeled with depression do not report feeling sad, but express 
boredom, discomfort, feelings of pain, dizziness, and fatigue. At the time ofthe above mentioned 
publication in 2004, the DSM was in its fourth edition (DSM-IV-TR); its criteria for major 
depressive episode are listed in Figure 20 for convenience. The reader will notice that “depressed 
mood” is not a necessary requirement, and most symptoms are physical in nature, forcing the 
question as to why Kleinman feels it necessary to make such claims about Chinese people. It 
appears that, even in 2004, he continues to insist on the dichotomy between somatizing and 
psychologizing that he popularized decades before when he initially claimed that Westerners 
psychologize and Chinese people lack the linguistic capacity and cultural normativity to 
psychologize and therefore somatize as a result.  
                                                             
604 For those who wish to verify my claim here, please see the Chinese state-managed database at the following 
website: http://www.cnki.net/ A simple search there of the term “ ” will yield 117 publications from 2003, 
which is the year I refer to here. In 2004 the number of publications was 105. Of course, the academic literature is 
much more prolific, but this is popular usage as can be found in newspapers. It does not even begin to address the 
numbers of such reference on television, on the internet, in fiction, or in other such realms of “popular usage”.  
605 For those interested in old newspapers and gazetteers from 1900–1949, see http://www.cnbksy.cn/ 





 Figure 20: DSM-IV criteria for depression607 
 
The conceptual dichotomy between somatization and psychologization received ever more 
rigorous investigation in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and it looks doubtful that 
earlier claims about a uniqueness of Asian somatizing held much merit. Not only has the concept 
of somatization since been addressed in a much more careful manner, as discussed in section two 
above, some research made clear that comparison of depression/neurasthenia symptom 
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presentations in Chinese and North American patients is rather complicated and nuanced.608 
Studying patients in 2002 from psychiatric clinics in Canada and at the same hospital site as 
Kleinman’s original work in China, Ryder et al. demonstrated that cultural differences in somatic 
symptoms were the greatest during structured interview with an unknown clinician, less still when 
symptoms were prompted using indirect and open questions allowing spontaneous patient 
narrative, and differences disappeared when patients respond privately to a symptom 
questionnaire. 609  What appears more accurate about the old dichotomy is that, even though 
psychological presentations are not rare in China, at least in psychiatric clinics, patients labeled as 
depressed from North American seem to describe a psychological component of their experience 
more often, regardless of which of the those three assessment methods are used.  
Using the same sample data from 2002, Dere et al. were later able to argue that we move 
“[b]eyond ‘somatization’ and ‘psychologization’” due to some interesting findings from more 
sophisticated analysis of symptom reporting.610 When “somatic” symptoms and “psychological” 
symptoms are examined on the basis of individual symptoms themselves, rather than as respective 
sets of symptom types, there may very well be “forms of somatization that are more common in 
‘Western’ contexts”.611 Furthermore, with respect to psychologization, it appears that cultural 
scripts regarding concepts like “hopelessness” may play a large part in Western cognizing about 
the depression experience. The researchers suspect that cultural scripts in China also changed 
immensely since the days of Kleinman’s early work there, but unfortunately, we are limited in our 
manner of studying such change as we do not have access to any (1980s) reliable, quantitative data 
of the type used to challenge the somatic/psychological dichotomy in 2002. For that reason, those 
                                                             
608 One difficulty of studies like the one mentioned here is that researchers are forced to include symptom criteria 
from both DSM depression and CCMD neurasthenia in order to capture all the people and phenomena they hope 
to study. By calling it depression/neurasthenia, I am not accepting equivalence, as I am sure the reader is aware. In 
fact, I think this difficulty is the major weakness of such studies, as it forces the logical fallacy of “begging the 
question”,  petitio principii, when it comes to the existence of depression, neurasthenia, or any other clinically 
labeled phenomena. That is to say, it begs the question regarding the somatization of the psychologization of 
what? 
609 Andrew G. Ryder et al., “The Cultural Shaping of Depression: Somatic Symptoms in China, Psychological 
Symptoms in North America?,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 117, no. 2 (2008): 300–313, 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.117.2.300. 
610 Jessica Dere et al., “Beyond ‘Somatization’ and ‘Psychologization’: Symptom-Level Variation in Depressed Han 
Chinese and Euro-Canadian Outpatients,” Frontiers in Psychology 4 (June 27, 2013): 377, 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00377. This study was performed in 2002, but the paper was published in 
2008. 




clinging to the old claims regarding the dichotomy can simply claim that Chinese used to somatize 
more. Expectedly, just such claims were explicitly made in 2017, and they unsurprisingly relied 
on Kleinman’s past work, as will be seen in the first section of the concluding chapter below. 
Nevertheless, decades of repeating the same claims about Chinese somatization/deficient 
psychologization appear to have made it easy for an experienced professor of anthropology, Jie 
Yang, to make outrageous statements like the claim that Chinese used “exclusively” to present 
mental distress with somatic complaints.612 This once again raises the topic of changing cultural 
scripts. Should we believe that cultural scripts in China have changed such that Chinese people are 
now psychologizing more? That is a fundamental question underlying Kleinman’s perspective 
piece and Jie Yang’s comment above. Should one be surprised if, after Kleinman’s many 
publications, pharmaceutical marketing efforts, and over two decades of Western psychiatric 
influence of professional bodies like the American Psychiatric Association, Chinese people have 
new and altered ideas about “mental disorders” and how they should think and talk about life 
difficulties? Cultural, economic, and political influence is very much capable of introducing new 
ideas and facilitating their adoption. We must be cautious regarding what we claim such changes 
to evince.613  
 Such theoretical claims aside, the first decade of the twenty-first century also had its own 
fair share of research literature investigating equivalencies between SJSR and other diagnostic 
categories, as was seen throughout the 1990s. Once again, SJSR patients at the site of Kleinman’s 
original study in Hunan were assessed and re-diagnosed using the DSM and the ICD.614 Chang et 
al. found that SJSR correlated best with an ICD diagnosis of neurasthenia, with the ICD “being 
more specific to subjects with prominent and persistent symptoms of fatigue”, while the closest 
DSM counterpart was undifferentiated somatoform disorder. 615 Researchers concluded that there 
is “continued phenomenological and clinical significance of shenjing shuairuo among rural 
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613 “Depression”, as it is defined today, is almost embarrassingly broad in its scope. Furthermore, I am not sure that 
Chinese adoption of American-styled, self-absorbed psychologization is something to laud as a great societal 
achievement. Still, the real issue is how the rise in incidence and prevalence of “mental disorders” should make us 
question whether or not the change in statistics is caused by creation of phenomena that were not there before.  
614 Doris F. Chang et al., “Shenjing Shuairuo and the DSM-IV: Diagnosis, Distress, and Disability in a Chinese Primary 
Care Setting,” Transcultural Psychiatry 42, no. 2 (June 2005): 204–18, https://doi.org/10.1177/1363461505052660. 
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Chinese patients despite its increasing marginalization in professional psychiatric discourse” and 
“that there may be therapeutic benefits to retaining [SJSR] at least in the immediate future”.616  
 In the midst of these types of efforts to determine equivalencies, researchers again looked 
toward a possible relationship between American definitions of CFS and Chinese experiences with 
SJSR. Writing in 2001, Lin et al. reported findings from a multi-site study undertaken in Los 
Angeles, Hong Kong, and Changsa, China.617 They found that overlap with ICD neurasthenia and 
DSM categories (other than somatoform disorders) was limited, with 78 percent of neurasthenia 
patients not meeting criteria for depression, anxiety, or other DSM diagnosis. A parallel study 
including Caucasians from LA also found that more Caucasians with primary complaints of 
chronic fatigue met criteria for ICD neurasthenia than they did for CDC-CFS. The researchers 
concluded: 
Symptom profiles of neurasthenia are strikingly similar among patients studied at divergent 
sites, even between the Chinese neurasthenics and the non-Chinese patients who fulfill 
criteria for CFS, suggesting the consistency and coherence of a discrete psychiatric 
condition. For the Chinese-Americans in the Greater Los Angeles metropolitan area, the 
prevalence of the syndrome exceeds all other psychiatric conditions. For the Los Angeles 
Caucasians, chronically fatigued patients had symptoms which fulfilled the criteria for 
neurasthenia better than criteria for CFS. At variance with the prevailing ideas of many 
clinicians and researchers that neurasthenia and CFS represent a form of depression or 
anxiety disorders, masked with somatic presentations, our data indicate that neurasthenia 
and CFS are essentially distinct from depression and other psychiatric diagnoses defined 
by the DSM system.618 
While the SJSR/CFS inquiry continued, some researchers turned to examinations of 
neurasthenia from the perspective of infectious disease. In addition to listing fatigue syndrome 
under the rubric of neurasthenia, ICD-10 also allowed for the diagnosis of a postviral fatigue 
syndrome, which it also calls benign myalgic encephalomyelitis (code G93.3). Recall that one of 
the etiological considerations for what was causing these fatigue syndromes even before the CDC 
published its definition in 1988 was Epstein-Barr virus (EBV). First identified in 1964, EBV is a 
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ubiquitous virus most readily known for its causal role in mononucleosis, and it was first isolated 
from Burkitt lymphoma cells.619 It is now known to infect nearly ninety percent of the world’s 
population and to be involved in many diseases.620 Although researchers in the West never really 
fell upon many convincing results, there had been some effort in the 1990s to implicate EBV as a 
causal factor for chronic fatigue.621 Similarly, some Chinese researchers also wondered if EBV 
could be implicated in SJSR cases. 
From May to October of 2000, Cao et al. studied thirty-four SJSR patients who were paired 
with thirty-three controls matched for age, gender, and educational levels at the Hunan, Xianya 
Hospital were Kleinman’s original study occurred decades earlier. 622  Serum gamma G 
immunoglobulin (IgG) and gamma M immunoglobulin (IgM) for Epstein-Barr virus were 
compared between groups as was serum presence of the viral DNA. While the positive percentage 
of EBV IgG was significantly higher in SJSR patients (76% vs. 52%, p=0.033), the geometric 
mean titers were not. IgM was positive in eight cases (indicating recent infection), and none were 
positive in controls. Unsurprisingly, there were no other significant findings. Still, researchers 
concluded that neurasthenia may be related to EBV infection.623 
At the end of the decade, Cao et al. published again on the subject in a paper titled 
“Psychosocial and Immunological Factors in Neurasthenia”. 624  This time they studied thirty 
patients meeting criteria for ICD neurasthenia and matched them with thirty controls. In addition 
to serum IgG and IgM, all participants were also measured using the SL-90 symptom checklist, 
Eysenck personality questionnaire (EPQ), and a life event scale.625 They found that neurasthenia 
patients had higher EPQ scores for neuroticism and introversion and a higher number of stressful 
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621 D.M. Glover, “Chronic Fatigue Syndrome,” Adolescent Medicine (Philadelphia, Pa.) 6, no. 1 (February 1995): 
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life events. Neurasthenia patients also had higher serum IgG (23 patients positive vs. 15 controls, 
p<0.01) and IgM (8 patients vs. 0 controls). With comparable immunoglobulin findings to their 
early study, the researchers concluded that the personality and stress scores may indicate a possible 
mechanism whereby EBV is more easily activated under stress conditions, leading to symptom 
manifestation. While the study is interesting, it is hardly convincing evidence that SJSR is related 
to viral infection, and with no meaningful findings relating to EBV or chronic fatigue syndrome, 
the decade did not really bring anything approximating closure to the tension between Western 
psychiatry’s dismissal of SJSR as a category and Chinese continued recognition of its usefulness.  
Writing in 2007, Lee and Kleinman coauthored a paper titled “Are Somatoform Disorders 
Changing with Time? The Case of Neurasthenia in China”.626 Readers of that article should be 
struck immediately with the conceptual difficulty that continues to linger over attempts to fit SJSR 
into DSM categories, insofar as it is not clear whether the title aims to position SJSR as a 
somatoform disorder, depression, or a somatoform depression. In any event, the authors suggest 
that the “changing with time” can be seen across three distinct periods. First, they suggest that the 
“prereform period” before 1980 was one where SJSR was a generic neurotic category that included 
depressive and anxiety disorders. Second, the “reform period” from the 1980s to 1995 saw the 
“impact of DSM-III and Kleinman’s study”.627 Finally, the “postreform period” after 1995 is called 
the “burial of neurasthenia”, which is framed as a new period where “those who do diagnose 
neurasthenia may be considered outdated if not deficient in clinical skills”. 628 Despite these claims, 
researchers have still made efforts to study SJSR/neurasthenia as conceptual categories that 
continue to capture the experience of countless people. In addition to the research cited in this 
chapter, young clinical researchers also made it the subject of numerous Master and Doctoral level 
theses.629 
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629 Doris Fu-Ping Chang, “The Cultural Validity of Neurasthenia:  Psychiatric Diagnosis and Illness Beliefs in a 
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In the same year that Lee and Kleinman were describing the three eras of neurasthenia’s 
transformation, Kleinman was preparing a preface to the text that was claimed to have initiated the 
“reform era”. Social Origins was going to be published in Chinese for the first time in 2008, and 
there needed to be a new, Chinese preface written for the occasion.630 As a conclusion to this 
chapter it is worthwhile looking at and citing at length that preface intended for the Chinese reader, 
as it brings into focus some of the overall contentions of this project. 
After some preliminary remarks about his choice of title and avoidance of the formal 
category of posttraumatic stress disorder when describing the trauma of SJSR patients who lived 
through the Cultural Revolution, Kleinman turns to the controversy that his book instigated. The 
problem, he suggests, is that some psychiatrists in China misunderstood his intention when they 
felt that he was criticizing them for uncritically lumping a variety of psychiatric patients under the 
label SJSR and failing properly to recognize and diagnose depression and anxiety disorders. 
Regarding this, he states that such was never the point of view that he wanted to express. Rather,  
regardless of whether it was SJSR, depressive disorder or anxiety disorder, all should be 
recognized as cultural concepts, and cultural concepts shape the actual physiological 
experiences and establish the boundary separating normal and pathological states. The 
cultural concepts influence the professional diagnostic system: professional diagnostic 
systems also have historical, sociological, political science, and economic backgrounds. 
These cultural conceptions are also part of the cross-national mobility of ideas, products, 
and people. This flow did not have a clear name to describe it in the 1980s, but now we all 
refer to it as ‘globalization’. Finally, I want to say that these rooted concepts exist in the 
network of personal and collective meanings. These kinds of meaning networks link 
together people, institutions, social events, and stressors of life. I refer to this type of 
linkage as ‘sociosomatic relationships’.631 
After such a conciliatory explanation of his work suggesting that he had not taken a stance 
regarding the validity and accuracy of Chinese diagnosing practices, he continues with a paragraph 
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that seems very much to affirm the concerns of his interlocutors in the neurasthenia/depression 
controversy. He writes,  
There is a theory regarding the relationship between authors and readers that maintains that 
when a work is published, regardless of the original intention of the author, the reader will 
understand it as he wishes. Because of this, the book has attracted the attention and 
discussion of the Chinese medical community. Discussion has primarily involved the 
debate as to whether SJSR is a kind of authentic or true disease, and whether a patient with 
SJSR is really trapped in depression. Ten years after this book was published, these 
discussions finally have a conclusion. The young generation of researchers believe that if 
the latest professional standards and facilities are used, patients with SJSR in China can be 
diagnosed with depression. Some pharmaceutical companies have also quoted my research 
findings to assert this view, and to confirm that patients with depression had not received 
the proper diagnosis and treatment.632 
It seems a very dubious practice to suggest that one’s position in a debate is validated by 
the fact that pharmaceutical companies have found your position to be economically favorable. 
Instead, it seems more reasonably to be a matter that ought to make those involved in the debate 
wonder if some of the interested parties would benefit by the “burial of neurasthenia” and by the 
convergence of how mental health concepts and psychiatric symptoms are experienced, viewed, 
and address worldwide. Whether or not we will eventually see the globalization of the American 
psyche, with the concomitant homogenization of illness manifestation and experience, is a 
question that only time will tell; there has been no shortage of efforts at bringing about such a 
change.633 However, if neurasthenia had been buried since 1995, it was to be resurrected in the 
following decades. In the next chapter, I will briefly address some continuing inquiries regarding 
SJSR, and will summarize and conclude this project.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Over the past five chapters, I have attempted to demonstrate that it is inappropriate to 
conceptualize SJSR phenomenologically, and nosologically, by framing it as a somaticized form 
of some other known entity. Any understanding of the SJSR experience must take into account 
that the worldwide population of Chinese speakers went from a state of having no such category 
to one in which a category appeared that clearly delineated a form of experience with which they 
could identify and for which they could seek help. What’s more, the transition from one state of 
affairs to the other took place over a rather short interval of time, approximately two decades 
(1900–1920). Chapter 3 recounted part of the process of SJSR’s entrenchment into the Chinese 
lexicon and the growing awareness of its phenomenology among the Chinese people. Such a 
background is a necessary starting point for understanding how people came to know about, 
conceptualize, and believe in the reality of SJSR as illness. The initial interpretation of their 
experience, which later morphed into the NCCP, was discussed in Chapter 4, with all the original 
papers and arguments that constituted the Western view of SJSR at that time. In its original form, 
the idea that Chinese speakers suffered from a poverty of language, which constrained their ability 
to describe emotional experience, has long since been condemned to the dustbin of intellectual 
history. Such explanations are now recognized as evincing a deep ignorance of the profound, 
emotionally descriptive complexity of the Chinese language and its family members, like Hokkien. 
Alternatively, such explicit claims as were made in the 1980s might instead be seen as evidence 
of overly hasty attempts at explanation. Either way, it is unfortunate to see that the poverty of 
language argument has resurfaced in new garb in recent years, which I will consider shortly. 
 In the decades after 1980, disagreeing parties continued to grapple with the idea that 
Chinese people “somatize” their emotional distress, and SJSR was the subject of a great deal of 
research and debate, as I have attempted to demonstrate. The previous chapter recounted the 
“neurasthenia-depression controversy” through the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
Although some parties have claimed victory in that debate, the changes that continue to occur in 
China and the research that continues to be undertaken worldwide will only very slowly 
demonstrate that the controversy was itself a false dichotomy. The rise of depression in China is 
precisely analogous to the rise of SJSR many decades earlier. That is to say, depression is now 




unconsciously conform. The irony is that those who claim victory in that earlier debate are 
seemingly unaware of their own role in shifting emphasis from one form of experience to another 
via, at the very least, their influence on psychiatric practice. 
 In an effort to bring this project to conclusion, I hope to accomplish five tasks in this final 
chapter. Briefly, I will (1) show some examples of the refurbished “poverty of language” argument, 
which is being used to interpret the changing incidence of “depression” in China; (2) point out an 
ongoing line of inquiry into the subject of “somatization” among Asian peoples; and (3) introduce 
the reader to a diagnostic issue in Japanese psychiatry, which very much appears to be the retention 
of a conceptual category accounting for clinical phenomena that lie within a realm of experience 
where the “neurasthenia-depression controversy” can persist. With these issues in mind, I also aim 
to (4) draw on some fascinating research from cultural neuroscience in order to offer a cursory 
explanation for how people can draw from available conceptual categories in ways that transform 
into embodied experience. Last, (5) I will offer some final thoughts in light of everything presented 
throughout the course of this project. 
 
6.1 Poverty of Language Revised  
In 2011 the book Deep China: The Moral Life of the Person, What Anthropology and Psychiatry 
Tell Us about China Today was published. The fifth chapter of that text was authored by Sing Lee, 
whom we have encountered numerous times above. He aimed in the chapter to discuss “how 
emotional expression, mental disorder, and sociopolitical context interrelate in Maoist and post-
collective China”.634 Specifically, his claim is that “repression of emotions during the Maoist 
period promoted neurasthenia as a popular physical idiom of distress and a ubiquitous medical 
diagnosis”.635 For several pages immediately following this claim, Lee describes to his readers that, 
as an aspect of Chinese culture, “inner feelings and their outward expressions can be cautiously 
controlled and distinct in Chinese people . . . by holding their feelings back, Chinese people may 
even appear to deny their emotions”.636 This chapter leaves one with the glaring question as to 
whether Lee wants to attribute the repression of emotional expression to Maoism, to Chinese 
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culture itself, or a combination of both. In any case, with respect to SJSR, the informed reader will 
recognize that Lee is presenting a reformulation of Kleinman’s (and by extension Leff’s) 
foundational claim regarding the nature of Chinese language and emotional expression. Of course, 
authors have reasonably moved away from the idea that the Chinese language is “relatively 
impoverished in psychological terminology”.637 Instead of attributing the symptomatology to 
linguistic constraints and lack of vocabulary, cultural psychiatrists began claiming that culture 
itself shaped, regulated, and constrained affect, which is obviously true to some extent. The claim 
that Chinese somatize because that is just what they do, however, does not leave much room for 
further discussion. Ultimately, Lee’s claim, drawing on Kleinman’s ethnographic work with 
people who survived the Cultural Revolution, ends up being a refurbished form of the original 
argument. In other words, Chinese somatize not because their language is deficient and they do 
not know how to psychologize; they somatize because they were not allowed to psychologize. 
Emotional repression under a political regime led to a poverty of expression.  
To remove any doubt that this is the claim, the reader can see from the conclusion of that 
chapter how the position is restated. He writes: “Although the Chinese Communist regime remains 
a dictatorship, it has expanded individual liberty in multiple recognizable ways . . . For one thing, 
interpersonal communication can be expected to become increasingly expressive of feelings. 
These feelings will become ever more discriminating, especially among younger and middle-class 
individuals”.638 One of the implications of this change, he claims on the next page, is the “finding 
of rapidly increasing rates of depression in community epidemiological surveys”.639 We may be 
willing to grant that increased psychologizing in the context of a multiplicity of influences from 
Big Pharma, Western psychiatry, international digital media, and others can facilitate changes such 
that rates of depression on epidemiological surveys increase. It does not follow from this, however, 
that among Chinese people, the long history and resonance of SJSR specifically, and somatic 
presentations generally, resulted from repression of emotions during the Maoist period. This type 
of sociological deus ex machina has appeared before in the writings of the NCCP, with references 
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to the influences of Soviet Psychiatry, Pavlov, and the trauma of the Cultural Revolution as 
putative explanations for why neurasthenia became entrenched in China.640  
The obvious problem with all such just-so explanations offered for neurasthenia’s 
resonance with the Chinese people is that they fail to address the fact that the phenomenon took 
hold not only in Mainland China but in a host of other places. Neither Soviet psychiatry, Mao, 
Pavlov, the initial “poverty of language” argument nor the repression of emotion during the 
Cultural Revolution offer any explanation of the domestication of neurasthenia in Japanese society 
for over half a century. Even though Kleinman began his career claiming that neurasthenia in 
Taiwan could be accounted for by the poverty of the Chinese language, it is still the case that Mao, 
the trauma of the Cultural Revolution, et cetera offer no explanatory value in the case of Taiwan. 
Such is also clearly true if we consider Hong Kong or generations of Chinese living overseas in 
places like Vietnam, Singapore, or anywhere else in the world. In short, the idea that Maoist 
repression or social trauma from the Cultural Revolution offers explanatory power for why 
neurasthenia took hold, resonated, became entrenched, was accepted, or was popularly used as a 
conceptual category in China is simply untenable. After all, Lee begins his chapter with a citation 
stating that Mao himself suffered from SJSR. Mao certainly did not develop SJSR as a consequence 
of the repression of emotion during the Maoist period, nor did “repression of emotions during the 
Maoist period promote neurasthenia as a popular physical idiom of distress and a ubiquitous 
medical diagnosis” for Mao Zedong himself.  Such a claim, when made explicit, appears very 
much nonsensical. My contention here in no way dismisses the role of political institutions in 
shaping and regulating the emotional lives of citizens.  In this instance, however, the principle of 
parsimony ought to lead us very seriously to suspect any explanation offered for one locale that 
does not apply to another, especially within the Chinese-speaking world. Furthermore, rather than 
viewing Maoist repression of emotion and cultural trauma as causal forces facilitating somatization 
at the expense of psychological expressivity, parsimony ought to suggest to us that such historico-
cultural events served as sources for deep impairment that could then manifest in a manner 
consonant with both human biology and the beliefs of a population for whom a salient category 
was available. Maoist repression did not promote neurasthenia for Mao or for Lu Xun, and insofar 
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as it did promote SJSR for others, such was the case only as a consequence of the antecedent 
cultural and historical factors that made SJSR a possibility of human experience in the first place.  
In like manner, recent increases in epidemiologic rates of “depression” in Chinese society 
can similarly be explained by the shifting modes of experience that have become viable for Chinese 
citizens. In other words, depression is an experiential category that has been introduced and 
marketed to the Chinese people in recent decades, and as long as Chinese people continue to 
conceptualize their “problems of living” within the available discourses of depression, it should 
not be surprising to see rates of depression increase.641 This in no way implies that suppressed or 
repressed emotional content constituting a previously somatized “depression” is now being given 
a voice. Instead, we might better conceive of the recent situation as a repetition of the past; that is 
to say, once again, an imported category is being deeply internalized and is giving shape to those 
most challenging of human experiences.  
Recent efforts at understanding the Mainland Chinese experience of “mental health” have 
borrowed from the same idea that China has gone “[f]rom somatization to the emphasis on 
psychological and emotional health”. 642  Anthropologist, Jie Yang, points out that “Arthur 
Kleinman examines the prevailing neurasthenia in China as a possible ‘somatization’ of depression 
in the aftermath of that tumultuous period”.643 Today, she claims, “people express mental health 
concerns both somatically and psychologically, rather than exclusively somatically, as often was 
the case prior to, during, and after the Cultural Revolution”.644 While it is not at all clear that 
Chinese people ever “exclusively” expressed their concerns somatically, it is encouraging to see 
that Yang recognizes the presumed dualism of such concerns. She further points out that the idea 
of somatization exists within a dichotomous relationship that in some ways may be imposed on 
Chinese people by researchers who overlook the psychosomatic unity of experience. Kleinman’s 
emphasis, she reminds us, was an attempt to explore “the social conditions that encouraged the 
somatic articulation of distresses”, but “[o]ther lines of inquiry about somatic complaints deriving 
from possible psychological or psychiatric disorders address the cultural habitus of 
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undifferentiating body from mind in Chinese medical contexts”.645 She does not find it necessary 
to make clear or criticize the fact that Kleinman’s exploration has resulted in and concluded with 
claims about the unavailability of psychological articulations. His attributions, discussed in the 
preceding paragraphs and chapters, do not really give an account for the traction neurasthenia has 
had in Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, overseas Chinese communities, Europe, India, 
and the USA.646 She also does not address the fact that “depression”, the clinical and conceptual 
category as it is currently being conceived, is an importation that is being domesticated in a way 
not altogether unlike the domestication of SJSR one hundred years ago.  
 
6.2 Ongoing Somatization Research 
In this section, I do not intend exhaustively to review the recent, ongoing research regarding 
somatization that has continued into the second decade of the twenty-first century. Instead, my aim 
is simply to make clear to the reader that such efforts are continuing, sometimes repeating various 
approaches, such as considering the pragmatics of the sick role, externally oriented thinking and 
alexithymia, the role of stigma, and similar paradigms that have already appeared above. Other 
researchers have attempted to transcend the limitations of these explanations for somatic symptom 
presentation by generating new models of cultural psychology.  
 From a checklist-psychiatry perspective, some clinicians find somatization to be an 
interesting topic of inquiry with implications for recent changes to DSM-5 “Somatic symptom and 
related disorders”. Representatives of this type of writing continue to rely on prior explanations 
for the findings that “somatic manifestation is common in the Asian population”, explaining the 
phenomenon by suggesting that “cultural factors” restrict discussion of psychological issues, the 
high “level of stigma associated with mental disorders in Asian countries”, and the “role of somatic 
symptoms as an idiom for help-seeking”.647 
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 An interesting and unique means of approaching somatization can be found in efforts at 
parsing the difference between somatic awareness and interoceptive accuracy. A brief survey of 
some of this work can be found in review by Ma-Kellams (2014); the main idea is that somatic 
awareness and interoceptive accuracy are distinct, the former being driven by cultural schemas 
while the later is constituted by bodily cues.648 The increasing complexity of research in this area 
takes very seriously the historic claim that disparate cultural groups experience bodily sensations 
and emotions differently, and there is a growing awareness in the neurosciences that interoceptive 
mechanisms make subtle contributions to the experience of emotion.649  
Among the more interesting approaches in the ongoing research into somatization are those 
found in the writings of Ryder, Chentsova-Dutton, Dere, and their collaborators, which were 
introduced in the previous chapter. I raise them again here to point out some of the advances in 
thinking about somatization that they achieved after 2010. First, they seem to have been able to 
put to rest most concerns about the utility of alexithymia in regard to Chinese patients’ tendency 
to describe physical symptoms as chief complaints. Specifically, Dere et al. considered alexithymia 
by looking at the discrete constitutive constructs of “externally oriented thinking” (EOT), 
“difficulty in identifying feelings” (DIF), and “difficulty in describing feelings” (DDF). They 
found that in outpatient samples in China, EOT was negatively predicted by scores on self-report 
scales for modern and Euro-American values, using scales designed to weigh self-identification 
with various clusters of traditional versus modern and Euro-American versus Asian values. DIF 
and DDF were not predicted by such scales.650 The implication was that the higher the levels of 
identification with modern and Euro-American values, the less likely one is to engage in externally 
oriented thinking.651 Second, as briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, they have helped to 
show that instead of “somatize” (as a verb or in its noun form), in the Chinese context, it is more 
useful to speak of physical or emotional descriptions of patient experience; that is, there is no need 
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to use the theory-laden term “somatization” as it implies the conversion of affect into physical 
complaint as a result of an inability or unwillingness to articulate affect in affective language.652  
Along these lines, they have argued for a culture-mind-brain model of experience that is 
always functioning in unity. “At the brain level, the body continually relays and receives signals 
to and from the brain, which monitors sensory inputs, integrates them, and maintains a dynamic 
representation of the state of the body . . . At the mind level, emergent conscious representation of 
the body integrates sensory and hedonic inputs with conceptions of normative and non-normative 
bodily responses . . . At the culture level, sufferers draw on the large but finite pool of possible 
responses to profound distress”.653 Symptoms arise out of the continual actions of these three 
aspects of the person and are regulated by the dynamic nature of remembering, responses from 
others, and input from socio-cultural norms. Unfortunately, their attempts to deepen this approach 
may be affected by their own act of referencing their model as a “propos[al] that Chinese 
somatization can be understood as a cultural script for depression”.654 Furthermore, it does not 
help their credibility on the subject when they make claims such as that SJSR was “[o]riginally 
described by Beard in the United States, [and this] diagnosis was adopted first by Pavlov and then 
introduced to China by Russian psychiatrists after the 1949 revolution”.655 
Despite attempts at sophisticated explanations for the divergences of symptom presentation 
often observed in comparisons of American and Chinese patients, in clinics or while in psychiatric 
care, it is unfortunate that these authors have themselves fallen into the larger hermeneutic frame 
that was set up by the NCCP in its earliest interpretations of these phenomena. This can be most 
clearly seen in the 2016 review paper by Sun and Ryder.656 The aim of the paper is stated to be an 
exploration of the psychological implications of sociocultural transformation in China since the 
1980s, with a specific focus on two issues: 1) social and developmental psychology research 
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demonstrating increasing adherence to individualistic values, and 2) psychiatric epidemiological 
research demonstrating increasing prevalence of depression in China. Analyzing these two 
phenomena together, the authors intend to lay out several conceptual hypotheses that can account 
for (2) in the light of (1). I list their hypotheses below so that the reader can more readily see what 
has not been considered. In their final section titled “The ‘Unleashing’ of Emotion in China”, we 
unsurprisingly find seven references to Kleinman (1981,1995), Lee (2011), and Yan (2003), all of 
whom have been mentioned above and who have suggested that there has been an “unleashing of 
emotions” in China since the open-door policy of Deng Xiaoping. With this in mind, the rising 
rates of depression in China are then attributed to the following possibilities:657 
1) Problematic aspects of a shift toward individualism.  
2) Problems arising from large amounts of internal migration and socioeconomic dislocation. 
3) Problematic nature of the rapidity of China’s change. 
4) Changes in emotion norms that have altered which experiences are more salient. 
5) Changes in societal attitudes toward mental illness and decreased stigma such that people are 
willing to express and discuss more. 
6) In the context of the “ever increasing influence of mainstream Western psychiatry”, there may 
have been changes in training of mental health professionals and alteration in diagnostic practice.  
We can see that item (1) is an example of culture itself being “pathogenic”, this 
phenomenon was briefly mentioned in Chapter 1 above. Individualism may simply lead to the 
experiences that we label depression. Items (2) and (3) are attributions external to the person 
whereby difficult social factors might facilitate experiences labeled depression. Item (4) is the 
main issue arising out of Lee’s claims (drawing on Kleinman) mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
More will be said of this momentarily. Item (5) assumes “concealment of emotion” due to stigma. 
I have argued throughout this project that concealment is an inadequate interpretation of somatic 
symptoms. Item (6) attributes depression prevalence to changes in diagnostic practice. This is 
certainly at the heart of this whole project, and we should expect this impact to grow, especially 
since DSM-5 does not even require sadness or depressed mood for the diagnosis of depression.  
                                                             




An interesting thought experiment in this regard would be to modify the timeframe and ask 
about the social change and prevalence of SJSR from 1900 to 1920. With some minimal 
modification to a few of these items, and leaving some the same (3, 5, and 6), one could come to 
the same conclusions. In fact, that appears to be pretty much how SJSR has been viewed by cultural 
psychiatry over the years. What is obviously missing is an item (7); namely, there was an 
introduction of an imported conceptual category that took on cultural salience, creating a symptom 
pool towards which people could consciously and/or unconsciously conform. Rather than reify 
depression, one might view it in the same way. I conclude this section with a quote from Sun and 
Ryder, which betrays the fact that they take depression, to some extent, as the supraordinate 
category of experience in their research. They write: 
With shifts in cultural values that reflect increasing individualism, we might expect 
changes toward a more self-focused thinking style, such as rumination, and increasing 
openness to the use of psychological language when reporting depressive symptoms. 
Moreover, increasing attention to internal psychological states might shape the very 
experience of depression, so that an increasing number of people in China suffer from 
psychological symptoms when depressed.658 
I suggest replacing the term “depression” here with some term that does not assume the 
prior ontology of the depression category. Given the influence of Western psychiatry (6), the 
influence of pharmaceutical expansion and cultural media (all impacting item 4), and the 
introduction of an imported conceptual category that took on cultural salience and creating a 
symptom pool towards which people could consciously and/or unconsciously conform (7), one 
ought not be surprised to find “an increasing number of people in China that suffer from depressive 
symptoms when distressed”.659  
 
6.3 Diagnostic Issues in Japanese Psychiatry 
While SJSR began as a Japanese neologism introduced into China through print and the 
minds of Chinese intellectuals who had studied in Japan, the Japanese story of neurasthenia took 
a different trajectory than the Chinese one. The research and debates that I addressed in Chapters 
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4 and 5 have not had analogous counterparts in Japan. Part of the reason for this difference is that 
Japan abandoned the category of neurasthenia rather early when compared to China. Japanese 
people are familiar with the term, but it does not carry anything like the cultural capital that it 
continues to in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Abandonment of the category occurred in an 
informal sense with the changes in practice that accompanied the embrace of the ICD and the DSM. 
This story is a complicated one, and I will not tell it in detail here. Instead, I want to introduce the 
idea that, although neurasthenia was in some sense abandoned by Japanese psychiatry around the 
time of DSM-III’s introduction to Japan, almost immediately alternative categories were available 
to take over the cultural work for which neurasthenia had previously done.  
Some scholars have written: “In the 1960s, neither the ICD nor the DSM was used in 
psychiatric diagnosis in Japan”.660 With the publication of DSM-III in 1980, Japanese scholars 
undertook translation of the text, with a completed translation becoming available in 1982. This 
does not mean, however, that Japanese clinicians began using the American diagnostic system, 
although many academics did use it for research purposes. Still, during the 1980s there were 
numerous studies by Japanese scholars that investigated the facility of the newly translated 
diagnoses and the measurable reliability of diagnosis between different users of the manual.661 
Regardless of reliability issues, which were favorable, many Japanese psychiatrists resisted its use, 
preferring their own etiologically informed diagnostic language that drew on the German 
psychiatry that first took root in Japan. “Compared with American psychiatrists who have been 
familiar with the concepts of ‘somatization’ and ‘somatoform disorder’ since the publication of 
the DSM-III (1980), it was not until the late 1990s when Japanese psychiatrists started using these 
terms”.662 Kitanaka Junko wrote that as late as 1997 she encountered “hardly any psychiatrists . . . 
at prestigious institutions” that regularly consulted the DSM.663 However, by the year 2000, she 
reported that most “depression experts” were using the manual, and that it had “become a fact of 
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everyday clinical practice, there to stay, despite the lingering skepticism”.664  While younger 
Japanese psychiatrists are familiar with and use DSM criteria, some studies suggest that clinicians 
over age forty do not really employ the system.665 Even today, “[t]he Japanese Government uses 
classifications from the tenth revision of the ICD to categorize disorders and determine treatment 
fees”.666 All of this is to say that the waning of neurasthenia in Japan did not occur overnight as its 
formal existence did in the USA. Its disappearance from the DSM did, however, play a role in 
Japan in a manner not seen in China. Its retention in the ICD does not appear to have been a strong 
enough reason to continue widely applying the diagnosis. Perhaps the fact that it was absent in the 
DSM had something to do with this, even though the DSM was not openly embraced. If such was 
the case, it might explain why a less obviously controversial diagnosis at the time might have 
served as a proxy for the DSM-defunct category.  
Kitanaka Junko suggests that in the long evolution of psychiatry in Japan, psychosomatic 
medicine made continued use of the concept of neurosis, while those in the biomedical schools of 
psychiatry “retained the ambiguity of shinkei by using notions such as autonomic nervous system 
disorder (jiritsu shinkei shicchosho) that simultaneously denotes both biological and psychosocial 
implications”.667 Her view on this matter appears to be consonant with the findings of other 
scholars. Writing about her fieldwork on women and menopause in Tokyo from 1980 to 1983, 
Nancy Rosenberger has described how jiritsu shinkei shicchosho (JRSK) was ubiquitously 
employed as one way of classifying various menopausal symptoms.668 Although describing the 
negotiations between patients and physicians in the context of the very specific types of symptoms 
that accompany menopause, Rosenberger highlights the manner in which, for a number of reasons, 
the concept of JRSK is resonant with Japanese. She believes that the vagueness of the concept, 
while grounded in the physiology of the peripheral nervous system, “reverberates with other voices 
in their folk-experience ideas about health, sickness and maturity stemming from Japanized 
versions of East Asian Medicine”, as well as late nineteenth century ideas pertaining to the 
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“nervous type” (shinkeishitsu).669 Physicians writing in popular media could readily shift between 
usages of JRSK that implied both the deeply physiologic aspects of the person as well as the 
personality and psycho-social aspects. In all four study cases of her interaction with physicians, 
JRSK was acknowledged to carry the implication of mental disorder. All of the patient perspectives 
likewise viewed JRSK as being embodiments of some underlying psychosocial perturbation in the 
lives of the patient. Fundamentally, the category served to eliminate a strict mind-body dichotomy. 
The availability of the category bridged layers of explanation for both physicians and patients alike. 
The use of JRSK as described above has not proven to be uncontroversial, however. 
Writing in 1994, Okada and Minoshita submitted a letter to the editor of Clinical Autonomic 
Research titled, “Functional dysautonomia: a valid clinical entity or pseudo-science?”670 In their 
letter, the authors bemoan the fact that “[p]hysicians in almost all areas of medicine in Japan 
diagnose patients with a malady . . . [that] has been thought to be based on difficulties of regulation 
throughout the autonomic nervous system stemming from instability in the system, or resulting 
nervous lability”. 671 They argue that in all the sixty years of combined practice, they have never 
seen a case of someone diagnosed with JRSK that could not be rediagnosed with another category 
of disease, including organic illness, psychological illness, or a combination of the two. 
Reminiscent of the claims in Chapter 4, they go on to state that JRSK “seems to be a convenient, 
‘catch-all’ diagnosis”.672 They conclude: “We feel that the terms ‘jiritsushkinkei-shicchosho’, 
‘functional dysautonomia’ and ‘autonomic nerve dysregulation syndrome’ should be dropped 
entirely. This flood of what will almost certainly turn out to be pseudo-scientific diagnoses is one 
of the mysteries of Japanese clinical medicine”.673 Using just a few representative papers in the 
controversy, I will point out that there has existed in the Japanese literature a “JRSK-depression 
controversy” that is somewhat analogous to the SJSR-depression controversy, only the Japanese 
version has been less controversial. 
Just a few years after Minoshita and Okada’s critique, one could find other Japanese 
clinicians who shared similar opinions. In 1998 Muramatsu Kumiko concluded that general 
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practitioners in Japan pragmatically use JRSK as a temporary category for those twenty percent of 
patients with functional symptoms whose complaints are psychiatric in origin but present to a 
general clinic and require a diagnosis on the basis of a preliminary clinical picture (
 ). 674 However, on the question of whether JRSK should be taken as an individual 
disease entity, she suggests that doing so will result in the failure to provide both appropriate 
diagnosis and treatment in regard specifically to the combined bodily and psychic complaints of 
the patient.675  
 Writing in a special collection of Stress and Clinical Medicine in 1999, Itoh Katsuhito 
argues that JRSK is a category that is so conveniently employed in clinical practice that it is easily 
open to the charge of overuse. More specifically, he claims that mild depression (  ) is 
easily mislabeled as JRSK, leading to missed opportunities for early treatment and the potential 
for rather tragic endings ( ).676 He concludes that the ease of over-applying the 
diagnosis of JRSK can confound the true nature of a patient’s illness; “the existence of depression 
wearing the mask of JRSK is one such example”.677 It is worth noting that the idea of depression 
wearing a mask, in both English and Japanese, is merely a reference to the concept of “masked 
depression”, which is termed kamen utsubyou ( ) in the Japanese literature. The reader 
may recall from Chapter 4, that Kleinman’s first major work on SJSR in Taiwan attributed patient 
symptoms to “somatically masked depressions”.678 In the case of Itoh, his criticism does not 
explicitly advocate for the total elimination of JRSK as a diagnostic category, but such opinions 
can easily be found.679 However, Itoh does appear desirous to re-diagnose cases of JRSK as 
depression. 
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On the other hand, there are those who advocate for the meaningfulness of JRSK as well. 
In fact, writing in the same special collection as Itoh, titled “General malaise—Life stress of 
modern people” (1999), Murakami Masato suggests that JRSK is a perfectly acceptable conceptual 
category as long as clinicians understand what it is intended to reference.680 He begins by pointing 
out that in daily clinical practice in Japanese society, JRSK is not used to refer to those “organic 
forms of autonomic nervous system failure such as Shy Drager syndrome, but as a general term 
for those functional abnormalities of the autonomic nervous system which manifest as general 
malaise secondary to psychosocial factors”.681 As such, there are a variety of clinical phenomena 
that exist alongside each other, such as general anxiety disorders, depression with anxiety, and 
other neurotic forms of experience. In the conceptual map shown in Figure 21 below, one can see 
that depression, neurosis ( ), and psychosomatic disorders ( ) all coexist within the 
broader conceptual category of JRSK.  
 
 
Figure 21: Conceptual map of JRSK in Murakami,1999.682 JRSK is comprised of multiple various 
pathologies. 
 
                                                             
680 , “ ,” っ , no. 1 (August 1999): 8–11. 
681Ibid., 8: “  ド つ
つ た 《 と ”. 
682 , “ ,” 10. I translate  as “pathology”, but the caption could read, “JRSK is comprised 




With this epistemological or nosological orientation, Murakami allows that, for some 
people, the supraordinate category of experience may very well be JRSK. It appears to be Itoh’s 
presupposition, however, that depression is the supraordinate concept, with JRSK phenomena as 
signs and indicators subordinate to the higher order category. Murakami’s thinking is more closely 
aligned with the nosological features of ICD-10, where section F45.3 makes provision for 
“somatoform autonomic dysfunction” as a class within the F40-F48 “neurotic, stress-related and 
somatoform disorders”. That is not to exclude depression as a supraordinate category in its own 
right. There are instances where such would be the proper conclusion, in which cases ICD section 
F32 is used to indicate a primary mood disorder. Murakami warns in a section on “easily 
overlooked depression” that when anti-anxiety medications are unhelpful with regard to the 
general malaise of the patient, and sleep disturbances are difficult to manage with hypnotics, 
clinicians would not be mistaken quickly to turn to the diagnosis of depression. Still, the major 
point here is that one need not run around rediagnosing all cases of JRSK as depression. Such an 
act would result from an oversimplification of human experience and a narrow view of nosological 
hierarchies, and it would evince a desire to lump categories of experience rather than take into 
consideration the need to split them for various reasons that may manifest themselves.  
That JRSK in Japan is a proxy for the abandoned category of neurasthenia is not a very 
surprising possibility to consider. The fact that such categories are needed to describe those 
conditions of existence for which standard diagnoses fail to capture patient’s experiences 
adequately, is a conundrum that will continue as long as categorical and discrete approaches to 
psychopathology hold sway. Earlier conceptions like “psychophysiologic nervous system reaction” 
were more open to lines of inquiry that conceived of the person as a psychosomatic unity. Even in 
the USA, where the DSM predominates, categories like JRSK serve to capture those complaints 
that do not fit the discrete categories currently available. As such, a popular website in 2018 can 
publish the views of a physician claiming: 
In the 19th century, there was a common medical condition called neurasthenia. Previously 
healthy people would find themselves suddenly unable to function due to a host of 
inexplicable symptoms, often including fatigue, weakness, unusual pain that would come 
and go and move from place to place, dizziness, various gastrointestinal symptoms, and 
syncope (passing out). Doctors would not find anything to explain these symptoms, so they 




Women with neurasthenia (men, being men, were usually not given this diagnosis) 
were often confined to their beds, where they would either recover or eventually die (since 
prolonged, enforced bed rest is very bad for one’s health). And, while nobody knew what 
caused this condition, everyone, doctors and laymen alike, took it quite seriously. More 
specifically, while neurasthenia could not be scientifically explained, it was regarded as a 
serious condition, and its victims were regarded with sympathy and respect. Most modern 
doctors who hear about this mysterious condition merely shake their heads in wonder. 
What, they ask themselves, ever became of this neurasthenia? Few seem to consider the 
possibility that neurasthenia is still with us. Consequently, they are less capable of 
recognizing the manifestations of this condition than were their old-time counterparts, and 
they tend to be far less sympathetic to people who suffer from it. People, who a century 
ago would have been called neurasthenics, today, are given a host of diagnoses. These 
include (but are not limited to): chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS), vasovagal or 
neurocardiogenic syncope, panic attacks, inappropriate sinus tachycardia (IST), irritable 
bowel syndrome (IBS), postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome (POTS), or fibromyalgia. 
Unfortunately, too many victims of these conditions are simply written off as being nuts. 
They are not nuts. (Or, if they are, it is a coincidence.) Sufferers of all these conditions tend 
to experience an imbalance, and most often a peculiar volatility, in the autonomic nervous 
system. This imbalance, which explains their strange symptoms, is called dysautonomia.683 
 
6.4 Cultural Neuroscience 
Cultural neuroscience is the study of cultural variation across neural, psychological, and genomic 
processes with the aim of elucidating the interrelationship among these processes and cultural 
practices.684 It is motivated by questions of how cultural traits (values, practices, beliefs) influence 
neurobiology at the level of genetics and neural processes. 
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It seems universally accepted that life experiences affect the organization and function of 
the brain. 685  While this is not a controversial or surprising notion, it has very fascinating 
implications. In order to expand this assumption to its more nuanced form, it is helpful to consider 
examples. 
 Neuroscientists have been able to demonstrate that experiences like working as a taxi 
driver,686 practicing juggling,687 or learning a second language688 result in anatomical changes in 
the brain. With long-term, professional musicians, anatomical differences are even discernible 
from coarse visual inspection of images of the brain. 689  Current understandings make such 
examples of brain plasticity seem commonplace, especially since, in these cases, the physical 
changes arise directly from the repetitive use of either a language region or a location in the brain 
affected by the repetitive activity associated with a particular set of motor neurons. The obvious 
metaphor is that of “growing brain muscle” through repeated use. However, more symbolically 
associated changes seem less expected. 
 For example, anthropologists who work in neuroscience have pointed out that watching the 
victory or defeat of a favorite sports team correlates with significant changes in cortisol and 
testosterone in a manner that very closely resembles the same changes that occur when dedicated 
chess players win or lose.690 In other words, similar biological changes associated with victory or 
defeat can be mediated symbolically. That is to say, through the internalizing of either chess or a 
sports game as a meaningful activity, one can elicit a biological response while the other may not. 
The determining factor is the extent to which either one is symbolically meaningful to the 
individual. To draw out the significance of this further, a different example might prove helpful. 
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 Cultural cognitive style has also been investigated in the context of neural representations 
of self and other. Using psychology constructs of “cognitive framing of self” as either 
“autonomous” or “inclusive of intimate others”,691 Zhu and colleagues measured brain metabolic 
activity via fMRI concurrent with the behavioral task of responding to personal trait adjectives 
either about oneself or about an intimate other. They demonstrated that ventromedial pre-frontal 
cortex activity differed markedly when Western participants were responding to self-judgments 
compared to when the same adjectives were offered in reference to an intimate other—one’s 
mother, for example. Chinese participants lacked the activation difference, as measured by 
fMRI.692  The inference drawn was that previous constructs accurately detect a difference in 
East/West conceptualizations of self in terms of including or excluding intimate others. In other 
words, for the American group, “I” did not extend past the self. Whereas “I”, for the Chinese 
participants, included family members. What was detected behaviorally in evaluations of self or 
other was reflected in the neural organization of what persons considered to constitute the “self”. 
More recent work has continued to pursue this line of research, concluding that construals of self 
are detectable in culture-specific mechanisms among Western and East-Asian groups.693 
  While the construct of “cognitive framing of self” in the previous example is the result of 
cultural differences that have been internalized over the life-course, major differences in cognitive 
style and its neurophysiological substrates need not take a lifetime to develop. A most fascinating 
example can be found in a replication of the study mentioned above (Han, Northoff 2008).694,695 
In the replication, all participants were Chinese from the PRC. One group was comprised entirely 
of non-religious persons, while the corresponding group was made up of Christians who had been 
part of their religious community for one to seven years. Interestingly, the differences found in the 
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original study were repeated in the second study. The Christian group demonstrated brain activity 
unlike their non-religious counterparts, but very much like the American participants in the early 
study. The “findings suggest that adopting Christian beliefs may result in weakened neural 
encoding of stimulus self-relatedness but may enhance neural activity in areas that mediate the 
evaluative process applied to self-referential stimuli”.696 Whatever one makes of the researchers’ 
interpretations, the most obvious implication is that belief itself affects brain activity and 
organization. 
  The most well-known example of belief affecting physiology is the placebo effect.697 
Traditionally, the placebo effect has referred to the positive outcomes that result from belief in the 
efficacy of treatment. Its opposite effect has been called the nocebo effect, and it is characterized 
as the negative outcome or worsening of symptoms that result from belief that a negative outcome 
is immanent or unavoidable. Recent studies have demonstrated that expectancy of a noxious 
stimulus not only increases the experience of pain subjectively, but it increases the afferent pain 
circuitry in the brain, an effect visible in fMRI.698 What are the implications of the possibility of 
belief modulating neurophysiological processes when considered in the light of beliefs about 
illness and disease? Some researchers have taken this on directly by attempting to induce illness 
symptoms by providing misinformation in a controlled environment. By comparing two groups 
who inhaled an inert substance as an experiment, Lorber and colleagues successfully induced 
symptom complaints in one group who were informed of possible, toxic side effects from 
inhalation. Although the symptom list was artificial and created by the researchers, symptom 
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reports were significantly greater for the group informed about such effects.699 The authors suggest 
that the mechanism at play in their research can account for cases of “mass psychogenic illness”. 
In any case, belief itself is capable of affecting neurophysiology such that bodily experiences 
manifest.700  
 
6.5 Concluding Thoughts 
Throughout this project I have attempted to draw the reader through a long and broad array of 
materials and intellectual disciplines in order to accomplish a number of goals. First, I wanted to 
show that SJSR is alive and well in China and the world today, and it is properly understood only 
within the discourse of nerves that arose in a nineteenth century Euro-American context. Second, 
I have tried to argue that its importation into and domestication within the Chinese lexicon and 
social-psychological milieu took place through a process of China’s coming-of-age on the world 
stage. The writings of physicians, novelists, students, quacks, advertisers, and intellectuals were 
made available to a Chinese population at a unique time in its history, when print was available 
like never before. SJSR became a culturally salient category of experience with a well-established 
framework for what it meant to be in distress in the modern world. These first two aims prepared 
me to address a subject that has intrigued me for a number of years. Specifically, my third aim was 
to highlight the neurasthenia-depression controversy that arose out of Kleinman’s works, which 
were first read in the early 1980s. I have demonstrated that his arguments were based on the notions 
of Asian suppression and denial of affect, linguistic incapacity for emotional descriptions (poverty 
of language), the need to avoid stigma by using clinical categories that failed to delineate the 
underlying reasons for patient distress, and the illness/disease distinction. His view of SJSR in 
China opened up decades of inquiry and redefinition of what the Chinese experience of distress 
“really was”, which is ongoing to this day. My fifth chapter assessed the efforts of researchers in 
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China and several Western countries as they considered alternative categories of diagnosis and 
parsed precisely what could be meant by the claim that “Chinese somatize”. Today, rates of 
depression are increasing in China, and the more recent revitalization of past arguments, which are 
employed to account for this increase, simply make the claim that Chinese have suffered from a 
poverty of emotional expression and suppression of affect as a result of political repression. In 
addition to the incoherence of these types of claims, especially when viewed in light of the broad 
impact of the SJSR experience on Chinese people outside of Mainland China, we see categories 
very similar to SJSR serving to capture the experience of many people around the world 
(dysautonomia, among others).  
As research into SJSR continues into the future, I am certain that much more material will 
be uncovered that will demonstrate even more complicated and rich ways that SJSR was 
understood in the past and shaped the lives of those who found the concept to be an accurate 
description of their experience.701 I am confident such research will only further demonstrate the 
need to develop a more nuanced conceptualization of how culture and the experience of what we 
might call “psychiatric distress” interrelate. The undercurrent of this project has really been to 
present a model of this interrelation.  
 To return to the symptom pool, it is important to ask again the question about moving from 
descriptions of experience to embodiment. In the introduction, I mentioned that for Edward Shorter, 
patients “somehow conformed” to the symptom pool of hysteria and neurasthenia.702 The creation 
of a symptom pool is a complicated sociocultural process that I have attempted to address 
throughout the materials addressed in this project, especially in Chapters 2 and 3. As shifting 
paradigms of what it means to be ill (whatever the category) are produced in print or on screen, 
the larger population gains access to a symptom pool that is not confined to the specialized 
textbooks used by clinicians. Cultural beliefs can then be internalized by the individual. The 
mechanism for conformity to the symptom pool is the neurophysiological consequence of belief 
itself. As patients find culturally recognized and sanctioned forms for the expression of real-life 
distress, they manifest symptoms that are both meaningful and available.  
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 Psychiatry and medicine are discourses that are aided by representations in a way that has 
only recently been considered. Rather than merely critique psychiatry as a hegemonic form (which 
it is), I have tried to show one way that psychiatry has such self-fulfilling power. It opens up a 
space for the expression of pathology; it creates niches for manifesting the distress that many 
people experience. Through its categories, symptom formation becomes a possibility. Ian Hacking 
refused to address whether the mental illness of dissociative walking fugue was real or not. It was 
obviously a social construction, but was it real? It was as real as hysteria, neurasthenia, depression, 
koro, or any other illness for which clearly defined symptoms exist. They serve as temporally, 
geographically, and culturally specific modes of manifesting human distress and inner perturbation, 
which distress is culturally formed and, through belief, can be translated from the mind to the body 






Abbey, S.E., and P.E. Garfinkel. “Neurasthenia and Chronic Fatigue Syndrome: The Role of Culture in the 
Making of a Diagnosis.” The American Journal of Psychiatry 148, no. 12 (December 1991): 1638–
46. https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.148.12.1638. 
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual Mental Disorders. Washington, D.C.: 
American Psychiatric Association, 1952. 
———. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-II. Washington, D.C.: American 
Psychiatric Association, 1968. 
———. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-III-R. American Psychiatric 
Association, 1987. 
———. DSM IV Options Book: Work in Progress (7/1/91). The American Psychiatric Association, 1991. 
———. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV. Washington, D.C.: American 
Psychiatric Association, 1998. 
———. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV-TR. Washington, D.C.: American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000. 
———. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-5. Washington, D.C: American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013. 
———. Nostrums and Quackery: Articles on the Nostrum Evil and Quackery Reprinted from the Journal 
of the American Medical Association. Press of American medical association, 1912. 
Baike.com. “ よ _ .” baike.com. Accessed December 8, 2017. 
http://www.baike.com/wiki/%E5%AE%89%E7%A5%9E%E8%A1%A5%E8%84%91%E6%B6%B2. 
Bangert, Marc, and Gottfried Schlaug. “Specialization of the Specialized in Features of External Human 
Brain Morphology.” European Journal of Neuroscience 24, no. 6 (2006): 1832–34. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-9568.2006.05031.x. 
Beard, George. “Neurasthenia, or Nervous Exhaustion.” The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal 80, no. 
13 (April 29, 1869): 217–21. 
Beard, George Miller. A Practical Treatise on Nervous Exhaustion (Neurasthenia): Its Symptoms, Nature, 
Sequences, Treatment. W. Wood & Co., 1880. 
———. American Nervousness, Its Causes and Consequences: A Supplement to Nervous Exhaustion 
(Neurasthenia). Putnam, 1881. 
Beard, George Miller, and Alphonse David Rockwell. A Practical Treatise on the Medical and Surgical 
Uses of Electricity: Including: Localized and General Faradization; Localized and Central 
Galvanization; Franklinization Electrolysis and Galvanocautery. W. Wood & Co., 1881. 
Beatty, Heather. Nervous Disease in Late Eighteenth-Century Britain: The Reality of a Fashionable 
Disorder. Routledge, 2012. 
Beeman, William O. “Dimensions of Dysphoria: The View from Linguistic Anthropology.” In Culture and 
Depression: Studies in the Anthropology and Cross-Cultural Psychiatry of Affect and Disorder, 
edited by Arthur Kleinman and Byron Good, 216–43. University of California Press, 1985. 




Bernard, H. Russell, Gery Ryan, and Amber Wutich. “Text Analysis.” In Handbook of Methods in Cultural 
Anthropology, edited by H. Russell Bernard and Clarence C. Gravlee, 533–60. Rowan & 
Littlefield, 2015. 
Birch, Stephen. “A Review and Analysis of Placebo Treatments, Placebo Effects, and Placebo Controls in 
Trials of Medical Procedures When Sham Is Not Inert.” Journal of Alternative & Complementary 
Medicine 12, no. 3 (2006): 303–10. https://doi.org/10.1089/acm.2006.12.303. 
Birnbaum, Steven J. “Master Hongyi Looks Back: A Modern Man Becomes a Monk in Twentieth-Century 
China.” In Buddhism in the Modern World : Adaptations of an Ancient Tradition, edited by 
Charles S. Prebish and Steven Heine, 76–124. Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Blumer, G. Alder. "The Coming of Psychasthenia." Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 33, no. 5 
(1906): 336–53. 
Bowers, John Z. When the Twain Meet: The Rise of Western Medicine in Japan. Vol. 5. Henry E. Sigerist 
Supplements to the Bulletin of the History of Medicine. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. 
Bridges, K., D. Goldberg, B. Evans, and T. Sharpe. “Determinants of Somatization in Primary Care.” 
Psychological Medicine 21, no. 2 (May 1991): 473–83. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291700020584. 
Bridges, K.W., and D.P. Goldberg. “Somatic Presentation of DSM III Psychiatric Disorders in Primary 
Care.” Journal of Psychosomatic Research 29, no. 6 (1985): 563–69. 
Broussais, François Joseph Victor. A Treatise on Physiology Applied to Pathology. Carey & Lea, 1832. 
Brown, R.A., and R. Seligman. “Anthropology and Cultural Neuroscience: Creating Productive 
Intersections in Parallel Fields.” Progress in Brain Research 178 (2009): 31–42. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0079-6123(09)17803-2. 
Bhugra, Dinesh, and Kamaldeep Bhui, eds. Textbook of Cultural Psychiatry. 2nd ed. Cambridge University 
Press, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316810057. 
Bhugra, Dinesh, Matthew Kelly, and Antonio Ventriglio. “Psychopathology and the Role of Culture.” 
In Textbook of Cultural Psychiatry. 2nd ed., edited by Dinesh Bhugra and Kamaldeep Bhui, 119–
31. Cambridge University Press, 2018. 
Burns, Susan. “Contemplating Places: The Hospital as Modern Experience in Meiji Japan.” In New 
Directions In The Study Of Meiji Japan, edited by Helen Hardcare and Adam Lewis Kern, 702–18. 
Brill, 1997. 
Burton, Robert. The Anatomy of Melancholy. Clarendon Press, 1989. 
Cao, Yuping, YaLin Zhang, Doris F. Chang, GuoQiang Wang, and XiangHui Zhang. “Psychosocial and 
Immunological Factors in Neurasthenia.” Psychosomatics 50, no. 1 (February 2009): 24–29. 
https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.psy.50.1.24. 
Caplan, E. M. “Trains, Brains, and Sprains: Railway Spine and the Origins of Psychoneuroses.” Bulletin of 
the History of Medicine 69, no. 3 (1995): 387–419. 





Castelnovo, Anna, Simone Cavallotti, Orsola Gambini, and Armando D’Agostino. “Post-Bereavement 
Hallucinatory Experiences: A Critical Overview of Population and Clinical Studies.” Journal of 
Affective Disorders 186 (November 1, 2015): 266–74. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2015.07.032. 
Chang, Doris F., Hector F. Myers, Albert Yeung, Yalin Zhang, Jingping Zhao, and Shunying Yu. “Shenjing 
Shuairuo and the DSM-IV: Diagnosis, Distress, and Disability in a Chinese Primary Care Setting.” 
Transcultural Psychiatry 42, no. 2 (June 2005): 204–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1363461505052660. 
Chang, Doris Fu-Ping. “The Cultural Validity of Neurasthenia: Psychiatric Diagnosis and Illness Beliefs in a 
Chinese Primary Care Sample.” PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2000. 
http://search.proquest.com/pqdtft/docview/304583304/abstract/F2446E3F7364E07PQ/2. 
Channing, William F. Notes on the Medical Application of Electricity. Daniel Davis, Jr. and Joseph M. 
Wightman, 1849. 
Chen, Hsueh-Shih. “Development of Mental Health Systems and Care in China: From the 1940s through 
the 1980s.” In Chinese Societies and Mental Health, edited by Tsung-yi Lin, Wen-Shing Tseng, 
and Yingkun Ye, 315–25. Oxford University Press, 1995. 
Cheung, F. M. “The Indigenization of Neurasthenia in Hong-Kong.” Culture Medicine and Psychiatry 13, 
no. 2 (1989): 227–41. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02220664. 
Cheung, Fanny. “Facts and Myths about Somatization among the Chinese.” In Chinese Societies and 
Mental Health, edited by Tsung-Yi Lin, Wen-Shing Tseng, and Ying-kʻun Yeh, 156–66. Oxford 
University Press, 1995. 
Chiao, Joan Y. “Cultural Neuroscience: A Once and Future Discipline.” Progress in Brain Research 178 
(2009): 287–304. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0079-6123(09)17821-4. 
Chung-Hua I Hsüeh Hui [Chinese Medical Journal]. China Medical Missionary Association. 
Clark, A. “Some Observations Concerning What Is Called ‘Neurasthenia’.” Lancet i (1886): 1–2. 
Clarke, Edwin, and L.S. Jacyna. Nineteenth-Century Origins of Neuroscientific Concepts. University of 
California Press, 1992. 
Cochran, Sherman. Chinese Medicine Men: Consumer Culture in China and Southeast Asia. Harvard 
University Press, 2006. 
Country Life, 1907. 
Critchley, Hugo D., and Sarah N. Garfinkel. “Interoception and Emotion.” Current Opinion in Psychology, 
Emotion 17 (October 1, 2017): 7–14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.04.020. 
Cullen, William. First Lines of the Practice of Physic: By William Cullen, M.D., Vol. IV. Bell & Bradfute, and 
William Creech; and G. G. and J. Robinsons, and H. Murray, London, 1796. 
Dana, Charles L. “The Partial Passing of Neurasthenia.” The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal 150, no. 
13 (1904): 339–44. 
Denton, Kirk A. Modern Chinese Literary Thought: Writings on Literature, 1893-1945. Stanford University 
Press, 1996. 
Dere, Jessica, Jiahong Sun, Yue Zhao, Tonje J. Persson, et al. “Beyond ‘Somatization’ and 




Outpatients.” Frontiers in Psychology 4 (June 27, 2013): 377. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00377. 
Dere, Jessica, Qiuping Tang, Xiongzhao Zhu, Lin Cai, et al. “The Cultural Shaping of Alexithymia: Values 
and Externally Oriented Thinking in a Chinese Clinical Sample.” Comprehensive Psychiatry 54, no. 
4 (May 2013): 362–68. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comppsych.2012.10.013. 
Desai, Geetha, and Santosh K. Chaturvedi. “Neurotic Disorders.” In Textbook of Cultural Psychiatry. 2nd 
ed., edited by Dinesh Bhugra and Kamaldeep Bhui, 205–14. Cambridge University Press, 2018. 
Dikötter, Frank. Sex, Culture, and Modernity in China: Medical Science and the Construction of Sexual 
Identities in the Early Republican Period. University of Hawaii Press, 1995. 
Dion, Kenneth L. “Ethnolinguistic Correlates of Alexithymia: Toward a Cultural Perspective.” Journal of 
Psychosomatic Research 41, no. 6 (December 1, 1996): 531–39. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-
3999(96)00295-4. 
Draganski, Bogdan, Christian Gaser, Volker Busch, Gerhard Schuierer, et al. “Neuroplasticity: Changes in 
Grey Matter Induced by Training.” Nature 427, no. 6972 (2004): 311–12. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/427311a. 
Dr. Miles Medical Company. New and Startling Facts for Those Afflicted with Nervous Diseases: An 
Illustrated Treatise on Sick and Nervous Headache, Nervousness, Convulsions, Neuralagia, 
Apoplexy, Paralysis, Sleeplessness, Nervous Prostration, Sexual Weakness, Epilepsy, Dyspepsia, 
Etc. Dr. Miles Medical Company, 1891. 
“Editor’s Preface.” Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 13, no. 2 (June 1, 1989): iii–iv. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02220655. 
Encyclopedia Britannica. “George Gershwin | American Composer.” britannica.com. Accessed October 
24, 2018. https://www.britannica.com/biography/George-Gershwin. 
Epstein, M. A., B. G. Achong, and Y. M. Barr. “Virus Particles in Cultured Lymphoblasts from Burkitt's 
Lymphoma.” The Lancet 283, no. 7335 (March 28, 1964): 702–3. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-
6736(64)91524-7. 
Erichsen, John Eric. On Railway and Other Injuries of the Nervous System. Henry C. Lea, 1867. 
Fabrega, Horacio, Jr. “The Role of Culture in a Theory of Psychiatric Illness.” Social Science & Medicine 
35, no. 1 (July 1, 1992): 91–103. https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(92)90122-7. 
Fabrega, Horacio, Jr. History of Mental Illness in India: A Cultural Psychiatry Retrospective, Vol. 10. 
Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2009. 
Fenwick, George Edgeworth, Thomas George Roddick, and George Ross. The Montreal Medical Journal. 
Gazette Printing Company, 1896. 
Fogoros, Richard N., MD, and A. Board-Certified Physician. “What Is Dysautonomia?” Verywell. Accessed 
February 5, 2018. https://www.verywell.com/dysautonomia-1745423. 
Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2012. 
———. The Birth of the Clinic; an Archaeology of Medical Perception. Vol. 1 American. World of Man, 
Book, Whole. New York: Pantheon Books, 1973. 
Free, Dan. Early Japanese Railways 1853-1914: Engineering Triumphs That Transformed Meiji-Era Japan. 




Freud, Sigmund, James Strachey, and Anna Freud. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud Vol. 3 (1893-1899): Early Psycho-Analytic Publications. Hogarth, 1966. 
Fruehstueck, Sabine. “Male Anxieties: Nerve Force, Nation, and the Power of Sexual Knowledge.” In 
Building a Modern Japan: Science, Technology, and Medicine in the Meiji Era and Beyond, edited 
by M. Low, 37–59. Springer, 2005. 
Frühstück, Sabine. “Male Anxieties: Nerve Force, Nation, and the Power of Sexual Knowledge.” Journal 
of the Royal Asiatic Society 15, no. 1 (2005): 71–88. 
Fujikawa, Yu, and John Ruhräh. Japanese Medicine. Hoeber, 1934. 
Fukuda, Keiji. “The Chronic Fatigue Syndrome: A Comprehensive Approach to Its Definition and Study.” 
Annals of Internal Medicine 121, no. 12 (December 15, 1994): 953. 
https://doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-121-12-199412150-00009. 
Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures : Selected Essays. Basic Books, 1973.  
Genshiro, H. “Japanese Psychiatry in the Edo Period (1600-1868).” History of Psychiatry 13, no. 2 (2002): 
131–51. 
Glover, D.M. “Chronic Fatigue Syndrome.” Adolescent Medicine (Philadelphia, Pa.) 6, no. 1 (February 
1995): 101–14. 
Goldman, Merle. Modern Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era. Harvard East Asian Series, Vol. 89. 
Harvard University Press, 1977. 
Gosling, Francis G. Before Freud: Neurasthenia and the American Medical Community, 1870-1910. 
University of Illinois Press, 1987. 
Grover, Sandeep, and Abhishek Ghosh. “Somatic Symptom and Related Disorders in Asians and Asian 
Americans.” Asian Journal of Psychiatry 7 (February 2014): 77–79. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajp.2013.11.014. 
Groves, James E. “Post-Traumatic Neurosis: From Railway Spine to the Whiplash.” Social Science & 
Medicine 16, no. 12 (June 15, 1982): 1243. 
Gutchess, Angela H., Robert C. Welsh, Aysecan Boduroĝlu, and Denise C. Park. “Cultural Differences in 
Neural Function Associated with Object Processing.” Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral 
Neuroscience 6, no. 2 (June 1, 2006): 102–9. https://doi.org/10.3758/CABN.6.2.102. 
Hacking, Ian. Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. Princeton University 
Press, 1998. 
Han, Shihui, and Georg Northoff. “Culture-Sensitive Neural Substrates of Human Cognition: A 
Transcultural Neuroimaging Approach.” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 9, no. 8 (August 2008): 
646–54. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2456. 
———. “Understanding the Self: A Cultural Neuroscience Approach.” Progress in Brain Research 178 
(2009): 203–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0079-6123(09)17814-7. 
Harrington, Ralph. “The Neuroses of the Railway.” History Today 44, no. 7 (July 1994): 15. 
Heine, Steven J. “Self as Cultural Product: An Examination of East Asian and North American Selves.” 
Journal of Personality 69, no. 6 (2001): 881–906. 
Held, Lisa. “Symptoms in Search of a Disease: Neurasthenia, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, and the 






Herman, Arthur. The Idea of Decline in Western History. Simon and Schuster, 2010. 
Hinrichs, T.J., and Linda L. Barnes, eds. Chinese Medicine and Healing: An Illustrated History. Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2013. 
Hinton, Devon E., and Roberto Lewis-Fernández. “Idioms of Distress Among Trauma Survivors: Subtypes 
and Clinical Utility.” Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry 34, no. 2 (June 1, 2010): 209–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11013-010-9175-x. 
Hockx, Michel, and Kirk A. Denton. Literary Societies of Republican China. Lexington Books, 2008. 
Hodgkiss, Andrew. From Lesion to Metaphor: Chronic Pain in British, French and German Medical 
Writings, 1800-1914. Rodopi, 2000. 
Holmes, G.P., J.E. Kaplan, N.M. Gantz, A.L. Komaroff, et al. “Chronic Fatigue Syndrome: A Working Case 
Definition.” Annals of Internal Medicine 108, no. 3 (March 1988): 387–89. 
Horwitz, Allan V., and Jerome C. Wakefield. The Loss of Sadness: How Psychiatry Transformed Normal 
Sorrow into Depressive Disorder. Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Hróbjartsson, A., and P. C. Gøtzsche. “Is the Placebo Powerless? Update of a Systematic Review with 52 
New Randomized Trials Comparing Placebo with No Treatment.” Journal of Internal Medicine 
256, no. 2 (August 2004): 91–100. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2796.2004.01355.x. 
Hsia, Chih-tsing. A History of Modern Chinese Fiction. Indiana University Press, 1999. 
Hufeland, Christoph Wilhelm. Enchiridion medicum oder Anleitung zur medizinischen Praxis. Jonas Verl., 
1851. 
Hufeland, Christoph Wilhelm, and Robert Nelson. Enchiridion Medicum, or, The Practice of Medicine : 
The Result of Fifty Years’ Experience, Vol. 4. W. Radde, 1855. 
Hughes, J., M. Gabbay, E. Funnell, and C. Dowrick. “Exploratory Review of Placebo Characteristics 
Reported in Randomised Placebo Controlled Antidepressant Drug Trials.” Pharmacopsychiatry 
45, no. 1 (January 2012): 20–27. https://doi.org/10.1055/s-0031-1286260. 
“JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association” 52 (1909): 1678. 
Jannetta, Ann Bowman. Epidemics and Mortality in Early Modern Japan. Princeton University Press, 
1987. 
Jordan, Thomas Edward. The Degeneracy Crisis and Victorian Youth. SUNY Press, 1993. 
Judge, Joan. Print and Politics: ‘Shibao’ and the Culture of Reform in Late Qing China. Stanford University 
Press, 1997. 
Justman, Stewart. The Nocebo Effect: Overdiagnosis and Its Costs. Springer, 2016. 
Kato, Tadafumi, and Saburo Takahashi. “Evolving DSM and Its Japanese Translation: Editorial.” 
Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 70, no. 9 (September 2016): 369–70. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/pcn.12417. 
Katon, W., A. Kleinman, and G. Rosen. “Depression and Somatization: A Review. Part I.” The American 




———. “Depression and Somatization: A Review. Part II.” The American Journal of Medicine 72, no. 2 
(1982): 241–47. 
Katon, W., R.K. Ries, and A. Kleinman. “A Prospective DSM-III Study of 100 Consecutive Somatization 
Patients.” Comprehensive Psychiatry 25, no. 3 (June 1984): 305–14. 
Katon, W., R.K. Ries, and A. Kleinman. “The Prevalence of Somatization in Primary Care.” Comprehensive 
Psychiatry 25, no. 2 (1984): 208–15. 
Kawa, Shadia, and James Giordano. “A Brief Historicity of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders: Issues and Implications for the Future of Psychiatric Canon and Practice.” 
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (January 13, 2012): 2. 
https://doi.org/10.1186/1747-5341-7-2. 
Kawanishi, Yuko. “Somatization of Asians: An Artifact of Western Medicalization?” Transcultural 
Psychiatry 29, no. 1 (March 1, 1992): 5–36. https://doi.org/10.1177/136346159202900101. 
Keltner, J. R., A. Furst, C. Fan, R. Redfern, et al. “Isolating the Modulatory Effect of Expectation on Pain 
Transmission: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study.” Journal of Neuroscience 26, no. 
16 (2006): 4437–43. 
Kirmayer, Laurence J. “Beyond the ‘New Cross-Cultural Psychiatry’: Cultural Biology, Discursive 
Psychology and the Ironies of Globalization.” Transcultural Psychiatry 43, no. 1 (March 1, 2006): 
126–44. https://doi.org/10.1177/1363461506061761. 
———. “Culture, Affect and Somatization: Part I.” Transcultural Psychiatry 21, no. 3 (1984): 159–88. 
———. “Culture, Affect and Somatization: Part II.” Transcultural Psychiatric Research Review 21, no. 4 
(December 1, 1984): 237–62. https://doi.org/10.1177/136346158402100401. 
———. “Cultural Variations in the Response to Psychiatric Disorders and Emotional Distress.” Social 
Science & Medicine 29, no. 3 (1989): 327–39. https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(89)90281-5. 
———. “Languages of Suffering Healing: Alexithymia as a Social and Cultural Process.” Transcultural 
Psychiatric Research Review 24, no. 2 (June 1, 1987): 119–36. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/136346158702400204. 
Kirmayer, Laurence J., and James M. Robbins, eds. Current Concepts of Somatization: Research and 
Clinical Perspectives. Progress in Psychiatry, no. 31. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric 
Press, 1991. 
———. “Patients Who Somatize in Primary Care: A Longitudinal Study of Cognitive and Social 
Characteristics.” Psychological Medicine 26, no. 5 (September 1996): 937–51. 
———. “Three Forms of Somatization in Primary Care: Prevalence, Co-Occurrence, and 
Sociodemographic Characteristics.” The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 179, no. 11 
(November 1, 1991): 647–55. 
Kitanaka, Junko. Depression in Japan: Psychiatric Cures for a Society in Distress. Princeton University 
Press, 2012. 
Kitayama, S., H.R. Markus, H. Matsumoto, and V. Norasakkunkit. “Individual and Collective Processes in 
the Construction of the Self: Self-Enhancement in the United States and Self-Criticism in Japan.” 




Kleinman, Arthur. “Anthropology and Psychiatry: The Role of Culture in Cross-Cultural Research on 
Illness.” The British Journal of Psychiatry 151 (October 1987): 447–54. 
http://dx.doi.org.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/10.1192/bjp.151.4.447. 
———. “A Comparative Cross-Cultural Model for Studying Health Care in China.” Studies in Comparative 
Communism 7, no. 4 (1974): 414–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/0039-3592(74)90013-1. 
———. “Culture and Depression.” New England Journal of Medicine 351, no. 10 (September 2, 2004): 
951–53. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp048078. 
———, ed. Deep China: The Moral Life of the Person: What Anthropology and Psychiatry Tell Us about 
China Today. University of California Press, 2011. 
———. “Depression, Somatization and the ‘New Cross-Cultural Psychiatry.’” Social Science & Medicine 
(1967) 11, no. 1 (January 1, 1977): 3–9. https://doi.org/10.1016/0037-7856(77)90138-X. 
———. “Neurasthenia and Depression: A Study of Somatization and Culture in China.” Culture, Medicine 
and Psychiatry 6, no. 2 (June 1, 1982): 117–90. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00051427. 
———. Patients and Healers in the Context of Culture: An Exploration of the Borderland Between 
Anthropology, Medicine, and Psychiatry. University of California Press, 1980. 
———. Rethinking Psychiatry. Simon and Schuster, 2008. 
———. Social Origins of Distress and Disease: Depression, Neurasthenia, and Pain in Modern China. Yale 
University Press, 1986. 
———. “The Moral Economy of Depression and Neurasthenia in China. A Few Comments on Sing Lee‘s 
'Diagnosis Postponed: Shenjing Shuairuo and the Transformation of Psychiatry in Post-Mao 
China,' by Sing Lee.” Culture, Medicine & Psychiatry 23, no. 3 (1999): 389–92. 
———. “The Symbolic Context of Chinese Medicine: A Comparative Approach to the Study of Traditional 
and Psychiatric Forms of Care in Chinese Culture.” The American Journal of Chinese Medicine 3, 
no. 2 (January 1, 1975): 103–24. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0192415X75000141. 
———. Writing at the Margin: Discourse between Anthropology and Medicine. University of California 
Press, 1995. 
———. “  (Somatization).” :  (Guowai Yixue: Jingshen bingxue fen ce) 
2 (1984): 65–68. 
Kleinman, Arthur, and Byron Good, eds. Culture and Depression: Studies in the Anthropology and Cross-
Cultural Psychiatry of Affect and Disorder. Comparative Studies of Health Systems and Medical 
Care. University of California Press, 1985. 
Kleinman, Arthur, Joan Kleinman, and Byron Good. “Somatization: The Interconnections in Chinese 
Society among Culture, Depressive Experiences, and the Meanings of Pain.” In Culture and 
Depression: Studies in the Anthropology and Cross-Cultural Psychiatry of Affect and Disorder, 
University of California Press, 1985. 
Kleinman, Arthur and John E. Fogarty. Medicine in Chinese Cultures: Comparative Studies of Health Care 
in Chinese and Other Societies: Papers and Discussions from a Conference Held in Seattle, 
Washington, U.S.A., February 1974. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public 




Kleinman, Arthur, and Tsung-Yi Lin. Normal and Abnormal Behavior in Chinese Culture. Vol. 2. Culture, 
Illness, and Healing. D. Reidel, 1981. 
Köhne, Annemarie C. J. “The Ontological Status of a Psychiatric Diagnosis: The Case of Neurasthenia.” 
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 26, no. 1 (2019): E-1-E-11. https://10.1353/ppp.2019.0008. 
Kraft, Frank. The American Physician. Chatterton-Peck Company, 1902. 
Kral, Michael. “Postcolonial Suicide Among Inuit in Arctic Canada.” Culture, Medicine & Psychiatry 36, 
no. 2 (2012): 306–25. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11013-012-9253-3. 
Kuroki, Toshihide, Makoto Ishitobi, Yoko Kamio, Genichi Sugihara, et al. “Current Viewpoints on DSM-5 
in Japan.” Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 70, no. 9 (2016): 371–93. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/pcn.12421. 
Larøi, Frank, Tanya Marie Luhrmann, Vaughan Bell, William A. Christian, et al. “Culture and 
Hallucinations: Overview and Future Directions.” Schizophrenia Bulletin 40, no. Suppl_4 (July 1, 
2014): S213–20. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbu012. 
Lau, Joseph S. M., and Howard Goldblatt. The Columbia Anthology of Modern Chinese Literature. 
Columbia University Press, 2007. 
Lee, Leo Ou-fan. Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930-1945. Harvard 
University Press, 1999. 
Lee, Sing. “A Chinese Perspective of Somatoform Disorders.” Journal of Psychosomatic Research 43, no. 
2 (August 1, 1997): 115–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-3999(97)00037-8. 
———. “Cultures in Psychiatric Nosology: The CCMD-2-R and International Classification of Mental 
Disorders.” Culture, Medicine & Psychiatry 20, no. 4 (December 1996): 421. 
———. “Depression: Coming of Age in China.” In Deep China: The Moral Life of the Person, What 
Anthropology and Psychiatry Tell Us about China Today, edited by A. Kleinman, 177–212. 
University of California Press, 2011. 
———. “Diagnosis Postponed: Shenjing Shuairuo and the Transformation of Psychiatry in Post-Mao 
China.” Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 23, no. 3 (September 1999): 349–99. 
———. “Estranged Bodies, Simulated Harmony, and Misplaced Cultures: Neurasthenia in Contemporary 
Chinese Society.” Psychosomatic Medicine July/August 1998 60, no. 4 (1998): 448–57. 
———. “Neurasthenia and Chinese Psychiatry in the 1990s.” Journal of Psychosomatic Research 38, no. 
6 (August 1994): 487–91. 
———. “Reconsidering the Status of Anorexia Nervosa as a Western Culture-Bound Syndrome.” Social 
Science & Medicine (1982) 42, no. 1 (January 1996): 21–34. 
———. “Self-Starvation in Context: Towards a Culturally Sensitive Understanding of Anorexia Nervosa.” 
Social Science & Medicine 41, no. 1 (1995): 25–36. 
———. “The Vicissitudes of Neurasthenia in Chinese Societies: Where Will It Go From the ICD-10?” 
Transcultural Psychiatry 31, no. 2 (June 1, 1994): 153–72. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/136346159403100205. 
Lee, Sing, Antoinette M. Lee, Emily Ngai, Dominic T.S. Lee, et al. “Rationales for Food Refusal in Chinese 





Lee, Sing, and Arthur Kleinman. “Are Somatoform Disorders Changing With Time? The Case of 
Neurasthenia in China.” Psychosomatic Medicine 69, no. 9 (November 2007): 846–49. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/PSY.0b013e31815b0092. 
Lee, S., and K.C. Wong. “Rethinking Neurasthenia: The Illness Concepts of Shenjing Shuairuo among 
Chinese Undergraduates in Hong Kong.” Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 19, no. 1 (March 
1995): 91–111. 
Leff, Julian. Psychiatry around the Globe: A Transcultural View. M. Dekker, 1981. 
———. “The Cross-Cultural Study of Emotions.” Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 1, no. 4 (December 1, 
1977): 317–50. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00116242. 
Lin, E.H.B., W.B. Carter, and A.M. Kleinman. “An Exploration of Somatization among Asian Refugees and 
Immigrants in Primary Care.” American Journal of Public Health 75, no. 9 (1985): 1080–84. 
Lin, K.M., M. Lin, and Y. Zheng. “Neurasthenia and Chronic Fatigue Syndrome: Lessons from Cross-
Cultural Study.” Key Issues in Mental Health 169 (June 2001): 68. 
Lin, T.Y. “Culture and Psychiatry: A Chinese Perspective.” Australasian Psychiatry 16, no. 4 (January 
1982): 235–45. https://doi.org/10.3109/00048678209161263. 
———. “Neurasthenia Revisited Its Place in Modern Psychiatry.” Culture Medicine and Psychiatry 13, no. 
2 (1989): 105–30. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02220656. 
Littlewood, Roland. “DSM-IV and Culture: Is the Classification Internationally Valid?” The Psychiatrist 16, 
no. 5 (May 1, 1992): 257–61. https://doi.org/10.1192/pb.16.5.257. 
Liu, Lydia He. Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations. Post-Contemporary 
Interventions. Duke University Press, 1999. 
———. Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Trnslated Modernity—China, 1900-1937. 
Stanford University Press, 1995. 
Liu, S.X. “Neurasthenia in China—Modern and Traditional Criteria for Its Diagnosis.” Culture Medicine 
and Psychiatry 13, no. 2 (1989): 163–86. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02220660. 
Lorber, William, Giuliana Mazzoni, and Irving Kirsch. “Illness by Suggestion: Expectancy, Modeling, and 
Gender in the Production of Psychosomatic Symptoms.” Annals of Behavioral Medicine 33, no. 1 
(2007): 112–16. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15324796abm3301_13. 
Lu, Xun. Lu Xun Quan Ji. Ren min wen xue chu ban she, 1973. 
Lutz, Catherine. “Depression and the Translation of Emotional Worlds.” In Culture and Depression: 
Studies in the Anthropology and Cross-Cultural Psychiatry of Affect and Disorder, edited by 
Arthur Kleinman and Byron Good, 63–100. University of California Press, 1985. 
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed. University of Notre Dame Press, 2007. 
MacLachlan, Malcolm, Sieglinde McGee, Brendan D. Kelly, and Fiona Larkan. “Psychology and Cultural 
Psychiatry.” In Textbook of Cultural Psychiatry. 2nd ed., edited by Dinesh Bhugra and Kamaldeep 
Bhui, 44–58. Cambridge University Press, 2018. 
Maeda, Eriko, Masaaki Akahane, Shigeru Kiryu, Nobuyuki Kato, et al. “Spectrum of Epstein-Barr Virus-





Maguire, Eleanor A., and David G. Gadian. “Navigation-Related Structural Change in the Hippocampi of 
Taxi Drivers.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 
97, no. 8 (2000): 4398. 
Ma-Kellams, Christine. “Cross-Cultural Differences in Somatic Awareness and Interoceptive Accuracy: A 
Review of the Literature and Directions for Future Research.” Frontiers in Psychology 5 
(December 3, 2014): 1379. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01379. 
Malhi, Gin S., and Yulisha Byrow. “Affective Disorders Coloured by Culture: Why the Pigment of 
Depression Is More Than Skin Deep.” In Textbook of Cultural Psychiatry. 2nd ed., edited by 
Dinesh Bhugra and Kamaldeep Bhui, 232–43. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 
Marr, H.C. Psychoses of the War: Including Neurasthenia and Shell Shock. Oxford Medical Publications, 
1919. 
Matthews, D.A., T.J. Lane, and P. Manu. “Antibodies to Epstein-Barr Virus in Patients with Chronic 
Fatigue.” Southern Medical Journal 84, no. 7 (July 1991): 832–40. 
McCartney, J.L. “Neuropsychiatry in China.” Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 18, no. 1 (1927): 87–
95. 
McLawhorn, Donald. “Disgusted by Food: Explanatory Models of Anorexia among Young Taiwanese 
Adults.” master's thesis, University of South Florida, 2008. 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/393. 
Mead, Margaret. And Keep Your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist Looks at America. Berghahn Books, 
2000. 
Micale, Mark S. “On the ‘Disappearance’ of Hysteria. A Study in the Clinical Deconstruction of a 
Diagnosis.” Isis; an International Review Devoted to the History of Science and Its Cultural 
Influences 84, no. 3 (1993): 496–526. 
———. Approaching Hysteria: Disease and Its Interpretations. Princeton University Press, 1995. 
Michigan Medicine. “Gamma Oryzanol.” uofmhealth.org. Accessed December 8, 2017. 
http://www.uofmhealth.org/health-library/hn-2850009. 
Mitchell, Silas Weir. Wear and Tear, Or Hints for the Overworked. Lippincott, 1871. 
Munakata, T. “The Socio-Cultural Significance of the Diagnostic Label Neurasthenia in Japans Mental-
Health Care System.” Culture Medicine and Psychiatry 13, no. 2 (1989): 203–13. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02220662. 
Nichter, M. “Idioms of Distress: Alternatives in the Expression of Psychosocial Distress: A Case Study 
from South India.” Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 5, no. 4 (1981): 379–408. 
Niedermüller, Péter, and Bjarne Stoklund, eds. Europe: Cultural Construction and Reality. Museum 
Tusculanum Press, 2001. 
NY Daily News. “McDonald’s Japan Unleashes Black Squid Ink Burger.” nydailynews.com. Accessed 
December 1, 2017. http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/eats/mcdonald-japan-unleashes-
black-squid-ink-burger-article-1.1957094. 
Obeyesekere, Gananath. “Depression, Buddhism, and the Work of Culture in Sri Lanka.” In Culture and 





Okada, Fumihiko, and Shinji Minoshita. “Functional Dysautonomia: A Valid Clinical Entity or Pseudo-
Science?” Clinical Autonomic Research 4, no. 4 (August 1, 1994): 189–90. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01826185. 
Olbert, Charles M., and Gary J. Gala. “Supervenience and Psychiatry: Are Mental Disorders Brain 
Disorders?” Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 35, no. 4 (November 2015): 
203–19. https://doi.org/10.1037/teo0000023. 
Pan, Guangdan. Pan Guangdan Wen Ji, Beijing da xue chu ban she, 1993. 
Parker, Gordon, Gemma Gladstone, and Kuan Tsee Chee. “Depression in the Planet’s Largest Ethnic 
Group: The Chinese.” American Journal of Psychiatry 158, no. 6 (June 1, 2001): 857–64. 
https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.158.6.857. 
Peng, Hsiao-yen. “A Traveling Disease: The ‘Malady of the Heart,’ Scientific Jargon, and Neo-Sensation.” 
In China and Its Others: Knowledge Transfer through Translation, 1829-2010, edited by James St. 
André and Hsiao-yen Peng, 95–137. Rodopi, 2012.  
Pharmaceutical Journal: A Weekly Record of Pharmacy and Allied Sciences. J. Churchill, 1908. 
Pinero, Jose M.L. Historical Origins of the Concept of Neurosis. Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
Playfair, W.S. “Some Observations Concerning What Is Called Neurasthenia.” The British Medical Journal 
2, no. 1349 (November 6, 1886): 853–55. 
Porter, Roy. The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: A Medical History of Humanity (The Norton History of 
Science). W. W. Norton & Company, 1999. 
Reed, Christopher A. Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876-1937. UBC Press, 2004. 
Rin, H., and M.G. Huang. “Neurasthenia as Nosological Dilemma.” Culture Medicine and Psychiatry 13, 
no. 2 (1989): 215–26. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02220663. 
Rogaski, Ruth. Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China, Vol. 9. Asia-
Local Studies/Global Themes. University of California Press, 2004.  
Rosenberger, Nancy R. “The Process of Discourse: Usages of a Japanese Medical Term.” Social Science & 
Medicine 34, no. 3 (1992): 237–47. https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(92)90266-S. 
Rush, Benjamin. Medical Inquiries and Observations. J. Conrad & Company, 1805. 
Rush, Benjamin, William Pritchard, and Peleg Hall. An Inquiry Into the Natural History of Medicine 
Among the Indians of North-America: And a Comparative View of Their Diseases and Remedies 
with Those of Civilized Nations. Prichard & Hall, 1774. 
Ryder, Andrew G., and Yulia E. Chentsova-Dutton. “Depression in Cultural Context: ‘Chinese 
Somatization,’ Revisited.” The Psychiatric Clinics of North America 35, no. 1 (March 2012): 15–
36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psc.2011.11.006. 
Ryder, Andrew G., Jian Yang, Xiongzhao Zhu, Shuqiao Yao, et al. “The Cultural Shaping of Depression: 
Somatic Symptoms in China, Psychological Symptoms in North America?” Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology 117, no. 2 (2008): 300–313. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.117.2.300. 
Ryder, Andrew George. “Cross -Cultural Differences in the Presentation of Depression: Chinese 






Sadock, Benjamin J. Kaplan & Sadock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry: Behavioral Sciences/Clinical Psychiatry, 
11th ed. Wolters Kluwer, 2015. 
———. Kaplan and Sadock’s Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry. Wolters Kluwer Health, 2012. 
St. James, André, and Hsiao-yen Peng, eds. China and Its Others: Knowledge Transfer through 
Translation, 1829–2010. Rodopi, 2012. 
Sawyer, Herbert Carleton. Nerve Waste: Practical Information Concerning Nervous Impairment in 
Modern Life, Its Causes, Phases and Remedies, with Advice on the Hygiene of the Nervous 
Constitution. Bancroft Co., 1890. 
Schlegel, Alexander A., Justin J. Rudelson, and Peter U. Tse. “White Matter Structure Changes as Adults 
Learn a Second Language.” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 24, no. 8 (2012): 1664–70. 
Schonebaum, Andrew. “Medicine in The Story of the Stone: Four Cases.” In Approaches to Teaching The 
Story of the Stone (Dream of the Red Chamber), edited by Andrew Schonebaum and Tina Lu, 
164–85. Modern Language Association of America, 2012.  
———. “Vectors of Contagion and Tuberculosis in Modern Chinese Literature.” Modern Chinese 
Literature and Culture 23, no. 1 (2011): 17–46. 
Schuster, David G. Neurasthenic Nation: America’s Search for Health, Happiness, and Comfort, 1869-
1920. Rutgers University Press, 2011. 
Schwarcz, Vera. The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement 
of 1919. University of California Press, 1986. 
Schwartz, Theodore, Geoffrey M. White, and Catherine A. Lutz. New Directions in Psychological 
Anthropology. Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
Scott, A.C. An Introduction to the Chinese Theatre. D. Moore, 1958. 
———. The Classical Theatre of China. Allen & Unwin, 1957. 
Shapiro, Hugh. “How Different Are Western and Chinese Medicine? The Case of Nerves.” In Medicine 
across Cultures: History and Practice of Medicine in Non-Western Cultures, edited by Helaine 
Selin and Hugh Shapiro, 351–72. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003. 
———. “Neurasthenia and the Assimilation of Nerves into China.” presented at the Symposium on the 
History of Disease, Academia Sinica, Institute of History and Philology, Nankang, Taiwan, 2000. 
———. “The Puzzle of Spermatorrhea in Republican China.” Positions 6, no. 3 (1998): 551. 
———. The View from a Chinese Asylum: Defining Madness in 1930s Peking. University Microfilms 
International, 1995.  
Shorter, Edward. From Paralysis to Fatigue: A History of Psychosomatic Illness in the Modern Era. 
Maxwell Macmillan International, 1993. 
———. From the Mind into the Body: The Cultural Origins of Psychosomatic Symptoms. Maxwell 
Macmillan International, 1993. 
———. How Everyone Became Depressed. Oxford University Press, 2013. 





———. “Depressive Disorders from a Transcultural Perspective.” Social Science & Medicine (1967) 9, no. 
6 (June 1, 1975): 289–301. https://doi.org/10.1016/0037-7856(75)90001-3. 
Smith, Arthur H. Chinese Characteristics, 2nd ed. Fleming H. Revell, 1894. 
Smithsonian.com. “The Shock of War.” smithsonianmag.com. Accessed April 2, 2015. 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-shock-of-war-55376701/ 
Solms, Mark. The Feeling Brain: Selected Papers on Neuropsychoanalysis. Routledge, 2018. 
Solms, Mark, and Oliver Turnbull. Brain and the Inner World: An Introduction to the Neuroscience of 
Subjective Experience. Other Press, LLC, 2010. 
Someya, Toshiyuki, Makoto Takahashi, and Makoto Takahashi. “Is DSM Widely Accepted by Japanese 
Clinicians?” Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 55, no. 5 (2001): 437–50. 
https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1440-1819.2001.00888.x. 
Starcevic, Vladan. “Neurasthenia in European Psychiatric Literature.” Transcultural Psychiatry 31, no. 2 
(June 1, 1994): 125–36. https://doi.org/10.1177/136346159403100203. 
Stark-Wroblewski, Kim, Barbara J. Yanico, and Steven Lupe. “Acculturation, Internalization of Western 
Appearance Norms, and Eating Pathology among Japanese and Chinese International Student 
Women.” Psychology of Women Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2005): 38–46. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.2005.00166.x. 
Strand, David. Rickshaw Beijing: City People and Politics in the 1920s. University of California Press, 
1989. 
Student Doctor Network. “Adult ADHD?!” studentdoctor.net. Accessed December 1, 2017. 
https://forums.studentdoctor.net/threads/adult-adhd.1225260/. 
Sullivan, Harry Stack. The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. Routledge, 2013. 
———. The Psychiatric Interview. W. W. Norton & Company, 1954. 
Sun, Jiahong, and Andrew G. Ryder. “The Chinese Experience of Rapid Modernization: Sociocultural 
Changes, Psychological Consequences?” Frontiers in Psychology 7 (April 5, 2016): 477. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00477. 
Suzuki, T. “The Concept of Neurasthenia and Its Treatment in Japan.” Culture Medicine and Psychiatry 
13, no. 2 (1989): 187–202. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02220661. 
Szasz, Thomas. The Myth of Mental Illness : Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct. Book, Whole. 
New York: Harper & Row, 1961. 
Teale, Thomas Pridgin. A Treatise on Neuralgic Diseases, Dependent upon Irritation of the Spinal Marrow 
and Ganglia of the Sympathetic Nerve, 1829. 
“The Englishman,” 1908. 
The Interior. Western Presbyterian Publishing Company, 1899. 
The New England Journal of Medicine. Massachusetts Medical Society, 1890. 
Travers, Benjamin. A Further Inquiry Concerning Constitutional Irritation and the Pathology of the 
Nervous System, 1835. 
———. An Inquiry Concerning That Disturbed State of the Vital Functions Usually Denominated 




Trotter, Thomas. A View of the Nervous Temperament: Being a Practical Inquiry Into the Increasing 
Prevalence, Prevention, and Treatment of Those Diseases Commonly Called Nervous, Bilious, 
Stomach and Liver Complaints, Indigestion, Low Spirits, Gout, &c. Wright, Goodenow, & 
Stockwell, and, 1808. 
Tsai, W. Reading Shenbao: Nationalism, Consumerism and Individuality in China 1919–37. Springer, 
2009. 
Wang, Te-Wei, and Ellen Widmer. From May Fourth to June Fourth: Fiction and Film in Twentieth-
Century China. Vol. 9. Harvard Contemporary China Series. Harvard University Press, 1993. 
Wang, W.J. “Tropical Neurasthenia or Oriental Nerves? White Breakdowns in China.” In Psychiatry and 
Chinese History, edited by Howard Chiang, 111–28. Taylor and Francis Inc., 2015. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315654379. 
Ware, N.C., and A. Kleinman. “Culture and Somatic Experience: The Social Course of Illness in 
Neurasthenia and Chronic Fatigue Syndrome.” Psychosomatic Medicine 54, no. 5 (October 
1992): 546–60. 
Ware, Norma C., and Mitchell G. Weiss. “Neurasthenia and the Social Construction of Psychiatric 
Knowledge.” Transcultural Psychiatry 31, no. 2 (June 1, 1994): 101–24. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/136346159403100202. 
Watters, Ethan. Crazy like Us: The Globalization of the American Psyche. Simon and Schuster, 2010. 
Wessely, S. “Old Wine in New Bottles: Neurasthenia and ‘ME.’” Psychological Medicine 20, no. 1 
(January 1990): 35–53. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291700013210. 
Whytt, Robert. Observations on the Nature, Causes, and Cure of Those Disorders Which Have Been 
Commonly Called Nervous, Hypochondriac, Or Hysteric: To Which Are Prefixed Some Remarks on 
the Sympathy of the Nerves. T. Becket, P. Du Hondt, London, and J. Balfour, 1765. 
Willis, Thomas. The London Practice of Physick, Or The Whole Practical Part of Physick. Thomas Basset 
and William Crooke, 1685. 
Wong, Kit Ching. “Psychometric Investigation into the Construct of Neurasthenia and Its Related 
Conditions: A Comparative Study on Chinese in Hong Kong and Mainland China.” PhD diss., The 
Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. 
http://search.proquest.com/pqdtft/docview/304831434/abstract/F2446E3F7364E07PQ/1. 
World Health Assembly. First World Health Assembly, Geneva 24 June to 24 July 1948: Plenary Meetings: 
Verbatim Records: Main Committees: Summary of Resolutions and Decisions. World Health 
Organization, 1948. http://www.who.int/iris/handle/10665/85592. 
World Health Organization. “International Classification of Diseases (ICD).” who.int. Accessed September 
6, 2014. http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/ 
World Health Organization (1979). “Schizophrenia: An International Follow-up Study.” who.int. Accessed 
October 24, 2018. http://www.who.int/iris/handle/10665/41598. 
World Psychiatric Association. “Neurasthenia—A Technical Report from The World Psychiatric 
Association Group of Experts.” (WPA Consensus Statements) wpanet.org. Accessed October 24, 
2018. https://www.wpanet.org/detail.php?section_id=5&category_id=9&content_id=10. 
World Health Organization. The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders: Clinical 




Wu, Harry Yi-Jui, and Wen-Ji Wang. “Making and Mapping Psy Sciences in East and Southeast Asia.” East 
Asian Science, Technology and Society 10, no. 2 (June 1, 2016): 109–20. 
https://doi.org/10.1215/18752160-3494245. 
Wu, Yu-Chuan. “Disorder of Ki: Alternative Treatments for Neurasthenia in Japan, 1890-1945.” 
University College, London, 2012. 
Yan, H.Q. “The Necessity of Retaining the Diagnostic Concept of Neurasthenia.” Culture Medicine and 
Psychiatry 13, no. 2 (1989): 139–45. 
Yang, Jie. Mental Health in China: Change, Tradition and Therapeutic Governance. John Wiley & Sons, 
2017. 
Yap, P.M. “Mental Diseases Peculiar to Certain Cultures: A Survey of Comparative Psychiatry.” The 
British Journal of Psychiatry 97, no. 407 (April 1, 1951): 313–27. 
https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.97.407.313. 
Young, D. “Neurasthenia and Related Problems.” Culture Medicine and Psychiatry 13, no. 2 (1989): 131–
38. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02220657. 
Young, D., S. Xiao, and A. Kleinman. “Several Theoretical Topics in Neurosis Research.” Integrative 
Psychiatry 9, no. 1 (01 1993): 5–12. 
Yvon, Wang Y. “Yellow Books in Red China: A Preliminary Examination of Sex in Print in the Early 
People’s Republic.” Twentieth-Century China 44, no. 1 (January 4, 2019): 75–97. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/tcc.2019.0004. 
Zayas, Luis H., and Lauren E. Gulbas. “Are Suicide Attempts by Young Latinas a Cultural Idiom of 
Distress?” Transcultural Psychiatry 49, no. 5 (2012): 718–34. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1363461512463262. 
Zhang, M.Y. “The Diagnosis and Phenomenology of Neurasthenia a Shanghai Study.” Culture Medicine 
and Psychiatry 13, no. 2 (1989): 147–61. 
Zheng, Y.P., K.M. Lin, J.P. Zhao, M.Y. Zhang, and D. Yong. “Comparative Study of Diagnostic Systems: 
Chinese Classification of Mental Disorders-Second Edition versus DSM-III-R.” Comprehensive 
Psychiatry 35, no. 6 (December 1994): 441–49. 
Zhou, Xiaolu, Yunshi Peng, Xiongzhao Zhu, Shuqiao Yao, et al. “From Culture to Symptom: Testing a 
Structural Model of ‘Chinese Somatization.’” Transcultural Psychiatry 53, no. 1 (February 2016): 
3–23. https://doi.org/10.1177/1363461515589708. 
Zhu, Ying, Li Zhang, Jin Fan, and Shihui Han. “Neural Basis of Cultural Influence on Self-Representation.” 
NeuroImage 34, no. 3 (2007): 1310–16. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.08.047. 
Zhonghua yixuehui jingshen kexuehui, and Nanjing yike daxue naoke yiyuan.
. [CCMD-2-R]. Dongnan daxue chubanshe, 1995. 
. 、 . Vol. 3 . [CCMD-3]. , 
2001, 2001. 
. “‘つ ’  (  -- ).” 
っ , no. 1 (August 1999): 12–15. 





. . , 1998. 
. . , 2014. 
, and . “ よ ず か り .” わ え
, no. 7 (2017): 36–37. 
 (Watarai Yoshi-ichi). ガ: , り , . , 2003. 
ゆ . あ . . あ . , Vol. 2. , 
2000. 
, , , and . “ り EB .” , no. 
1 (2002): 18–20. 
に. . , 2016. 
ゆ. “つ  ( つ っ < >).” The Journal of 
the Japan Medical Association 109, no. 11 (June 1993): 1794–96. 
, , , and . “ り が .” , 
no. 03 (1994): 162, 169–70. 
, , , and . “ が ." [A diagnostic study of 
patients with medically unexplained chronic fatigue.]   [Journal of clinical and 
psychological medicine] 6 (1996): 325–28. 
, and . “ り ?” , no. 4 (1993): 243–
45. 
. “ .” っ , no. 1 (August 1999): 8–11. 
け . “ – フ (33)つ .”  185, no. 
12 (June 1998): 909–12. 
. “ り .” , no. 05 (1984): 307–9. 
 (Masatake Morita). り ャん  : , 
. , 2008. 
, “ ゆ : で り つ .” In ょ で : 
, edited by , 65–100. 2013. 
. “さ り C- .” 
, no. 3 (2017): 410–11. 
, and な. . , 1997. 
“ち り .” , 1909. 
. “ .” . , no. 3 (1984): 129–31. 
“ り .” Shen Bao ( ) 3, no. 22 (1905): 1–3. 





. “ り ?” . , no. 2 (1983): 65–68. 
, and つ . レ . , 1986. 
“ り .” す」  (Yesu Jiao Jiating Xinwen), no. 254 (1907): 7. 
. “  で , 1912–1926.” In 
 17, 141–94. , 1988. 
 
 
